Mogilev Conference

The Mogilev Conference was a September 1941 Wehrmacht training event aimed at improving rear-area security behind the Army Group Center area of operation during Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The event was organised by General Max von Schenckendorff, commander of Army Group Centre Rear Area, in cooperation with the officials of the SS and the SD, the security and intelligence services of Nazi Germany, operating in the same area. Ostensibly an "anti-partisan" training conference, the event marked an escalation of violence against Jews and other civilians in the area of Schenckendorff's command.

Background

The Wehrmacht's aggressive rear security doctrine, and the use of the "security threat" to disguise genocidal policies, resulted in close cooperation between the army and the security apparatus behind the front lines during Operation Barbarossa, the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. General Max von Schenckendorff, commander of Army Group Centre Rear Area, in cooperation with Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, the Higher SS and Police Leader (HSS-PF) for Army Group Centre, organised a three-day field conference in Mogilev to create an "exchange of experiences" for the Wehrmacht rear unit commanders.[1] Police Colonel Max Montua, commander of Police Regiment Center, was in charge of the event's planning and logistics.[2]

Participating officers were selected on the basis of their "achievements and experiences" in security operations already undertaken; participants included representatives of the Army High Command and Army Group Centre.[3] The audience also included officers (battalion commanders and above) from both SS-Police and the Wehrmacht, including its security divisions, the 221st and 286th.[4]

The conference

The conference began on 24 September and focused on "combatting partisans" (Bekämpfung von Partisanen) and reflected Schenckendorff's views on the need for total eradication of the resistance to German occupation as the only way to secure territory behind the armies.[2] The speakers included: Arthur Nebe, commander of Einsatzgruppe B; Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, as the representative of Heinrich Himmler; Max Montua; Hermann Fegelein, commander of the SS Cavalry Brigade; and Gustav Lombard, commander of the 1st SS Cavalry Regiment.[5]

Talks presented covered the evaluation of Soviet "bandit" organisations and tactics, why it was necessary to kill political commissars immediately upon capture, and gaining intelligence from local collaborators. Bach-Zelewski's session was entitled "The Capture of Kommissars and Partisans in 'Scouring-Actions', referring to the activities of the SS Cavalry Brigade in the "Pripyat swamps" punitive operation. Nebe's talk focused on the role of the SD in the common fight against "partisans" and "plunderers". He also covered the "Jewish question", with particular consideration to the anti-partisan movement.[5]

The conference included three field exercises. On the second day, participants travelled to the settlement of Knyazhichi (German: Knjaschitschi) where a unit of the Police Regiment Center conducted a demonstration of how to surround and screen a village. According to the after-action report, "suspicious strangers" (Ortsfremde), that is "partisans", could not be found but the screening of the population revealed fifty-one Jewish civilians, of whom thirty-two were shot.[6]

Impact

A 16-page executive summary of the conference, under Schenckendorff's signature, was distributed to the Wehrmacht troops and police units in the rear area. The document focused on tactics of security warfare, while also prescribing harsh measures, such as "the streets should be kept clear of 'wanderer'" who should be handed over to the Secret Field Police or sent to filtration camps. It warned that the enemy was employing women, children and the elderly as agents.[7]

The summary proclaimed that "the enemy must be completely annihilated", while specifying that the distinction between a "partisan" and a "suspicious person" was not always possible, thus giving a carte blanch to the troops for the most brutal approach possible. The conference marked a dramatic increase in atrocities by the Wehrmacht units against Jews and other civilians in the last three months of 1941.[7]

References

Citations

  1. ↑ Beorn 2014, pp. 95–96.
  2. 1 2 Blood 2006, p. 167.
  3. ↑ Förster 1998, pp. 1204–1205.
  4. ↑ Beorn 2014, p. 105.
  5. 1 2 Beorn 2014, pp. 99–101.
  6. ↑ Beorn 2014, p. 10.
  7. 1 2 Beorn 2014, pp. 102–106.

Bibliography

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