Team B

Team B was a competitive analysis exercise commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to analyze threats the Soviet Union posed to the security of the United States. It was created, in part, due to a 1974 publication by Albert Wohlstetter, who accused the CIA of chronically underestimating Soviet military capability. Years of National Intelligence Estimates that were later demonstrated to be very wrong was another motivating factor.

President Gerald Ford began the Team B project in May 1976, inviting a group of outside experts to evaluate classified intelligence on the Soviet Union. Team B, approved by then Director of Central Intelligence George H. W. Bush, was composed of "outside experts" who attempted to counter the positions of intelligence officials within the CIA.[1] The intelligence community was in the process of putting together its own assessment at the same time.

United States and Soviet Union/Russia nuclear stockpiles.[2] The Soviets strove for "nuclear superiority", especially in terms of numbers of ICBMs beginning in the 1970s, which in an oral history project conducted years later, was intended to overtake Washington.[3]

Team B concluded that the NIE on the Soviet Union, generated yearly by the CIA, underestimated Soviet military power and misinterpreted Soviet strategic intentions. Its findings were leaked to the press shortly after Jimmy Carter's 1976 presidential election win in an attempt to appeal to anti-communists in both parties and not appear partisan.[4][5] The Team B reports became the intellectual foundation for the idea of "the window of vulnerability" and of the massive arms buildup that began toward the end of the Carter administration and accelerated under President Ronald Reagan.[6]

Some scholars and policy-makers, such as Anne Hessing Cahn of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, later criticized the Team B project's findings.[7][8] Many of these experts argued that the findings were grossly inaccurate.[9][10]

A major issue in support of Team B's overall "window of vulnerability" sentiment, was confirmed with the defection of Sergei Popov and his testimony that led to the discovery in the 1990s that Premier Gorbachev and his predecessors had all clandestinely continued to oversee weapon developments and actively engaged in spreading disinformation about the nature of the "Biopreparat" program. A program that directly breached the enthusiastically signed convention in 1972 that was to eliminate all biological weapons, the Soviet Union had instead engineered, produced and stockpiled tons of biological agents after signing the 1972 "ban the bugs" agreement, rationalizing this deceit to the 30,000 or so Soviet biologists, by claiming that the US was doing the same.[11] Popov and others later denounced their Soviet superiors for creating this asymmetry of vulnerability and for misleading them.[12]

Creation

A number of conservative foreign policy intellectuals were worried that the U.S. was sacrificing strategic position in the early 1970s by embracing détente.

In 1974, Albert Wohlstetter, a professor at the University of Chicago, accused the CIA of systematically underestimating Soviet missile deployment, in his 1974 Foreign Policy article entitled "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Wohlstetter concluded that the United States was allowing the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority by not closing a perceived missile gap. Many conservatives then began a concerted attack on the CIA's annual assessment of the Soviet threat.[6][13]

United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began to make speeches arguing that the Soviets were ignoring Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's treaties and secretly building up their weapons, with the intention of attacking the United States. Rumsfeld used his position to persuade President Ford to set up an independent inquiry. Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz wanted to create a much more severe view of the Soviet Union, Soviet intentions, Soviet views about fighting and winning a nuclear war.[14][15][16]

The organization chosen by the Ford administration to challenge the CIA's analysis was the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

In 1975, PFIAB members asked CIA Director William Colby to approve the initiative of producing comparative assessments of the Soviet threat. Colby refused, stating it was hard "to envisage how an ad hoc independent group of analysts could prepare a more thorough, comprehensive assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities than could the intelligence community."[17] Colby was removed from his position in the Halloween Massacre; Ford has stated that he, himself, made the decision alone,[18] but the historiography of the "Halloween Massacre" appears to support the allegations that Rumsfeld had successfully lobbied for this.[19]

When George H. W. Bush became the Director of Central Intelligence in 1976 the PFIAB renewed its request for competitive threat assessments. Although his top analysts argued against such an undertaking, Bush checked with the White House, obtained a go-ahead, and by May 26 signed off on the experiment.[6]

A team of 16 "outside experts" were to take an independent look at highly classified data used by the intelligence community to assess Soviet strategic forces in the yearly National Intelligence Estimates.[6][20]

There were three teams:

It is the third team, chaired by Harvard University professor Richard Pipes, that ultimately received considerable publicity and is most commonly referred to as Team B.[6]

Members

PFIAB's Team B was headed by Richard Pipes, a Harvard historian and specialist in Russian history. Team B's members included Daniel O. Graham, Thomas Wolf, John Vogt, and William Van Cleave[21][22] Advisors included Foy D. Kohler, Seymour Weiss, Jasper Welch, Paul Wolfowitz, and Paul Nitze, who also helped to create the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), the objectives of which were to raise awareness about the Soviets' alleged nuclear dominance and to pressure the American leadership to close the missile gap.[17][23]

Detailed sections

Part One

The first section of the report dealt with the team's criticisms of the NIE's assessment of Soviet strategic objectives. It was the conclusion of the report, that the NIE was mostly wrong to view Soviet strategic actions as primarily a response to its history of being invaded and that the NIE ignored or misinterpreted evidence that most Soviet strategic actions were offensive rather than defensive in nature. The report also rejected the NIE's conclusion that as the Soviet Union grew more powerful and capable its foreign policy would also become less aggressive.[24]

Part Two

The second section of the report was primarily a criticism of the NIE's conclusions regarding Soviet strategic weapons programs, and how they are integrated into conventional Soviet forces and what impacts they have on Soviet strategic goals and plans. The report argued that the NIE underestimated the threat posed by Soviet strategic weapons programs, and that the development and deployment of several new weapons platforms and advancements in existing technologies would drastically alter the advantages that the United States and NATO had over the Warsaw Pact. The report cited these specific areas to reinforce its assessment:

Criticism

Team B concluded that the Soviet Union did not adhere to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, but rather believed it could win a nuclear war outright. Pipes—in his Commentary article—argued that CIA suffered from "mirror-imaging" (i.e., from assuming that the other side had to—and did—think and evaluate exactly the same way); Pipes further wrote that Team B showed Soviet thinking to be based on winning a nuclear war (i.e., not avoiding such war due to MAD, because, he wrote, the Soviets were building MIRV'd nuclear missiles of high yield and high accuracy—appropriate for attacking hardened missile silos, but not needed for such large and vulnerable 'hostage' sites as cities). This was shocking to many at the time,[1] but Pipes argues that later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was proven to be true.[33]

Fareed Zakaria notes, however, that the specific conclusions of the report "were wildly off the mark. Describing the Soviet Union, in 1976, as having 'a large and expanding Gross National Product,' it predicted that it would modernize and expand its military at an awesome pace. For example, it predicted that the Backfire bomber 'probably will be produced in substantial numbers, with perhaps 500 aircraft off the line by early 1984.' In fact, the Soviets had 235 in 1984."[34]

According to Anne Hessing Cahn (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1977–1980), Team B's analysis of weapons systems was later proven to be false. "I would say that all of it was fantasy. ... if you go through most of Team B's specific allegations about weapons systems, and you just examine them one by one, they were all wrong."[9] The CIA director at the time, George H. W. Bush, concluded that the Team B approach set "in motion a process that lends itself to manipulation for purposes other than estimative accuracy."[8][14] Brookings Institution Scholar Raymond Garthoff concurred, writing that in "retrospect, and with the Team B report and records now largely declassified, it is possible to see that virtually all of Team B's criticisms... proved to be wrong. On several important specific points it wrongly criticized and 'corrected' the official estimates, always in the direction of enlarging the impression of danger and threat."[10] A top CIA analyst called Team B "a kangaroo court of outside critics all picked from one point of view."[20]

Joshua Rovner, Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, argues that the Team B exercise made sense in theory because scrutiny from outside of the intelligence bureaucracy can pressure analysts to be forthright regarding their assumptions and methodology. Providing Team B the opportunity to create an alternative assessment could have shed light on any institutional baggage, group-think, and inefficiency. "The competition turned ugly, however, when Team B turned its attention away from Moscow and leveled a blistering attack on the NIE process itself."[35] It excoriated intelligence agencies for "persistent flaws" in past estimates and took it upon itself to "determine what methodological misperceptions cause their most serious errors of judgment."[36] The intelligence community was furious, Rovner maintains, because they believed that the exercise was motivated by an ideological desire to frame the Soviet Union as more belligerent than the intelligence community was leading on. The NIE that emerged from the debacle was strongly influenced by Team B's contributions. Rovner believes that Team B was a case of indirect politicization. "The administration did not try to determine the membership of Team B nor the process of the exercise, but it gave de facto control over these pivotal issues to a group of outspoken critics of détente who argued publicly that the United States was seriously underestimating the Soviet threat."[35]

Richard K. Betts, the Arnold Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University argues that the underlying problem was confusion about what level of analysis was at issue—an implicit blurring together of Soviet political objectives and military strategy.[37]

Paul Warnke, an official at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) at the time of the Team B, wrote:

Time Magazine editor Strobe Talbott stated in 1990 that:

Richard Pipes has defended the project,[1] and in 2003 said:

Also in 2003, Edward Jay Epstein offered that Team B had been a useful exercise in competitive analysis.[40]

Derek Leebaert, professor of government at Georgetown University, supported Team B in his 2002 book The Fifty Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Shapes Our World.[41] Although he agrees that "Team B's alternative National Intelligence Estimate contained its own mistakes", he claims that "Russian sources now show that the Team B analysts were fundamentally correct on all the key issues." He further says that when Team B and the CIA debated their reports in 1976, the CIA "conceded all essential points on Soviet nuclear war strategy to its harshest critics."

In his 2007 book The Fall of the House of Bush, Vanity Fair contributing editor Craig Unger goes into detail about the formation and inaccuracy of Team B:

Jason Vest assessed the lasting implications of Team B:

References

  1. 1 2 3 Pipes, Richard (1986). "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth". Commentary Magazine. 82 (4).
  2. ↑ Multimegaton Weapons — The Largest Nuclear Weapons by Wm. Robert Johnston
  3. ↑ Burr, William; Savranskaya, Svetlana, eds. (September 11, 2009). "Previously Classified Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades". Washington, DC. Retrieved April 21, 2013.
  4. ↑ Christopher Andrew. For the President's Eyes Only. pg 424
  5. ↑ Dana H. Allin. Cold War Illusions: America, Europe, and Soviet Power, 1969-1989 pg 61
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 Cahn, Anne Hessing (April 1993). "Team B: The trillion-dollar experiment". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. 49 (03): 22–27.
  7. ↑ Thom Hartmann (December 7, 2004). "Hyping Terror For Fun, Profit - And Power". Commondreams.org. Archived from the original on April 19, 2006. Retrieved April 23, 2006.
  8. 1 2 Goodman, Melvin A. (November 19, 2004). "Righting the CIA". The Baltimore Sun.
  9. 1 2 Thom Hartmann (December 7, 2004). "Hyping Terror For Fun, Profit - And Power". Commondreams.org. Retrieved April 23, 2006.
  10. 1 2 Jeff Stein (October 28, 2005). "Bush team sought to snuff CIA doubts". San Francisco Chronicle. Retrieved September 17, 2007.
  11. ↑ did star wars end the cold war Hoffmann & Katayev
  12. ↑ Silent Weapon: Smallpox and Biological Warfare
  13. ↑ Barry, Tom (February 12, 2004). "Remembering Team B". International Relations Center. Retrieved 5 January 2012.
  14. 1 2 The Power of Nightmares, 0h25m55s Part 1 - Baby It's Cold Outside]
  15. ↑ Stein, Jeff (26 October 2005). "Bush team sought to snuff CIA doubts Differences over Iraq WMD latest attempt to override agency". San Francisco Chronicle.
  16. ↑ Blumenthal, Sidney (28 November 2005). "The Long March of Dick Cheney". Salon.
  17. 1 2 Guy Caron (May 1, 2005). "Anatomy of a Neo-Conservative White House". Canadian Dimension. 39 (03): 46.
  18. ↑ Goldman, Peter, "Ford Shakes Up His Cabinet," Time, 11/17/75. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16381141/site/newsweek/
  19. ↑ Blumenthal, Sidney, "The Long March of Dick Cheney," Salon.com
  20. 1 2 Tanenhaus, Sam (November 2, 2003). "The Mind Of The Administration A Continuing Series On The Thinkers Who Have Shaped The Bush Administration's View Of The World". The Boston Globe.
  21. ↑ Team B Strategic Objectives Panel rightweb.irc-online.org
  22. ↑ Sanders, Jerry Wayne (1983). Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment. p. 226. ISBN 0-89608-181-8.
  23. ↑ Team B Report. Page 6.
  24. ↑ Team B Report. Page 15.
  25. ↑ Team B Report. Page 21.
  26. ↑ Team B Report. Page 23.
  27. ↑ Team B Report. Page 26.
  28. ↑ Team B Report. Page 27.
  29. ↑ Team B Report. Page 28.
  30. ↑ Team B Report. Page 30.
  31. ↑ Team B Report. Pages 30–34.
  32. ↑ Team B Report. Pages 35–37.
  33. 1 2 Tanenhaus, Sam (November 11, 2003). "The Hard Liner". The Boston Globe. Retrieved June 9, 2006.
  34. ↑ Fareed Zakaria, "Exaggerating The Threats," Newsweek (16 June 2003).
  35. 1 2 Rovner, Joshua (2011). Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 113–114. ISBN 9780801448294.
  36. ↑ "Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis, Report of Team 'B,'" (PDF). Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View: iii–iv. December 1976. Retrieved 3 December 2012.
  37. 1 2 Betts, Richard (2007). Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Power in American National Security. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 87. ISBN 9780231138895.
  38. ↑ See Barry (above), Warnke, Paul C. (January–February 1999). "The B Team: Paul C. Warnke reviews Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA: Cahn, Anne Hessing". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 55 (01): 70.
  39. ↑ Talbott, Strobe (October 14, 1991). "America Abroad The Case Against Gates". Time Magazine.
  40. ↑ Edward Jay Epstein (2003). "Did Team B do more than "second guess" the CIA professionals?". Question of the Day. Retrieved June 9, 2006.
  41. ↑ Derek Leebaert. The Fifty Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Shapes Our World pg 451
  42. ↑ Interview with Craig Unger, David Shankbone, Wikinews, November 12, 2007.
  43. ↑ Jason Vest, "Darth Rumsfeld," The American Prospect 12:4 (Feb 26, 2001) p. 20.

Further reading

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