Operation Skorpion

Operation Skorpion or Unternehmen Skorpion, from 26–27 May 1941, was a military operation during the North African Campaign of the Second World War, fought between Axis forces under Colonel Maximilian von Herff and British forces under Lieutenant-General William "Strafer" Gott. A counter-attack was made on British positions at Halfaya Pass in north-western Egypt, which had been captured during Operation Brevity (15–16 May). Unternehmen Skorpion was the second offensive operation commanded by Rommel in Africa (apart from the Siege of Tobruk) and pushed the British out of Halfaya Pass, back to the area from Buq Buq to Sofafi. The Germans and Italians fortified the pass and built other strong points back towards Sidi Azeiz as tank killing zones, ready to meet another British attack. The British continued preparations for Operation Battleaxe (15–17 June). (Battleaxe was another costly British failure that led to the sacking of General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East and other senior officers.)

Background

Unternehmen Sonnenblume

After the great British victory over the Italian 10th Army in Operation Compass, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, the German armed forces high command) began Unternehmen Sonnenblume (Operation Sunflower), the dispatch of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK, Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel) to Libya to reinforce the remnants of the 10th Army. Rommel attacked at once and drove the British forces from Cyrenaica across the Egyptian border, except for the port of Tobruk, where a nine-month siege began. By 8 April, advanced German units had reached Derna east of the Jebel Akhdar but some units had run out of water and fuel at Tengeder. A column of reconnaissance, anti-tank, machine-gun and artillery units was sent ahead to block the eastern exit from Tobruk and on 10 April, Rommel made the Suez Canal the DAK objective.[1] A break-out from Tobruk was to be prevented and next day the port was invested; Reconnaissance Unit 3 went on to Bardia and a composite force was sent to Sollum, about 15 kilometres (9.3 mi) into Egypt, to try to reach Mersa Matruh. The Mobile Force (Brigadier William Gott) improvised by the British, conducted a delaying-action on the frontier around Sollum and Fort Capuzzo and from Halfaya Pass eastwards to Sidi Barrani.[1] The first Italo-German offensive had been an operational success but supply constraints made it impossible to advance further than the Egyptian border. The Axis forces were distracted by the siege of Tobruk, while the British began to rebuild their strength in Egypt.[2]

Halfaya Pass

The Western Desert, is about 390 kilometres (240 mi) wide, from Mersa Matruh in Egypt to Gazala on the Libyan coast. The Litoranea Balbo (Via Balbia) was the only paved road. The Sand Sea 150 miles (240 km) inland to the south, marks the limit of the desert, which is widest at Giarabub and Siwa Oasis. In British parlance, the Western Desert came to include eastern Cyrenaica in Libya. From the coast, extending inland lies a raised, flat plain of stony desert about 500 feet (150 m) above sea level, 120–190 miles (200–300 km) wide, with the Sand Sea beyond. Westwards from Sofafi in Egypt, there are few places where the escarpment can be traversed north/south by wheeled or tracked vehicles. Scorpions, vipers and flies populate the region, which is inhabited by a small number of Bedouin nomads.[3] Halfaya Pass is a gap in the escarpment near Sollum, about 1-kilometre (0.62 mi) inland from the coast. British forces attacked in Operation Brevity (15–16 May), through Halfaya Pass, against the desert flank of the Axis forces, to reach Sidi Azeiz beyond Fort Capuzzo in Libya and destroy any Axis forces met during the advance. The attack was repulsed except at Halfaya Pass, which was captured by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and then garrisoned by the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards (Lieutenant-Colonel J. Moubray), a squadron of Infantry tanks from the 4th Royal Tank Regiment (4th RTR, Major C. G. Miles), field, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, with the 7th Support Group of the 7th Armoured Division on the southern flank.[4][5]

Prelude

Operation Brevity

Operation Brevity area of operations

Operation Brevity (15–16 May) was a limited British offensive, planned as a rapid blow against weak Axis front-line forces around Sollum, Fort Capuzzo and Bardia on the Egyptian–Libyan frontier. The port garrison of Tobruk, 100 miles (160 km) to the west, had resisted Axis attacks and its Australian and British troops endangered the Axis supply line from Tripoli, which led Rommel to give priority to the siege, leaving the front line thinly held. The British objectives were to capture ground, from which to begin an offensive toward Tobruk and to inflict attrition on the German and Italian forces. On 15 May, Gott attacked with a mixed infantry and armoured force in three columns.[5]

Halfaya Pass was taken against determined Italian opposition and in Libya, the British captured Fort Capuzzo but German counter-attacks regained the fort during the afternoon, causing many casualties among the defenders. The operation had begun well and had thrown the Axis commanders into confusion but most of its early gains were lost to counter-attacks and with German reinforcements arriving from Tobruk, the operation was called off. Gott became concerned that his forces risked being caught in the open by German tanks and conducted a staged withdrawal to the Halfaya Pass on 16 May.[5]

Plan

Unternehmen Skorpion was intended to recapture Halfaya Pass by a demonstration on a wide front, to bluff the British into a withdrawal. On the frontier, Kampfgruppe von Herff (Oberst Maximilian von Herff), included Panzer Regiment 8 and troops from Motorised Infantry Regiment 15, Reconnaissance Battalion 33 and a battalion of Rifle Regiment 104. The panzer regiment had 160 tanks but insufficient fuel and only 70 panzers were used in the attack. The Kampfgruppe was divided into Group Wechmar on the right, with much of the artillery, that was to perform a flanking move to the right towards Deir el Hamra. In the centre, Group Cramer with most of the tanks, was to advance on Sidi Suleiman to the south-west of the pass and on the left (coastal) flank, Group Bach was to advance close to the escarpment against the British infantry positions, where there was bad going for tanks. Group Knabe was held in reserve and if the British stood their ground, Group Wechmar and Group Cramer were to concentrate before attacking.[6]

Battle

Halfaya Pass

During the evening of 26 May, Kampfgruppe von Herff assembled on the coast at the foot of Halfaya Pass. The kampfgruppe attacked the next morning, intending to bluff the British into retiring from the plateau above the escarpment. A panzer battalion west of Fort Capuzzo manoeuvred as a decoy, to give the British the impression that an outflanking move was under way on the desert flank.[7][8][9] Only Group Bach encountered opposition and in the afternoon, Herff ordered the tanks of Group Cramer to move northwards to defeat the British at Halfaya. The move took place during the night and at dawn on 27 May, Group Knabe attacked the head of the pass, Group Bach attacked the foot and the panzers appeared at the top of the escarpment and bombarded the coastal plain. The commander of the nine 4th RTR tanks at Halfaya, ordered an advance to engage the German tanks and during the morning, Gott authorised a withdrawal. Moubray managed to extricate the battalion, although some Guards were captured at the bottom of the pass by Group Bach.[10] There were no British forces near enough to reinforce and the pass was re-occupied by Axis troops.[11]

Aftermath

Analysis

Example of a German 50 mm PAK 38 anti-tank gun

The German successes during Operation Brevity and Unternehmen Skorpion were a consequence of the technical superiority of some German equipment, particularly in anti-tank guns and wireless. German field intelligence gleaned and quickly exploited tactically useful information from British wireless signals and captured documents. British intelligence had the advantage of Ultra decrypts, particularly from Luftwaffe signals but the time taken to send the information from England to Cairo and then deliver it to the commanders on the frontier, made much of it obsolete, even when it contained useful tactical information. Rommel was able secretly and rapidly to reinforce the frontier posts from Tobruk, when Operation Brevity began and then spring the surprise at Halfaya Pass on 27 May.[12] (The garrison at Tobruk had made two small raids during Operation Brevity but the commander had not been informed of the operation until 17 May.)[13]

Casualties

British casualties were 173 men, four 25-pounder field guns, eight 2-pounder anti-tank guns and five Infantry tanks.[9] Herff reported that forty prisoners, nine 25-pounder field guns, seven Matilda (A12) tanks and two other tanks had been captured.[14]

Tiger Convoy

On 12 May, the Tiger convoy had arrived in Alexandria with 238 tanks and 43 Hawker Hurricane fighters.[15] The tanks included 21 × Light Tank Mk VI, 82 × Cruiser tanks (including fifty of the new Crusader tanks) and 135 × Infantry tanks.[16] There were delays in unloading the tanks, which also had to be adapted for desert use so Battleaxe was postponed until 10 June.[17] The tanks were intended for the 7th Armoured Division, which had been out of action since February, after most of its tanks were worn out during Operation Compass.[18]

Subsequent operations

Axis defensive preparations

Tanks, Cruiser, Mk VI (Crusaders), photographed in September 1941

After the re-capture of Halfaya Pass, the Axis forces fortified the Gazala line and the siege lines around Tobruk in Libya and the 5th Light Afrika Division was withdrawn on 8 June, to refit at El Adem near Tobruk and replaced on the frontier with the 15th Panzer Division (Generalmajor Walter Neumann-Silkow), with three Italian infantry battalions and an artillery regiment from the 102nd Motorised Division Trento in support at Sollum, Musaid and Capuzzo. The Axis troops built a defensive line just over the border in Egypt, based on Halfaya Pass, in an arc through Qalala and Hafid Ridge 6 miles (9.7 km) south-west of Fort Capuzzo to Sidi Azeiz.[17][19][lower-alpha 1] Rommel adopted the defensive tactics which had been used to defeat the Axis attack on Tobruk at Ras el Medauar in late April.[13]

Six strong points were built in which 88 mm guns and 50 mm PAK 38 anti-tank guns were dug in down to their barrels, camouflaged and organised for all-round defence. Even with a relatively small force on the frontier, supply difficulties made stocking the defences with water, fuel and ammunition difficult. Hauptmann Wilhelm Bach, the commander of the anti-tank unit that contained most of the 13 88 mm guns in North Africa, sited five of the 88 mm guns and several 50 mm PAK 38 in the new fortifications at Halfaya, held by a battalion of Rifle Regiment 104. Turrets were removed from knocked-out Matilda tanks and dug in and the bottom of the pass was sown with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.[13] Four 88 mm guns were dug in behind minefields on Hafid Ridge and Sidi Azeiz Ridge, covering the Sidi Azeiz crossroads; the last four 88 mm guns remained mobile with the 15th Panzer Division.[19][20] The British made preparations for Operation Battleaxe, which was due to begin as soon as tank reinforcements were ready from the Tiger convoy, which had arrived from Britain on 12 May.[21]

Operation Battleaxe

A dug in 88 mm gun captured in July 1942, similar to those dug in at Halfaya Pass after Unternehmen Skorpion.

On 15 June, the Axis garrisons of Halfaya Pass, Bardia, Sollum, Capuzzo and Sidi Aziez were to be destroyed by XIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Noel Beresford-Peirse) with the 4th Indian Division, 7th Armoured Division and the 22nd Guards Brigade, which were then to capture the area around Tobruk and El Adem and then advance further west to take Derna and Mechili.[22] Poor British signals security gave Rommel notice of the operation and its course, then during the battle, captured documents were exploited.[23] The 5th Light Afrika Division was moved to the south of Tobruk, ready for operations in the Sollum area or Tobruk and Rommel ordered a big artillery bombardment of Tobruk the night before the operation, to prevent the Allied garrison from breaking out.[24]

On 17 June, XIII Corps was ordered to retire before the 22nd Guards Brigade was trapped and by dark, the British had withdrawn to the area of Sidi Barrani–Sofafi and the Axis troops had returned to their positions on the frontier. The British lost 969 casualties, 27 of the 90 Cruiser tanks and 64 of the 100 Infantry tanks which had started the operation. German losses were 678 men, 12 tanks destroyed, about 50 damaged (excluding vehicles repaired during the battle) and ten aircraft. British troops captured about 350 Italians but let most go when they withdrew. On 1 July, Wavell was sacked and replaced by General Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief, India; Beresford-Pierce was sacked and replaced by Lieutenant-General Reade Godwin-Austen.[25]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Panzer Regiment 8 (two battalions), Reconnaissance Unit 33, I Battery, Artillery Regiment 33, I Battalion, Motorised Infantry Regiment 104, Panzerjäger Battalion 33 (21 × 37 mm and 12 × 50 mm anti-tank guns), Motor-cycle Battalion 15, an anti-aircraft battery (13 × 88 mm guns), three Italian infantry battalions and three Italian field artillery batteries).[17]

Footnotes

  1. 1 2 Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 35–36.
  2. ↑ Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 29–35.
  3. ↑ Playfair et al. 1954, pp. 115–116.
  4. ↑ Howard & Sparrow 1951, p. 77.
  5. 1 2 3 Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 159–163.
  6. ↑ Maughan 1966, pp. 274–275.
  7. ↑ Lyman 2009, pp. 184–185.
  8. ↑ Rommel 1982, p. 137.
  9. 1 2 Playfair et al. 2004, p. 163.
  10. ↑ Maughan 1966, p. 275.
  11. ↑ Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 162–163.
  12. ↑ Hinsley 1994, pp. 78–79.
  13. 1 2 3 Harrison 1999, p. 135.
  14. ↑ Lyman 2009, p. 185.
  15. ↑ Playfair et al. 2004, p. 118–119.
  16. ↑ Pitt 2001, p. 294.
  17. 1 2 3 Playfair et al. 2004, p. 164.
  18. ↑ Playfair et al. 1954, pp. 1–2, 32, 163–164.
  19. 1 2 Pitt 2001, p. 277.
  20. ↑ Lewin 1979, p. 69.
  21. ↑ Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 162, 164.
  22. ↑ Pitt 2001, p. 295.
  23. ↑ Hinsley 1994, p. 79.
  24. ↑ Playfair et al. 2004, p. 168.
  25. ↑ Playfair et al. 2004, pp. 171, 316.

References

  • Harrison, Frank (1999) [1996]. Tobruk: The Great Siege Reassessed (Brockhampton Press ed.). London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-86019-986-8. 
  • Hinsley, F. H. (1994) [1993]. British Intelligence in the Second World War. Its influence on Strategy and Operations. History of the Second World War (2nd rev. abr. ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-0-11-630961-7. 
  • Howard, Michael; Sparrow, John (1951). The Coldstream Guards, 1920–1946. London: Oxford University Press. OCLC 9151069. 
  • Lewin, Ronald (1979) [1977]. The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps (Corgi ed.). London: Batsford. ISBN 978-0-552-10921-5. 
  • Lyman, R. (2009). The Longest Siege: Tobruk, the Battle that Saved North Africa. London: Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-71024-5. 
  • Maughan, Barton (1966). Tobruk and El Alamein. Official History of Australia in the Second World War Series 1 (Army). III (online ed.). Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 954993. 
  • Pitt, B. (2001) [1980]. The Crucible of War: Wavell's Command. I (Cassell ed.). London: Jonathan Cape. ISBN 978-0-304-35950-9. 
  • Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; with Stitt RN, Commander G. M. S.; Molony, Brigadier C. J. C. & Toomer, Air Vice-Marshal S. E. (1954). Butler, J. R. M., ed. The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. I. HMSO. ISBN 978-1-84574-065-8. 
  • Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; with Flynn RN, Captain F. C.; Molony, Brigadier C. J. C. & Toomer, Air Vice-Marshal S. E. (2004) [1st. pub. HMSO 1956]. Butler, J. R. M., ed. The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Germans come to the help of their Ally (1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. II (Naval & Military Press ed.). London. ISBN 978-1-84574-066-5. 
  • Rommel, Erwin (1982) [1953]. Liddell-Hart, Basil, ed. The Rommel Papers. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-80157-0. 

Further reading

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