Iranian Principlists

Principlists
Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani[1]
Chief Justice Sadegh Larijani
Chairman of the Assembly of Experts Ahmad Jannati
Parliamentary leaders Kazem Jalali (Wilayi Independents fraction) and Hamid-Reza Haji Babaee (Wilayi Deputies fraction)[2]
Ideology

Conservatism
Islamism[3]
Political Islam[4]
Vilayat Faqih

Factions:
Populism[5]
Traditionalism[5][6]
Pragmatism[5]
Fundamentalism[7]
Political position Right-wing
Religion Shia Islam
Alliances The Two Societies
Front of Followers
Transformationalists
Builders
Grand Coalition
Conservative control over power
Cabinet
5 / 31 (16%)
Parliament
83 / 290 (29%)
Judiciary Dominant[8]
Assembly of Experts
66 / 88 (75%)
Guardian Council Dominant[8]
City Council seats
Tehran[9]
16 / 31 (52%)
Mashhad[9]
24 / 25 (96%)
Isfahan[9]
10 / 21 (48%)
Tabriz[9]
9 / 21 (43%)
Bushehr[9]
3 / 11 (27%)
Arak[9]
10 / 15 (67%)
Qom[9]
20 / 21 (95%)
Karaj[9]
6 / 21 (29%)
Shiraz[9]
13 / 21 (62%)

The Principlists (Persian: اصول‌گرایان‎, translit. Osul-Garâyân‎, lit. followers of principles[10] or fundamentalists)[3][11] also known as the Iranian Conservatives[12] and formerly referred to as the Right-wing,[13][14] are one of two main political camps inside post-revolutionary Iran, the other being Reformists. The term ‘hardliners’ that some western sources use in the Iranian political context, usually refers to the faction,[15] despite the fact it includes also more centrist tendencies.[16]

The camp rejects the status quo internationally,[6] but tends to preserve it domestically.[17]

Within Iranian politics, a principlist refers to the conservative supporters of the Supreme Leader of Iran and advocates for protecting the ideological 'principles' of the Islamic Revolution’s early days.[18] According to Hossein Mousavian, "The Principlists constitute the main right-wing/conservative political movement in Iran. They are more religiously oriented and more closely affiliated with the Qom-based clerical establishment than their moderate and reformist rivals".[19]

A declaration issued by The Two Societies, which serves as the Principlists "manifesto", focuses on loyalty to Islam and the Iranian Revolution, obedience to the Supreme Leader of Iran, and devotion to the principle of Vilayat Faqih.[20]

According to a poll conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) in April 2017, 15% of Iranians identify as leaning Principlist. In comparison, 28% identify as leaning Reformist.[21]

The Principlists currently dominate the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Assembly of Experts and several City Councils, as well as non-elective institutions such as the Guardian Council.[20]

Factions

Election results

President

President of Iran
Date Candidate Supported % Votes Rank Notes
2001 Ahmad Tavakkoli 15.6% 4,393,544 2nd Endorsed by Coordination Council of Islamic Revolution Forces
2005/1 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 19.43% 5,711,696 2nd No major party support
Endorsed by Islamic Society of Students
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 13.93% 4,095,827 4th Supported by Alliance of Builders and Society of Devotees
Ali Larijani 5.83% 1,713,810 5th Main Principlist Candidate
Endorsed by Coordination Council of Islamic Revolution Forces
2005/2 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 61.69% 17,284,782 1st Supported by Alliance of Builders and Society of Devotees
2009 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 62.63% 24,527,516 1st Main Principlist Candidate
Mohsen Rezaee 1.73% 678,240 3rd No major party support
2013 Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 16.56% 6,077,292 2nd Supported by Progress and Justice Population
Saeed Jalili 11.36% 4,168,946 3rd Stability Front Candidate
Mohsen Rezaee 10.58% 3,884,412 4th Resistance Front Candidate
Ali Akbar Velayati 6.18% 2,268,753 6th Supported by Followers Front
2017 Ebrahim Raisi 38.28% 15,835,794 2nd Main Principlist Candidate
Endorsed by Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces
Mostafa Mir-Salim 1.16% 478,267 3rd Supported by Islamic Coalition Party

Islamic Consultative Assembly

Islamic Consultative Assembly
Date Seats
# % ± pp
2004[24]
156 / 290
 53.8% Steady
2008[25]
199 / 290
 68.6% Increase14.8
2012
182 / 290
 62.75% Decrease5.85
2016
83 / 290
 28.62% Decrease34.13

Assembly of Experts

Assembly of Experts
Date Seats
# % ± pp
2006
59 / 86
 69% Steady
2016
42 / 88
 48% Decrease21

City Council of Tehran

City Council of Tehran
Date Seats
# % ± pp
2003
14 / 15
 93.3% Steady
2006
11 / 15
 73.3% Decrease 20
2013[9]
16 / 31
 51.6% Decrease 21.7
2017[9]
0 / 21
 0% Decrease 51.6

Parties

Media

See also

References

  1. ↑ Bodaghi, Ehsan (4 May 2017). "'National dialogue' initiative indicates shifting political sands in Iran". Al-Monitor. Retrieved 17 June 2017.
  2. ↑ Rohollah Faghihi (4 November 2016), "Iran’s parliament shows its true colors", Al-Monitor, retrieved 25 May 2017
  3. 1 2 Mehdi Mozaffari (2007), "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept", Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Routledge, 8 (1): 17–33, doi:10.1080/14690760601121622, In fact, Iranian ‘Islamists’ of our day call themselves ‘Usul gara’, which literally means ‘fundamentalist’, but in a positive sense. It designates a ‘person of principles’ who is the ‘true Muslim’.
  4. ↑ Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi (2013), "Women’s Rights, Shari‘a Law, and the Secularization of Islam in Iran", International Journal of Politics Culture and Society, New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 26 (3): 237–253, doi:10.1007/s10767-013-9143-x, “Principlism” or osul-gera’i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency of Mohammad Khatami as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari‘a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari‘a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.
  5. 1 2 3 Melody Mohebi (2014), The Formation of Civil Society in Modern Iran: Public Intellectuals and the State, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 129–131, ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6
  6. 1 2 Robert J. Reardon (2012), Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation, pp. 81–82, ISBN 083307637X
  7. ↑ Mehdi Moslem (2002), Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press, p. 135, ISBN 9780815629788
  8. 1 2 "Freedom in the World: Iran", Freedom House, 2017, retrieved 25 May 2017
  9. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 "سهم گروه‌های سیاسی از چهارمین انتخابات شورای شهر در تهران و ۸ شهر بزرگ". Khabar Online. July 2013. Retrieved March 10, 2015.
  10. ↑ Axworthy, Michael (2016), Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic, Oxford University Press, p. 430, ISBN 9780190468965
  11. ↑ Kevan Harris (2017). A Social Revolution: Politics and the Welfare State in Iran. Univ of California Press. p. 157. ISBN 9780520280816. This discourse was eventually tagged with the Persian neologism osulgarāi, a word that can be translated into English as “fundamentalist,” since osul means “doctrine,” “root,” or “tenet.” According to several Iranian journalists, state-funded media were aware of the negative connotation of this particular word in Western countries. Preferring not to be lumped in with Sunni Salafism, the English-language media in Iran opted to use the term “principlist,” which cought on more generally.
  12. ↑ Said Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown (2013). The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. p. 150. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7. “Conservative” is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as “principlist” is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eslahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congrous groups and individuals.
  13. ↑ Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan. "Jāme'e-ye Rowhāniyyat-e Mobārez". Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. p. 108. ISBN 9781908433022.
  14. ↑ Robin B. Wright, ed. (2010), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press, p. 37, ISBN 1601270844
  15. ↑ Masoud Kazemzadeh (2008), "Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran", Middle Eastern Studies, 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, In Western sources, the term ‘hard-liners’ is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves ‘Osul-gara’. The word ‘osul’ means ‘fundamentals’, or ‘principles’ or ‘tenets’. And the suffix ‘gara’ means ‘those who uphold or promote’. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves ‘Ommat Hezbollah’. ‘Ommat’ is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. ‘Hezbollah’ literally means ‘Party of Allah’. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as ‘mohafezeh-kar’ (‘conservative’). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms ‘eqtedar-gara’ (authoritarian) and ‘tamamiyat-khah’ (totalitarian) for what many Western observers have termed ‘hard-liners’. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners ‘eqtedar-gara’.
  16. ↑ Banafsheh Keynoush (2012), "Iran after Ahmadinejad", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 54 (3): 127–146, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988, What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hardliners but also more centre-right factions.
  17. ↑ Etel Solingen, ed. (2012), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press, p. 222, ISBN 9781107010444
  18. ↑ Ladane Nasseri; Kambiz Foroohar; Yeganeh Salehi (June 16, 2013). "Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope". Bloomberg. Retrieved March 10, 2015.
  19. ↑ Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2012), The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press, p. 486, ISBN 9780870033025
  20. 1 2 SHAUL, BAKHASH (12 September 2011). "Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc". Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tehran Bureau. Retrieved March 10, 2015.
  21. ↑ "Poll Results of Popular Leaning Towards Principlists and Reformists", Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) (in Persian), 28 April 2017, retrieved 1 June 2017 – via Khabaronline
  22. 1 2 3 Sherrill, Clifton. "After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran’s Supreme Leader?". Orbis. 55 (4): 631–47.
  23. ↑ Thaler et. al (2010). Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA: RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1.
  24. ↑ Farhi, Farideh. "Iran's 2008 Majlis Elections" (PDF). University of Brendies. Retrieved 2015-03-17.
  25. ↑ Rasouli, Habib. "آرايش سياسي مجلس نهم". Mardomsalari. Retrieved 2015-03-17.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.