Siege of Melos

Siege of Melos Part of the Peloponnesian War Melos (indigo), the Delian League (orange), the Peloponnesian League (green) Date 416 BC Location Melos Result Athenian Victory Belligerents Athens Melos

The Siege of Melos occurred in 416 BC during the Peloponnesian War, a war fought between Athens and Sparta. Melos is an island in the Aegean Sea roughly 110 km east of mainland Greece. At the time it was populated by Dorians. Though the Melians were of the same ethnic group as the Spartans, they chose to remain neutral in the war. Athens invaded Melos in 416 BC and demanded that the Melians surrender and pay tribute to Athens, or face annihilation. The proud Melians refused, and after a siege the Athenians captured their city, slaughtered the men, and enslaved the women and children.

This siege is best remembered for the Melian Dialogue by Thucydides, which is a dramatization of the negotiations between the Athenians and the Melians before the former launched the siege. It is taught as a classic case study in political realism to illustrate that selfish and pragmatic concerns ultimately motivate a country at war.

Lead-up

The Peloponnesian War lasted from 431 to 404 BC. On one side was the Peloponnesian League, an alliance of Greek cities led by Sparta. On the other side was the Delian League, an alliance led by Athens. The people of Melos had ancestral ties to Sparta^[1][2] but were independent.^[3] In 427 BC the Melians donated at least twenty Aeginetan minae^[4][5] (roughly 12½ kg^[6] of silver) to the Spartan war effort. Otherwise, the island remained neutral in the war.^[7]

In 426 BC, Athens sent an army of 2,000 men led by Nicias to raid the Melian countryside,^[8] but the Melians refused to do battle and the Athenians were not willing to mount a siege.^[9] In 425 or 424 BC, Athens formally demanded of Melos a tribute of fifteen talents^[10][11] of silver (roughly 390 kg^[12]). This sum could have paid the wages of a trireme crew for 15 months,^[13] or bought 540 metric tons of wheat, enough to feed 2,160 men for a year.^[14] Only the islands of Paros and Thasos were assessed for more at 30 and 60 talents respectively.^[15] This is evidence that Melos was a prosperous island. Melos had never paid tribute to Athens before, and they refused to pay now.^[16]

The siege

★

Melos, and the approximate location of the ancient city.^[18]

In the summer of 416 BC, during a truce with Sparta, Athens sent an army of at least 3,400 men to conquer Melos: 1,600 heavy infantry, 300 archers, and 20 mounted archers all from Athens, plus 1,500 heavy infantry from other Delian League cities. The fleet that transported this army had 38 ships: 30 from Athens, 6 from Chios, and 2 from Lesbos. This expedition was led by the generals Cleomedes and Tisias.^[19] After setting up camp on the island, the Athenians sent emissaries to negotiate with the rulers of Melos. The emissaries demanded that Melos join the Delian League and pay tribute to Athens or face destruction. The Melians rejected the ultimatum. The Athenians laid siege to the city and withdrew most of their troops from the island to fight elsewhere. The Melians made a number of sorties, at one point capturing part of the Athenians' lines, but failed to break the siege. Athens sent reinforcements under the command of Philocrates. The Athenians also had help from traitors within Melos.^[20] Melos surrendered in the winter of 416 or 415 BC.^[21]

The Athenians executed the adult men^[22] and sold the women and children into slavery. They then settled 500 of their own colonists on the island.^[20]

Restoration by Sparta

In 405 BC, with Athens losing the war, the Spartan general Lysander expelled the Athenian settlers from Melos and restored the survivors of the original Dorian colony to the island.^[23][24] The once-independent Melos became a Spartan territory. It now had a Spartan garrison and a military governor (a harmost).^[25]

The Melian Dialogue

In History of the Peloponnesian War (book 5, chapters 84–116), the contemporary Athenian historian Thucydides inserted a dramatization of the negotiations between the emissaries of the Athenian invaders and the rulers of Melos. Thucydides did not witness the negotiations and in fact had been in exile at the time, so this dialogue only captures the substance of what he believed was discussed.

In summary, the Athenian emissaries appealed to the Melians' sense of pragmatism, citing the Athenian army's overwhelming strength and their "reasonable" surrender terms, whereas the Melians appealed to the Athenians' sense of decency. Neither side was able to sway the other and the negotiations failed. This dialogue is frequently cited by political scientists and diplomats as a classic case study in political realism. It demonstrates the foolishness of pride and hope, and that selfish and pragmatic concerns drive wars.

Synopsis

The Athenians offer the Melians an ultimatum: surrender and pay tribute to Athens, or be destroyed. The Athenians do not wish to waste time arguing over the morality of the situation, because in practice might makes right—or, in their own words, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must".^[26]

The Melians argue that they are a neutral city and not an enemy, so Athens has no need to conquer them. The Athenians counter that if they accept Melos' neutrality and independence, they would look weak: Their subjects would think that they left Melos alone because they were not strong enough to conquer it.

The Melians argue that an invasion will alarm the other neutral Greek states, who will become hostile to Athens for fear of being invaded themselves. The Athenians counter that the Greek states on the mainland are unlikely to act this way. It is the independent island states and the disgruntled subjects that Athens has already conquered that are more likely to take up arms against Athens.

The Melians argue that it would be shameful and cowardly of them to submit without a fight. The Athenians counter that it is only shameful to submit to an opponent whom one has a reasonable chance of defeating. There is no shame in submitting to an overwhelmingly superior opponent like Athens.

The Melians argue that though the Athenians are far stronger, there is at least a slim chance that the Melians could win, and they will regret not trying their luck. The Athenians counter that this argument is emotional and short-sighted. If the Melians lose, which is highly likely, they will come to bitterly regret their foolish optimism.

The Melians believe that they will have the assistance of the gods because their position is morally just. The Athenians counter that the gods will not intervene because it is the natural order of things for the strong to dominate the weak.

The Melians argue that their Spartan kin will come to their defense. The Athenians counter that the Spartans are a practical people who never put themselves at risk when their interests are not at stake, and rescuing Melos would be especially risky since Athens has the stronger navy.

The Athenians express their shock at the Melians' lack of realism. They say that there is no shame in submitting to a stronger enemy, especially one who is offering reasonable terms. They also argue that it is sensible to submit to one's superiors, stand firm against one's equals, and be moderate to one's inferiors. The Melians do not change their minds and politely dismiss the envoys.

Analysis

Warships of the era (triremes) could carry little in the way of supplies, and thus needed friendly and neutral ports where the crew could purchase food and other necessities on a daily basis. Whether or not Melos was truly neutral, Peloponnesian ships could freely resupply there, which made it strategically important.^[27] Capturing Melos thus reduced the combat radius of the enemy's navy.^[28]

The mercilessness which the Athenian invaders showed to the Melians was exceptional even for the time and shocked many Greeks, even in Athens.^[29] These may have included the Athenian playwright Euripides, whose play The Trojan Women is widely regarded as a commentary on the razing of Melos. The historian Xenophon wrote that in 405 BC, with the Spartan army closing in on Athens, the citizens of Athens worried that the Spartans would treat them with the same cruelty that the Athenian army had shown the Melians.^[30] The Athenian rhetorician Isocrates was a proud patriot but accepted that the razing of Melos was a stain on Athens' history.^[31][32]

It is uncertain whether the fate of Melos was decided by the government of Athens or the Athenian generals on Melos. An historical speech falsely attributed to the Athenian orator Andocides claims that the statesman Alcibiades advocated the enslavement of the Melian survivors before the government of Athens.^[33] This account gives no date for the decree, so it could have been passed to justify the atrocities after-the-fact.^[34] Thucydides made no mention of any such decree in his own account.

The phrase "Melian hunger" became a byword for extreme starvation. Starvation is a normal goal of sieges and the ancient Greeks had much experience with them, so this suggests that the Melian experience was extreme. The earliest known reference to the starvation of the Melians is in Aristophanes' play, The Birds, which was first performed in 414 BC.^[35] Its usage lasted well into the Byzantine era, as it is mentioned in the Suda, a 10th-century Byzantine encyclopedia.^[36]

See also

• The Trojan Women, a play by Euripides, performed the same year, considered a commentary on the capture of Melos.

Bibliography

• Constantakopoulou, Christy (2007). The Dance of the Islands. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-921595-9. 
• Gardner, Percy (1918). A History of Ancient Coinage. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 
• Hanson, Victor (2011). A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War. Random House Publishing Group. ISBN 978-1-58836-490-6. 
• Herodotus (1998) [440 BC]. Dewald, Carolyn, ed. The Histories. Translated by Waterfield, Robin. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-212609-2. 
• Hultsch, Friedrich (1882). Griechische und Römische Metrologie [Greek and Roman Metrology] (in German) (2nd ed.). Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. 
• Loomis, William T. (1992). The Spartan War Fund: IG V 1, 1 and a New Fragment. Franz Steiner Verlag. ISBN 978-3-515-06147-6. 
• Low, Polly, ed. (2008). Athenian Empire. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-3124-7. 
• Meiggs, Russell (1972). The Athenian Empire. Carendon Press. 
• Meritt, Benjamin Dean; McGregor, Malcolm Francis (1950). The Athenian Tribute Lists. 3. ASCSA. ISBN 978-0-87661-913-1. 
• Michell, Humfrey (1964). Sparta. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-09219-7. 
• Midlarsky, Manus (2005). The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-44539-9. 
• Renfrew, Colin; Wagstaff, Malcolm, eds. (1982). An Island Polity: The Archaeology of Exploitation in Melos. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-23785-8. 
• Sabin, Philip; van Wees, Hans; Whitby, Michael, eds. (2008). The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Volume 1: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-78273-9. 
• Smith, William; Wayte, William; Marindin, G. E., eds. (1890). A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities. John Murray (Albermane Street, London). 
• Thucydides (c. 400 BC). History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley (1914).

• The Melian Dialogue (original Greek)
• The Melian Dialogue (Rex Warner translation)
• The Melian Dialogue (Benjamin Jowett translation)

• Tritle, Lawrence A. (2002). From Melos to My Lai: A Study in Violence, Culture and Social Survival. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-60364-0. 
• Winiarczyk, Marek (2016). Diagoras of Melos: A Contribution to the History of Ancient Atheism. Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG. ISBN 978-3-11-044765-1. 
• Zimmern, Alfred (1961). The Greek Commonwealth: Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens (5th ed.). Oxford University Press. 

References

Coordinates: 36°41′N 24°25′E / 36.683°N 24.417°E / 36.683; 24.417