Keystroke logging

A keylogger example of a screencapture, which holds potentially confidential and private information. The image below holds the corresponding keylogger text result.

Keystroke logging, often referred to as keylogging or keyboard capturing, is the action of recording (logging) the keys struck on a keyboard, typically covertly, so that the person using the keyboard is unaware that their actions are being monitored.[1] Keylogging can also be used to study human–computer interaction. Numerous keylogging methods exist: they range from hardware and software-based approaches to acoustic analysis.

Application

Software-based keyloggers

A logfile from a software-based keylogger, based on the screencapture above.

These are computer programs designed to work on the target computer's software.[2] Keyloggers are used in IT organizations to troubleshoot technical problems with computers and business networks. Families and business people use keyloggers legally to monitor network usage without their users' direct knowledge. Even Microsoft publicly admitted that Windows 10 operation system has a built-in keylogger in its final version “to improve typing and writing services”.[3] However, malicious individuals can use keyloggers on public computers to steal passwords or credit card information. Most keyloggers are not stopped by HTTPS encryption because that only protects data in transit between computers, thus the threat being from the user's computer.

From a technical perspective there are several categories:

Keystroke logging in writing process research

Keystroke logging is now an established research method for the study of writing processes.[8][9] Different programs have been developed to collect online process data of writing activities,[10] including Inputlog, Scriptlog, and Translog.

Keystroke logging is legitimately used as a suitable research instrument in a number of writing contexts. These include studies on cognitive writing processes, which include

Keystroke logging can be used to research writing, specifically. It can also be integrated in educational domains for second language learning, programming skills, and typing skills.

Software keyloggers may be augmented with features that capture user information without relying on keyboard key presses as the sole input. Some of these features include:

Hardware-based keyloggers

A hardware-based keylogger.
A connected hardware-based keylogger.

Hardware-based keyloggers do not depend upon any software being installed as they exist at a hardware level in a computer system.

History

An early keylogger was written by Perry Kivolowitz and posted to the Usenet news group net.unix-wizards,net.sources on November 17, 1983.[29] The posting seems to be a motivating factor in restricting access to /dev/kmem on Unix systems. The user-mode program operated by locating and dumping character lists (clists) as they were assembled in the Unix kernel.

In the 1970s, spies installed keystroke loggers in the US Embassy and Consulate buildings in Moscow and St Petersburg.[30][31] They installed the bugs in Selectric II and Selectric III electric typewriters.[32]

Soviet embassies used manual typewriters, rather than electric typewriters, for classified information—apparently because they are immune to such bugs.[32] As of 2013, Russian special services still use typewriters.[31][33][34]

Cracking

Writing simple software applications for keylogging can be trivial, and like any nefarious computer program, can be distributed as a trojan horse or as part of a virus. What is not trivial for an attacker, however, is installing a covert keystroke logger without getting caught and downloading data that has been logged without being traced. An attacker that manually connects to a host machine to download logged keystrokes risks being traced. A trojan that sends keylogged data to a fixed e-mail address or IP address risks exposing the attacker.

Trojans

Researchers devised several methods for solving this problem. They presented a deniable password snatching attack in which the keystroke logging trojan is installed using a virus or worm.[35] [36] An attacker who is caught with the virus or worm can claim to be a victim. The cryptotrojan asymmetrically encrypts the pilfered login/password pairs using the public key of the trojan author and covertly broadcasts the resulting ciphertext. They mentioned that the ciphertext can be steganographically encoded and posted to a public bulletin board such as Usenet.

Use by police

In 2000, the FBI used FlashCrest iSpy to obtain the PGP passphrase of Nicodemo Scarfo, Jr., son of mob boss Nicodemo Scarfo.[37] Also in 2000, the FBI lured two suspected Russian cyber criminals to the US in an elaborate ruse, and captured their usernames and passwords with a keylogger that was covertly installed on a machine that they used to access their computers in Russia. The FBI then used these credentials to hack into the suspects' computers in Russia in order to obtain evidence to prosecute them.[38]

Countermeasures

The effectiveness of countermeasures varies, because keyloggers use a variety of techniques to capture data and the countermeasure needs to be effective against the particular data capture technique. In the case of Windows 10 keylogging from Microsoft it is enough to change some privacy settings on your computer.[39] For example, an on-screen keyboard will be effective against hardware keyloggers, transparency will defeat some—but not all—screenloggers and an anti-spyware application that can only disable hook-based keyloggers will be ineffective against kernel-based keyloggers.

Also, keylogger program authors may be able to update the code to adapt to countermeasures that may have proven to be effective against them.

Anti keyloggers

An anti keylogger is a piece of software specifically designed to detect keyloggers on a computer, typically comparing all files in the computer against a database of keyloggers looking for similarities which might signal the presence of a hidden keylogger. As anti keyloggers have been designed specifically to detect keyloggers, they have the potential to be more effective than conventional anti virus software; some anti virus software does not consider a keylogger to be a virus, as under some circumstances a keylogger can be considered a legitimate piece of software.[40]

Live CD/USB

Rebooting the computer using a Live CD or write-protected Live USB is a possible countermeasure against software keyloggers if the CD is clean of malware and the operating system contained on it is secured and fully patched so that it cannot be infected as soon as it is started. Booting a different operating system does not impact the use of a hardware or BIOS based keylogger.

Anti-spyware / Anti-virus programs

Many anti-spyware applications are able to detect some software based keyloggers and quarantine, disable or cleanse them. However, because many keylogging programs are legitimate pieces of software under some circumstances, anti spyware often neglects to label keylogging programs as spyware or a virus. These applications are able to detect software-based keyloggers based on patterns in executable code, heuristics and keylogger behaviours (such as the use of hooks and certain APIs).

No software-based anti-spyware application can be 100% effective against all keyloggers. Also, software-based anti-spyware cannot defeat non-software keyloggers (for example, hardware keyloggers attached to keyboards will always receive keystrokes before any software-based anti-spyware application).

However, the particular technique that the anti-spyware application uses will influence its potential effectiveness against software keyloggers. As a general rule, anti-spyware applications with higher privileges will defeat keyloggers with lower privileges. For example, a hook-based anti-spyware application cannot defeat a kernel-based keylogger (as the keylogger will receive the keystroke messages before the anti-spyware application), but it could potentially defeat hook- and API-based keyloggers.

Network monitors

Network monitors (also known as reverse-firewalls) can be used to alert the user whenever an application attempts to make a network connection. This gives the user the chance to prevent the keylogger from "phoning home" with his or her typed information.

Automatic form filler programs

Automatic form-filling programs may prevent keylogging by removing the requirement for a user to type personal details and passwords using the keyboard. Form fillers are primarily designed for web browsers to fill in checkout pages and log users into their accounts. Once the user's account and credit card information has been entered into the program, it will be automatically entered into forms without ever using the keyboard or clipboard, thereby reducing the possibility that private data is being recorded. However someone with physical access to the machine may still be able to install software that is able to intercept this information elsewhere in the operating system or while in transit on the network. (Transport Layer Security (TLS) reduces the risk that data in transit may be intercepted by network sniffers and proxy tools.)

One-time passwords (OTP)

Using one-time passwords may be keylogger-safe, as each password is invalidated as soon as it is used. This solution may be useful for someone using a public computer. However, an attacker who has remote control over such a computer can simply wait for the victim to enter his/her credentials before performing unauthorised transactions on their behalf while their session is active.

Security tokens

Use of smart cards or other security tokens may improve security against replay attacks in the face of a successful keylogging attack, as accessing protected information would require both the (hardware) security token as well as the appropriate password/passphrase. Knowing the keystrokes, mouse actions, display, clipboard etc. used on one computer will not subsequently help an attacker gain access to the protected resource. Some security tokens work as a type of hardware-assisted one-time password system, and others implement a cryptographic challenge-response authentication, which can improve security in a manner conceptually similar to one time passwords. Smartcard readers and their associated keypads for PIN entry may be vulnerable to keystroke logging through a so-called supply chain attack[41] where an attacker substitutes the card reader/PIN entry hardware for one which records the user's PIN.

On-screen keyboards

Most on-screen keyboards (such as the on-screen keyboard that comes with Windows XP) send normal keyboard event messages to the external target program to type text. Software key loggers can log these typed characters sent from one program to another.[42] Additionally, keylogging software can take screenshots of what is displayed on the screen (periodically, and/or upon each mouse click), which means that although certainly a useful security measure, an on-screen keyboard will not protect from all keyloggers.

Keystroke interference software

Keystroke interference software is also available.[43] These programs attempt to trick keyloggers by introducing random keystrokes, although this simply results in the keylogger recording more information than it needs to. An attacker has the task of extracting the keystrokes of interest—the security of this mechanism, specifically how well it stands up to cryptanalysis, is unclear.

Speech recognition

Similar to on-screen keyboards, speech-to-text conversion software can also be used against keyloggers, since there are no typing or mouse movements involved. The weakest point of using voice-recognition software may be how the software sends the recognized text to target software after the recognition took place.

Handwriting recognition and mouse gestures

Also, many PDAs and lately tablet PCs can already convert pen (also called stylus) movements on their touchscreens to computer understandable text successfully. Mouse gestures use this principle by using mouse movements instead of a stylus. Mouse gesture programs convert these strokes to user-definable actions, such as typing text. Similarly, graphics tablets and light pens can be used to input these gestures, however these are less common everyday.

The same potential weakness of speech recognition applies to this technique as well.

Macro expanders/recorders

With the help of many programs, a seemingly meaningless text can be expanded to a meaningful text and most of the time context-sensitively, e.g. "en.wikipedia.org" can be expanded when a web browser window has the focus. The biggest weakness of this technique is that these programs send their keystrokes directly to the target program. However, this can be overcome by using the 'alternating' technique described below, i.e. sending mouse clicks to non-responsive areas of the target program, sending meaningless keys, sending another mouse click to target area (e.g. password field) and switching back-and-forth.

Deceptive typing

Alternating between typing the login credentials and typing characters somewhere else in the focus window[44] can cause a keylogger to record more information than they need to, although this could easily be filtered out by an attacker. Similarly, a user can move their cursor using the mouse during typing, causing the logged keystrokes to be in the wrong order e.g., by typing a password beginning with the last letter and then using the mouse to move the cursor for each subsequent letter. Lastly, someone can also use context menus to remove, cut, copy, and paste parts of the typed text without using the keyboard. An attacker who is able to capture only parts of a password will have a smaller key space to attack if he chose to execute a brute-force attack.

Another very similar technique uses the fact that any selected text portion is replaced by the next key typed. e.g., if the password is "secret", one could type "s", then some dummy keys "asdfsd". Then, these dummies could be selected with the mouse, and the next character from the password "e" is typed, which replaces the dummies "asdfsd".

These techniques assume incorrectly that keystroke logging software cannot directly monitor the clipboard, the selected text in a form, or take a screenshot every time a keystroke or mouse click occurs. They may however be effective against some hardware keyloggers.

See also

References

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