NSC-68

National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) was a 58-page top secret policy paper by the United States National Security Council presented to President Harry S. Truman on April 14, 1950. It was one of the most important statements of American policy that launched the Cold War. In the words of scholar Ernest R. May, NSC-68 "provided the blueprint for the militarization of the Cold War from 1950 to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s." NSC-68 and its subsequent amplifications advocated a large expansion in the military budget of the United States, the development of a hydrogen bomb, and increased military aid to allies of the United States. It made the containment of global Communist expansion a high priority. NSC-68 rejected the alternative policies of friendly détente and rollback against the Soviet Union.[1]

Historical background

By 1950, events dictated the need to examine U.S. national security policies: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was operational; military assistance for European allies had begun; the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb and the communists had solidified their control of China. In addition, a British sterling-dollar crisis in the summer of 1949 had brought home to U.S. officials that the Marshall Plan would not suffice to cure Western European economic ills by 1952, the Plan's scheduled end year, with the prospect that Western Europe would have no choice but to pursue autarchy, as it had in the 1930s, with all the attendant difficulties that would pose for the world economy generally and the U.S. economy particularly.[2] Similar problems were also plaguing Japan.[3] With these threats to the U.S. and its allies expanding, on 31 January 1950 President Truman directed the Department of State and Department of Defense "to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans." A State-Defense Policy Review Group was set up under the chairmanship of Paul Nitze of the State Department.[4]

The Defense Department representatives on the committee initially resisted proposals that would exceed the existing $12.5 billion ceiling on defense spending.[5]

The report, known as NSC-68, was requested by NSC Study Group

Originally, President Truman did not support NSC-68 when it was brought to him in 1950. He believed that it was not specific about which programs would be affected or changed and it also didn't go well with his previous defense spending limits. Truman sent it back for further review until he finally approved it in 1951.[6]

The document outlined the de facto national security strategy of the United States for that time (though it was not an official NSS in the form we know today) and analyzed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America from military, economic, political, and psychological standpoints.

The NSC-68 described the challenges facing the United States in cataclysmic terms. "The issues that face us are momentous," the document stated, "involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself."[7]

Content and meaning

NSC-68 saw the goals and aims of the United States as sound, yet poorly implemented, calling "present programs and plans... dangerously inadequate".[8] Although George F. Kennan's theory of containment articulated a multifaceted approach for U.S. foreign policy in response to the perceived Soviet threat, NSC-68 recommended policies that emphasized military over diplomatic action. Kennan's influential 1947 "X" article advocated a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union. NSC-68 thought of containment as "a policy of calculated and gradual coercion." NSC-68 called for significant peacetime military spending, in which the U.S. possessed "superior overall power" "in dependable combination with other like-minded nations." It called for a military capable of

NSC-68 itself did not contain any specific cost estimates at a time when the United States was committing six to seven percent of its GNP to defense. It was evident that the limits the President had previously set on defense spending were too low. NSC-68 called for tripling defense spending to $40 or $50 billion per year from the original $13 billion set for 1950.[9] NSC-68 does specify a reduction of taxes and a "reduction of Federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign assistance, if necessary by the deferment of certain desirable programs",[10] as a means for paying for it. However, several officials involved in the preparation of the study, including the future chairman of the president's Council of Economic Relations Leon Keyserling, suggested that the massive increase in military spending could be afforded by deliberate acceptance of government deficits, which would have the added benefit of energising and stimulating parts of the American economy, as it did after 1930.[11] Indeed, the document does note that achieving a high gross national product “might itself be aided by a build-up of the economic and military strength of the United States…”,[12] and the Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett also suggested that the American economy "might benefit from the kind of build-up we are suggesting".[13] In essence, NSC-69 advocated a form of military Keynesianism, in which, according to Noam Chomsky is a system of "state-corporate industrial management" needed "to sustain high-technology industry, relying on the taxpayer to fund research and development and provide a guaranteed market or waste production, with the private sector taking over when there are profits to be made".[14]

Relation to U.S. foreign policy

"For several centuries, it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength." —NSC-68, p. 4

Serving as the main point of the opening paragraph of NSC 68, this sentence is a reference to the U.S. leading the international community out of World War II (by way of ending the war in Japan). The 'one nation' is in reference to the Nazis, and the 'coalition of other nations' is in reference to the Allied nations during World War II.

The document continues to identify that the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, if allowed to grow, would become such a powerful force, that no coalition of nations could band together and oppose it. This is significant because firstly, the Soviet Union is identified in the document as the antithesis of the United States, and secondly, the Soviet Union is committed to extending its sphere of influence.

A thorough knowledge of this document is required for understanding U.S. foreign policymakers in the early Cold War. After reading this document, they rapidly recognized the need for militarization out of the interest of self-preservation. In other words, the aggressive nature of Soviet expansion required a strong response from the U.S. in order to prevent the destruction of America. This, of course, was phrased in a context of military exploits (referring to the military victory in World War I and World War II), and therefore emphasized military expansion.

Also crucial in understanding this document is the language. Indeed, primary sources must be read carefully, in order to recognize themes or motifs. Adjectives provide valuable insight into the motives of this document's authors, and the impression it had on its intended audience. An example is the description of the international situation, as provoked by the Soviet Union, as endemic. By using this language, it is clear that the authors wished to portray the Soviet Union as a sickness, and the U.S. as the cure. This message was received loud and clear, and dominated many foreign policy decisions throughout the Cold War.

Internal debate

NSC-68 drew some criticism from senior government officials who believed the Cold War was being escalated unnecessarily. When the report was sent to top officials in the Truman administration for review before its official delivery to the President, many of them scoffed at its arguments. Willard Thorp questioned its contention that the "USSR is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the United States." Thorp argued: "I do not feel that this position is demonstrated, but rather the reverse... The actual gap is widening in our favor." He pointed out that in 1949 the US economy had increased twofold over that of the Soviet Union. Steel production in the US outpaced the Soviet Union by 2 million tons, stockpiling of goods, and oil production far exceeded Soviet amounts. As for Soviet military investment, Thorp was skeptical that the USSR was committing such large portion of its GDP: "I suspect a larger portion of Soviet investment went into housing." William Schaub of the Bureau of the Budget was particularly harsh, believing that "in every arena," the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the stockpiling of atomic bombs, the economy, the US was far superior to the Soviet Union. Kennan, although "father" of the containment policy, also disagreed with the document, particularly its call for massive rearmament (FRUS, 1950, Vol. I).

Truman's position

President Harry S. Truman, even after the Soviets became a nuclear power, sought to curb military spending. However, he did not reject the recommendations of NSC-68 out of hand, instead of returning it to circulation and asking for an estimate of the costs involved. In the ensuing two months, little progress was made on the report. By June, Nitze had practically given up on it. But on June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel north.[15] With the Korean War begun, NSC-68 took on new importance. As Acheson later remarked: "Korea... created the stimulus which made action."[16]

Public opinion

The Truman Administration began a nationwide public relations campaign to convince Congress and opinion-setters of the need for strategic rearmament and containment of Soviet communism. It had to overcome isolationists, including Senator Robert A. Taft, who wanted less world involvement, as well as intense anti-Communists such as James Burnham who proposed an alternative strategy of rollback that would eliminate Communism or perhaps launch a preemptive war. The State Department and the White House used the North Korean attack of June 1950 and the see-saw battles during the first few months of the Korean War to steer congressional and public opinion toward a course of rearmament between the two poles of preventive war and isolationism.[17]

Historical debate

NSC-68 is a source of much historical debate as is the escalation of the Cold War. NSC-68 was an important part of an overall shift in American foreign policy to a comprehensive containment strategy that was confirmed by successive administrations. Analyses range from Michael Hogan's belief that NSC-68 portrayed the threat "in the worst light possible" to providing an accurate picture of a genuine and growing threat.

Conclusion

This document is critical to understanding the Cold War with its effect on similar national security documents such as the National Security Strategy March 2005, but also provides insight to current US foreign policy.[18] Implementation of NSC-68 shows the extent to which it marked a 'shift' in US policy — not only toward the USSR, but toward all communist governments. By signing the document, Truman provided a clearly defined and coherent US policy that did not really exist previously. Furthermore, it can be argued that NSC-68, as proposed by the NSC, addressed Truman's problem of being attacked from the right following the "red scare" and Alger Hiss case. Although not made public, NSC-68 was manifested in subsequent increases in America's conventional and nuclear capabilities, thereby adding to the country's financial burden. While NSC-68 did not make any specific recommendations regarding the proposed increase in defense expenditures, the Truman Administration almost tripled defense spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product between 1950 and 1953 (from 5 to 14.2 percent).[19]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Walter L. Hixson, "What Was the Cold War and How Did We Win It?" Reviews in American History (1994) 22#3 pp. 507-511 in JSTOR
  2. ↑ Curt Cardwell, NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War (Cambridge, 2011).
  3. ↑ William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade policy, 1947-1955 (Wisconsin, 1984)
  4. ↑ Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, Brief Chronology, pp. 17–9.
  5. ↑ Block, Fred L. "The Origins of International..." Google Books. 28 Apr. 2010. Web. 29 Apr. 2010.
  6. ↑ Paul H. Nitze, S. Nelson Drew, Ed., NCS-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment, p. 6, National Defense University, Washington DC: 1994. Google Books, 23 Apr. 2009
  7. ↑ Alfred Andrea and James Overfield, eds. (2011). The Human Record: Sources of Global History, Volume II: Since 1500. Cengage Learning. pp. 471–74.
  8. ↑ "A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68", April 12, 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers.
  9. ↑ Bowie, Robert R.; Immerman, Richard H. (2000). Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. Oxford UP. p. 17.
  10. ↑ "A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68", April 12, 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers.
  11. ↑ Craig, Campbell., Logevall, F. (2012). America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.pp.113-114
  12. ↑ "A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68", April 12, 1950. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers.
  13. ↑ Craig, Campbell., Logevall, F. (2012). America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p.114
  14. ↑ Chomsky, Noam. (1992). Deterring Democracy. London: Vintage. p.21
  15. ↑ Matray, Truman Library.
  16. ↑ Princeton Seminars, October 10, 1950, reel 2, track 2, p. 15, Acheson Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
  17. ↑ Steven Casey, "Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950-51." Diplomatic History 2005 29(4): 655-690. ISSN 0145-2096 Fulltext: Ebsco
  18. ↑ Kristen E. Boon; et al. (2011). Assessing President Obama's National Security Strategy. Oxford UP. p. 114.
  19. ↑ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian - MILESTONES:1945-1952 NSC-68,1950

Further reading

Primary Sources

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