Operation Sea Lion

Operation Sea Lion
Part of the Western Front of the Second World War
Operational scope Normandy, the Belgian coast line, the English Channel and the English coast line from Kent to Dorset, Isle of Wight and parts of Devon, but principally in Sussex and Kent
Planned September 1940
Planned by OKW
Objective Elimination of the United Kingdom as a base of military operations against the Axis Powers[1]
Outcome Eventual cancellation and diversion of German and Italian forces for Operation Barbarossa

Operation Sea Lion, also written as Operation Sealion[2][3] (German: Unternehmen Seelöwe), was Nazi Germany's code name for the plan for an invasion of the United Kingdom during the Battle of Britain in the Second World War. Following the Fall of France, Adolf Hitler, the German Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, hoped the British government would seek a peace agreement and he reluctantly considered invasion only as a last resort if all other options failed. As a precondition, he specified the achievement of both air and naval superiority over the English Channel and the proposed landing sites, but the German forces did not achieve this at any point during the war and both the German High Command and Hitler himself had serious doubts about the prospects for success. A large number of barges were gathered together on the Channel coast, but, with air losses increasing, Hitler postponed Sea Lion indefinitely on 17 September 1940 and it was never put into action.

Background

Adolf Hitler hoped for a negotiated peace with the UK, and made no preparations for amphibious assault on Britain until the Fall of France. At the time, the only forces with experience of or modern equipment for such landings were the Japanese, at the Battle of Wuhan in 1938.[4]

Outbreak of war and fall of Poland

In September 1939, the German invasion of Poland was a success, but this infringed on both a French and a British alliance with Poland, and both countries declared war on Germany. On 9 October, Hitler's "Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War" planned an offensive to defeat these allies and "win as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium, and northern France to serve as a base for the successful prosecution of the air and sea war against England".[5]

With the prospect of the Channel ports falling under Kriegsmarine (German Navy) control, Grand Admiral (Großadmiral) Erich Raeder (head of the Kriegsmarine) attempted to anticipate the obvious next step that might entail and instructed his operations officer, Kapitän Hansjürgen Reinicke, to draw up a document examining, "the possibility of troop landings in England should the future progress of the war make the problem arise". Reinicke spent five days on this study and set forth the following prerequisites:

One complication was the tidal flow in the English Channel, where high water moves from west to east, with high water at Lyme Regis occurring around six hours before it reaches Dover. If all the landings were to be made at high water across a broad front, they would have to be made at different times along different parts of the coast, with the landings in Dover being made six hours after any landings in Dorset and thus losing the element of surprise. If the landings were to be made at the same time, methods would have to be devised to disembark men, vehicles and supplies at all states of the tide. That was another reason to favour landing craft.

The battle plan called for German forces to be launched from Cherbourg to Lyme Regis, Le Havre to Ventnor and Brighton, Boulogne to Eastbourne, Calais to Folkestone, and Dunkirk and Ostend to Ramsgate. Fallschirmjäger (paratroopers) would land near Brighton and Dover. Once the coast was secured, they would push north and take Gloucester and encircle London.[7] There is reason to believe that the Germans would not attempt to assault the city but besiege and bombard it.[8] German forces would secure England up to the 52nd parallel (approximately as far north as Northampton), anticipating that the rest of the United Kingdom would then surrender.[9]

German coastal guns

With Germany's occupation of the Pas-de-Calais region in Northern France, the possibility of closing the Strait of Dover to Royal Navy warships and merchant convoys by the use of land-based heavy artillery became readily apparent, both to the German High Command and to Hitler. Even the Kriegsmarine's Naval Operations Office deemed this a plausible and desirable goal, especially given the relatively short distance, 34 km (21 mi), between the French and English coasts. Orders were therefore issued to assemble and begin emplacing every Army and Navy heavy artillery piece available along the French coast, primarily at Pas-de-Calais. This work was assigned to the Organisation Todt and commenced on 22 July 1940.[10]

The huge 21 cm K12 railway gun was only suitable for bombarding targets on land.

By early August, four 28 cm (11 in) traversing turrets were fully operational as were all of the Army’s railway guns. Seven of these weapons, six 28 cm K5 pieces and a single 21 cm (8.3 in) K12 gun with a range of 115 km (71 mi), could only be used against land targets. The remainder, thirteen 28 cm and five 24 cm (9.4 in) pieces, plus additional motorised batteries comprising twelve 24 cm guns and ten 21 cm weapons, could be fired at shipping but were of limited effectiveness due to their slow traverse speed, long loading time and ammunition types.[11]

Better suited for use against naval targets were the four heavy naval batteries installed by mid-September: Friedrich August with three 30.5 cm (12.0 in) barrels; Prinz Heinrich with two 28 cm guns; Oldenburg with two 24 cm weapons and, largest of all, Siegfried (later renamed Batterie Todt) with a pair of 38 cm (15 in) guns. Fire control for these weapons was provided by both spotter aircraft and by DeTeGerät radar sets installed at Blanc Nez and Cap d’Alprech. These units were capable of detecting targets out to a range of 40 km (25 mi), including small British patrol craft inshore of the English coast. Two additional radar sites were added by mid-September: a DeTeGerät at Cap de la Hague and a FernDeTeGerät long-range radar at Cap d’Antifer near Le Havre.[12]

To strengthen German control of the Channel narrows, the Army planned to quickly establish mobile artillery batteries along the English shoreline once a beachhead had been firmly established. Towards that end, 16th Army’s Artillerie Kommand 106 was slated to land with the second wave to provide fire protection for the transport fleet as early as possible. This unit consisted of twenty-four 15 cm (5.9 in) and seventy-two 10 cm (3.9 in) guns. About one third of them were to be deployed on English soil by the end of Sea Lion's first week.[13]

The presence of these batteries was expected to greatly reduce the threat posed by British destroyers and smaller craft along the eastern approaches as the guns would be sited to cover the main transport routes from Dover to Calais and Hastings to Boulogne. They could not entirely protect the western approaches, but a large area of those invasion zones would still be within effective range.[13]

The British military was well aware of the dangers posed by German artillery dominating the Dover Strait and on 4 September 1940 the Chief of Naval Staff issued a memo stating that if the Germans "…could get possession of the Dover defile and capture its gun defences from us, then, holding these points on both sides of the Straits, they would be in a position largely to deny those waters to our naval forces". Should the Dover defile be lost, he concluded, the Royal Navy could do little to interrupt the flow of German supplies and reinforcements across the Channel, at least by day, and he further warned that "…there might really be a chance that they (the Germans) might be able to bring a serious weight of attack to bear on this country". The very next day the Chiefs of Staff, after discussing the importance of the defile, decided to reinforce the Dover coast with more ground troops.[14]

The guns started to fire in the second week of August 1940 and were not silenced until 1944, when the batteries were overrun by Allied ground forces. They caused 3,059 alerts, 216 civilian deaths, and damage to 10,056 premises in the Dover area. However, despite firing on frequent slow moving coastal convoys, often in broad daylight, for almost the whole of that period (there was an interlude in 1943), there is no record of any vessel being hit by them, although one seaman was killed and others were injured by shell splinters from near misses.[15] Whatever the perceived risk, this lack of ability to hit any moving ship does not support the contention that the German coastal batteries would have been a serious threat to fast destroyers or smaller warships.[16]

Indefinite postponement

During the summer of 1940, both the British public and the Americans believed that a German invasion was imminent, and they studied the forthcoming high tides of 5–9 August, 2–7 September, 1–6 October, and 30 October-4 November as likely dates.[17] The British prepared extensive defences, and, in Churchill's view, "the great invasion scare" was "serving a most useful purpose" by "keeping every man and woman tuned to a high pitch of readiness".[18][19] He did not think the threat credible. On 10 July, he advised the War Cabinet that the possibility of invasion could be ignored, as it "would be a most hazardous and suicidal operation". That summer, Britain exported tanks to the campaign in Egypt.[20]

The Germans were confident enough to film a simulation of the intended invasion in advance. A crew turned up at the Belgian port of Antwerp in early September 1940 and, for two days, they filmed tanks and troops landing from barges on a nearby beach under simulated fire. It was explained that, as the invasion would happen at night, Hitler wanted the German people to see all the details.[21]

In early August, the German command had agreed that the invasion should begin on 15 September, but the Navy's revisions to its schedule set the date back to 20 September. At a conference on 14 September, Hitler praised the various preparations, but told his service chiefs that, as air superiority had still not been achieved, he would review whether to proceed with the invasion. At this conference, he gave the Luftwaffe the opportunity to act independently of the other services, with intensified continuous air attacks to overcome British resistance; on 16 September, Göring issued orders for this new phase of the air attack.[22] On 17 September 1940, Hitler held a meeting with Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt during which he became convinced the operation was not viable. Control of the skies was still lacking, and coordination among three branches of the armed forces was out of the question. Later that day, Hitler ordered the postponement of the operation. He ordered the dispersal of the invasion fleet in order to avert further damage by British air and naval attacks.[23]

The postponement coincided with rumours that there had been an attempt to land on British shores on or about 7 September, which had been repulsed with large German casualties. The story was later expanded to include false reports that the British had set the sea on fire using flaming oil. Both versions were widely reported in the American press and in William L. Shirer's Berlin Diary, but both were officially denied by Britain and Germany. Author James Hayward has suggested that the whispering campaign around the "failed invasion" was a successful example of British black propaganda to bolster morale at home and in occupied Europe, and convince America that Britain was not a lost cause.[24]

On 12 October 1940, Hitler issued a directive releasing forces for other fronts. The appearance of preparations for Sea Lion was to be continued to keep political pressure on Britain, and a fresh directive would be issued if it was decided that invasion was to be reconsidered in the Spring of 1941.[25][26]

While the bombing of Britain intensified during the Blitz, Hitler issued his Directive No. 21 on 18 December 1940 instructing the Wehrmacht to be ready for a quick attack to commence his long planned invasion of the Soviet Union.[27] Seelöwe lapsed, never to be resumed.[28]

Chances of success

Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, believed the invasion could not succeed and doubted whether the German air force would be able to win control of the skies; nevertheless he hoped that an early victory in the Battle of Britain would force the UK government to negotiate, without any need for an invasion.[29] Adolf Galland, commander of Luftwaffe fighters at the time, claimed invasion plans were not serious and that there was a palpable sense of relief in the Wehrmacht when it was finally called off.[30] Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt also took this view and thought that Hitler never seriously intended to invade Britain and the whole thing was a bluff to put pressure on the British government to come to terms following the Fall of France.[31] He observed that Napoleon had failed to invade and the difficulties that confounded him did not appear to have been solved by the Sea Lion planners. In fact, in November 1939, the German naval staff produced a study on the possibility of an invasion of Britain and concluded that it required two preconditions, air and naval superiority, neither of which Germany ever had.[32] Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz believed air superiority was not enough and admitted, "We possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it."[33] Grand Admiral Erich Raeder thought it would be impossible for Germany to attempt an invasion until the spring of 1941;[34] he instead called for Malta and the Suez Canal to be overrun so German forces could link up with Japanese forces in the Indian Ocean to bring about the collapse of the British Empire in the Far East, and prevent the Americans from being able to use British bases if the United States entered the war.[35]

As early as 14 August 1940, Hitler had told his generals that he would not attempt to invade Britain if the task seemed too dangerous, before adding that there were other ways of defeating the UK than invading.[36]

In Memoirs of WWII, Churchill stated, "Had the Germans possessed in 1940 well trained [and equipped] amphibious forces their task would still have been a forlorn hope in the face of our sea and air power. In fact they had neither the tools or the training".[37] He added, "There were indeed some who on purely technical grounds, and for the sake of the effect the total defeat of his expedition would have on the general war, were quite content to see him try."[38]

Although Operation Sea Lion was never attempted, there has been much speculation about its hypothetical outcome. The great majority of military historians have opined that it had little chance of success. Kenneth Macksey asserts it would have been possible only if the Royal Navy had refrained from large-scale intervention[39] and the Germans had assaulted in July 1940 (although Macksey conceded they were unprepared at that time),[40] while others such as Peter Fleming, Derek Robinson and Stephen Bungay believe the operation would have most likely resulted in a disaster for the Germans. Len Deighton and some other writers have called the German amphibious plans a "Dunkirk in reverse".[41] Robinson argues that the massive superiority of the Royal Navy over the Kriegsmarine would have made Sea Lion a disaster.

Logistics

Four years later, the Allied D-Day landings showed just how much materiel had to be landed continuously to maintain an amphibious invasion. The problem for the Germans was worse, as the German Army was mostly horse-drawn. One of its prime headaches would have been transporting thousands of horses across the Channel.[42] British intelligence calculated that the first wave of 11 divisions (including the airborne divisions) would require a daily average of 3,300 tons of supplies.[43] In fact, in Russia in 1941, when engaged in heavy fighting (at the end of a very long supply line), a single German infantry division required up to 1,100 tons of supplies a day,[44] though a more usual figure would be 212-425 tons per day.[45] The smaller figure is more likely due to the very short distances the supplies would have to travel. Rations for two weeks were to be provided to the German troops of the first wave because the armies had been instructed to live off the land as far as possible in order to minimise supply across the Channel during the initial phase of the battle. [46] British intelligence further calculated that Folkestone, the largest harbour falling within the planned German landing zones, could handle 150 tons per day in the first week of the invasion (assuming all dockside equipment was successfully demolished and regular RAF bombing raids reduced capacity by 50%). Within seven days, maximum capacity was expected to rise to 600 tons per day, once German shore parties had made repairs to the quays and cleared the harbour of any blockships and other obstacles. This meant that, at best, the nine German infantry and two airborne divisions landed initially would receive less than 20% of the 3,300 tons of supplies they required each day through a port, and would have to rely heavily on whatever could be brought in directly over the beaches or air-dropped.[47]

The capture of Dover and its harbour facilities was expected to add another 800 tons per day, raising to 40% the amount of supplies brought in through ports. However, this rested on the rather unrealistic assumption of little or no interference from the Royal Navy and RAF with the German supply convoys which would have been made up of underpowered (or unpowered, i.e. towed) inland waterways vessels as they shuttled slowly between the Continent to the invasion beaches and any captured harbours.[47]

Weather

From 19 to 26 September 1940, sea and wind conditions on and over the Channel where the invasion was to take place were good overall, and a crossing, even using converted river barges, was feasible provided the sea state remained at less than 4, which for the most part it did. Winds for the remainder of the month were rated as "moderate" and would not have prevented the German invasion fleet from successfully depositing the first wave troops ashore during the ten days needed to accomplish this.[48] From the night of 27 September, strong northerly winds prevailed, making passage more hazardous, but calm conditions returned on 11–12 October and again on 16–20 October. After that, light easterly winds prevailed which would have assisted any invasion craft travelling from the Continent towards the invasion beaches. But by the end of October, according to British Air Ministry records, very strong south-west winds (force 8) would have prohibited any non-seagoing craft from risking a Channel crossing.[49]

German intelligence

At least 20 spies were sent to England by boat or parachute to gather information on the British coastal defenses under the codename "Operation Lena"; many of the agents spoke limited English. All agents were quickly captured and many were convinced to defect by MI5's Double-Cross System, providing disinformation to their German superiors. It has been suggested that the "amateurish" espionage efforts were a result of deliberate sabotage by the head of the army intelligence bureau in Hamburg, Herbert Wichmann, in an effort to prevent a disastrous and costly amphibious invasion; Wichmann was critical of the Nazi regime and had close ties to Wilhelm Canaris, the former head of the Abwehr who was later executed by the Nazis for treason.[50]

While some errors might not have caused problems, others, such as the inclusion of bridges that no longer existed[51] and misunderstanding the usefulness of minor British roads,[51] would have been detrimental to German operations, and would have added to the confusion caused by the layout of Britain's cities (with their maze of narrow roads and alleys) and the removal of road signs.[52]

Post-war wargaming of the plan

In the 1974 wargame conducted at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst,[53] which assumed the Luftwaffe had not yet won air supremacy and continued to divert much of their efforts into bombing London, the Germans were able to establish a beachhead in south-east England. However, the German ground forces were delayed at the "Stop Lines" (such as the GHQ Line), a layered series of defensive positions that had been built, each a combination of Home Guard troops and physical barriers. At the same time, the regular troops of the British Army were forming up. After only a few days, the Royal Navy was able to reach the Channel from Scapa Flow, cutting off supplies and blocking further reinforcement. Isolated and facing regular troops with armour and artillery, the invasion force was forced to surrender.[54]

Planned occupation of Britain

Administration

According to the most detailed plans created for the planned post-invasion administration, Great Britain and Ireland were to be divided into six military-economic commands, with headquarters in London, Birmingham, Newcastle, Liverpool, Glasgow and Dublin.[55] Hitler decreed that Blenheim Palace, the ancestral home of Winston Churchill, was to serve as the overall headquarters of the German occupation military government.[56] A certain source indicated that the Germans only intended to occupy Southern England, and that draft documents existed on the regulation of the passage of British civilians back and forth between the occupied and unoccupied territories.[57] Some Nazi planners envisaged the institution of a nationalities policy in Western Europe to secure German hegemony there, which entailed the granting of independence to various regions. This involved detaching Scotland from the United Kingdom, the creation of a United Ireland, and an autonomous status for Western England.[58]

The OKW, RSHA, (the Reichssicherheitshauptamt) and Foreign Ministry compiled lists of those they thought could be trusted to form a new government along the lines of that in occupied Norway. The list was headed by Oswald Mosley. The RSHA also felt that Harold Nicolson might prove useful in this role.[59] OKW also expected to face armed civilian resistance.

After the war rumours also emerged about the selection of two candidates for the "viceregal" office of Reichskommissar für Großbritannien ("Imperial Commissioner for Great Britain"), which in other occupied territories (such as Norway and the Netherlands) actually entailed the granting of near-dictatorial powers to its officeholders (Josef Terboven and Arthur Seyss-Inquart, respectively).[60] The first of these was Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister and previously an ambassador to Great Britain, the second was Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, an undersecretary in the Foreign Office and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP/AO.[60] However, no establishment by this name was ever approved by either Hitler or the Reich government during the Second World War, and was also denied by Bohle when he was interrogated by the victorious Allies (von Ribbentrop not having been questioned on the matter). After the Second Armistice at Compiègne with France, when he expected an imminent British capitulation, Hitler did however assure Bohle that he would be the next German ambassador to the Court of St. James's "if the British behave[d] sensibly".[60]

British monarchy

A Channel 5 documentary broadcast on 16 July 2009 repeated the claim that the Germans intended to restore Edward VIII to the throne in the event of a German occupation.[61][62] Many senior German officials believed the Duke of Windsor to be highly sympathetic to the Nazi government, a feeling that was reinforced by his and Wallis Simpson's 1937 visit to Germany. However, despite German approaches, "The Duke never wavered in his loyalty to Great Britain during the war", according to a statement by the British Foreign Office.[63]

Death squads

Dr. Franz Alfred Six at Nuremberg (1948)

Had Operation Sea Lion succeeded, Einsatzgruppen ("task forces" which operated as death squads) under Dr Franz Six were to follow the invasion force to establish the New Order. Six's headquarters were to be in London, with regional task forces in Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Edinburgh.[55] They were provided with a list (known as the Black Book) of 2,820 people to be arrested immediately. The Einsatzgruppen were also tasked with liquidating Britain's Jewish population, who numbered over 300,000.[64]

Artworks and newspapers

Six had also been entrusted with the task of securing "aero-technological research result and important equipment" as well as "Germanic works of art". There is also a suggestion that he toyed with the idea of moving Nelson's Column to Berlin.[65]

The RSHA planned to take over the Ministry of Information, to close the major news agencies and to take control of all of the newspapers. Anti-German newspapers were to be closed down.[66]

It appears, based on the German police plans, that the occupation was to be only temporary, as detailed provisions for the post-occupation period are mentioned.[67]

Deportation

According to captured German documents, the commander-in-chief of the German Army, Walther von Brauchitsch, directed that "The able-bodied male population between the ages of 17 and 45 will, unless the local situation calls for an exceptional ruling, be interned and dispatched to the Continent". This represented about 25% of male citizens. The UK was then to be plundered for anything of financial, military, industrial or cultural value,[68] and the remaining population terrorised. Civilian hostages would be taken, and the death penalty immediately imposed for even the most trivial acts of resistance.[69]

The deported male population would have most likely been used as industrial slave labour in areas of the Reich such as the factories and mines of the Ruhr and Upper Silesia. Although they might have been treated less brutally than slaves from the East (whom the Nazis regarded as sub-humans, fit only to be worked to death), living and working conditions would still have been severe.[70]

In late February 1943, Otto Bräutigam of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories claimed he had the opportunity to read a personal report by General Eduard Wagner about a discussion with Heinrich Himmler, in which Himmler had expressed the intention for special forces of the SS to kill about 80% of the populations of France and England after the German victory.[71] In an unrelated event, Hitler had on one occasion called the English lower classes "racially inferior".[72]

In fiction

There is a large corpus of works set in an alternate history where the Nazi invasion of Britain is attempted or successfully carried out.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Führer Directive 16, July 16, 1940.
  2. ↑ Cruickshank, Dan. "The German Threat to Britain in World War Two". BBC History. British Broadcasting Company. Retrieved 7 May 2017.
  3. ↑ "Operation Sealion - History Learning Site". The History Learning Site. Retrieved 7 May 2017.
  4. ↑ Deighton 1996, pp. 23–26.
  5. ↑ Murray 2002, pp. 32–33, 35, Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War, Berlin, 9 October 1939
  6. ↑ Ansel, p.43
  7. ↑ Booth, Owen, and Walton, John. The Illustrated History of World War II (1998), p.70.
  8. ↑ Rob Wheeler, Rob Wheeler, ed. German Invasion Plans for the British Isles 1940 (Bodleian Library 2007), p.9.
  9. ↑ "Hitler planned to halt invasion at Northampton". Northampton Chronicle & Echo. Johnston Press. 28 September 2007. Retrieved 27 June 2013.
  10. ↑ Schenk, p.323
  11. ↑ Schenk, p.324
  12. ↑ Schenk, pp.324–325
  13. 1 2 Schenk, pp.325–327
  14. ↑ Cox, pp.149–150
  15. ↑ Hewitt, Nick p. 109
  16. ↑ Hewitt, Geoff p. 41
  17. ↑ "Next Week May See Nazis Attempt British Invasion". St. Petersburg Times. 1940-08-03. p. 1. Retrieved November 26, 2011.
  18. ↑ Bishop 2010, pp. 70–71.
  19. ↑ John Colville, The Fringes of Power (1986), diary notes on Churchill's 11 July meetings; in Michael I. Handel (November 12, 2012). War, Strategy and Intelligence. Routledge. p. 221. ISBN 978-1-136-28631-5. He emphasised that the great invasion scare (which we only ceased to deride six weeks ago) is serving a most useful purpose: it is well on the way to providing us with the finest offensive army we have ever possessed and it is keeping every man and woman tuned to a high pitch of readiness. He does not wish the scare to abate therefore, and although personally he doubts whether invasion is a serious menace he intends to give that impression, and to talk about long and dangerous vigils, etc., when he broadcasts on Sunday.
  20. ↑ Deighton 1996, p. 51.
  21. ↑ Reagan, Geoffrey. Military Anecdotes (1992) p. 210, Guinness Publishing ISBN 0-85112-519-0
  22. ↑ Overy 2010, pp. 87–88.
  23. ↑ Wright, Gordon (1968). The Ordeal of Total War: 1939–1945. New York: Harper & Row. p. 32.
  24. ↑ Hayward, James. Myths and Legends of the Second World War, p. 214
  25. ↑ Shirer 1960, p. 927.
  26. ↑ Overy 2010, p. 88.
  27. ↑ Bungay 2000, p. 339.
  28. ↑ Fleming, Peter.,Invasion 1940 (Readers Union, London, 1958), p. 273.
  29. ↑ Bungay, Stephen The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain (2000) p. 337
  30. ↑ World At War, pt5, "Alone" (Thames Television 1973).
  31. ↑ Operation Sea Lion – The German Invasion Plans section (David Shears) – p. 160
  32. ↑ Operation Sea Lion – The German Invasion Plans section (David Shears) – p. 156
  33. ↑ Dönitz 1958 (1997 edition), p. 114
  34. ↑ Bungay, Stephen (2000). The Most Dangerous Enemy : A History of the Battle of Britain. London: Aurum Press. ISBN 1-85410-721-6. (hardcover), 2002, ISBN 1-85410-801-8 (paperback) p.110-114
  35. ↑ Bird, Keith W. Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich (2006) p. 171
  36. ↑ "History – World Wars: The German Threat to Britain in World War Two". BBC. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  37. ↑ Churchill, Winston, abridged by Denis Kelly. Memoirs of WWII(Bonanza, 1978 ISBN 0-517-27032-3), p.355.
  38. ↑ Churchill, Memoirs of WWII, p.345.
  39. ↑ Macksey 1990, pp. 144–146.
  40. ↑ Macksey 1990, pp. 209–210
  41. ↑ Deighton, Len Battle of Britain Jonathan Cape, 1980
  42. ↑ Deighton, Len (1993). Blood, Tears & Folly. Jonathan Cape, London. ISBN 0-224-03135-X.
  43. ↑ Fleming, p.237
  44. ↑ Handbook on German military forces - Google Books. Books.google.co.uk. Retrieved 2013-04-08.
  45. ↑ Handbook on German military forces - Google Books p.VI-17 - VI-18
  46. ↑ Kieser, pp. 226
  47. 1 2 Fleming, pp. 257–258
  48. ↑ Fleming, p. 259
  49. ↑ Cox, p. 187
  50. ↑ Frenzel, Eike (2014-08-21). "Hitlers Unternehmen "Seelöwe": Invasion der Amateure" [Hitler's Operation "Sea Lion": Invasion of Amateurs]. Der Spiegel (in German). Hamburg: Spiegel-Verlag. Retrieved 2014-08-21.
  51. 1 2 German Invasion Plans for the British Isles, Ed Rob Wheeler, Bodleian Library 2007, p. 10
  52. ↑ Wheeler, text of plate 7
  53. ↑ http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
  54. ↑ The Sandhurst wargame was fictionalised in Richard Cox (ed.), Operation Sea Lion (London: Thornton Cox, 1974. ISBN 0-902726-17-X). An analysis by F-K von Plehwe, "Operation Sea Lion 1940", was published in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, March, 1973.
  55. 1 2 Rich, Norman (1974). Hitler's War Aims vol. II, p. 397
  56. ↑ Goodall, H. Lloyd (2006). A need to know: the clandestine history of a CIA family. Left Coast Press, Inc., p. 175
  57. ↑ Lampe & Sheffield (2007). The Last Ditch: Britain's Secret Resistance and the Nazi Invasion Plan. Books.google.fi. 2007-03-15. Retrieved 2013-04-08.
  58. ↑ Mazower, Mark (2008). Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis ruled Europe, p. 109. The Penguin Press, New York.
  59. ↑ Kieser, p.249
  60. 1 2 3 Fleming (1957), pp. 260–261.
  61. ↑ "Britain's Nazi King – Revealed July 16th, 2009 : digiguide.tv". Uk-tv-guide.com. 2009-07-16. Retrieved 2012-10-14.
  62. ↑
  63. ↑ Shirer, p. 792,
  64. ↑ Shirer, p.965
  65. ↑ Kieser, p.251
  66. ↑ Kieser, p.247
  67. ↑ Rich (1974), p. 398
  68. ↑ Shirer, p. 943
  69. ↑ Shirer, p. 782
  70. ↑ Shirer, p. 949
  71. ↑ Otto Bräutigam: "So hat es sich zugetragen…" (Holzner Verlag, Germany 1968, p. 590)
  72. ↑ Adolf Hitler: table talk November 5th, 1941 (in: Hitler's Table Talk, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953)

Bibliography

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