Vela Incident

Prince Edward Islands
Crozet Islands
Estimated location

The Vela Incident, also known as the South Atlantic Flash, was an unidentified "double flash" of light detected by an American Vela Hotel satellite on 22 September 1979, near the Prince Edward Islands off Antarctica. The most common theory among those who believe the flash was of nuclear origin is that it resulted from a joint South African–Israeli nuclear test.[1][2][3][4] The topic has been highly disputed. In 2016 researchers from George Washington University's National Security Archive noted that the debate over the South Atlantic flash has shifted over the last few years to the side of a man-made weapon test.[5][6][7]

While a "double flash" signal is characteristic of a nuclear weapons test in the atmosphere, the signal could also have been a spurious electronic signal generated by an ageing detector in an old satellite, or a meteoroid hitting the Vela satellite. No corroboration of an explosion, such as the presence of nuclear byproducts in the air, was ever identified. Numerous passes in the area by Boeing WC-135s, planes designed by the U.S. Air Force to detect airborne radioactive dust, were negative. Other examiners of the data, including the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), and defense contractors, have come to the conclusion that the flash was not a result of a nuclear detonation.[8][9][10] Portions of the information about the event remain classified.[5]

Detection

Vela-5A/B Satellites in a clean room. The two satellites are separated after launch.

The "double flash" was detected on 22 September 1979, at 00:53 UTC, by the American Vela satellite 6911, which carried various sensors designed specifically to detect nuclear explosions that contravened the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In addition to being able to detect gamma rays, X-rays, and neutrons, the satellite also contained two silicon solid-state bhangmeter sensors that could detect the dual light flashes associated with an atmospheric nuclear explosion: the initial brief, intense flash, followed by a second, longer flash.[10]

The satellite reported the characteristic double flash of a small atmospheric nuclear explosion of two to three kilotons, in the Indian Ocean between the Crozet Islands (a very small, sparsely inhabited French possession) and the Prince Edward Islands (which belong to South Africa) at 47°S 40°E / 47°S 40°E / -47; 40Coordinates: 47°S 40°E / 47°S 40°E / -47; 40. The previous 41 double flashes the Vela satellites detected were all subsequently confirmed to be nuclear explosions.[11]

Other systems data, such as Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) and Missile Impact Location System (MILS), that were established by the U.S. and NATO to detect Soviet submarines and the locations where used missile test warheads splashed down respectively, was searched in an effort to gain more knowledge on the possibility of a nuclear detonation in the region. This data was found to not have enough substantial evidence of a detonation of a nuclear weapon.[12] Several U.S. Air Force WC-135B surveillance aircraft flew 25 sorties over that area of the Indian Ocean soon after the "double flash" was reported, but they failed to detect any sign of nuclear radiation.[13] Studies of wind patterns confirmed that fall-out from an explosion in the southern Indian Ocean could have been carried from there to southwestern Australia.[14] It was reported that low levels of iodine-131 (a short-half-life product of nuclear fission) were detected in sheep in the southeastern Australian States of Victoria and Tasmania soon after the event. Sheep in New Zealand showed no such trace.[14][15] The Arecibo ionospheric observatory and radio telescope in Puerto Rico detected an anomalous ionospheric wave during the morning of 22 September 1979, which moved from the southeast to the northwest, an event which had not been observed previously.[16]

Bhangmeter light patterns detected by a pair of sensors on Vela satellite 6911 on 22 Sep 1979.

After the event was made public, the US Defense Department clarified that the event was either a bomb blast or a combination of natural phenomena, such as lightning, a meteor, or a glint from the sun.[17] The initial assessment by the United States National Security Council (NSC), with technical support by the Naval Research Laboratory[18] in October 1979 was that the American intelligence community had "high confidence" that the event was a low-yield nuclear explosion, although no radioactive debris had been detected, and there was "no corroborating seismic or hydro-acoustic data."[19] A later NSC report revised this position to "inconclusive" about whether or not a nuclear test had occurred.[20] That same report concluded that if a nuclear test had occurred, responsibility should nevertheless be ascribed to the Republic of South Africa.[20]

Office of Science and Technology evaluation

The Carter Administration asked the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to convene a panel of instrumentation experts to re-examine the Vela Hotel 6911 data, and to attempt to determine whether the optical flash detected came from a nuclear test. The outcome was important to Carter, as his presidency and 1980 re-election campaign prominently featured the themes of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.[21] The SALT II treaty had been signed three months earlier, and was pending ratification by the United States Senate,[21] and Israel and Egypt had signed the Camp David Accords six months earlier.[22]

An independent panel of scientific and engineering experts was commissioned by Frank Press, who was the Science Advisor to president Carter and the chairman of the OSTP, to evaluate the evidence and determine the likelihood that the event was a nuclear detonation. The chairman of this science panel itself was Dr. Jack Ruina of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and also the former director of the U.S. Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency. Reporting in the summer of 1980, the panel noted that there were some key differences in the detected optical signature from that of an actual nuclear explosion, particularly in the ratio of intensities measured by the two detectors on the satellite. The now-declassified report[9] contains details of the measurements made by the Vela Hotel satellite.

The explosion was picked up by a pair of sensors on only one of the several Vela satellites; other similar satellites were looking at different parts of the earth, or weather conditions precluded them seeing the same event.[23] The Vela satellites had previously detected 41 atmospheric tests—by countries such as France and the People's Republic of China—each of which was subsequently confirmed by other means, including testing for radioactive fallout. The absence of any such corroboration of a nuclear origin for the Vela Incident also suggested that the "double flash" signal was a spurious 'zoo' signal of unknown origin, possibly caused by the impact of a micrometeoroid. Such 'zoo' signals which mimicked nuclear explosions had been received several times earlier.[24]

Their report noted that the flash data contained "many of the features of signals from previously observed nuclear explosions",[25] but that "careful examination reveals a significant deviation in the light signature of the 22 September event that throws doubt on the interpretation as a nuclear event". The best analysis that they could offer of the data suggested that, if the sensors were properly calibrated, any source of the "light flashes" were spurious "zoo events". Thus their final determination was that while they could not rule out that this signal was of nuclear origin, "based on our experience in related scientific assessments, it is our collective judgment that the September 22 signal was probably not from a nuclear explosion".[26]

Victor Gilinsky (former member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) argued that the science panel's findings were politically motivated.[16] There was some data that seemed to confirm that a nuclear explosion was the source for the "double flash" signal. There was the "anomalous" traveling ionospheric disturbance that was measured at the Arecibo Observatory in Puerto Rico at the same time,[16] but many thousands of miles away in a different hemisphere of the earth. A test in Western Australia conducted a few months later found some increased nuclear radiation levels.[27] A detailed study done by New Zealand's National Radiation Laboratory found no evidence of excess radioactivity, and neither did a U.S. Government-funded nuclear laboratory.[28] Los Alamos National Laboratory scientists who worked on the Vela Hotel program have professed their conviction that the Vela Hotel satellite's detectors worked properly.[16][29]

Leonard Weiss, at the time Staff Director of the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation, has also raised concerns about the findings of the Ad-Hoc Panel, arguing that it was set up by the Carter administration to counter embarrassing and growing opinion that it was an Israeli nuclear test.[30] Specific intelligence about the Israeli nuclear program was not shared with the panel whose report therefore produced the plausible deniability that the administration sought.[30]

Possible responsible parties

If a nuclear explosion did occur, it occurred within the 3,000-mile-wide (4,800 km diameter) circle covering parts of the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic, the southern tip of Africa, and a small part of Antarctica.[31]

Israel

Well before the Vela Incident, American intelligence agencies had made the assessment that Israel probably possessed its own nuclear weapons.[32] According to journalist Seymour Hersh, the detection was the third joint Israeli-South African nuclear test in the Indian Ocean, and the Israelis had sent two IDF ships and "a contingent of Israeli military men and nuclear experts" for the test.[2] Author Richard Rhodes also concludes the incident was an Israeli nuclear test, conducted in cooperation with South Africa, and that the United States administration deliberately obscured this fact in order to avoid complicating relations with South Africa.[3] Likewise, Leonard Weiss offers a number of arguments to support the test being Israeli, and claims that successive US administrations continue to cover up the test to divert unwanted attention that may portray its foreign policy in a bad light.[4] In the 2008 book The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman stated their opinion that the "double flash" was the result of a joint South African-Israeli nuclear bomb test.[33] David Albright stated in his article about the "double flash" event in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that "If the 1979 flash was caused by a test, most experts agree it was probably an Israeli test".[34]

In 2010, it was reported that, on February 27, 1980, President Jimmy Carter wrote in his diary, "We have a growing belief among our scientists that the Israelis did indeed conduct a nuclear test explosion in the ocean near the southern end of Africa."[35]

Leonard Weiss, of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University writes: "The weight of the evidence that the Vela event was an Israeli nuclear test assisted by South Africa appears overwhelming."[36]

Thomas C. Reed writes that he believes the Vela incident was an Israeli neutron bomb test.[37] The test would have gone undetected as the Israelis specifically chose a window of opportunity when, according to the published data, no active Vela satellites were observing the area. Although the decade-old Vela satellite which detected the blast was officially listed as 'retired' by the US government, it was still able to receive data. Additionally, the Israelis chose to set off the test during a typhoon.[38] By 1984, according to Mordechai Vanunu, Israel was mass-producing neutron bombs.[39]

South Africa

The Republic of South Africa did have a nuclear weapons program at the time,[1] and it falls within that geographic location. Nevertheless, it had acceded to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963,[40] and since the end of apartheid, South Africa has disclosed most of the information on its nuclear weapons programme. According to international inspections and the ensuing International Atomic Energy Agency report, South Africa could not have constructed such a nuclear bomb until November 1979, two months after the "double flash" incident. Furthermore, the IAEA reported that all possible South African nuclear bombs had been accounted for. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report dated 21 January 1980, that was produced for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, concluded that:[41]

In sum, State/INR finds the arguments that South Africa conducted a nuclear test on 22 September inconclusive, even though, if a nuclear explosion occurred on that date, South Africa is the most likely candidate for responsibility.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 of 4 November 1977 introduced a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, which also required all states to refrain from "any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons".[42]

Sasha Polakow-Suransky writes that, in 1979, South Africa was not yet advanced enough to test a nuclear device: "By the first week of October, the State Department had realized that South Africa was probably not the guilty party; Israel was a more likely candidate."[43]

Soviet Union

In 1979, the DIA reported that the test might have been a Soviet test done in violation of the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.[44] The USSR had twenty years earlier in 1959 conducted a few secret underwater tests in the Pacific in violation of the 1958 bilateral moratorium between the Soviet Union and the US (cf. List of nuclear weapons tests of the Soviet Union)[45][46][47] before the 1958 moratorium was unilaterally and officially abrogated by the Soviet Union in 1961.

India

India had carried out a nuclear test in 1974 (codenamed Smiling Buddha). The possibility that India would test a weapon was considered, since it would be possible for the Indian Navy to operate in those waters so far south; however, this was dismissed as impractical and unnecessary (given the fact that India had signed and ratified the Limited Test Ban Treaty or LTBT in 1963, and had complied with it even in its first test, and that India was not hiding its nuclear weapons capability).[48]

Pakistan

An interagency intelligence memorandum requested by the United States National Security Council and entitled "The 22 September 1979 Event" analyzed the possibility of Pakistan wanting to prove its nuclear explosive technology in secret.[49]

France

Since the "double flash", if one existed, could have occurred not very far to the west of the French-owned Kerguelen Islands, it is possible that the French were testing a small neutron bomb[31] or other small tactical nuclear bomb.

Subsequent developments

1981 Los Alamos report as cited.

Since 1980, some small amounts of new information have emerged. However, most questions remain unanswered:

A shorter form of this wording was used in a subsequent National Intelligence Council memorandum of September 1985.[52]

Gerhardt further stated that no South African naval vessels had been involved, and that he had no first-hand knowledge of a nuclear test. In 1993, then President F.W.de Klerk admitted that South Africa had indeed possessed six assembled nuclear weapons, with a seventh in production, but that they had been dismantled (before the first all-race elections of April 1994). There was no mention specifically of the Vela incident or of Israeli cooperation in South Africa's nuclear program.

The newly released research and subsequent report was largely based upon recently declassified documents in files at the National Archives of Gerard C. Smith, a former Ambassador and special envoy on nuclear nonproliferation during Jimmy Carter's presidency.[5][6][7] Smith had once said: "I was never able to break free from the thought that the event was a joint operation between Israel and South Africa." The documents cited a June 1980 U.S. State Department report where Defense Intelligence Agency Vice Director Jack Varona had said the ensuing U.S. investigation was a "white wash, due to political considerations" based on "flimsy evidence." He added that the "weight of the evidence pointed towards a nuclear event" and cited hydroacoustic data analyzed by the Naval Research Laboratory. The data, he suggested, involved "signals… unique to nuclear shots in a maritime environment" and emanating from the area of "shallow waters between Prince Edward and Marion Islands, south-east of South Africa."[5][7][59]

See also

Notes

    Footnotes

    1. 1 2 Von Wielligh, Nic; Von Wielligh-Steyn, Lydia (2015). The Bomb – South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme. Pretoria, ZA: Litera. ISBN 9781920188481. OCLC 930598649.
    2. 1 2 Hersh 1991, p. 271.
    3. 1 2 Rhodes 2011, pp. 164–69.
    4. 1 2 Weiss 2011.
    5. 1 2 3 4 5 Vela Incident: South Atlantic Mystery Flash in September 1979 Raised Questions about Nuclear Test National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 570 (December 8, 2016) Edited by William Burr and Avner Cohen. Retrieved December 8, 2016.
    6. 1 2 "PressTV-'Israel, S Africa conducted nuclear test in 1979'".
    7. 1 2 3 "Declassified documents indicate Israel and South Africa conducted nuclear test in 1979".
    8. ↑ Albright 1994, p. 42.
    9. 1 2 Ruina 1980.
    10. 1 2 3 Richelson 2006.
    11. ↑ Lewiston Morning Tribune 1979, p. 25.
    12. ↑ "The Vela Incident: Nuclear Test or Meteorite?". nsarchive.gwu.edu. Retrieved 2017-04-19.
    13. ↑ USAF 1982.
    14. 1 2 Barnaby 1989, p. 17.
    15. ↑ Polakow-Suransky 2010, p. 139.
    16. 1 2 3 4 Gilinsky 2004.
    17. ↑ Gwertzman, Bernard (26 October 1979). "U.S. Monitors Signs of Atom Explosion Near South Africa". The New York Times.
    18. ↑ Amato 2001.
    19. ↑ National Security Council 1979, p. 2.
    20. 1 2 National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation (January 25, 1980). "Interagency Intelligence Memorandum "The 22 September 1979 Event"" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. p. 11. Retrieved 28 July 2017.
    21. 1 2 Weiss 2011, p. 3.
    22. 1 2 Cohen, Abner; Burr, William (2016-12-08). "What the U.S. Government Really Thought of Israel’s Apparent 1979 Nuclear Test". Politico.
    23. ↑ Ruina 1980, p. 9.
    24. ↑ Ruina 1980, pp. 14–16, 18–19.
    25. ↑ Ruina 1980, pp. 9–11.
    26. ↑ Ruina 1980, p. 19.
    27. ↑ Barnaby 1989.
    28. ↑ Richelson 2007, p. 289.
    29. 1 2 Los Alamos National Laboratory – 1997.
    30. 1 2 Weiss 2011, p. 4.
    31. 1 2 Richelson 2007, p. 296.
    32. ↑ CIA 1974.
    33. ↑ Broad 2008, p. 2.
    34. ↑ Albright 1992, p. 42.
    35. 1 2 Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (Norton and Co., 2010), p. 405.
    36. ↑ Israel’s 1979 Nuclear Test and the U.S. Cover-Up, Leonard Weiss, Middle East Policy Journal, Vol. 18 no. 4, pp. 83–95, Winter 2011
    37. ↑ The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation, By Thomas C. Reed, Danny B. Stillman (2010), p. 177
    38. ↑ The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation, By Thomas C. Reed, Danny B. Stillman (2010), p. 178
    39. ↑ The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation, By Thomas C. Reed, Danny B. Stillman (2010), p. 181
    40. ↑ "Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water". United States Department of State.
    41. ↑ Clarke 1979, p. 11.
    42. ↑ United Nations 1977.
    43. ↑ The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa, by Sasha Polakow-Suransky, (Vintage 2011), p. 138
    44. ↑ Richelson 2007, p. 419.
    45. ↑ "One hell of a gamble by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali" p132.
    46. ↑ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Jan 1985 p33
    47. ↑ Essays of a Soviet Scientists By Vitaliĭ Iosifovich Golʹdanskiĭ p195
    48. ↑ Richelson 2007, § 7: The Double Flash.
    49. ↑ Wilson Center Digital Archive. "Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release]". Retrieved March 23, 2016.
    50. ↑ Hones, Baker & Feldman 1981.
    51. ↑ CIA 1984.
    52. ↑ National Intelligence Council 1985.
    53. ↑ Albright 1994.
    54. ↑ McGreal, Chris (March 10, 2006). "Brothers in arms – Israel's secret pact with Pretoria". The Guardian. London.
    55. ↑ Pike.
    56. 1 2 Albright 1997.
    57. ↑ Bartoli 1999.
    58. ↑ Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea Jeffrey T. Richelson, (W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), p. 314
    59. ↑ "PressTV-'Israel, S Africa conducted nuclear test in 1979'".
    60. ↑ Ariel, Abe. The last war, Collins Australia, 1988, ISBN 0-7322-2416-0, ISBN 978-0-7322-2416-5.

    References

    Further reading

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