The King v. Pear

The King v. Pear, I Leach 211, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (1779), is a criminal case involving interpreting possession and intent in "larceny by trick".^[1]:947–9 A horse owner gave Pear custody of a horse by renting it out for a day, after which it was to be returned when Pear returned to town. Pear did not take his journey, sold the horse the same day, prior to the expiration of the rental contract, and had no lodging in town where he was to return to, which was evidence he never intended to return it in the first place.^[1]:947–8

At the time, common law was that if the horse was sold after the rental contract had expired, this was larceny since there was no longer a contract in force for possession.^[1]:947–8 If the renter intended to return the horse, and therefore had legal possession (custody) then was later forced to sell it because of unforeseen circumstances, this would be a breach of trust, but would not be felony larceny.^[1]:947–8 The fact that the renter had no lodging was used to show a fraudulent criminal intent from the beginning, whereby the act of taking and selling the horse did not transfer legal possession to Pear for the day, and his act of taking and selling the horse was found to be felonious larceny.^[1]:947–8

The court wrote that the original intention at the time of renting the horse was the critical issue as to whether there was larceny,

"[The Jury was properly left to consider whether] ... there were other circumstances which imported that at the time of the hiring the prisoner had it in intention to sell the horse, as his saying that he lodged at a place where he was not... Whether the prisoner meant at the time of hiring to take such a journey, but was afterwards tempted to sell the horse? For if so he must be acquitted; but if... at the time of the hiring the journey was a mere pretense to get the horse into his possession, and he had no intention to take such a journey but intended to sell the horse... with a fraudulent view and intention of selling it immediately... Whether the delivery of the horse... to the prisoner, had so far changed possession of the property, as to render the subsequent conversion of it a mere breach of trust, or whether the conversion was felonious... the question, as to original intention... had been properly left to the jury; and as they had found, that his view in doing so was fraudulent... [so] had not changed the nature possession... and that the prisoner was therefore guilty of felony [larceny]."

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