Battle of Lechfeld (910)

The First Battle of Lechfeld
Part of the Hungarian invasions of Europe
Date 12 June, 910 Location Lechfeld plain, near Augsburg, Bavaria Result Crushing Hungarian victory
Belligerents
East Francia, Swabia	Principality of Hungary
Commanders and leaders
- Louis the Child -Count Gozbert of Alemannia (the real commander of the army) † -Managolt, count of Alemannia †	Unknown Hungarian commander
Strength
Unknown	Unknown
Casualties and losses
Heavy, among them count Gozbert, and Managolt, the count of Alemannia	Light

The Battle of Lechfeld in 910, was an important victory by a Magyar army over Louis the Child's united Frankish Imperial Army.^[1][2] Located south of Augsburg, the Lechfeld is the flood plain that lies along the Lech River. At this time the Grand Prince of Hungary was Zolta, Zoltán of Hungary, but there is no record of him taking part in the battle.

This battle is one of the greatest examples of the success of the famous feigned retreat tactic of the nomadic warriors, but also is a good example how the psychological warfare can cause important defeats on the enemy.

The battle appears as the first Battle of Augsburg^[3] in Hungarian historiography.

Sources

Antapodosis, seu rerum per Europam gestarum, written by Liutprand of Cremona,^[4] Continuator Reginonis, Annales Alamannici,^[5] Necrologies of the German counts (Gozbert and Managolt), killed in this battle. The chronicle named Annalium Boiorum VII, written in the 16th century by the Bavarian humanist Johannes Aventinus is also a very important source of this battle, because it narrates in a detailed way the first battle of Augsburg, relying on old sources, which today are lost. However he makes some mistakes by putting this battle in 907, quickly after the Battle of Pressburg, its place at Ennsburg in Bavaria, and instead of Swabians, names the Bavarians as its participants.^[6]

Location and date

The majority of the historians accept the date and place of the battle given by Liutprand of Cremona as 910 and Augsburg. respectively. Although Liutprand of Cremona's work Antapodosis was written in the 950s, so only a few decades after the events, the Hungarian historian Torma Béla believes that not him, but Aventinus, who wrote in the XVI. century, was right when he put the battle which he presents in detail, in 907 and at Ennsburg and not Augsburg, as Liutprand points.^[7] However, he represents a dissenting opinion, from the other historians, who believe, that the contemporary Liutprand's information is right.

Background

This battle was part of the war between the, in the Carpathian Basin, newly settled Hungarians and the East Frankish kingdom, which lasted between 900, the conqering of Transdanubia by the Hungarians from the Bavarians, and 910, the Battle of Rednitz. After the Battle of Pressburg, the Hungarians continued their campaigns against East Francia, in order to subdue completely the Germans, beaten in 907. In 908 a Hungarian army invaded Thuringia, killing, in the Battle of Eisenach its duke, Burchard, duke Egino and Rudolf I, Bishop of Würzburg. In 909 a Hungarian army invaded Bavaria, but it was defeated by Arnulf, Duke of Bavaria in a minor battle near Pocking.

Prelude

Possibly desirous of repeating the victorious campaigns of his ancestor Charles the Great against the Avars which ended with the subjugation of the latter (though unmindful of the fate of Luitpold in the Battle of Pressburg three years earlier), King Louis the Child decided that forces from all the German duchies should come together to fight the Hungarians. He even threatened with execution those who would not gather under his flag.^[8] So we can presume that Louis gathered a "huge army," as Liutprand terms it in his Antapodosis.^[9] We do not know its exact number, but it can be assumed that it was far more numerous than the Hungarian army, which explains why the Magyars were so cautious during the battle, and waited an unusually long time (more than twelve hours), sapping the strength of the enemy little by little with hit-and-run tactics, as well as using psychological methods to confuse them, before making the decisive tactical step.

The historian Igaz Levente says that the Hungarian campaign of 910 was started in order to prevent another German campaign against the Hungarian territories like the one from 907, which ended with in disaster for the Western army in the battle of Pressburg. Although it was a crushing Hungarian victory, the Magyars thought that it is safer to conduct military operations in Germany rather than in their own lands.^[10] This Hungarian campaign is often cited as a brilliant example of the preventive war strategy.^[11]

The king and his troops arrived near the city of Augsburg, on the plains of Gunzenle, near the Lech river, and waited for the Frankish army led by Gebhard, Duke of Lorraine to appear and join them against the Hungarians. The king's army was led by Count Gozbert,^[12] because Louis the Child was only 16 years old at the time.^[13] We do not know who led the Hungarians, inasmuch as the Grand Prince of the Hungarians in the ninth and tenth centuries never took part in a battle outside of the Hungarian territories, the campaigns being led by more minor military leaders—possibly the gyula,^[14] the horka or one of the princes.^[15]

The Hungarians learned about plans of Louis the Child, and sent quickly a Hungarian army, which rushed to prevent the joining of the Swabian and Frankish-Lotharingian-Bavarian forces. From the work of Aventinus: Annalium Boiorum volume VII, we can reconstruct even their route: after they had crossed Bavaria through the River Enns, they reached Augsburg through Tegernsee, then Sandau near to Landsberg am Lech.^[16] They reached Augsburg on forced march very quickly, totally unexpected by Louis the Child and his army.^[17] This is another proof of the incredible efficiency of the espionage due to its emphasis by the Principality of Hungary and other states of the nomadic warriors.^[18][19] because the unexpected appearance of the Hungarians before the battle of Augsburg is hard to believe that it was only a coincidence. This shows that the Hungarian intelligence worked very effectively not only in Hungary, but also in the enemy territory, making possible the moving of the place of the military operations on his land. As Liutprand of Cremona mentions, the king did not waited that the Hungarians will appear in his land so quickly.^[20] So his plans of uniting all of his forces: his mostly Swabian troops and the Frankish-Lotharingian-Bavarian army, before the battle, failed because of the remarkable espionage of the nomadic Hungarian state and the superior mobility of the Magyar army, which made possible for them to defeat these two armies separately. In conclusion we can say that the Hungarian spies learned of the German armies preparations and informed the Magyar commanders so quickly, that these had the time to gather an army and move in the German territory so quickly that the Eastern Franks had no time not only to reach Hungary, but even to finish the concentration of their troops, and start to move towards it. Still, from the account of Liutprand of Cremona it can be understood that, even without the Frankish help, the king's army had many more soldiers than the Hungarians.

One historian supposes that a small Hungarian unit kept the Frankish Army busy until the Battle of Augsburg ended. Hungarian nomadic warriors used similar tactics elsewhere. They distracted enemies with simple maneuvers to hide the real tactical movement and intent. An example is the Battle of the Brenta.^[21]

Battle

In the dawn of 12 June 910, the Hungarian horsemen made a surprise attack, shooting arrows from distance on the kings sleeping camp, killing many Germans with their nomadic arrows in their sleep, or quite after they woke up.^[22] But this attack was only a minor preparatory, so called swarming attack^[23] in order to diminguish the fighting spirit of the Germans,^[24] after which they retreated to their camp.

The first phase of the battle.

The Germans prepared for battle, making their battle formation, and it begun, with the Hungarians, probably in small swarming archer groups, attacking on horses, shooting arrows on the Germans, who protected themselves with their wall of shields. After a while the Hungarians retreated feigning defeat, and when the German heavy mounted horsemen pursued them, they shoot arrows back on the Germans, killing many of them, while their horses continued to retreat. In the course of the day this tactic was used a several times.^[24] Probably the German army was composed of infantry and heavy cavalry, with heavy shields, lances and swords, while the Hungarians were all light cavalry, with bow and arrows as their main weapon. This is why when the Germans attacked, only the heavy cavalry pursued the Hungarians, while the infantry formed a solid wall, and stayed in their places.^[13] Because of their light weapons and armor, Hungarians were more mobile and quick, but at the same time more vulnerable to the Germans' heavy weapons. But their nomadic composite bows were much more superior than the European bows, and because of this they could kill the enemy with their arrows, without being reached by theirs. Also the Hungarian horses were quicker than the German ones, because they had less weight to carry. But still, in order to lure the German soldiers after them, the Hungarians had to move very close, and even start short hand to hand squirmishes with the superior Germans, in the places of the defensive line, where they saw weaknesses, then to run, when the situation started to be severe, convincing the enemy that he is about to win, persuading him to pursue them, and with this to break his battle formation, giving them the opportunity to exploit this, and inflict heavy losses on them.

It was 7 a clock in the evening, which is more than 12 hours from the start of the battle (at dawn), and Louis the Child thought that his troops are about to win the battle. At this moment the Hungarians started a general attack, then again used the famous feigned retreat tactic of the nomadic warriors, starting to retreat in haste, like they were defeated.^[25] We do not know for sure why, but at this point the Germans were very sure that they won the battle, and started a general attack on the retreating Hungarians, leaving their well-protected defensive lines, and breaking their battle formation in their rush to catch up the Hungarians, who retreated in ordered lines, very careful of not disorganising their battle order.^[26]

The second phase of the battle.

Maybe they did not wanted to wait for another night, thinking that the Hungarians will shoot arrows on them all the night, destroying their camp, or they tired by the unusual length of the battle (it lasted all day, from dawn to evening), in the hot summer sun,^[27] or they were traumatised by the ever growing losses inflicted on them by the Hungarian arrows, or on the contrary the Hungarians, with their monotone, apparently unsuccessful attacks against their lines aroused in them a self-conceit that they are about to win the battle.^[27] Nevertheless, this shows that the Hungarians used again the psychological warfare tactics, making the enemy troops to be frightened, or to lose their will to fight, or to be exaggeratedly self-conceited, which made them easier to defeat. The Hungarians also used the psychological warfare in another battle occurred 11 years earlier: the Battle of Brenta River, feigning defeat in an early skirmish, then running away, showing to the enemy commanders that they had despaired, then sending envoys to them asking for forgiveness, with this convincing the enemy to feel pretentious and comfortable, then striking in an unexpected moment and destroying the Italian army.^[28]

During the whole battle of Augsburg, the Hungarians waited for this moment, hiding their reserve troops in woods^[29] that allowed concealing huge numbers of soldiers. The retreating main Hungarian army lured the attacking German cavalry to the places in which their reserve troops were hidden, and they continued to retreat until the whole pursuing German cavalry crossed the narrow field which separated two woods in which the Hungarian reserves were hidden, when suddenly without observing them, these hidden Hungarian reserves came out from their hiding places and attacked the Germans with loud screaming in order to frighten and demoralize them before the final clash.^[30]

The third phase of the battle

In this moment the retreating Hungarian main troops turned back and attacked the Germans from the front, resisting their charge, and not letting them break their line.^[31] At that moment those Hungarian units who came from the rear and sides of the Swabians surrounded them completely, and entered in a final hand-to-hand fight with the hopeless enemy.^[32] This shows that before the battle the Hungarian commander chose carefully a place near the initial battlefield, with two woods near to each other, in which he could hide some of his troops, which waited until the pursuing Germans passed them, and then attacked them. One of the key elements of the nomadic warfare was the careful choosing of the battlefield, which provide them advantage in winning the battle.^[33] For nomads one of the important elements in a battlefield were the places where they could hide some of their troops, and to lure the enemy there in order to encircle and destroy it.^[34] In the battle in point, the German camp and its surroundings was not adequate for hiding troops without being observed by the Swabians, so the Hungarian commander chose an adequate place away from the battlefield (the first battlefield), where he could hide some of his units (this being the second battlefield), and his main purpose during the battle was to lure the enemy to that place, which he succeeded after manoeuvres which lasted from the dawn until the evening, finally ending with success. This shows the great patience of the Hungarian commander, who in the whole day conducted manoeuvres which diverted the enemy's attention from his real purpose. The same thing happened also during the events which led to the Battle of the Brenta (899), this time against the Italians, a battle in which probably the Hungarians were led by the same commander.

The fact that the Hungarian troops which performed the tactic of the feigned retreat, luring the German cavalry at the second battlefield, could withstand, in the decisive moment, the charge of the Swabian heavy cavalry, shows that the Hungarians had also troops with adequate armor and weapons to resist a charge from the most formidable heavy cavalry of those times. Their success was also facilitated by the fact that they retreated in order, when the Swabians lost theirs. This shows also that the Hungarian commander chose attentively which branches to use in the precise moments of the battle, and that he was totally at charge of his troops from the beginning until the end of the battle.

From Liutprand‘s account ("the kings people") we can understand that the king was not among the pursuing German cavalry, so this is why he escaped. In this slaughter, because they could not break the Hungarian encirclement, probably no German cavalrymen survived, and presumably here was killed count Gozbert,^[35] the real commander of the army and Managolt, the count of Alemannia, who were leading the attack of the German cavalry.

The last phase of the battle.

At this point the king Louis the Child had to be among the infantry, which marched after the German cavalry from far behind, thinking that they won the battle, but when he arrived to the new battle scene, he saw that his bravest soldiers were slaughtered by the Hungarians, shortly before. From Liutprand of Cremona‘s account we can understand very well that he was not part of the slaughter of the cavalry, and he saw only the result of it a little later. He narrates his astonishment, despair at that moment, and the fact that he was totally fooled and misled by their clever tactics.^[36]

The remaining German infantry troops started to run away in despair, trying to save their lives. Probably the bodyguard unit of the king, which was mounted, managed to save him, and take him away quickly from the battlefield, while the Hungarians were busy of slaughtering the running German infantry, which suffered very heavy losses, caused by the Hungarian horsemen, who because these were the rules of nomadic warfare (eliminate the beaten enemy and his commanders completely ^[37]), pursued them all the way, killing every one in their reach.^[38]

Aftermath

The king escaped, entering the nearest town with walls (probably Augsburg), but the Germans lost almost their entire army. The Hungarian losses were so light, that after just 10 days, on 22 June, they managed to annihilate, in the Battle of Rednitz, the other German army, the Frankish-Lorrainian-Bavarian one, which before the battle of Augsburg was expected to unite with the main army led by the king Louis the Child, and to fight together against the Hungarians, killing also the commanders of that army, among them Gebhard, Duke of Lorraine. So, the Hungarian army, with a "Napoleonean" tactic (István Bóna),^[13] cleverly managed to attack and beat these two armies separately. After these two battles the Hungarian army plundered and burned the German territories while nobody tried to fight them off again, retreating to the walled towns and castles, and waiting for them to turn back to Hungary.^[39] On their way back home, the Hungarians plundered the surroundings of Regensburg, burned Altaich and Osterhofen.^[40] Only the Bavarians managed to beat a minor plundering Hungarian unit at Neuching,^[41] but this did not changed the fact: the annihilation of much of Germany's military power and capability to withstand the Hungarian attacks. This is demonstrated by the fact that after these defeats, Louis IV the Child, the German king, together with the Swabian, Frankish, Bavarian and Saxonian princes, agreed to pay tribute to the Hungarians.^[3]

However, Louis the Child didn't survive for long these battles, dying in 911, maybe caused by the trauma and humiliation of these defeats. His successor as German king, Conrad I of Germany (911–918), refused to pay any tribute to the Hungarians (however, the dukes of Bavaria and Swabia paid from 917 tribute to the Magyars, who helped their fight against the German kings ^[42][43]), and this caused frequent attacks on Germany made by the Hungarian nomadic armies (911, 913, 915, 917, 919, 924), which caused many defeats (Eresburg in 915, Püchen in 919), destruction (the burning of Bremen in 915, Basel in 917) and plunderings, and just a few successes (particularly in 913), which finally forced king Henry the Fowler in 924 to again start to pay tribute to the Hungarians, until 933, the Battle of Riade which ended the long (26 years) period of Hungarian military superiority and domination in Germany. However, the Hungarian raids in Germany continued until 955, their defeat in the second Battle of Lechfeld.

References