Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONA)

The Signal Intelligence Regiment (German:Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung) (abbr. KONA) was the basic element of the field organization of the German Army (Wehrmacht) signal intelligence organization during World War II.^[1][2] The KONA regiment were mobile intelligence gathering units which were assigned to an Army group and operated close to the front lines within the operational Theatre to intercept and build intelligence, via evaluation services (cryptanalysis) and disseminate the intelligence to senior staff locally and in the OKH/GDNA headquarters in the rear.^[3] To quote World War II cryptographic historian, Christos Triantafyllopoulos:

The KONA units did not have the ability to solve complicated Allied cryptosystems. Instead they focused on exploiting low/mid level ciphers and even in this capacity they were assisted by material sent to them by the central cryptanalytic department. This was the German Army High Command's Inspectorate 7/VI

Sources

The remains of Signal Intelligence Regiment 1 (abbr KONA 1) was a signals regiment that surrendered to American troops near Tausing, located close to and northwest of Liezen, Austria on 9 May 1945. Commanded by the fanatical Nazi^[4] Major Ernst Hertzer, the remains of the regiment consisted of around 700 officers, enlisted men and women who were sent to the abbey at Stift Tepl, that was being used as a Prisoner of War enclosure. They had destroyed all their papers on route except those document they considered the most important for reconstruction of their records. The remaining documents were kept in three briefcases plus a single book. On the afternoon of 9 May, with strong rumours of Russians approaching the area, the three briefcases were burned with only the book remaining. The book remained in the unit vehicles after an extensive search and was never found^[5]

Between 23 May and 28 May 1945, over 350 prisoners were screened at a town called Konstantinsbad close to Plzeň in the Czech Republic. All primary personnel were interviewed, with a further 41 chosen for further questioning. Some reports were written at Pilsen but most TICOM documents relating to KONA units were written between 30 May and 2 June at Oberursel near Frankfurt am Main. Further interrogations were undertaken and more specific information given when the group was moved to Revin.^[6] In total, the material created consisted of 31 reports supported with supplements giving information of the makeup and organization of Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklärung unit 1.^[7]

History

KONA 1 operated in the southern sector of the Russian Front from June 1941 until May 1945, intercepting and evaluating Russian Army, Russian Army Air and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) traffic.^[8] Certain personnel within Kona 1 appeared to have succeeded in reconstructing the detailed Order of Battle of the Russian military, and in predicting the timing and location of Russian offensive before they occurred^[9] The results were achieved by close integration of all sources of information as opposed to cryptanalysis of Russian ciphers, although low and medium grade Russian ciphers were read. The ratio of general evaluation against pure cryptanalysis was about three to one which was due to the following:

Russian High Grade ciphers were generally unreadable, due to the use of one-time pads.

A large amount of information could be obtained from Russian military practices, movements of strategic reserves, chain of command, intentions to attack as well as including use of Indicators on ciphers, call-signs and a low standard of Russian wireless discipline.^[9]

From an examination of the cryptographical processes of Russian security, Kona 1 appeared to have determined that one time pads were used for high grade ciphers, and a number of code books and recyphering tables were used for medium and low grade ciphers. Medium and low grade ciphers appear in most cases were within the capability of KONA 1 to be available for reading.^[9]

Captain Roman Roessler, Chief Evaluator of KONA 1, and commanding officer of the Intelligence Evaluation Centre (German:Nachrichten Aufklaerung Auswertungsstelle) (abbr. NASS) of the KONA regiment, stated that even if identification of individual formations wasn't possible, KONA was still successful in formulating a picture of groupings and number of formations. As regards the Russian Rifle Corps and Divisions, KONA had to rely on other means to gather signal intelligence^[10] KONA 1 successes may be considered overenthusiastic.^[11]

Organization

Introduction

The purpose of a KONA regiment was to supply intelligence to the Staff (military) of the Army Corps, Armies and Army Groups. Each KONA unit consisted of an Regimental Evaluation center and possibly 5 or 6 intercept and intelligence companies. The KONA regiment operated with the signal intelligence platoons operating close to the front line, with its companies situated close to army HQ and the main evaluation unit situated in the rear at Army Group Headquarters (abbr. HQ).

Close Range Signal Intelligence Companies (German:Nachrichten Nahaufklärungskompanie) (abbr.NANAK or NAK) were tasked with intercepting low level traffic. These were evaluated as they came in, with all intelligence passed to Senior Staff of their assigned Army Group as it became available, with all intercepts and immediate reports passed back to an evaluation platoon at company headquarters, for further evaluation.

Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies (German: Nachrichten Fernaufklärungskompanie) (abbr. NAFAK or FAK) intercepted high level traffic, undertook some immediate evaluation which was passed to Senior Staff, and also passed back reports and intercepts to the regimental Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre (German:Nachrichten-Aufklaerungs Auswertestelle) (abbr. NAAS).

In 1944, the Signal Intelligence Battalion (German:Nachrichten Aufklaerung Abteilung) (Abbr. NAA) was introduced into the organization of the KONA. These battalions were small administrative units, which acted to co-ordinate unit activities at Army level. Major Hertzer, Commanding Officer of KONA 1 stated that the NAA supervisions were generally elderly soldiers, who duty was to gather opinions and make small adjustments in close range signal, intelligence platoons, i.e. NAZ. Colonel Boetzel, head of the OKH/GdNA, stated that the NAA was not an effective improvement.^[12]

Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre

The NAAS centre was situated close to an Army Group HQ^[9] The NAAS functionality included evaluation and traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, collation and dissemination of intelligence.

1. Four types of activity was included for the Evaluation and Traffic Analysis of intercepts:^[13]
   1. Technical and tactical evaluation of all identified intercepts, i.e. picked up by Long Range units.

   2. Processing of all unidentified intercepts. Traffic analysis from both long and short range units including intercepts which may not be from the enemy armies.

   3. Checking and tactical evaluation of reports from Short Range units.

   4. Traffic analysis, Direction finding evaluation, update of registry card index, NKVD evaluation and Russian Air force intercepts processing.

2. Cryptanalysis in the NAAS primarily meant the solution of unknown systems, the study of developments in known systems, and work on NKVD ciphers and processes. The NAAS worked on 4-figure Russian ciphers.

3. The NAAS was responsible for the dissemination of intelligence, passing its results to the Intelligence Officer of the associated Army Group, and also forwarding the intelligence to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the OKH/GDNA^[14]

4. The NAAS had a key position in the direction of coverage for interception. Through the chain of command, it controlled the intercept coverage for all lower units with co-ordination by staff of the headquarters of OKH/GDNA controlling everything else^[15] Certain items were passed unprocessed straight to the GDNA cryptanalysis unit. Ciphers from the NKVD that were formatted using 5-figure groups were passed automatically to the GDNA cryptanalysis unit for additional cryptanalysis.^[16]

Stationary Intercept Company

The stationary Intercept Companies (1923–1939 German: Feste Horchstelle, 1939–1945 German: Feste Nachrichten Aufklaerungsstelle) (Abbr:Feste or more commonoly FNAST) were designed to work at a lower level to the NAAS, i.e. that of the Army. The intercept were designed in the pre-war period, and although they were retained, their traditional functionality and designation of being fixed (German:Feste Horchstelle) in a single location was redesigned to become semi-motorized for use in the East during the Russian campaign and later. Feste 10, the stationary company of KONA 1, operated close to Army HQ^[17]

Feste 10 consisted of five sections, besides the HQ section. An intercept platoon, controlled by the NAAS,^[18] covered unknown traffic in the 3500-5500 kHz band, fixed NKVD nets assigned by NAAS and those formations of mobile network traffic as directed by NAAS.^[19] An evaluation section identified and reported unknown traffic. The study of unidentified intercepts was a primary function of the Feste.^[20] A cryptanalysis section worked to identify cipher keys, translation of plain-text messages and solutions to cypher's.^[21] The Feste also had a Direction Finding platoon, which provided resources on demand. Communications between the Direction Finding sites and the Regiment were provided by a Communications platoon, which passed results back to the NAAS via telegram or teleprinter.^[21]

Long Range Intelligence Company

These companies (German:Nachrichten Fernaufklaerung Kompanie) (Abbr:FAK) were different from the Feste, in that they were more concerned to a greater degree with identified traffic. Like the Feste, they were semi motorized and were designed to operate close to Army HQ.^[17] They were designed in a manner that each unit should be associated with each army staff covering an army section. In reality however, the operations of these types of companies, and indeed the Feste, took place further and further in the rear. The large amount of work that needed to be undertaken and became heaviest just at the time when safety precautions required a withdrawal, meant that it was found to be more practical to undertake work in the rear where it would be less frequently interrupted.

In gathering intercepts, the FAK's were directed by the cover control section of the Evaluation Centre (NAAS).^[18] The traffic intercepts received by the unit was studied as fully as resources allowed. Plain-text messages were translated, with intercepts with known ciphers were decoded by specialists attached to the unit. A card index section was maintained by the archivist. For those intercepts which couldn't be analysed via cryptanalysis were forwarded to the traffic analysis section of the NAAS.

Close Range Intelligence Company

The Close Range Company (German: Nachrichten Nahaufklaerung Kompanie) (Abbr:NAK) worked at Army Corps level. Its primary task was to intercept and work on low-level 2, 3, and possibly 4 digit ciphers traffic close to the front lines.^[22] Although the unit was designed to work at Army Group level, in practice such companies were also stationed by the commander of regiment with each Army as well^[23] In contrast to the Long Rang Companies, these units were designed to operate by platoon^[17] The operation of each company was divided amongst four platoons which were, Intercept (German:Horchzug), Direction Finding (German:Peilzug), Evaluation (German:Auswertezug) and Communications (German:Sendezug)^[24] The direction finding platoon whose organization was particularly elaborate, operated from tents.^[25]

Each Close Range Company usually had two or three Close Range Signal Intelligence Platoons (Nachrichten Nahaufklaerungszug) (Abbr. NAZ), designed to work below the NAK but still at Army Corps level.

Normal direction finding operations for one company called for an average of eight out-stations, spaced 5 to 10 kilometres from each other and parallel to the front of one to several hundred kilometres. From HQ to the outstation was 20-30 kilometers. Each station was mobile and moved as the fighting moved. For communications wire would sometimes be available, but mostly it was wireless. A normal days operations used approximately 20 receivers, of different designs and types, according to the frequency range they listened too.^[26] Attached to each platoon was a small evaluation section, consisting of 1-3 evaluators^[27] who generally operated out of a captured house or tent near the intercept station^[24] with their results being passed to the Evaluation platoon of the company. Only the simplest systems were worked on at the NAK level, with the majority of the intercepts being passed the NAAS, which studied the intercepts using cryptanalysis and well as for tactical intelligence derivable through traffic analysis.

Operations

Direction Finding

Direction finding (D/F) was perhaps of the greatest importance in signal intelligence activities, as it enabled the location of the enemy. Its importance increased as Russian radio discipline, code and cypher security improved during the latter half of the war^[28] The Kona employed 5 personnel with each forward platoon with 50 D/F personnel stationed at Feste 10 (the long range intercept unit).^[12]

The NAAS evaluation section received raw intercepts from the D/F sections of both the FAK and the NAK. The FAK sent requests not only to the long range but also the close range direction finding sites. Fak 617, which covered the Russian 1st Ukrainian Front, for example, sent its orders both to three or four long range direction finding sites and about 12 close range units. The D/F reported back using enciphered wireless signals^[28]

Long range D/F sets were located 200-350 kilometres behind the front line. 3 D/F sets at particular spot constituted a D/F group^[29] A supervisor who worked at Company level working in the intercept room issued requests. Through this means, simultaneous fixes could be taken by two and frequently by three sites^[30]

Close range D/F sets were located at the NAK platoon level. These sets received requests not only from the Long Range Companies but also the Close Range Headquarters^[29]

Direction finding techniques

The purpose of Direction Finding units was to locate enemy stations which had been identified and where wireless interception was occurring. The site chosen by the D/F unit had to be favourable for good radio reception and minimum magnetic declination. Each unit included two operators, one of whom received messages from other D/F teems, while the second acted as intercept operator, relaying intercepts back to the NAAS.^[2]

The D/F operators had to acquire adeptness in rotating the loop antenna to the point of minimum volume, ascertaining the width of this band of minimum response, and computing the exact azimuth from the marginal readings. Moreover, D/F operations had to be carried out with exceptional speed, since often only one or two call signs or an acknowledgement lasting a few seconds could be intercepted. Extreme care had to be exercised to ensure the NAAS operators weren't deceived. Each operator used a report form on which he entered information regarding the time, frequency, call sign, and fragments of intercepted messages, as well as the szimuths obtained.^[2]

To dispatch D/F teams a transmitter at the intercept center was used. The operator stated the frequency and call sign of the station to be located and the number of the D/F team, so that the azimuth thus taken could be later confirmed by checking. If no teletype communication was available, the D/F data was forwarded to the evaluation center by radio.^[2]

History of Kona Units

Kona 1

To Kona 1 headquarters were subordinated:^[31]

• 1 Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre - NAAS 1
• 1 Stationary Intercept Company - Fest 10
• 1 Close Range Signal Intelligence Company - NAX Preuss
• 2 Signal Intelligence Battalions - NAA 3 and NAA 4

To NAA 3 were subordinated:

• 1 Long Range Signal Intelligence Company - FAK 623
• 1 Close Range Signal Intelligence Company - NAK 953

To NAA 4 were subordinated:

• 1 Long Range Signal Intelligence Company - FAK 617
• 1 Close Range Signal Intelligence Company - NAK 954

KONA Headquarters
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Women
Commander	1	-	-
Adjunct	1	-	-
S-3	1	-	-
Paymaster	1	-	-
Technical Inspector	1	-	-
Clerks		4	2
Truck Drivers		9	-
	5	13	2

The headquarters unit of KONA 1 which worked at Army Group HQ, consisted of the commandant of the KONA, his Adjutant, a Chief of Operations, a paymaster, a technical inspector, clerks and truck drivers. The following statistics show the breakdown of the HQ unit^[32]

NAAS
Section	Officer	Enlisted Men	Women
HQ	1	18	2
Evaluation	6	66	25
Cryptanalysis	1	42	-
Communication	-	21	23
Truck Drivers	-	13	-
	8	160	50

The NAAS of KONA 1 has two major operation subdivisions: a section engaged in evaluation and traffic analysis, and a section for cryptographic activities. There was also an HQ section, a communication line section, a truck drivers section, a communication line section and a section for truck drivers. The number of personnel totaled 8 officers, 160 enlisted men and 50 enlisted women divided as follows:^[32] e subsections and strength of the Feste 10, FAK 617 and FAK 623^[33] The following described the layout of Feste 10:

FESTE 10
Section	Officer	Enlisted Men	Women
HQ	1	18	2
Evaluation	1	25	8
Monitoring Platoon		32	61
Cryptanalysis	1	42	2
Communication Platoon	-	10	-
Truck Drivers	-	13	-
D/F and Intercept	-	50	-
	3	158	73

The Stationary Intercept Company, Feste 10, and the Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies, FAK 617 and FAK 623, were similar in the organization and operation. Each had a HQ Section, monitoring platoons, and evaluation section, a cryptanalytic section and a communication platoon. The difference between Feste 10 and the FAK were minor. Feste 10 was less mobile that the FAK, having eight truck drivers, instead of 12 and 16 assigned to FAK 617 and FAK 623. The following tables show the subsections and strengths of the Feste 10, FAK 617 and FAK 623.

FAK 617
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Women
Headquarters	1	15	3
Monitoring and Intercept	1	91	-
Evaluation	1	33	-
Cryptanalysis	-	20	-
Comms Platoon	-	23	-
Truck Drivers	-	16	-
	5	198	3

FAK 623
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Women
Headquarters	1	14	4
Monitoring and Intercept	1	83	-
Evaluation	1	34	-
Cryptanalysis	-	16	-
Comms Platoon	1	17	-
Truck Drivers	-	12	-
	4	176	4

NAK 954
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Women
Headquarters	1	41	-
Evaluation	1	30	-
Radio Receiving	-	25	-
Comms Platoon	1	18	-
4 Monitoring Platoons	4	112	-
	4	226	-

The Close Range SigInt Company, NAK 954, was also managed and split into a number of subsections:

The NAK operated by platoons, one platoon attached to each Army Corps.^[29] The strength of the platoon was from 20 to 30 men, of which approximately 12 were used for radio telephone intercept, 2 in radio intercept, 4 in D/F and 3 in evaluation. The rest of the platoon compromised clerks, drivers and cooks. For NAK 953, Up to September 1944, it was subordinated to NAA 3 of KONA 1, at the time it was moved to the West, leaving behind its interpreters and cryptanalysts, who continued to server on the eastern front.^[9] NAK Benold, named after its commanding officer, was composed of specialists of various kinds who had been drawn from the SigInt companies subordinate to KONA 1. As a company, it formed part of NAA 3. NAK Preuss was formed from forces withdrawn from other units of KONA 1. This close range company was, in contrast to other companies, subordinated directly to KONA Headquarters.

Kona 2

The Kona 2 organization is not known in detail. It had the following order of battle:^[9]

• 1 Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre, NAAS 2
• 3 Signal Intelligence Battalions, NAA 6,7,8
• 1 Stationary Intercept Company, Feste 7
• 3 Long range Signal Intelligence Companies, FAK 610, FAK 619, FAK 622
• 3 Close range Signal Intelligence Companies, NAK 951,955,958

In February 1945, these components of KONA 2 were split; part of them remained with KONA 2, which was reassigned from Army Group North to Army Group Weichsel; part of them were attached to KONA Nord, which took the place of KONA 2 with Army Group North. The original components were divided between the two KONA in the following way:^[34]

KONA 2:

• 2 Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies, FAK 610, 622
• 1 Close Range Signal Intelligence Company, NAK 958
• 1 Stationary Intercept Company, Feste 7

KONA Nord:

• 1 Long range Signal Intelligence Company, FAK 619
• 1 Close Range Signal Intelligence Platoon, NAZ Brutus
• 2 Close Range Signal Intelligence Companies, NAK 951, NAK 955
• 1 Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre, NAAS 2

This remained the general structure until 28 March 1945, when by order of General Albert Praun to return KONA Nord units to KONA 2, except the Close Range Signal Intelligence Companies NAK 951, and NAK 955^[34]

Kona 3

KONA 3 was composed of one NAA (10),^[35] one FAK (possibly 611, which was transferred to the west under KONA 6 in October 1944),^[35] one NAK, one FESTE. Nothing further is known about KONA 3, as it ended up caught by the Russians in a pocket in Kurland, a region in Latvia, towards the end of the war and captured intact by the Red Army^[36][37]

Kona 4

Kona 4 was subordinated to the Commanding Officer Southeast, OB Südost (German:Befehlshaber Suedost), who controlled the German Armies of the Balkans^[38] These armies responsibility was one of an occupational force and there KONA 4 added to its normal task of intercepting long range traffic emanating from the Middle East and Africa, i.e. that of monitoring the traffic of the occupied Balkan countries. For this reason KONA 4 included no mobile Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies and only two mobile Close Range Signal Intelligence companies. The other units belonging to KONA 4 were NAAS 4, and two Feste, Feste 5 and Feste 6^[38]

NAAS 4

NAAS 4 code name was HASSO, which stood for Horchauswertestelle Suedost (Listening from the Southeast), Intercept Evaluation Station Southeast^[39] NAAS 4 was divided into the cryptanalysis section, a D/F section, a tactical and final evaluation sections.^[40] The NAAS 4 unit has around 90 men, including interpreters, decoders, cryptanalysts, evaluators, draughtsmen, drivers, telephonist and wireless operators.^[41]

Feste 5

Feste 5 was the former Army Fixed Intercept Station at Graz. The unit has the sections:

• HQ
• Radio intercept section.
• Radio operation and maintenance section for radio transmitter.
• Cryptanalysis section.
• Evaluation section for D/F activities.

The unit had a headcount of around 170 men and operated around 50 radio intercept sets. It had the usual mix of staff prevalent in KONA 1 Feste.

Feste 6

Feste 6 was the former Army Fixed Intercept Station at Tulln. It had a strength of around 130 personnel^[41] and similar sectioned layout as Feste 5.

NAZ T

Kona 4 had two Close Range Signal Intelligence Platoons: NAZ T and NAZ W.

NAZ T consisted of 42 men, among them was Turkish linguists, cryptanalysts and interpreters.^[41] NAZ T had the following layout:

• Platoon HQ
• Radio intercept station with 10 sets.
• Radio maintenance section
• D/F Platoon
• Cryptanalysis section for Turkish communications only
• Final evaluation section for D/F

NAZ W

NAZ W consisted about 80 personnel who specialized in monitoring internal Balkan radio traffic.^[41] It was organized as follows:

• Platoon HQ
• Radio intercept station.
• Radio maintenance section
• D/F Platoon
• Cryptanalysis section
• Final evaluation section for D/F

The KONA unit had a Radio Controlled Station, or Broadcast Monitoring Point (German:Rundfunkueberwachungstelle) which was part of KONA 4 until it was dissolved in 1942.^[41]

Kona 5

KONA 5 was located on the Western Front for much of World War II and was the only unit of that type located there, until the establishment of KONA 7 in February 1943. Before February 1944, the KONA 5 organization consisted of NAAS 5, Feste 2, 3,9 and 12, as well as two Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies, FAK 613 and FAK 624^[42] Sometime after February 1944, KONA 5 was changed.^[43] The reorganisation of KONA 5 follows the change in the German order of battle which took place on the western front in early 1944. Prior to that time, the western armies had been under command of Army Group D to which KONA 5 was attached. However, in early 1944, Army Group D was absorbed into OB West (German:Oberbefehlshaber West) which took control of three newly formed Army Groups on the western front, Army Group B, Army Group H and Army Group G. KONA 5 was reorganized so that it contained:

• Three NAA: NAA 12, 13 and 14. NAA 12 was attached to Army Group D, NAA 13 to Army Group B and NAA 14 to Army Group G^[44]

In regard to the subordination of the six component parts of KONA 5 to the three NAA units, there is disagreement between the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre publication^[42] and a TICOM interrogation report.^[35][45]

According to the TICOM report: Feste 12 combined with Feste 3 to form NAA 12; Feste 2 and 9 combined with FAK 613 to form NAA 12. There was no indication whether FAK 624 combined with other companies when it formed NAA 14.

Kona 5 organization remained constant throughout most of 1944. In late 1944, an attempt was made to centralize and strengthen the western field organization. A new senior communication intelligence officer (German:Hoeherer Kommandeur der Nachrichten Aufklaerung) (Abbr. Hoeh Kdr D Na) was established. The new Commander, Colonel Kopp was attached to OB West (German:Oberbefehl-shaber West) and was made responsible for all signal intelligence activities in the west^[46] The western field organisation was strengthened by moving KONA 6 from the eastern front to the western front to join KONA 5. Both KONA unit's were subordinated to Colonel Kopp: KONA 5 was assigned to Army Group D, which controlled the German armies on the southern end of the western front, and KONA 6 was attached to Army Group B which controlled the German armies on the northern end of the western front^[47]

With KONA 6 move to the west, KONA 5 organization was modified. The Signal Intelligence Battalions were reduced to two, NAA 12 and NAA 14. NAA 13 which had been composed to two Stationary Intercept Companies: Feste 2 and 9, and one Long Range Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 613, was taken from KONA 5, broken up and its individual components reassigned. Feste 2 was placed under direct supervision of Colonel Kopp; Feste 9 was shifted from Norway to Italy, where it fell under KONA 7; and NAA 12 with FAK 613 was assigned to KONA 6. KONA 5 was compensated for the loss of FAK 613 by the addition of FAK 626, which was taken from one of the eastern front KONA, (perhaps KONA 8) and brought to the western front.^[35][42]

During Spring 1945, KONA 5 was organized as: One evaluation centre: NAAS 5, with two battalions: NAA 12 and NAA 14, one Stationary Intercept Company: Feste 12, one Long Range Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 624 which was subordinated to NAA 14, one Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 626. This was the organisation of KONA 5 until the capitulation.

1. NAAS 5 was located close to Paris at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The unit had about 150 personnel, consisting of interpreters, cryptanalysts, evaluators, Draughtsman, switchboard operators and telephonists, drivers, clerks. In addition, some women auxiliaries were available, particularly for telephonist and switchboard work. The internal organization of NAAS 5 is not known^[43]

2. Feste 12: The unit was subordinated to NAAS 5 until early 1944, when it joined with Feste 3 to form NAA 12. Feste 12 organisation consisted of a radio intercept platoon, and a telephone communication unit. When it was attached to NAAS 5, Feste 12 has no cryptanalysis or evaluation personnel since this work was being done at NAAS 5. The strength of Feste 12 was estimated at 120 men and 30 women auxiliaries^[48]

3. Feste 2: According to a prisoners account^[48] the organization of Feste 3, the former Army (Wehrmacht) intercept station at Münster, closely approximated Feste 3. It had a radio intercept platoon, a D/F platoon, and an evaluation platoon consisting of two sections: one for the evaluation of content of messages, content evaluation (German:Inhaltsauswertung) and one for the evaluation of traffic, traffic analysis (German:Verkehrsauswertung). In 1944, Feste 2 combined with Feste 9 and FAK 613 to form NAA 13. When NAA 13 was broken up in November 1944, Feste 2 was subordinated directly to the Senior Commander of Signal Intelligence in the West, Major General William Gimmler.

4. Feste 3. Fest 3 was the original Army intercept station at Euskirchen. Early in the war it had been subordinated to KONA 5. Administered independently in 1944, it combined with Feste 12 to form NAA 12. When KONA 5 was reorganized in the fall of 1944, Feste 3 was combined with the Long Range Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 626, which had been brought from the Eastern Front to form NAA 14. This organization was valid until the end of the war^[49] The internal organization of Feste 3 is described by a liaison officer, Lt. Hans Lehwald, who was attached to it. He stated that it consisted of a radio reception platoon of approximately 70 receivers, and an evaluation platoon of 25-30 men. The evaluation was broken into section for traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, evaluation, D/F and filing section for diagrams of the nets, call signs, personalities, code names and D/F results^[50]

5. Feste 9. Feste 9 was a Stationary Intercept Company formed in Frankfurt in the Spring of 1942 and sent to Norway in July of that year. It was first stationed at Trondheim, later in Bergen, and in the Spring of 1944 at Ski near Oslo. Between the summer of 1944 and the following winter, most of the personnel were moved to Italy and by Christmas 1944, there was nothing left of the unit in Norway^[51] While in Norway, Feste 9 was organized along the lines of a Long Range Signal Intelligence Company, with a HQ platoon, an intercept platoon· or BO-120men, a D/F platoon, a radio reconnaissance platoon of about 20 men, and an evaluation section of about 30 men. The evaluation section had one subsection for the evaluation of message contents one for traffic, and one for cryptanalysis^[51] When in Norway, Feste 9 was, subord1nated to KONA 5. It can be surmised, however, that its connection with KONA was always more flexible than that other units because of its geograph1cal position in Norway. When NAA 13 was broken up, Feste 5 rema1ned under the supervision of KONA 5 until it was shifted to Italy under KONA 7^[52]

6. FAK 624. FAK 624 was formed at Montpellier on 16 April 1943 and attached to KONA 5^[49] In February 1944, FAK 624 was subordinated to NAA 14 of KONA 5, and in late Autumn it combined with Feste 3 to form the reorganized NAA 14.^[47] The unit was composed of an intercept platoon and an evaluation platoon. For transport, FAK 624 is said to have approximately 85 vehicles with six special French radio trucks and trailers for D/F equipment. The strength of the company was roughly 250 men including interpreters, code clerks, cryptanalysts, radio intercept operations and 90 drives.^[49]

7. FAK 613. FAK 613 belonged to KONA 5, in so far as is known from its inception. In February 1944 FAK 613 combined with Feste 2 and Feste 9 to form NAA 13. When this battalion was broken up in late 1944, FAK 613 was reassigned to KONA 6, where it remained until the end of the war.^[47] Little is known about the organization outwith its organization paralleled that of FAK 624.^[48]

8. FAK 626. FAK 626 was established in August 1943, trained until January 1944 and was activated in Winniza. It was subordinated to an eastern KONA, perhaps KONA 8 and was stationed in the Ukraine. In October 1944, FAK 626 was sent to Landau where it was tutored in western traffic and reorganized. In November 1944, it met FAK 624 at Landau, and both units were sent west to KONA 5 with which they remained until the end of the war.^[53] The strength of FAK 626 on the Russian Front was around 250-300 men of whom 80-100 men were intercept operators, 10-15 D/F operators, 10-15 cryptanalysts, 5-7 translators, 10 were traffic analysts. The unit was greatly under strength on the Western Front.^[54]

Kona 6

KONA 6 was created and activated as an eastern KONA at Frankfurt in 1941 and stationed in the Crimea to work in the Caucasian campaign. After that campaign, it was reassigned to work on the interception of Russian partisan traffic. This remained its task until the KONA was reassigned to work in the western front.

There is little information about what KONA 6 did while it was in the east. As a western KONA, it had two Signal Intelligence Battalions: NAA 9 and NAA 12.

NAA 9 had been brought from the east in November 1944. Subordinated to it were the Close Range Signal Intelligence Company: NAK 956, which was established in October 1944 and the Long Range Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 611, which had been brought from the east at the time.

NAA 13, which had been assigned to KONA 6 from KONA 5 with the Long Range Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 613. Subordinated to NAA 12 were also FAK 610 which had been brought from the east in November 1944; and NAK 953 which had been reassigned from the east also in October 1944.

1. FAK 613. FAK 613 was given by KONA 5 to KONA 6 in late 1944. Nothing is known of the organization of this unit, but was likely the same as other Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies.^[48]

2. FAK 611. FAK 6111 was active in the Eastern front during the Russian campaign from June 1941. It was also stationed in Poland, where it was attached to Army Group Centre.^[55] In November 1944, FAK 611 was moved to the western front and subordinated to KONA 6, NAA 9^[47] Nothing is known about the size of FAK 611 on the eastern front. On the western front, it was small enough to occupy a house in Zutphen, the Netherlands. It consisted of 30-40 radio and telephone operators, 10 cryptanalysts and decoders, and 25 evaluators^[56]

3. FAK 610. FAK 610 was activated in 1940 for operations on the eastern front^[57] Subordinated to KONA 2, it worked at Tilsit in September 1940 and later settled at Volkhov, where it intercepted Russian traffic. In November 1944, it was transferred to the western front where it was subordinated to NAA 13 of KONA 6^[47]

Kona 7

KONA 7 was established in February 1943 and subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief South (OB Süd), Albert Kesselring who controlled the Armies in Italy. In 1944, KONA 7 was made up as follows:^[58]

• 1 HQ Unit.
• 1 Signal Intelligence Evaluation Centre: NAA 7, with a code-name of Krimhilde
• 2 Stationary Intercept Companies: Feste 1 and Feste 9, with code-names of Monika and Astrid
• 1 Long Range Signal Intelligence Company: FAK 621 with code-name of Erika

1. NAAS 7. NAAS 7 was organized into cryptography, cryptanalysis, evaluation. The evaluation sections included immediate, tactical, D/F, traffic, content, and final evaluation. The strength of the evaluation centre was about 150 men.^[59]

2. Feste 1. Feste 1, the former Army intercept station in Stuttgart, which had been stationed in Strasbourg in 1940, Brittany in 1941, and later that year in Montpellier, moved to Italy and was attached to KONA 7 in 1943^[59] The main task of Feste 1, was interception. No evaluation was done by the personnel who consisted of radio intercept operations, telegraph and telephone operators and D/F operators.^[58]

3. Feste 9. The origin of Feste 9 is described under KONA 5.

4. FAK 621. FAK 621 was created in 1942 from the remnants of former intercept (German:Horch Kompanie) 3rd company NA 56 Bielefeld.^[60] Most of the original FAK 621 was captured in the North African Campaign on 10 July 1942. The remnants of the company continued to work on Allied systems until May 1943, when the Allies captured the unit in Tunisia^[61] Nothing is known of the organization of the company.

Kona 8

KONA 8, which was formed in October 1944 was assigned to the Eastern Front Army Group South. It had one Evaluation Centre: NAAS 8, 2 Signal Intelligence Battalions, NAA 1 and NAA 2,^[47] one Long Range Battalion: FAK 620, one Close Range Signal Intelligence Company whose identity is unknown, and one Stationary Intercept Company, either Feste 4 or Feste 8. It was known that Feste 8 attempted in the winter of 1942-3 to intercept Russian radio telephone traffic at Königsberg, but is not certain to what eastern KONA this Feste was assigned.^[62]

FAK 620

FAK 620 had monitored western traffic on the Norderney Island from about August 1939 until it was sent to the eastern front and subordinated to KONA 8^[53] Nothing more is known of the units.

Kona Nord

KONA Nord was created in February 1945 to serve Army Group North when KONA 2, which had been attached to that group, was transferred to Army Group Weichsel. From KONA 2, KONA Nord received NAAS 2, FAK 619, NAK 951, NAK 955, NAZ Brutus. This organization was valid until 28th Match 1945, when by order of General Albert Praun, KONA Nord was ordered to return to Army Group Weichsel all its components except the two Close Range Signal Intelligence companies: NAK 951 and NAK 955. These probably remained with KONA Nord until the capitulation^[34]

NAA 11

NAA 11 was a field using unique in the General der Nachrichtenaufklärung organization. Although it was assigned to the 20th Mountain Army (German: Gebirgsarmee), in matters of signal intelligence it was an independent unit subordinated directly to Intercept Control Station East (HLS Ost) acting in all respects like a Signal Intelligence Regiment^[63]

The original code of NAA 11 was the Long Range Signal Intelligence Platoon designated North (German:Nachrichten Fernaufklaerungszug Nord) (abbr. FAZ Nord) which operated Finland after 1941. One 1 March 1944, FAZ Nord was merged with the Close Range Signal Intelligence Company:NAK 961 to form NAA 1. In Autumn 1944, after Finland's capitulation, NAA 11 retreated to Norway.^[63] In May 1945, when it was located as Gjovik, Norway, it was ordered to turn over all its documents and paper to the 20th Mountain Army and to organize a group which would incorporate the experience and knowledge of the unit.^[64] This party became known as the The Norway Party and their published reports became TICOM documents I-55 and I-106.

TICOM Publications

The Target Intelligence Committee was a project formed in World War II by the United States to find and seize German intelligence assets, particularly signals intelligence and cryptographic ones. The archive consists of 11 primary documents Volume I to Volume IX. These primary volumes, are aggregate summary documentation, each volume targeting a specific German military agency. The archive also consists of Team Reports, DF-Series, I-Series, IF-Series and M-series reports which cover various aspects of TICOM interrogation and amount to over 1500 documents. The following documents are referenced in this article.

• "TICOM I-23 Interrogation of Major Ernst Hertzer of Army Signals Intelligence Service 18th June 1945" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 27 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-62 Field Interrogation of Paul Raatz of the German Army Signals Intelligence (1933-1945) 19th August, 1945" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 2 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-19ab Report on Interrogation of KONA 1 at Revin, France, June 1945" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 2 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-19c Interrogation of KONA 1 - Annexe 1 Report on Russian Ciphers" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 2 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-19d Interrogation of KONA 1 - Annexe 1 Figures I to XVII" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 2 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-19f Interrogation of KONA 1 - Annexe 2 Traffic Analysis" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 2 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-19g Interrogation of KONA 1 - Annexe 3 German Army (Eastern Front) SIGINT Organization and Method" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 2 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-67 Paper of Dr. Otto Buggisch of OKH/IN. 7/VI and OKW/Chi on Cryptanalytic Machines" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 2 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-76 Prisoner of War Interrogation Reports" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 25 February 2017. 
• "TICOM DF-9 Translation of OKW/Chi Activity Report 1st January 1944-25th June 1944" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 27 February 2017. 
• "TICOM I-198 Short Brown List, July 1946." (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 11 March 2017. 
• "TICOM I-78 Interrogation of Oberstlt. Mettig on the History and Achievements of OKH/AHA/ln 7/VI, 15 May 1945." (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 21 March 2017. 
• "TICOM I-55 "Interrogation of Seven Members of NAA 11. 12th July 1945" (PDF). TICOM. Retrieved 21 March 2017. 

Missing TICOM Documents

The following TICOM documents are not currently available on the open inter-networks but may be available on the external link below at National Archives and Records Administration. If they are not available there, then they are still considered Top Secret but may be available via an NSA FOIA request.

• TICOM DF-18 "Russian Decryption in the Former German Army" by Dettmann and Samsonow.
• TICOM I-116 "Interrogation of Ltn. Alex Dettmann and Oberwachtmeister Sergius Samsonow of OKH (Gen.d.NA) at Oberursel, Germany, during August 1945."
• TICOM IF-171 "Report on Further Information obtained from Uffz. Kotschy and Uffz. Boscheinen both of Festungs art Abt 1518, deserted at Diffenbach 22 November 1944."
• TICOM IF-120 "First detailed interrogation report on Thomas Barthel."

• IF-144, IF-127, IF-10, IF-40 still remain secret and have not been released by the NSA.

References

External links

• TICOM Documents at NARA