Franco-Polish alliance (1921)

Foreign alliances of France
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American Indians 17–18th c.
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Franco-Persian alliance 1807–1809
Franco-Prussian alliance 1812
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Franco-Polish alliance 1921–1940
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Franco-Soviet Treaty 1936–1939
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The Franco-Polish alliance was the military alliance between Poland and France that was active between 1921 and 1940. During the interwar period the alliance with Poland was one of the cornerstones of French foreign policy. Near the end of that period, along with the Franco-British Alliance, it was the basis for the creation of the Allies of World War II.

Background

Already, during the France-Habsburg rivalry that started in the 16th century, France had tried to find allies to the east of Austria and hoped to ally with Poland. Polish King Jan III Sobieski also had the intention to ally with France against the threat of Austria, but the greater threat posed by the Muslim-led Ottoman Empire made him fight for the Christian cause in the Battle of Vienna. In the 18th century, Poland was partitioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria, but Napoleon recreated the Polish state in the Duchy of Warsaw. With the rise of a united German Empire in the 19th century, both France and Poland found a new common enemy.

Interwar

During the Polish-Soviet War of 1920, France was one of the most active supporters of Poland, and it sent the French Military Mission to Poland to aid the Polish army. In early February, in Paris, three pacts were discussed by Polish Chief of State Józef Piłsudski and French President Alexandre Millerand: political, military and economic.

The political alliance was signed there on February 19, 1921 by Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Eustachy Sapieha and his French counterpart Aristide Briand, in the background of the negotiations that ended the Polish-Soviet War (Treaty of Riga). The agreement assumed common foreign policies, promotion of bilateral economical contacts, consultation of new pacts concerning Central and Eastern Europe and help in case one of the signatories became a victim of an "unprovoked" attack. As such, it was a defensive alliance. The secret military pact was signed two days later, on February 21, 1921, and clarified that the agreement was aimed at possible threats from both Germany and the Soviet Union. In case of aggression on Poland, France would keep the communication lines free and keep Germany in check, but it was not required to send its troops or to declare war. Both political and military pacts were legally not in force until the economic pact was ratified, on August 2, 1923.[1]

The alliance was further extended by the Franco-Polish Warrant Agreement signed on October 16, 1925 in Locarno, as part of the Locarno Treaties. The new treaty subscribed all previously-signed Polish-French agreements to the system of mutual pacts of the League of Nations.

This alliance was closely tied with the Franco-Czech Alliance. The alliances of France with Poland and Czechoslovakia were aimed at deterring Germany from the use of force to achieve a revision of the postwar settlement and ensuring that German forces would be confronted with significant combined strength of its neighbours. Although Czechoslovakia had a significant economy and industry, and Poland a strong army, the French-Polish-Czechoslovakian triangle never reached its full potential. Czechoslovakian foreign policy, under Edvard Beneš, shied from signing a formal alliance with Poland, which would force Czechoslovakia to take sides in the Polish-German territorial disputes. Czechoslovakia's influence was weakened by the doubts of its allies as to the trustworthiness of its army, and Poland's influence was undermined by fighting between supporters and opponents of Józef Piłsudski. French reluctance to invest in its allies (especially Polish) industry, strengthening trade relations (buying their agricultural products) and sharing military expertise, further weakened the alliance.[2]

In the 1930s, alliance remained mostly inactive and its only effect was the French Military Mission to Poland, which continued to work with the Polish General Staff ever since the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920. However, with the German threat becoming increasingly visible in the latter part of the decade, both countries started to seek a new pact that would not only guarantee the independence of all contracting parties but also ensure military co-operation in case of a war with Germany.

1939

Finally, a new alliance started to be formed in 1939. The Kasprzycki-Gamelin Convention was signed May 19, 1939 in Paris. It was named after Polish Minister of War Affairs General Tadeusz Kasprzycki and Commander of the French Army Maurice Gamelin. It was military (army-to-army, not state-to-state) convention and was not in force legally, as it was dependent on signing and ratification of political convention. It obliged both armies to provide help to each other in case of a war with Germany. In May, Gamelin promised a "bold relief offensive" within three weeks of a German attack. The treaty became ratified by France on September 4, 1939, on the fourth day of German offensive on Poland.

However, France provided only token help to Poland during the Polish Defensive War of 1939, in the form of the Saar Offensive. That is often considered an example of Western betrayal. However, the political convention was a basis of the recreation of the Polish Army in France

Piotr Zychowicz quotes memoirs of the French ambassador to Poland, Leon Noel, who as early as October 1938 wrote: "It is of utmost importance that we remove from our obligations everything that would deprive French government the freedom of decision on the day when Poland finds itself in war with Germany". Georges Bonnet reassured Noel, writing that "our agreement with Poland is full of gaps, needed to keep our country away from war". (pages 279 - 280)

See also

References

  1. ↑ Dz.U. 1923 nr 106 poz. 833: http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19231060833
  2. ↑ this paragraph is based on a review of Zandycz book by Detlef Brandes, from Slavic Review, Fall 1990 issue
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