Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction

Within Tibetan Buddhism, a distinction is being made between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika as different interpretations of Madhyamaka. The distinction was introduced by Tibetan scholars, who perceived two different approaches toward Madhyamaka in Candrakīrtis writings, and favored Candrakīrtis interpretation of Madhyamaka.

Svātantrika is a category of Madhyamaka viewpoints attributed primarily to the 6th century Indian scholar Bhāviveka. Prasaṅgika views are attributed to Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti. Their approach was called Prāsaṅgika, after the usage of Prasaṅga, a method of logical inquiry which deconstructs any ground for positive (affirmative) statements.

For the Sakya and Nyingma schools, the difference is of minor importance. The key distinction between these viewpoints is whether one works with assertions about the ultimate nature of reality, or if one refrains completely from doing so. If one works with assertions, then that is a Svātantrika approach. Refraining from doing so is a Prāsangika approach.^{[web 1]}

For Tsongkhapa, its most outspoken proponent and founder of the Gelugpa school, but also for the Karma Kagyu school, the difference is of major importance.^{[web 1]} Prasaṅgika as propagated by Tsongkhapa negates any inherent, unchanging identity or self-characterizing essence of phenomena; and, in contrast to Svātantrika, it also negates the identity of phenomena as it appears to normal, everyday perception.

Besides the technical definitions, the styles of the different approaches are notable. Svatantrika style approaches have a more structured syllogistic form, making assertions with argumentation, whereas the Prasangika approach may make assertions, but with significantly less reasonings for those assertions. Instead they mainly point out errors resulting from taking reasonings to logical extremes.

History

Indian Madhyamaka

Madhyamaka originated with the works of Nāgārjuna, and his commentators. The Svatantrika-Prasaṅgika distinction can be traced to the following three commentators:

• Buddhapālita, whom Tibetan tradition credits as the founder of the Prasangika "school," was an early adopter of syllogistic and consequentialist methods in his writings, although of a particularly limited form;
• Bhāvyaviveka, who was influenced by the developing Buddhist logic, and used syllogistic reasoning in his exposition of Madhyamaka. He did so to catch up with these developments in Buddhist logic, and prevent Madhyamaka from becoming obsolete.^[1] His criticisms of Buddhapalita are retrospectively imagined as the foundation of the Svatantrika "school";
• Candrakīrti, who defended Buddhapālita against Bhāvyaviveka, and became regarded by the Tibetan tradition as an important defender of Prāsangika.

The name Prasangika is derived from Prasaṅga, a method of logical inquiry which deconstructs any ground for positive (affirmative) statements. It term refers to Bhāvaviveka's criticism that Buddhapālita ought not to have relied solely on reductio ad absurdum arguments—hence the name "Prāsangika", from prāsanga ("consequence")—but ought to have set forth "autonomous" (svātantra) syllogisms of his own.^{[2][note 1]} Dreyfus and McClintock observe that Bhāvaviveka was more influential in Indian Madhyamaka than was Candrakirti:

In this regard, Bhāvaviveka should probably be seen as quite successful: apart from Candrakirti and Jayananda, nearly all other Indian Madhyamikas were to follow in his footsteps and embrace autonomous arguments as important tools in their endeavors to establish the supremacy of the Madhyamaka view.^[3]

Tibetan Buddhism

Introduction of the distinction

Before the Prāsangika-Svātantrika distinction rose to prominence, other divisions of Madhyamaka were proposed. Jnanasutra (Wylie: ye shes sde , 8th–9th centuries) posited two alternative categories:

1. "Sautrāntika Madhyamika," including Bhāviveka; and
2. "Yogācāra Madhyamaka," including Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra.

When Buddhism was established in Tibet, the primary philosophic viewpoint established there was that of Śāntarakṣita (725–788), a synthesis of Chittamātra and Madhyamaka called Yogācāra-Svatantrika-Mādhyamika.^[4] Later Gelugpa scholars as well as Nyingmapas considered both of the above to constitute subdivisions of Svatantrika, however, under the names of

1. "Sautrantika Svātantrika Madhyamaka"; and
2. "Yogācāra Svātantrika Madhyamaka."

The Prāsangika-Svātantrika distinction was possibly invented by the Tibetan translator Pa tshab nyi ma grags (1055-1145), using the terms Rang rgyud pa and Thal 'gyur ba, which were Sanskritized by modern scholars as Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika.^[5] According to Dreyfus and McClintock, Tibetan scholars state that the distinction "is a Tibetan creation that was retroactively applied in an attempt to bring clarity and order to the study of contemporary Indian Madhyamaka interpretations."^[6]

Tsongkhapa and Gelugpa's strict distinction

The preferred Gelugpa approach, Prāsangika, was represented chiefly by Candrakirti. Classical Indian commenters did not acknowledge Candrakirti as an important Nāgārjuna commentator, but the Tibetan tradition after the 14th century considers his commentary critical.

Tsongkhapa became the most outspoken defender of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction,^{[note 2]} arguing that "the two subschools are separated by crucial philosophical differences, including a different understanding of emptiness and of conventional reality."^[7] According to Tsongkhapa,^{[8][note 3]}

The opponents of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā^{[note 4]} are both (a) the essentialists, who accept that things ultimately have intrinsic nature, and (b) the Svātantrikas, who refute that, but accept that things conventionally have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature.

Though lacking a formal categorization, there are key differences between Tsongkhapa's interpretation of Prāsangika, and earlier forms of Prāsangika.

Moderate alternate approaches

According to Dreyfus & McClintock, "many other Tibetan commentators have tended to downplay the significance of any differences."^[7] Mainstream Sakyas (following Rongtön and Gorampa) hold the position that the distinction between these two schools is merely of pedagogical nature. With regard to the view of the ultimate truth both have no difference.^[9]

The debate is also not strictly along lineage lines, since there are some non-Gelugpa's who prefer Je Tsongkhapa's points, while a notable Gelugpa, Gendün Chöphel, preferred and wrote about Ju Mipham's interpretation.^{[web 2]}

While Lama Tsongkhapa's approach to Madhyamaka is still viewed as authoritative in the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, the 14th Dalai Lama has published works like The Gelug/Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra which are clearly closer to the views of Shāntarakshita and Padmasambhava, and contain a blend of Tantric theory, Chittamātra, and Madyamaka-Prasangika. Other teachers of the various lineages of Tibetan Buddhism also adhere to Prāsaṅgika views, but hold different opinions with regard to the best way to explain emptiness.^[10]

The emptiness of conventional reality

In the Tibetan tradition, the distinction centers around the role of prasaṅga (consequence) in formal debate, and the subsequent implications of statements about the emptiness of phenomena. While Bhavaviveka argued that logical assertions about the nature of the ultimate were necessary, the Prāsaṅgika view holds prāsaṅgika to be the only valid method of demonstrating emptiness of inherent existence. The Prāsaṅgika argue that when attempting to find the correct object of understanding - which is a mere absence or mere negation of impossible modes of existence - one should not use positivist statements about the nature of reality. Positing an essencelessness rather than merely negating inherent identity creates a subtle linguistic and analytic barrier to finding the correct understanding.

A related distinction is between Rangtong-Shentong, which concerns the "nature" of ultimate truth as empty of a self or essence, or as constituting an absolute reality which is "truly existing" and empty of any other, transitional phenomena.

Two truths

Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth or reality, conventional truth and ultimate truth,^[11] to make clear that it does make sense to speak of existence.^[12]Conventionally, we perceive concrete objects which we are aware of.^[12] Yet, this perceived reality is an experiential reality, not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence.^[12] Ultimately, we realize that all phenomena are sunyata, empty of concrete existence.^[12]

This ultimate truth of sunyata does not refer to "nothingness" or "non-existence"; it refers to the absence of inherent existence of phenomena.^[13] Nor does it mean that sunyata is an ultimate reality, or ground of being, beyond conventional reality: "emptiness" is itself also empty of inherent existence.

Insight into the emptiness of phenomena is part of developing wisdom, seeing things as they are. Conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. Buddhapalita says:

What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.

— Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2^[14]

Svātantrika

The Svātantrika are primarily using syllogistic reasoning to arrive at emptiness. According to Tsongkhapa, while this approach is effective, it leaves room to affirm that there is a real, true, and inherent Essencelessness or Emptiness "out there." The Prāsaṅgika approach rejects this reification of emptiness.^[14]

According to Tsongkhapa, for the Svātantrika, a table is not empty of being a table, it is empty of being inherently existent, but the conventional appearance is valid. From the Svātantrika viewpoint, there is - in fact - a conventionally arising self apart from the observer or mental imputation - the constituents of a table, for example - which are thought to be a natural basis for the term "table."

According to Tsongkhapa, the Svātantrika assert that the table is empty of a true self or a truly existent table, while simultaneously asserting that the undesignated object - through the causal nexus that brought it about - is a natural basis for the term. Not only is it a natural basis for the term, but they insist that a practitioner is negating only 'inherence' and should not be negating the 'identity of the table as it appears.' For the Svātantrika, the table still has a self, which is not negated and appears conventionally, but that self is not 'true' in the sense that it is not findable at the material level and that it is nominally designated. This view - in effect and practice - means that the table is already a table before it is mentally designated, from the Prāsaṅgika interpretation of Chandrakirti.

Prāsaṅgika

Tsongkhapa argued that because the Svatantrika conventionally establish things by their own characteristics, they do not arrive at a complete understanding of emptiness. So Tsongkhapa asserted that not only were their methods different but also that students using Svatantrika do not achieve the same realization as those using the Prasangika approach.^[15]

According to Tsongkhapa, the Prāsaṅgika sees the Svātantrika mode of thinking as a subtle form of grasping at inherent existence: one's mind is still searching for some way to hold on to an essence, self, or identity for the table. For the Prāsaṅgika, when analysing a table, the object being negated is not some abstract intellectual concept apart from the table which can be called 'inherent existing', but the conventionally appearing table itself, which appears to naive perception as being inherent, is negated.^{[note 5]} The table is not just empty of inherent existence in some abstract way, but the identity of the table as it appears to normal, everyday perception is also negated.

Ultimate truth and emptiness

Empty of inherent existence or essence

According to Tsongkhapa, prāsaṅgika asserts that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence or essence, because they are dependently co-arisen. All phenomenon in all possible worlds lack inherent existence, and come into existence only relative to a designating consciousness.

At the time of Candrakīrti, the Prāsaṅgika discerned three dependencies:^[16]

1. Pratītyasamutpāda or 'dependent arising' - all phenomena come to be in dependence on causes and conditions, and cease when those causes and conditions are no longer present.^{[note 6]}
2. All wholes are dependent upon their parts, and the parts of wholes are dependent for their existence on the wholes of which they are parts.^{[note 7]}
3. Prajñaptir upādāya or 'dependent designation' - entities are also dependent for their existence as entities on conceptual imputation.^{[note 8]}

According to Tsongkhapa, the most important and primary relationship of co-dependent arising is the third relationship, dependent designation.^{[note 9]} According to Tsongkhapa, Prāsaṅgika are not stating that nothing exists, but hold that nothing inherently exists. They argue that phenomena only come into existence relative to conscious observers who are applying conceptual and nominal conventions to mere experiences. Things and phenomenon do exist co-dependently, based upon a relationship with a knowing and designating mind, but nothing exists in an independent, self-arising, or self-sustaining manner.

The emptiness of emptiness

According to Tsongkhapa, emptiness is also empty of inherent existence: emptiness only exists nominally and conventionally. Emptiness is co-dependently arisen as a quality of conventional phenomenon, and is itself a conventional phenomenon. There is no Emptiness just "floating around out there" or a "great Emptiness from which everything else arises." For example, a table is empty of inherently being a table from its own side. This is referred to as "the emptiness of the table." The Emptiness of the table exists conventionally as a property of that particular table. It is the same with all types of emptiness. There is no "independent Emptiness" or "ultimate Emptiness." Therefore, emptiness is an ultimate truth or reality (a fact which applies to all possible phenomena, in all possible worlds), but it is not an Ultimate Phenomenon (something which has always existed, is self-created, and is self-sustaining).

Non-affirming negation

According to Tsongkhapa, a prominent and important feature of the Prāsaṅgika approach is their use of the non-affirming negation. A non-affirming negation is a negation which does not leave something in the place of what has been negated. For instance, when one says that a Buddhist should not drink alcohol, they are not affirming that a Buddhist should - in fact - drink something else. One is merely negating the consumption of alcohol under a particular circumstance.

According to Tsongkhapa, for the Prāsaṅgika the philosophical position of emptiness is itself a non-affirming negation, since emptiness lacks inherent existence. If one were to describe emptiness as the presence of some quality, it would linguistically and philosophically contradict the nature of the object which it is attempting to characterize. The Prāsaṅgika rarely use words like "essencelessness," "thusness," or "Selflessness." Emptiness itself is a non-affirming negation, so the term being applied to emptiness should not imply that it is an object with an essence or an independent existence.^[14]

Criticism

Nihilism

The criticism of the Prāsaṅgika in Buddhism, and also by some Western scholars, is that it is actually a form of Nihilism: since the Prāsaṅgika have negated the inherent identity of object but have not affirmed anything else, haven't they negated the object's existence completely? Yet, Tsongkhapa argues that the Prāsaṅgika have not negated the object completely, but rather have merely eliminated an impossible mode of existence misattributed to the object.^[14]

Level of realization

As a result of Je Tsongkhapa's view, the Gelugpa lineage establishes a sort of ladder of progressively refined worldviews and identify the Svatantrika view as inferior to the Prasangika. Sakya and Kagyu scholars argued against the claim that students using Svatantrika do not achieve the same realization as those using the Prasangika approach;^[15] According to those critics, there is no difference in the realization of those using the Svatantrika and Prasangika approaches. They also argue that the Svatantrika approach is better for students who are not able to understand the more direct approach of Prasangika, but it nonetheless results in the same ultimate realization.^[15]

Svātantrika in disguise

According to the Padmakara Translation Group,

The Gelugpa interpretation of Prāsangika has often been described by its critics as a form of Svātantrika in disguise, since its presentation of "conventional," as distinct from "true," existence seems very close to the "existence according to characteristics" that Bhavya had ascribed to phenomena on the relative level.^{[20][note 10]}

According to the Nyingma lineage, Ju Mipham was one of the criticasters who argued that Je Tsongkhapa was also a Svatantrika, because of the way he refutes true establishment instead of objects themselves.^[15] According to Ju Mipham, Je Tsongkhapa's approach is an excellent Svatantrika approach, that leads students further but will not lead to the true ultimate until they go further.^[15]

See also

Notes

References

Printed

Web

Sources

Further reading

Primary

• Tsong Khapa (2002), The great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment: Volume 3, Snow Lion Publications, ISBN 1-55939-166-9 
• Shantarakshita; Ju Mipham (2005), The Adornment of the Middle Way, Padmakara Translation, ISBN 1-59030-241-9 

Scholarly

• Cabezon, J. I.; Lobsang Dargyay (2007), Freedom from Extremes. Gorampa's "Distinguishing the View" and the Polemics of Emptiness, Wisdom 
• Vose, Kevin Alan (2005), The Birth of Prāsaṅgika: A Buddhist Movement in India and Tibet, University of Virginia 
• Dreyfus, Georges B.J.; McClintock, L. Sara, eds. (2015), Svatantrika-Prasangika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?, Simon and Schuster 
• Lopez, Donald. A Study of Svatantrika. Snow Lion Publications. Ithaca, New York. (1987)
• della Santina, Peter. Madhyamaka Schools in India. Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi. (1986)
• Phuntsho, Karma. Mipham's Dialectics and Debates on Emptiness: To Be, Not to Be or Neither. London: RoutledgeCurzon (2005) ISBN 0-415-35252-5

External links

• The Buddha Within by S. K. Hookham on Rangtong and Shentong