Tomás Domínguez Arévalo

Tomás Domínguez Arévalo
Born Tomás Domínguez Arévalo
1882[1]
Madrid[2]
Died 1952
Villafranca
Nationality Spanish
Occupation landowner
Known for politician
Political party CT

Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, 7th Count of Rodezno,[3] 12th Marquis of San Martin[4] (1882–1952) was a Spanish Carlist and Francoist politician. He is known mostly as the first Francoist Minister of Justice (1938–1939). He is also recognised for his key role in negotiating Carlist access to the coup of July 1936 and in the attempt to amalgamate Carlism into the Francoist state party, Falange Española Tradicionalista.

Family and youth

Tomás Domínguez y de Arévalo Romera y Fernández Navarrete was a descendant of two landowner families from the very south and from the very north of Spain. The paternal Domínguez family has been for centuries related to the Andalusian town of Carmona (Seville province). Its first representatives were noted as regidores in the 18th century and intermarried with another distinguished local family, the Romeras.[5] Their descendant was Tomás’ father, Tomás Domínguez Romera (1853–1931),[6] who inherited the local Campo de la Plata estate.[7] He demonstrated political sympathies hardly typical for the region siding with the legitimists during the Third Carlist War[8] and had to leave the country afterwards.[9] Following the amnesty he returned to Spain and at unspecified date[10] he married María de Arévalo y Fernandez de Navarrete (1854–1919),[11] descendant to a Riojan-Navarrese Arévalo family. Her father, Justo Arévalo y Escudero, was a well known conservative politician; in the mid-19th century he served in the Cortes[12] and later as a long-time senator from Navarre (1876–1891).[13] As at the time of the marriage she was already condesa de Rodezno,[14] Tomás Domínguez Romera became conde consorte.

None of the sources consulted clarifies whether the couple initially settled in the Arévalo’s Navarrese estate in Villafranca[15] or in Madrid.[16] In the late 1880s Tomás Domínguez Romera emerged holding major posts within the Madrid Carlist structures,[17] but when unsuccessfully running for the Cortes in the 1890s, he stood in Haro (Logroño province)[18] He emerged triumphant in 4 successive elections between 1905 and 1914, voted in from the Navarrese district of Aoiz.[19] At that time he was already member of the national Carlist executive; in 1912 he entered Junta Nacional Tradicionalista representing Castilla La Nueva,[20] in 1913 entered comisión de Tesoro de la Tradición[21] and chaired party gatherings interchanging with the likes of Cerralbo, Feliu or de Mella.[22]

landscape near Villafranca

It is not clear whether Tomás Domínguez Arévalo spent his early childhood in the capital or in Villafranca. He was then educated in the Jesuit Colegio de San Isidoro in Madrid,[23] at unspecified date commencing law studies at the University of Madrid;[24] he followed classes of the then Carlist political leader, Matías Barrio y Mier. It is during his academic years that Domínguez came to know Jaime Chicharro and Luis Hernando de Larramendi, active in Juventud Jaimista but also in literary and artistic circles.[25] He graduated in 1904;[26] some authors, contemporary press and the official Cortes service refer to him as “abogado”,[27] though none of the sources consulted confirms that he practiced as a lawyer. Urbane and gregarious,[28] in 1917[29] Domínguez married Asunción López-Montenegro y García Pelayo,[30] descendant to a wealthy aristocratic terrateniente family from Cáceres, with its representatives holding prestigious posts in the city and in the province.[31] The couple settled in Villafranca; they had one child, María Domínguez y López-Montenegro.[32] Following the death of his mother,[33] in 1920 Tomás Domínguez Arévalo inherited the title of conde de Rodezno;[34] following the death of his father in 1931 he became marqués de San Martín.[35]

Early political career

Carlist electoral meeting, ca 1910

There is almost no information on Domínguez’s public activity in the first decade of the 20th century; he was probably active in Juventud Jaimista and Juventud Hispanoamericana.[36] In 1909 he published his first work, a booklet dedicated to medieval rulers of Navarre,[37] followed by articles in scholarly reviews focusing on history of the province[38] and short biographical studies, also anchored in history of Navarre.[39] Domínguez also tried his hand in Pamplona dailies as a literary critic.[40] Some authors claim that his first public assignment was mayorship of Villafranca,[41] but when first running for seat in the Cortes, he was referred to by the press only as “joven abogado y escritor”.[42]

Domínguez’s entry into politics was facilitated by memory of his late maternal grandfather and especially by standing of his father, one of the most distinguished politicians of Navarre;[43] his position is dubbed as “cacicato” and the Aoiz district was considered his personal fiefdom.[44] It is not known why he decided not to renew his mandate in the 1916 campaign. Initially Domínguez Romera was to be substituted as Jaimista candidate by Joaquín Argamasilla, but in unclear circumstances the latter was replaced by Domínguez Arévalo. Argamasilla stroke back with a pamphlet, lambasting alleged alliance with the liberals and charging his substitute with flexibility bordering opportunism.[45] Though resident of another Navarrese district of Tafalla,[46] Domínguez Arévalo was also presented as a cuckoo candidate.[47] Despite the critique, he was narrowly[48] elected;[49] he renewed his ticket, though also marginally, in the 1918 campaign in the same district.[50]

At that time Carlism was increasingly paralyzed by tension between its top theorist Vazquez de Mella and the claimant Don Jaime; Domínguez was counted among supporters of the former.[51] According to some historians[52] he considered orthodox Carlism a dead-end street given the Carlist dynasty was already certain to extinguish.[53] He shared de Mella’s vision of a grand extreme-right coalition, which would be new possibilist reincarnation of Traditionalism;[54] he also considered sort of transfer of legitimist rights to the Alfonsine dynasty.[55] However, at the 1919 moment of breakup he decided to stay loyal to Don Jaime,[56] even given discrepancies between him and his king were already public.[57]

In the 1919 campaign Domínguez Arévalo presented his bid in Aoiz,[58] but lost to a Maurista candidate by the smallest margin possible.[59] In 1920 the same two hopefuls competed in the same district;[60] this time Domínguez, already conde de Rodezno, lost more decisively,[61] the visible sign of increasingly loose Carlist grip on Navarre. A mere week after the defeat he presented his candidature to the Senate.[62] As indirect elections to the upper chamber were more about behind-the-stage party dealings rather than about seeking popular vote, the Jaimistas managed to negotiate Rodezno’s success.[63] He was also re-elected for the successive term in 1922. His activity as recorded in the Senate archive was insignificant.[64] One of his few interventions referred to tariffs on cork exports,[65] the issue he was personally interested in as there was cork produced on his Andalusian Carmona estate.[66]

Dictatorship

Rodezno with knights of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta

Advent of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship suspended Rodezno’s parliamentarian career. Having lost his senate mandate he abandoned politics and is not listed as active in any of the primoderiverista institutions, be it either Somatén, Unión Patriotica or any other organization.[67] However, he did not withdraw from public life. Rodezno took part in various Christian activities, contributed to cultural initiatives, remained engaged in Carlist structures and pursued his career as author and historian, at the same time dedicating his time to family and business.

A member of the Catholic aristocracy, Rodezno was active in the Sovereign Military Order of Malta and remained on good terms with Spanish hierarchy and the papal nuncio.[68] He forged particularly good relationship with Pedro Segura, welcoming the new bishop in Caceres,[69] 6 years later greeting him as new archbishop of Burgos during the homage celebrations in the same city,[70] and in 1928 taking part in Toledo celebrations following Segura’s ascendance to the primate of Spain.[71] On the more practical side, adhering to Segura’s knack for social action he co-organized Acción Social Diocesana in Caceres[72] and gave lectures during various initiatives like Semana Social, organized by Acción Católica.[73]

Rodezno’s cultural activities were strongly flavored by Carlism. In Pamplona he organized anniversary homage celebrations to veterans of the Third Carlist War,[74] in San Sebastián he took part in works of Sociedad de Estudios Vascos when preparing “La exposición de las Guerras Civiles” of the 19th century,[75] and in Madrid he co-organized fundraising and himself donated large sums to the planned monument of Vazquez de Mella.[76] However, he became most noted for his historical effort. Apart from inedita,[77] in 1928 he published La princesa de Beira y los hijos de D. Carlos[78] and in 1929 Carlos VII, duque de Madrid, monographs dedicated to already mythical Carlist figures; both books were widely discussed on literary pages of the Spanish press of the day.[79] Though they pursued a personal approach of the author, both remain quoted and referenced also by present-day scholars.[80]

Rodezno and his wife held land estates scattered across Spain: in Navarre,[81] Extremadura[82] and Andalusia.[83] Some authors refer to him as “grande terrateniente”[84] “cacique terrateniente”,[85] “grandee proprietor”[86] or “prominent landowner”, an exemplary case of link between landownership and power,[87] though exact size of his holdings is unclear and probably did not exceed 500 ha combined.[88] He was head of Federacion Catolico Agraria de Navarra,[89] co-founder of Asociación de Terratenientes de Navarra[90] and member of Asociacion de Propietarios de Alcornocales.[91] On behalf of some of these pressure groups he held talks with various ministers,[92] publishing also analytical studies on agricultural credit[93] and land ownership.[94] In his opinion in terms of rural property the Navarrese structure was close to ideal, almost reaching the objective “que todos los agricultores fueran propietarios”.[95]

Jefe

Though mostly dormant in times of the dictatorship, during dictablanda Carlism assumed more active stance. In June 1930 the new Navarrese junta with Rodezno its member was set up, an attempt to enforce more cautious policy towards Basque nationalism and to shift focus from foral to religious issues.[96] The move might have backfired following declaration of the Republic, as the Carlists decided to forge electoral coalition with PNV; when concluded as “lista católico-fuerista”[97] it enabled Rodezno, elected from Navarre, to resume his parliamentary career in 1931.[98] In the Cortes he was the least-Basque minded among Carlist deputies;[99] he ceased to support the autonomy draft when it turned out that it would not allow autonomous religious policy[100] and started to toy with the idea of an exclusively Navarrese statute.[101]

Already in the late 1920s advocating reconciliation with the Mellistas,[102] Rodezno welcomed re-unification of three Traditionalist streams in Comunión Tradicionalista.[103] Early 1932 he was appointed to its Supreme National Junta, intended to assist the ailing Jefe Delegado, marqués de Villores.[104] After his death in May that year Rodezno was nominated its president,[105] effectively becoming the Carlist political leader.[106]

Rodezno’s leadership was marked by rapprochement strategy towards the Alfonsinos,[107] exercised by means of alliances within Acción Popular,[108] Renovación Española[109] and Bloque Nacional,[110] but not within CEDA;[111] its objective was sort of dynastical union on Traditionalist platform.[112] Though always consulted with the claimant[113] it was popular only among the party professional politicians; among the rank-and-file it first caused grumblings and then increasingly open protest against mixing with “debris of the fallen liberal monarchy”.[114] When sitting in executive bodies of the organizations mentioned, Rodezno and Pradera were getting detached from the mainstream Carlist feeling.[115]

Rodezno was acutely sensitive to threat of revolution and convinced that democracy could not contain it; he responded warmly to authoritarian nationalism, covering in his opinion a broad spectrum from fascist Benito Mussolini's regime to Ramsay MacDonald’s National Government.[116] Hostile especially to militant republican secularism[117] and agrarian reform,[118] he remained vehement opponent in the parliament and was once hit by a flying glass in return.[119] Touring the country[120] he boasted that “Carlist shock troops are ready to defend society against Marxist threat”.[121] However, he was not among those pressing an insurgent strategy. Aware of the planned Sanjurjo coup he steered clear of direct collaboration,[122] which did not spare him expropriations administered by the government afterwards.[123]

Rodezno’s term as the leader emphasized politics and propaganda rather than organization and militancy;[124] some scholars claim that obsolete structures of Communión, favoring “placentera y anárquica autonomia”,[125] could not bear the weight of dynamically growing movement.[126] This, combined with internal protest against pro-Alfonsist advances and his “tactica transaccionista y el gradualismo”,[127] brought about a major challenge. When former Integrists suggested that Manuel Fal becomes president of the Junta, Rodezno proposed he rather becomes personal secretary to the claimant.[128] As Don Alfonso Carlos at that time decided to abandon plans of dynastic reconciliation,[129] in April 1934 Rodezno agreed to step down from leadership.[130]

Conspiracy and coup

requetés in captured Donostia, 1936

Though Rodezno’s supporters complained about “fascistización” of the Communion under the new leadership of Fal,[131] Carlism firmly changed course from political negotiations to organizational build-up.[132] Rodezno was not appointed head of any of the newly created sections,[133] nominated to Consejo de Cultura instead.[134] Re-elected to the Cortes in 1933[135] and 1936,[136] he was permitted to pursue talks with the Alfonsinos on the private business basis; in 1936 these contacts started to take shape of negotiating a joint insurgency.[137] According to one source he was on the target list of the hit-team which, in his absence, shot Calvo Sotelo instead.[138]

Rodezno played vital role in negotiating Carlist role in the military coup. Talks between Mola and Fal stalled as both failed to reach a compromise on terms of the Carlist access;[139] at that point the general opened parallel talks with Navarrese leaders, headed by Rodezno.[140] Bypassing Fal and ready to confront him if needed,[141] they suggested that Navarrese issues are discussed locally and offered requeté support in return for usage of monarchist flag and assurance that Navarre would be left as Carlist political fiefdom.[142] Facing sort of internal rebellion, Fal considered dismissing the entire Navarrese junta.[143] He was finally outmaneuvered when Rodezno and the Navarros assured conditional support of claimants’ envoy, Don Javier;[144] Mola and Fal decided to act together on the basis of a vague letter, sent by pre-agreed leader of the insurgency, general Sanjurjo.[145]

During the coup Rodezno was in Pamplona, the city easily captured by insurgents. Though Fal considered him disloyal, in late August he had no option but to include Domínguez in Junta Nacional Carlista de Guerra, a newly constituted Carlist wartime executive; within this body he entered Section of General Affairs heading Delegación Política, a sub-section entrusted with handling relations with military junta and local authorities.[146] Rodezno settled in the emergent military headquarters in Salamanca,[147] but went on pursuing independent policy engineered by a local Navarrese executive, transformed into Junta Central Carlista de Guerra de Navarra.[148] Following death of the claimant and assumption of regential duties by his successor Don Javier, the so-called Rodeznistas[149] were visibly disappointed with Fal’s confirmation as political leader in October 1936.[150]

Carlist standard

The Carlists, who initially imagined their position as equals of the military, within few months acknowledged that they were being reduced to junior role, especially that despite mobilization of their supporters, Falange attracted far more recruits.[151] Their attempt to safeguard autonomous standing crashed in December 1936, when following Fal’s decision to set up a Carlist military academy he was summoned to Franco’s headquarters and presented with the choice between firing squad and exile abroad.[152] Some authors speculate whether the unusual overreaction of Franco was not intended to get rid of Fal and replace him with complacent Rodezno.[153] At the Carlist emergency meeting the Rodeznistas enforced the decision to comply with the exile alternative,[154] though later Rodezno himself visited Franco trying to get Jefe Delegado re-admitted.[155]

Unification

Francisco Franco

With Fal on exile and party leadership assumed by France-based Don Javier, Rodezno emerged as “maxima figura carlista en España”.[156] Starting January 1937 he and other party bigwigs were approached by the military and the Falangists about forming a monopolist state party;[157] the pressure started to mount later on. The Carlist leaders met 3 times to address the challenge: in Insua (February), in Burgos (March) and in Pamplona (April), all attended by Rodezno.[158] He and the faction he headed advocated compliance with political amalgamation, pressed by the military;[159] they were confronted by the Falcondistas, opting for intransigence.[160] As the formal party executive Junta Nacional was getting decomposed and theoretically local, Rodeznista-dominated Junta Central assumed a key role,[161] the balance tipped towards unification. The fusion was presented as means to build a new state, Catholic, regionalist,[162] social and ultimately formatted as Traditionalist monarchy.[163]

On April 22 Rodezno was nominated to Secretariado Político[164] of the new party, Falange Española Tradicionalista,[165] one of 4 Carlists[166] within the 10-member body.[167] He and other Carlists learned of the party program only once its 21 points were announced and immediately demonstrated some unease.[168] His relations with Fal and Don Javier remained extremely tense, though falling short of total breakup; both considered him a fronding rebel.[169] Rodezno’s efforts to elicit authorization from the regent produced no effect.[170] During the next few months he presided over absorption into Falange rather than a fusion,[171] bombarded with queries and protests from Carlist rank-and-file about total predomination and arrogance of camisas azules.[172] Possibly as a result of complaints about the Falangists’ lack of give and take in October 1937 Franco called up theoretically governing structure of the party, the National Council;[173] within its ranks the Carlists were even worse-off, only 11 of them among its 50 members.[174] Despite Fal’s calls to decline, Rodezno accepted the seat and in December 1937 Don Javier expulsed him from Carlism.[175]

Falangist standard

Rodezno’s motives are unclear; apart from partisan claims that he traded Carlist principles for a few Navarrese alcaldias,[176] there are many conflicting interpretations offered. According to one, he feared that internal divisions within the Nationalist camp might lead to defeat in the war.[177] According to another, he has never been a genuine Carlist and is better described as a conservative monarchist.[178] Some scholars claim that he was a possibilist, who realized that Traditionalism was unable to seize power single-handedly and needed coalition partners;[179] one more clue might have been that perceiving Carlism as rooted in family and regional values, he downplayed the issues of organization and structures.[180] Others underline that he considered the emerging system largely in line with the Carlist vision and did not think it worthwhile to be marginalized for the sake of defending second-rate discrepancies.[181] Finally, there are authors who believe that he realized neither gravity of the moment nor totalitarian nature of the new party; Rodezno – the theory goes – imagined the structure either as a new incarnation of Unión Patriotica or as a loose alliance, both permitting Carlism to maintain its proper identity.[182]

Francoism

prison, Spain

In January 1938 Rodezno entered the first regular Francoist government as Minister of Justice.[183] At this position he commenced work on revoking the Republican laws, focusing mostly on the laic legislation. Though the task was completed by his successor, it was Rodezno who ensured that the Church re-took a key role in a number of areas, especially education, and that intimate Church-state relations were restored.[184] When setting the direction he had to overcome the Falangist resistance and outmaneuver its key exponents, Jordana and Yanguas.[185] He is best remembered, however, for his role in Francoist repressions. Wartime purges rested on most tortured juridical basis and produced some 72,000 executions;[186] it is difficult to tell to what extent Rodezno might be held liable, especially that most of them were carried out under military jurisdiction and before he assumed office.[187] He started to replace the chaotic practice by laying the foundations of the repressive Francoist judicial system.[188] Its first pillar, Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas, retroactive to 1934, was adopted in 1939,[189] supplemented by many other laws and regulations.[190] There were some 100,000 political prisoners[191] before he stepped down as minister in August 1939.[192]

Francoist Spain, 1939

It is not clear whether Rodezno’s departure from the government was anyhow related to tension between the Falangists and the Carlists, though he was not on good terms with Serrano Suñer[193] and admitted to disappointment with shape adopted by the regime.[194] In 1939 he moved back to Navarre. Though expelled from formally illegal Comunión Tradicionalista he was eager to take part in the movement.[195] Some authors consider him leader of Rodeznistas, the informal collaborative faction,[196] other scholars prefer to name him leader of Navarrese Carlism[197] or even of Spanish Carlism altogether.[198] In the immediate post-war period he tried to support Carlist cultural outposts, either preventing their amalgamation in the Francoist machinery[199] or creating the new ones.[200] Some orthodox Carlists considered him indispensable, as it was with their support that Rodezno was elected vice-president of Navarrese Diputación Provincial in 1940.[201] At this post he took part in provincial battle for power against the Falangists[202] and clashed with some of their leaders also on the national level;[203] it is partially thanks to his efforts that Navarre was, together with Álava, the only province which retained some regional establishments.[204]

Though apparently overwhelmed fascistoid nature of the emerging regime[205] and by actual shape of the unification - up to contributing to its failure in Navarre[206] - Rodezno kept pursuing the collaborative line even when it became painfully evident that Carlism was entirely marginalized in the new state party.[207] In 1943 Rodezno resigned from the Navarrese government to enter the Francoist quasi-parliament, Cortes Españolas;[208] he was ensured its mandate as member of Consejo Nacional.[209] The term lasted three years and was not renewed in 1946, which suggests that at that time he had already dropped out from the Falangist executive.[210]

Juanista

Don Javier on the cover of a Carlist periodical

Already in the 1910s Rodezno timidly advanced the idea of transferring legitimist rights to an appropriate Alfonsist candidate once the Carlist dynasty would extinguish;[211] also during the Republican years he was the most enthusiastic supporter of rapprochement within the monarchist camp and in 1935 proposed that Don Alfonso Carlos names Don Juan his legitimate heir.[212] When the last direct Carlist claimant indeed died in September 1936 Rodezno was the last to acknowledge the regency of Don Javier. At that time he was already considering another regency, this of Franco on behalf of Don Juan,[213] whom he held well familiar with Traditionalist ideas. It is not clear when the two first met; during the Civil War Rodezno and the Alfonsist prince already exchanged friendly correspondence.[214]

In the early 1940s Rodezno turned into an open advocate of Don Juan as a future Carlist king, especially once the latter inherited the Alfonsist title after his late father in 1941. Theoretically this support did not breach the rules of Don Javier’s regency, which permitted forming factions around prospective candidates; in practice this mattered little, as Rodezno was already expulsed from the Comunión.[215] When the new Alfonsist claimant was assembling a team of collaborators, José María Oriol travelled to meet him in Lausanne to suggest (in vain) that Rodezno is nominated the official Alfonsist representative in Spain.[216] In the mid-1940s Fal mounted an offensive offering various Carlist regentialist solutions to Franco;[217] as a response, in April 1945 Rodezno travelled to Portugal[218] to meet Don Juan and prepare ground for his Carlist legitimization.[219] The initiative bore fruit in February 1946, when the Alfonsist claimant signed a Rodezno co-drafted document, intended to confirm his Traditionalist spirit. Known as “Bases institucionales para la restauracion de la monarquia” or simply as “Bases de Estoril”, it outlined the basics of the future monarchy.[220] They very much resembled the Traditionalist principles, though the document fell short of declaring Don Juan the legitimate Carlist claimant.[221]

Juan de Borbón

The 1946 “Bases de Estoril” was the last major Rodezno’s initiative and little is known either about his political views or about his public activity in the very last years of his life.[222] He remained leader of informal but very significant collaborative and pro-Juanista faction of Carlism, the movement which as a whole was rapidly disintegrating into even more branches.[223] Though most Carlist rank-and-file remained utterly hostile to the despised Liberal dynasty, many if not the majority of Carlist pre-war leadership inclined towards accepting Don Juan.[224] Also after Rodezno's death they kept pursuing the idea of Alfonso XIII’s son assuming the Carlist title. Named Rodeznistas, Juancarlistas, Juanistas or Estorilos they officially declared Don Juan the legitimate Carlist heir in 1957, the act considered climax of the earlier Rodezno's policy.[225] In historiography the term “Rodeznistas” is last applied to the year 1959.[226]

Legacy and reception

old banner (now unused)[227]

During Francoism Rodezno was honored by a number of prestigious orders, like Cruz de Isabel la Católica or Cruz de San Raimundo de Peñafort; in the mid-1940s he entered Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación[228] and Real Academia de la Historia,[229] named also hijo predilecto by the province of Navarre and by his native town of Villafranca.[230] Posthumously Franco conferred upon him Grandeza de España, title currently born by his descendants.[231] Some streets and plazas were named upon him, the most prestigious one in Pamplona.

After transition to democracy the perception of Rodezno changed dramatically. In the current Spanish public discourse he is associated mostly with the most repressive phase of Francoism.[232] Naming of the Pamplona plaza was subject to heated public debate in Navarre and elsewhere following adoption of ley de Símbolos de Navarra and ley de Memoria Histórica. The 2008-2009 discussion, involving present-day political parties and related to some present-day political issues,[233] has eventually led to renaming the plaza to “Conde de Rodezno”, an aristocratic title formally not associated with any individual,[234] until in 2016 it was renamed to "Plaza de la Libertad".[235] The former Pamplona mausoleum erected during Francoism to honor the fallen requetés has been renamed to “Sala de exposiciónes Conde de Rodezno”[236] but in public it prefers to be named “Sala de exposiciónes”.[237] In unrestrained cyberspace Rodezno is at times referred to as "fascist to the core".[238] In 2008 Audiencia Nacional, the Spanish high tribunal, launched formal bid to acknowledge Rodezno as guilty of crimes against humanity during his tenure as Minister of Justice and afterwards, but the motion bore no fruit due to procedural reasons.[239] Judge Baltasar Garzón was later charged with perversion of justice for launching the bid, which was defined as an error by the Supreme Court of Spain.[240]

former placard (now removed)[241]

In Traditionalist historiographical narration Rodezno is one of the black characters, among the likes of Rafael Maroto, Alejandro Pidal or Don Carlos Hugo. He is charged with blatant political miscalculation at best and with treason of principles and kings at worst. His vacillating stance during the Mellista crisis in 1914-1919, rapprochement towards the Alfonsinos in the Republic years or bypassing Carlist command when pushing for almost unconditional adherence to the generals’ coup of 1936 are less of an issue; it is Rodezno’s stance on unification and pro-Juanista lobbying which earned him most hostility.[242] Though scholars speculate on his different motives, the opinion which gained particular popularity is that he has never been a genuine Carlist, adhering to the movement mostly out of respect for his father.[243] None of the currently existing organizations claiming Carlist identity, be it either those pursuing a socialist path (javierocarlistas, Partido Carlista) or those attached to Traditionalist values (tronovacantista CTC, sixtinos, carloctavistas) admits deference to his name.

See also

Footnotes

  1. unclear, see footnote #16
  2. unclear, see footnote #16
  3. there are conflicting views on which count in sequence he was. According to diffent sources, Tomás’ mother was the 5th condesa de Rodezno, compare F. Fz. de Bobadilla, Vinculación riojana del Condado de Rodezno y su historia, pp. 548–49, available here, or the 6th condesa de Rodezno, one version presented in María de los Dolores de Arévalo y Fernandez de Navarrete, 6º condessa de Rodezno, 6º condessa de Valdellano entry at Geneall service, available here and another one, different but also claiming she was 6th condesa, presented at Compactgen service, available here. Yet another version, incomplete and erroneous, is pursued at Euskalnet service, available here.
  4. sequential number is unclear. He is considered the 12th marquis by Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, Conde de Rodezno, Ministro de Justicia y Consejero Nacional, [in:] Fundacion Nacional Francisco Franco service, available here, and the 13th marquis by F. Fz. de Bobadilla, Vinculación riojana del Condado de Rodezno y su historia, pp. 548–49
  5. Antonio Lería, Proclamación y jura reales. El caso de Carmona, [in:] Carel. Revista de estudios locales, 2/2 (2004), pp. 591–667
  6. most sources wrongly claim he died in 1920, compare Tomás Domínguez Romera entry at Geneall service, available here. For correct date of death, see La Epoca 12.05.31, available here or El Siglo Futuro 12.05.31, available here
  7. Jorge Maier, Jorge Bonsor, 1855-1930: un académico correspondiente de la Real Academia de la Historia y la Arqueología Española, Madrid 1999, ISBN 9788489512306, p. 55
  8. Tomás Domínguez Romera Pérez de Pomar entry at Auñamendi Eusko Entziklopedia service online, available here
  9. Juan Sebastián Elián, El gran libro de los apellidos y la heráldica, Barcelona 2001, ISBN 9788479275495, p. 100
  10. probably between 1878 (the amnesty) and 1882 (birth of Tomás)
  11. see María de los Dolores de Arévalo y Fernandez de Navarrete, 6º condessa de Rodezno, 6º condessa de Valdellano entry at Generallnet service, available here
  12. ses the official Cortes service, available here
  13. see the official Senate service, available here
  14. Annuario del comercio, de la industria, de la magistratura y de la administración 1883, p. 42, available here. Her mother was Maria de los Angeles Fernandez de Navarrete, condesa de Rodezno, who died in 1856; at that moment her father from conde consorte converted to conde viudo. The couple had two children; the older son also died early and at that point the title passed to María de los Dolores
  15. compare Palacio del Conde Rodezno entry at definde service, available here
  16. also the birthplace of Tomás, the older of their two children, is disputed; most scholarly sources claim he was born Madrid; this version is repeated on the official senate site allegedly after the birth certificate reproduced, though handwriting is entirely illegible, compare here. Obituaries claimed he was born in Villafranca, see ABC (Seville version) 12.08.52, available here or in Pamplona, see ABC (Madrid version) 12.08.52, available here; both give the birth date as 1883, not 1882
  17. in 1888 he was president of comisión de propaganda of the Madrid Junta Directiva del Circula Tradicionalista de Madrid, Agustín Fernández Escudero, El marqués de Cerralbo (1845-1922): biografía politica [PhD thesis], Madrid 2012, pp. 84-5, the same year elected its secretario general, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 118
  18. Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 249
  19. see the official Cortes service available here
  20. Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 443, some sources claim that he headed Castilla la Nueva y Extremadura, see Tomás Domínguez Romera Pérez de Pomar entry at Auñamendi Eusko Entziklopedia service online, available here
  21. Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 458
  22. like in 1911, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 436. Some authors consider him a politician who betrayed Carlism in 1911, allegedly mounting a coalition with the Integrists and the Conservatives, see Josep Carles Clemente Muñoz, Breve historia de las guerras carlistas, Madrid 2011, ISBN 8499671713, 9788499671710, p. 232
  23. see La Voz 03.05.29, available here; the college closed one Jesuits were expulsed in the early days of the Second Republic, see another alumni meeting 23 years later, ABC 03.06.52, available here
  24. Jesús Pavón, Semblanza del Conde de Rodezno, [in:] Principe de Viana 15/54-55 (1954), p. 188
  25. Pavón 1954, pp. 188-9; Ignacio de Hernando de Larramendi, Asi si hizo Mapfre, Madrid 2000, ISBN 9788487863875, p. 28
  26. María Dolores Andrés Prieto, La mujer en la política y la política de la memoria. María Rosa Urraca Pastor, una estrella fugaz [MA thesis], Salamanca 2012, p. 60
  27. Leandro Alvarez Rey, La derecha en la II República: Sevilla, 1931-1936, Sevilla 1993, ISBN 978-8447201525, p. 140; also La Epoca 23.05.16, available here
  28. Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939, Cambridge 2008, ISBN 9780521207294, 9780521086349, p. 50
  29. Miguel Muñoz de San Pedro, Cuando vesti mis primeros pantalones largos, [in:] Alcántara 20/146 (1966), p. 10, available here, also La Nación 06.03.17, available here
  30. Asunción López-Montenegro y García Pelayo entry at Geni genealogical service, available here
  31. Manuel Vaz-Romero, Cristina Nuñez, López-Montenegro fue un franquista coyuntural y episodico, [in:] Hoy 12.02.06, available here; her father had already passed away when she was getting married
  32. see María del Sagrado Corazón Domínguez y López-Montenegro, 8º condessa de Rodezno entry at Geneall service, available here
  33. in 1919, see La Acción 28.11.19, available here
  34. his mother held 2 titles, condesa de Rodezno and condesa de Valdellano. The first one was inherited by Tomás, the second one by his younger brother José María, see La Corespondencia de España 03.03.20, available here and La Corespondencia de España 04.03.20, available here
  35. Domínguez Romera inherited the title from maternal line in 1911, compare La Corespondencia de España 05.05.11, available here
  36. later on, in 1919,he grew to vice-president of the organisation, see Cervantes. Revista Hispanoamericana 1919, p. 97, available here
  37. Los Teobaldos de Navarra. Ensayo de crítica histórica, Madrid 1909
  38. in 1912 he published Un Infante de Navarra, yerno del Cid and in 1913 De tiempos lejanos. Glosas históricas, both in Revista de Historia y Genealogia
  39. for his 1915 and 1916 articles on genealogy see here and here
  40. see his Arturo Campión. Semblanza literaria, published in Diario de Navarra between 20.1.12 and 18.02.12
  41. Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, Conde de Rodezno, un político profundamente antidemocrático, responsable y cómplice del exterminio político, [in:] Autobús de la memoria 21.06.08, available here, also Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, Conde de Rodezno, Ministro de Justicia y Consejero Nacional, [in:] Fundacion Nacional Francisco Franco service, available here; his 1952 obituary also referred to him as ex-alcalde de Villafranca but specified no period of his term in office, see ABC 19.08.52, available here
  42. compare La Epoca 23.03.16, available here
  43. periodically serving also as dean of the Navarrese deputies and senators, see Federico Suárez, Estudios de historia moderna y contemporánea: homenaje a Federico Suárez Verdeguer, Madrid 1991, ISBN 9788432127489, p. 478. At that time the strength of Carlism was at its peak in the province, with the movement gaining 70–85% of deputy seats available and controlling the remaining pool by means of electoral alliances. Some authors maintain that Domínguez Romera was jefe of Navarrese Carlism and that his son “inherited” the post; this claim about Domínguez Romero’s Navarrese jefatura is not confirmed elsewhere. Until 1916 the Navarrese jefe was Francisco Martinez, and after 1916 it was Romualdo Cesareo Sanz Escartin, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 487–88
  44. “en Navarra tambien existieron cacicatos estables, como el de los carlistas condes de Rodezno en el distrito de Aoiz”, Maria del Mar Larazza, Navarra, [in:] José Varela Ortega (ed.), El poder de la influencia: geografía del caciquismo en España (1875-1923), Madrid 2001, ISBN 9788425911521, p. 443
  45. "este señor hubiera logrado el apoyo de los elementos independientes del mismo modo como ha conseguido la ayuda fervorosa de los jefes liberales de Navarra sin tener por eso la desgracia de ser sospechoso entre los suyos”, quoted after Jesús María Fuente Langas, Elecciones de 1916 en Navarra, [in:] Príncipe de Viana 51 (1990), p. 951
  46. Villafranca was part of the Peralta zone, itself forming the Tafalla electoral district, see esús María Zaratiegui Labiano, Efectos de la aplicación del sufragio universal en Navarra. Las elecciones generals de 1886 y 1891, [in:] Príncipe de Viana 57 (1996), p. 222; currently it is part of the Tudela merindad, compare real estate Definde service available here
  47. by their opponents both Domínguez Romera and Domínguez Arévalo were presented as “cuneros”, Ángel García-Sanz Marcotegui, Elites económicas y políticas en la Restauración. La diversidad de las derechas navarras, [in:] Historia contemporánea, 23 (2001), p. 600
  48. both candidates won in two out of 4 comarcas of the district, but Domínguez Arévalo won in more populous ones, Fuente Langas 1990, p. 956
  49. see 1916 file at official Cortes service, available here
  50. see 1918 file at official Cortes service, available here
  51. some authors claim that Domínguez was from his youth a “fiel seguidor desde su juventud de Juan Vázquez de Mella”, see El Conde de Rodezno (1883-1952) entry [in:] Guerra civil española dia a dia ser4vice 27.12.12, available here
  52. the opinion of Melchor Ferrer approvingly repeated in Juan Ramón de Andrés Martín, El cisma mellista. Historia de una ambición política, Madrid 2000, ISBN 9788487863820, pp. 181–182
  53. the Carlist king Jaime III was over 50 and still a bachelor; he had no brothers and his uncle was over 70 with no descendants
  54. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 181
  55. this stand was lambasted as „dishonor” by the orthodox Jaimistas, Andrés Martín 2000, p. 182
  56. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 182; another historian claims he followed de Mella, see Josep Carles Clemente, Seis estudios sobre el carlismo, Madrid 1999, ISBN 8483741520, 978848374152, p. 21
  57. José Luis Orella Martínez, El origen del primer católicismo social Español [PhD thesis UNED], Madrid 2012, p. 182
  58. La Epoca 24.05.19, available here
  59. out of two competitors running, his counter-candidate gained 50.52% of votes, see his 1919 file at official Cortes service here
  60. La Libertad 12.12.20, available here
  61. his counter-candidate gained 55.8% of the votes, see his 1920 file at official Cortes site here, for press report see La Acción 20.12.20, available here
  62. El Globo 29.12.20, available here
  63. see his file at the official Senate site, available here
  64. see the Diario de sesiones bookmark at the Senate site here
  65. see Diario de Sesiones de Cortes for May 1921, p. 1210, available here
  66. see Madrid Cientifico 1929, p. 8, available here
  67. however, he is recorded as not particularly averse towards the dictatorship. Having learnt of his Villafranca mayorship Luis Hernando de Larramendi asked Rodezno: "pero cómo puedes soportar eso?", to which the latter replied „mira chico, el caso es mandar”, Larramendi 2000, p. 30
  68. El Imparcial, 26.06.288
  69. Santiago Martínez Sánchez, El Cardenal Pedro Segura y Sáenz (1880-1957), [PhD thesis at Universidad de Navarra], Pamplona 2002, p. 65
  70. which at that formed part of the Burgos archdiocese, see El Siglo Futuro 03.01.27, available here
  71. El Siglo Futuro 25.01.28, available here
  72. Revista católica de cuestiones sociales February 1925, p. 52, available here
  73. Revista católica de cuestiones sociales November 1930, p. 56, available here
  74. El Sol 25.05.26, available here
  75. El Sol 16.07.27, available here
  76. La Epoca 12.12.29, available here
  77. La abdicación de D. Carlos y el Conde de Montemolín and La muerte de Zumalacárregui, DOMÍNGUEZ ARÉVALO, Tomás entry [in:] Gran Enciclopedia Navarra, available here
  78. entire book available here
  79. "Ia obra, repetimos, es de valor histórico y biográfico” – as noted with reservation by one of the papers, anxious not to be suspected of Carlist leaning, La Voz 07.03.30, available here
  80. as a historian he blamed the second wife of Carlos VII, Bertha de Rohan, for his alleged ineptitude during late phases of his life, when he “no era el arriscado caudillo de Navarra de 1873”, Fernández Escudero 2012, p. 305
  81. inherited from his mother
  82. brought into the marriage by his wife
  83. inherited from his father
  84. Javier Dronda Martínez, Con Cristo o contra Cristo. Religión y movilización antirrepublicana en navarra (1931-1936), Tafalla 2013, ISBN 9788415313311, p. 163
  85. some even blame him for the 1894 events, when 800 soldiers protected estate of his grandfather during social unrest in Villafranca, see Floren Aoiz, El jarrón roto: la transición en Navarra: una cuestión de Estado, Tafalla 2005, ISBN 8481363294, 9788481363296, p. 31
  86. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 128; he claims also that Rodezno owned a señorio in La Rioja, (p. 80)
  87. and quote him as examplary case of a link between landownership and power, Ralph Gibson, Landownership and Power in Modern Europe, London 1991, ISBN 9780049400917, p. 229
  88. he had 502 robadas in Villafranca, divided into 47 fincas, Ramón Lapeskera, Villafranca, a merced de las ideologías del Capital, [in:] Revista del Centro de Estudios Merindad de Tudela 4 (1992), p. 84. Given a robada was ca 0,09 ha his estate covered some 45 ha and was far behind largest estates in the area, exceeding even 100 ha. In Carmona he and his wife held 200 ha, Alvarez Rey 1993, p. 140. The estates did not make an impressive figure by national Spanish standards; as late as in 1919 duque de Peñaranda possessed 51,000 ha, Antonio Manuel Moral Roncal, Aristocracia y poder económico en la España del siglo XX, [in:] Vegueta 7 (2003), p. 157; in the sole Cordoba district there were around 30 landholders with estates exceeding 1,000 ha, see here p. 80-81 (surface area is listed in fanegas (fgs), a fanega differed from province to province, though one scholar suggests an average of 1 fg = 1,044 ha for the nearby Almeria province, see here, p. 88
  89. La Correspondencia de España 20.11.23, available here
  90. Gorka Pérez de Viñaspre, José María Pérez Bustero, Vascones, Tafalla 2002, ISBN 9788481362343, p. 496
  91. Madrid Cientifico 1930, p. 8, available here
  92. like the minister of economy, meeting with a group of “cerealistas” in 1926, El Siglo Futuro 17.06.26, available here minister of infrastructure in 1930, see Heraldo de Madrid 25.03.30, available here and also minister of economy in 1930, Heraldo de Madrid 09.12.30, available here
  93. Madrid Cientifico 1924, available here
  94. in 1926 he published La propiedad privada en Navarra, y un informe sobre reforma tributaria, El Siglo Futuro 15.04.26, available here
  95. Aoiz 2005, p. 35; later in the republic defended arrendamiento structure, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 80
  96. Jesus Maria Fuente Langas, Los tradicionalistas navarros bajo la dictadura de Primo de Rivera (1923–1930), [in:] Príncipe de Viana 55 (1994), pp. 424-5, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 54
  97. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 54
  98. see his 1931 file at official Cortes service here. Detailed analysis in Ana Serrano Moreno, Los resultados de las elecciones a Cortes Constituyentes de 1931 en el municipio de Pamplona: un análisis especial, [in:] Principe de Viana 49 (1988), pp. 457-464, Ana Serrano Moreno, Las elecciones a Cortes Constituyentes de 1931 en Navarra, [in:] Príncipe de Viana, 50 (1989), pp. 687-776
  99. highlighting differences between “these” [Basque] provinces and Kingdom of Navarre, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 58
  100. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 65; anyway he did not like the project as corresponding to “concepción nacionalista euzkadiana”, Dronda Martínez 2013, p.332; he also voiced against the Catalan statute as unrepresentative Blinkhorn 2008, p. 81
  101. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 82; in 1935 declared that PNV revealed its true revolutionary colours in 1934 and no longer deserved alliance with the Carlists, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 205
  102. Fuente Langas 1994, p. 425
  103. “Fue uno de los principales agentes de la reunificación de las tres familias de la Comunión: jaimistas, mellistas e integristas”, Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, Conde de Rodezno, Ministro de Justicia y Consejero Nacional entry [in:] Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco sercice, available here
  104. Jordi Canal, El carlismo, Madrid 2000, ISBN 8420639478, p. 295
  105. Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 73-74, Canal 2000, p. 304, Robert Vallverdú i Martí, El Carlisme Català Durant La Segona República Espanyola 1931-1936, Barcelona 2008, ISBN 8478260803, 9788478260805, p.90
  106. in 1933 the body was replaced with much smalled Delegate Junta, still headed by Rodezno, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 133, Canal 2000, p. 304
  107. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 66, Dronda Martínez 2013, p. 376
  108. between May 1931 and September 1932; initially the organization was named Acción Nacional. Rodezno was sitting in its National Committee until early 1932, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 52, 68. Growing uproar among the Carlist rank-and-file against its increasingly accidentalist stance has finally forced Carlist exit from the group, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 68
  109. between January 1933 and May 1934; he started working anew with Alfonsinos introducing Goicoechea as almost a Carlist, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 107
  110. already when Rodezno stepped down as Carlist leader, between December 1934 and April 1936
  111. initially Rodezno was sympathetic towards CEDA; in early 1934 he admonished Pradera for being “too violent” on them, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 126. Later on his position changed and Rodezno compared them to Pidalistas, who had been swallowed by the system, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 130; nevertheless, even in 1936 he expressed regret that CEDA were too mild confronting the revolution, which prevented political Carlist rapprochement with them, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 196
  112. Eduardo G. Calleja, Julio Aróstegui, La tradición recuperada: el Requeté Carlista y la insurrección, [in:] Historia Contemporanea 11 (1994), p. 35, Eduardo González Calleja, La violencia y sus discursos. Los límites de la "fascistización" de la derecha española durante el régimen de la II República, [in:] Ayer 71 (2008), p. 110
  113. Martínez Sánchez 2002, pp. 212, 216
  114. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 85-7; he is referred to as leading “sector minoritario del tradicionalismo representado por Rodezno”, Eduardo González Calleja, Aproximación a las subculturas violentas de las derechas antirrepublicanas españolas (1931-1936), [in:] Pasado y Memoria 2 (2003), p. 123
  115. Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 97, 110, 134-135, Canal 2000, p. 289
  116. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 143; though when choosing between the Italians and the British in 1935, Rodezno gave in to anglophobia and declared in the Cortes that Spanish interests in the Mediterranean lie with Italy, the ultimate objective the recovery of Tangier and, implicitly, Gibraltar, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 164
  117. when commenting on draft of the Republican constitution he warned that it would open an abyss between the Republic and the Catholics, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 66, Dronda Martínez 2013, p. 376. In June 1931 he protested to authorities against measures taken against Segura, Antonio Manuel Moral Roncal, 1868 en la memoria carlista de 1931: dos revoluciones anticlericales y un paralelo, [in:] Hispania Sacra, 59/119 (2007), p. 335
  118. by a Brisith historian Rodezno is presented as staunch defender his own and other landowners’ interests, e.g. when protesting against the agrarian reform and defending arrendamiento structure, which ensured also political domination of landowners over the tenants, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 80. Also later on he opposed modest Rural Leases Act pursued by Giménez Fernandez, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 195; he claimed that in Navarre the reform was not needed at all since almost all peasants were owners of the plots they worked, Dronda Martínez 2013, p. 105
  119. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 128, Canal 2000, p. 318
  120. in early 1936 he was touring the country and delivering lectures as far as Seville, Cadiz and Jerez de la Frontera in early 1932, Leandro Álvarez Rey, La contribución del carlismo vasconavarro a la formación del tradicionalismo en Andalucía (1931-1936), [in:] Príncipe de Viana 10 (1988), p. 26. He harangued in Andalusia also in 1934 and 1935, Álvarez Rey 1988, p. 30
  121. Calleja, Arósteguia 1994, p. 40, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 185
  122. Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 89-90, 326f, Vallverdú 2008, pp. 107-8
  123. Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 128, 92
  124. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 133
  125. González Calleja 2008, p. 100
  126. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 133, Vallverdú 2008, p. 157
  127. Canal 2000, p. 311
  128. Calleja, Aróstegui 1994, p. 40
  129. in 1935 Rodezno pressed Don Alfonso Carlos to nominate Don Juan as heredero, Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 257-8
  130. Vallverdú 2008, p. 278, Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 137-8; he remained the local Navarre jefe, Juan Carlos Peñas Bernaldo de Quirós, El Carlismo, la República y la Guerra Civil (1936-1937). De la conspiración a la unificación, Madrid 1996, ISBN 9788487863523, p. 20
  131. González Calleja 2008, p. 100; what was meant by that was probably strong leadership and organizational build-up of the party and its satellite structures; some Carlists grumbled at uninspiring mediocre Fal compared to eloquent and gregarious Rodezno, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 215
  132. including the paramilitary. However, it was Rodezno who agreed to a send few Carlists, together with Alfonsists conspirators, to Rome; the objective was military training, negotiating financial support and arms supply, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 136
  133. Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 207-8
  134. Eduardo González Calleja, La prensa carlista y falangista durante la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil (1931-1937), [in:] El Argonauta Espanol 9 (2012), p. 5, Vallverdú 2008, p. 163. Fal initially considered Rodezno an acceptable leader and insisted on changing structures rather than people. He criticised Rodezno rather for lack of faith, “El jefe delegado ideal es Rodezno. Solo le falta fe en lo nuestro”, quoted after Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 237
  135. see his 1933 file at official Cortes service here
  136. see his 1936 file at official Cortes service here Rodezno became chairman of the 10-men Carlist minority, Vallverdú 2008, p. 174
  137. he also visited in prison Jose Antonio, Manuel Ferrer Muñoz, Navarra y País Vasco, 1936: conspiración contra la República, [in:] Vasconia. Cuadernos de Sección Historia-Geografía 22 (1994), p. 254
  138. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 249
  139. Fal demanded that Republican regime is replaced with corporative Catholic state, possibly a monarchy, and insurgency is directed by a directory headed by Sanjurjo and including two civilians acceptable to the Comunión. Mola insisted on Republican regime and state separated from the Church, with insurgency commanded by the military at their own discreetion, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 144-5
  140. Peñas Bernaldo 1996, p. 32-3, Mercedes Peñalba Sotorrío, Entre la boina roja y la camisa azul, Estella 2013, ISBN 9788423533657, pp. 20-21
  141. he considered purely a Carlist rising “a ludicrous dream” and nurtured no doubt that alliances are needed; Republic should be overthrown as first objective, with further goals to be discussed later, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 238-9. What interested him was not so much the total victory of Carlism – attractive as that was – as obtaining of certain minimum gains plus control over their own corner of Spain, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 269, also Peñas Bernaldo 1996, p. 35
  142. Blinkhorn pp. 246-7, Canal 2000, p. 326, Vallverdú 2008, pp. 309-310
  143. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 249; some authors claim that Fal refrained from taking steps against the Navarrese junta conscious that also the Navarrese rank-and-file were more than enthusiastic to join the insurgency regardless of the terms agreed, Peñas Bernaldo 1996, p. 39
  144. who initially opposed compromising 100 years of Carlist history in exchange for local ayuntamientos, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 248
  145. its basic lines were that Carlists may conditionally use monarchical flag, provisional government would be apolitical with civilian members, Republican legislation rectified, parties would be abolished and “new state” would be built, Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 247-250
  146. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 269, Canal 2000, p. 332, Peñas Bernaldo 1996, p. 219
  147. Fal, heading the Military Section, settled in Toledo, Jaime Ignacio del Burgo Tajadura, Un episodio poco conocido de la guerra civil española. La Real Academia Militar de Requetés y el Destierro de Fal Conde, [in:] Principe de Viana 196 (1992), p. 492
  148. some scholars claim JCCNG was “liderada por el conde de Rodezno”, Manuel Martorell Pérez, Navarra 1937-1939: el fiasco de la Unificación, [in:] Príncipe de Viana 69 (2008), p. 437, though other authors maintain that it was formally headed by Berasain. Its official constituting document does not contain the name of Rodezno at all, see Ricardo Ollaquindia Aguirre, La Oficina de Prensa y Propaganda Carlista de Pamplona al comienzo de la guerra de 1936, [in:] Príncipe de Viana 56 (1995), p. 499
  149. Iker Cantabrana Morras, Lo viejo y lo nuevo: Díputación-FET de las JONS. La convulsa dinámica política de la "leal" Alava (Primera parte: 1936-1938), [in:] Sancho el Sabio 21 (2004), p. 167
  150. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 273; the rodeznista-controlled El Pensamiento Navarro wrote that “monarchists live even if kings die”, an rather amibguous statement given Carlists had a regent not a monarch now, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 266
  151. compare graphs and tables in José Antonio Parejo Fernández, Falangistas y requetés: historia de una absorción violenta, [in:] María Encarna Nicolás Marín, Carmen González Martínez (eds.), Ayeres en discusión: temas clave de Historia Contemporánea hoy, Madrid 2008, ISBN 9788483717721, pp. 4-5, 9
  152. details in del Burgo Tajadura 1993
  153. compare Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 238-9, also Manuel Martorell Pérez, La continuidad ideológica del carlismo tras la Guerra Civil [PhD thesis in Historia Contemporanea, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia], Valencia 2009, p. 32, Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 303
  154. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 277; Canal 2000, p. 338 gives the date as January 1937
  155. noting that though he considered the idea of a Carlist military academy tempting, at the same time he did not approve of the way Fal pursued it, Peñalba Sotorrío 2013, p. 34, also Burgo Tajadura 1992, p. 502
  156. Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 304; Fal was not happy about Rodezno’s pre-eminence and when on exile intended to send him abroad, possibly on a diplomatic mission to Vatican, Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 303
  157. the first meeting recorded was with Sancho Davila in early January 1937, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 282
  158. early March Rodezno moved to his Caceres estate and remained there until April 12, when he was summoned to Burgos by Franco. No scholar clarifies the reasons for his temporary withdrawal, compare Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 261, 270, Maximiliano Garcia Venero, Historia de la Unificacion, Madrid 1970, p. 86
  159. according to his own account, when summoned to Burgos on April 12 he told Franco that in Portugal it had not been necessary to create partido unico, to which Franco replied that Salazar did not enjoy popular support. The caudillo made clear that unification would not be transitory phase but an ultimate objective, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 272
  160. most thorough account of Carlist response to the unification threat in Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 241-301; somewhat less detailed but still very informative chapters in Martorell Pérez 2008, p. 28-50, and Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, pp. 30-47
  161. some scholars prefer to talk about “carlismo regional” prevailing over “carlismo nacional”. Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 241-247; he also notes that one of the factors enhancing position of JCCGN over JNG was that there were still new requeté tercios being formed in Navarre in the spring of 1937
  162. “organización estatal que reconozca las peculiaridades regionales”, Peñas Bernaldo 1996, p. 273. Until mid-1937 Rodezno believed that decentralised vision based on “autarquias regionales” was possible and called not to revert to “centralismo liberal”, Xosé Manoel Núñez Seixas, La región y lo local en el primer franquismo, [in:] Stéphane Michonneau, Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (eds.), Imaginarios y representaciones de España durante el franquismo, Madrid, 2014, ISBN 9788415636656, p. 135
  163. Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 252, 273, Canal 2000, p. 338; Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 45; most Carlists might have understood this as future instauration of a Carlist dynasty, e.g. the Borbón-Parmas, the Borbón-Habsburgos or other, Rodezno has probably meant a dynastical accord with the Alfonsinos, most likely with Franco nominated regent for Don Juan de Borbón
  164. some authors refer to this body as Junta Política or Secreteria General, see Mercedes Peñalba Sotorrio, La Secretaría General del Movimiento como pilar estructural del primer franquismo, 1937-1945, [in:] Miguel Ángel Ruiz Carnicer (ed), Falange. Las culturas políticas del fascismo en la España de Franco (1936-1975), Zaragoza 2013, ISBN 9788499112169. In official Francoist document the body was referred to as "Secretariado o Junta Política", see Boletin Oficial de la Provincia de Soría 28.04.37, available here
  165. Garcia Venero 1970, p. 109
  166. the other three were Luis Arellano, Tomás Dolz de Espejo and Jose Luiz Mazon
  167. Cantabrana Morras 2004, p. 167, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 291, Canal 2000, p. 339, Garcia Venero 1970, p. 109. The Falangists like Giron were extremely unhappy about its performance and composition, with very few members "fielmente el espiritu de nuestro Movimiento", quoted after Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 83
  168. he was also susprised and concerned by detention of Manuel Hedilla. Franco assured Rodezno that Traditionalist doctrine will be embodied in outlook of the new party "en su dia", Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 54
  169. Martorell Pérez 2008, p. 41; he was held among, “maximos responsables de la actitud de rebeldia mantenida por el carlismo navarro frente a la autoridad de don Javier”, Aurora Villanueva Martínez, Organizacion, actividad y bases del carlismo navarro durante el primer franquismo [in:] Geronimo de Uztariz 19 (2003), p. 101
  170. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 293
  171. opinions of Payne, Canal, Blinkhorn, and Fraser, approvingly referred by Martorell Pérez 2008, p. 11)
  172. Peñas Bernaldo 1996, p. 294; detailed discussion in Peñalba Sotorrío 2013, especially the chapter Conflictos y tensiones durante el periodo de integracion. Un analisis estadistico, pp. 91-105. The province where most formal complaints were received was the Integrist stronghold, Seville (220), followed by Navarre (169) and the Catalan provinces, Cadiz and Ourense (60-90), Peñalba Sotorrío 2013, p. 96
  173. at this point Secretariado Politico ceased to function, Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 81; in fact, Rodezno ceased to take part in its sittings already in August 1937, Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 133
  174. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 293. Canal 2000, p. 340 claims there were 12 Carlists, while Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime, London 1987, ISBN 9780299110741, p. 178, claims the correct number is 13
  175. Peñas Bernaldo 1996, p. 297; Rodezno did not take notice, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 293. Some authors claim he was expulsed already in the spring, following accepting post in Secretariado, José Carlos Clemente Muñoz, El carlismo en el novecientos español (1876-1936), Madrid 1999, ISBN 9788483741535, p. 90
  176. dubbed „el traidor por unas alcaldías”, Clemente 2011, p. 232
  177. Jaime Ignacio del Burgo Tajadura, El carlismo y su agónico final, [in:] Príncipe de Viana 74 (2013), p. 293; though he does not mention Rodezno personally, also Payne points to this feature, Stanley G. Payne, Prólogo, [in:] Navarra fue la primera 1936-1939, Pamplona 2006, ISBN 8493508187. Putting common goal against particularisms on the Nationalist side is also confronted with internal power struggle within the Republican camp, see Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, Cambridge 2012, ISBN 9781107002265, especially the chapter Second Counterrevolution? The Power Struggle in the Republican Zone (p. 169-182) or Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain; The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939, London 2006, ISBN 9780143037651, especially the chapter The Civil War within Civil War (pp. 263-274)
  178. version coined mostly by Melchor Ferrer, Historia del Tradicionalismo Español, vol XXIX, referred after Martorell Pérez 2008, p. 183; another scholar seems to adhere, noting that Rodezno also sided with “corriente conservadora autoritaria” rather than with “populismo tradicionalista”, Dronda Martínez 2013, p. 95
  179. according to this approach, unlike ideologically driven Fal, Rodezno was above all a realist who considered that ideal of a purely Carlist seizure of power as a dream. Alliances were inevitable and as its result, Carlists might have to settle for the second-best option. This does not necessarily boil down to the “dead-end street” vision of Carlism; Rodezno viewed it as a spiritual and ideological force guiding a new formation, built possibly on a new monarchist but fundamentally Traditionalist platform. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 296
  180. Blinkhorn 2008, pp. 153–4
  181. Villanueva Martínez 2003, p. 99
  182. Peñas Bernaldo 1996, p. 275; immediately following announcement of the FET programme, largely a copy-paste from the original Falange 27 points, Rodezno visited Franco to voice his disgust, Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 54; following three months he ceased to attend sittings of the FET secretariat, considering it pointless, Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 133
  183. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 294
  184. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 294, Dronda Martínez 2013, p. 388
  185. Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 329; in 1942 Rodezno managed to defeat “serranistas” drafting the future legislation, Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 415
  186. Payne 1987, p. 219
  187. According to some sources, he was "responsable de la firma de unas 50.000 penas de muerte", see Diario de Navarra 10 March 2009, available here; according to scholars, there were some 51,000 death sentences administered during the first few years after the War, Payne 2012, p. 245; most of that time it was Esteban Bilbao holding the post of Minister of Justice
  188. including massive purges in the judiciary, Payne 2012, p. 246
  189. though the law itself was drafted by Gónzalez Bueno, Payne 1987, pp. 221-2
  190. one of them required all persons of legal age to hold a personal ID card, obligation introduced for the first time in Spanish history, Payne 1987, p. 220
  191. Payne 1987, p. 221
  192. Canal 2000, p. 343. None of the sources consulted provides information on the mechanism of Rodezno leaving the office, especially whether he resigned or was dismissed
  193. Serrano described Rodezno in his memoirs as follows: “era alto, de rostro afilado, con un gesto entre triste y burlón; con su ademán mezclado de solemnidad, indolencia y cortesía. Era puntillosamente leal a sus tradiciones, aunque políticamente parecía más consecuente que creyente...", quoted after El Conde de Rodezno (1883-1952) entry [in:] Guerra civil española dia a dia service 27.12.12, available here. The two clashed especially on issues related to centralisation and regional rights. Serrano intervened to make sure the address of Rodezno, delivered when accepting the hijo predilecto title from Navarrese diputación, is not distributed, Martorell Pérez 2008, p. 176
  194. Rodezno admitted that “no dejaba de sentirse cierta tristeza por el desengaño y la decepción que producía la disparidad entre el esfuerzo aportado y el rumbo amenazador de las cosas para el porvenir”, Martorell Pérez 2008, p. 170
  195. e.g. in 1939 he took part in the first Montejurra ascent, riding all the way to the summit on the horse, Francisco Javier Caspistegui Gorasurreta, El naufragio de las ortodoxias. El carlismo, 1962-1977, Pamplona 1997; ISBN 9788431315641, p. 287, also his Navarra y el carlismo durante el régimen de Franco: la utopía de la identidad unitaria, [in:] Investigaciones históricas: Época moderna y contemporánea, 17 (1997), p. 309
  196. compare Villanueva Martínez 2003, also Jeremy MacClancy, The Decline of Carlism, Reno 2000, ISBN 9780874173444, p. 76
  197. “principal dirigente de los Carlistas Navarros”, del Burgo Tajadura 2013, p. 291
  198. “leadership of Spain’s Carlists rested unchallengeably with Rodezno and his mainly Navarrese circle”, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 299
  199. he took part in the plot intended to counter takeover of El Pensamiento Navarro by the Francoist press conglomerate by converting it into a formally commercial newspaper, owned by a company named Editorial Navarra; Rodezno became its primary shareholder with 600 shares, other major owbers were Luis Arellano (150 shares), and the Baleztena brothers (50 each), Villanueva Martínez 2003, p. 115, González Calleja 2012, p. 29
  200. he founded and became the first president of Principe de Viana, formally the cultural institution managed by the Navarrese provincial government, see here, also Alvaro Baraibar Etxeberria, Una visión falangista de la foralidad navarra, [in:] Gerónimo de Uztariz 2006, p. 13
  201. Villanueva Martínez 2003, pp. 103, 113
  202. detailed discussion in Maria del Mar Larazza Micheltorena, Alvaro Baraibar Etxeberria, La Navarra sotto il Franchismo: la lotta per il controllo provinciale tra i governatori civili e la Diputacion Foral (1945-1955), [in:] Nazioni e Regioni, Bari 2013, pp. 101-120, also Baraibar Etxeberria 2006, pp. 12-13. “Conde de Rodezno, dentro de la Diputacion o despu.s de haber cesado en ella a voluntad propia, dio a este organismo una influencia, una prepotencia y una brillantez”, opinion quoted after Baraibar Etxeberria 2006, p. 19
  203. in June 1939 Rodezno clashed with the Falangist pundit Gimenez Caballero, who in accused Navarre of historical disobedience and lambasted the fueros as sinister separatism. Rodezno as minister prevented the publication of his harangue in the press except Arriba, firmly controlled by Falange, Baraibar Etxeberria 2006, pp. 10, 33
  204. according to his account of Esteban Bilbao, he was supported by Rodezno when objecting to homogenisation designs of Minister of Economy, Entrevista a Esteban Bilbao, [in:] Esfuerzo común 102 (1969)
  205. at one point in 1938 he told Franco: "mi general, la doctrina tradicionalista no es el fascismo", Javier Tusell, Franco en la guerra civil, Barcelona 1992, ISBN 9788472236486, p. 298, referred after Stanley G. Payne, El Carlismo en la politica espanola, [in:] Stanley G. Payne (ed.), Identidad y nacionalismo an la España contemporanea: el carlismo, 1833-1975, Madrid 2002, ISBN 8487863469, p. 111
  206. he anyway acknowledged that "un año habia bastado para apreciar que era imposible de fraguar la unificación y menos en Navarra, donde el desengaño cundia entre los nuestros", quoted after Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 86
  207. Peñalba Sotorrio 2013, p. 90
  208. see his 1943 file on the official Cortes service
  209. ABC 24.11.42, available here
  210. none of the sources consulted provides information as to if and when Rodezno ceased as member of Consejo Nacional and Junta Politica. Auto of judge Garzon raises charges based on Rodezno’s role in FET between April 20, 1937 (coincides with the day of his nomination to Secretariado) and 1951 (no daily date), pp. 140-141
  211. Andrés Martín 2000, p. 182
  212. Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 257-8
  213. Peñas Bernaldo 1996, pp. 273, 252, Canal 2000, p. 338
  214. Rodezno was in touch with Don Juan since 1937 and considered him knowledgable of Traditionalist ideas, Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 306
  215. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 301
  216. Ballestero 2014, p. 79, Cantabrana Morras 2005, p. 145, Martínez Sánchez 2002, p. 421
  217. MacClancy 2000, p. 79; in December 1945 Fal also wrote to Don Juan asking him to acknowledge the regency of Don Javier, Martínez Sánchez 2002, pp. 448-9
  218. monarchist alliance concept was made easier by Don Javier’s unhappy absence in 1944-1945, when he was held captive in the Nazi concentration camp, Blinkhorn 2008, p. 299
  219. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 300
  220. Caspistegui Gorasurreta 1997, p. 23
  221. "religion, unidad, monarquia, and representacion organica", Martínez Sánchez 2002, pp. 448-9
  222. in 1944 he entered Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación, see here
  223. carloctavistas, sivattistas, javieristas, rodeznistas
  224. Blinkhorn 2008, p. 301-2
  225. in 1957 around 70 Carlist politicians travelled to Estoril and declared Don Juan the legitimate Carlist heir. The late Rodezno was considered “principal promotor” of the initiative, Canal 2000, pp. 351, 361. Some authors even claim that Rodezno was present at the ceremony, see Josep Carles Clemente, Historia del Carlismo contemporaneo, Barcelona 1977, ISBN 9788425307591, p. 46. For the most comprehensive account see José María Toquero, El carlismo vasconavarro y Don Juan de Borbon. La influencia del conde de Rodezno, [in:] Euskal herriaren historiari buruzko biltzarra 7 (1988), pp. 261-274
  226. Mercedes Vázquez de Prada Tiffe, El papel del carlismo navarro en el inicio de la fragmentación definitiva de la comunión tradicionalista (1957-1960), [in:] Príncipe de Viana 72 (2011), p. 404
  227. picture taken in 2007. For 2012 banner, see here
  228. ABC 11.02.43, available here
  229. ABC 12.11.44, available here
  230. ABC 19.08.52, available here
  231. ABC 01.10.52, available here
  232. “Tomás Domínguez de Arévalo una persona afín al régimen franquista”, Plaza Conde de Rodezno de ida y vuelta [in:] Diario de Navarra 06.03.09, available here, also Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, Conde de Rodezno, un político profundamente antidemocrático, responsable y cómplice del exterminio político, [in:] Autobús de la memoria 21.06.08, available here
  233. like the question of Navarrismo and the Basque role in Navarre
  234. it might refer to Tomás Domínguez Arévalo, but also to his father Tomás Domínguez Romera, his maternal grandfather Justo Arévalo y Escudero or previous holders of the title from the Jiménez-Navarro family; for the discussion, see e.g. Diario de Noticias 21.06.08, Diario de Navarra 06.03.09, Diario de Navarra 10.03.09, Diario de Noticias 11.03.09
  235. La Plaza de la Libertad estrena placa con su nuevo nombre para "reivindicar la memoria histórica", [in:] Diario de Navarra 14.04.16
  236. see the official Pamplona ayuntamiento site, available here
  237. see here
  238. “fascista de una sola pieza”, see Víctor Moreno, Un articulo del Conde de Rodezno, [in:] Gerindabai blog, available here
  239. compare the document as published by El Pais service, available here
  240. see here
  241. current version here
  242. from works of Partido Carlista sponsored socialismo autogestionario supporters like Josep Carles Clemente 1977, 1999, 2011 or Fermín Pérez-Nievas Borderas, Contra viento y marea. Historia de la evolución ideological del carlismo a través de dos siglos de lucha, Estella 1999, ISBN 8460589323, to scholarly discourse flavored by political sympathies like Martorell Pérez 2009, to orthodox Traditionalist discourse of César Alcalá, D. Mauricio de Sivatte. Una biografía política (1901-1980), Barcelona 2001, ISBN 8493109797
  243. “Rodezno no sentía el carlismo, no pensó nunca en su triunfo y, con su característica ligereza, podría decirse que lo aceptaba como aquel personaje de Valle Inclán que lo quería declarar monumento nacional (...) Sus opiniones pro-alfonsinas acrecentaban el confusionismo de unos y los recelos de los leales. Cuando al fin dio el paso definitivo, reconociendo públicamente como su Rey al pretendiente Don Juan, coronaba una historia política de una lógica implacable, pero aquel día perdía la única virtud que, en los salones aristocráticos, tenía el Conde de Rodezno: el mantenerse leal a la dinastía legítima”, opinion of Melchor Ferrer quoted after Martorell Pérez 2009, p. 183

Further reading

former Plaza Conde de Rodezno
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