Frederick Tucker, Baron Tucker
Frederick James Tucker, Baron Tucker PC (22 May 1888 – 17 November 1975) was a British judge.
Tucker was born in Pietermaritzburg, and was educated at Winchester and at New College, Oxford. He was called to the Bar (Inner Temple) in 1914, and was commissioned into the Army as a Lieutenant during World War I. After the war, he became the pupil of Rayner Goddard (later Lord Goddard) and joined his chambers. He was made King's Counsel in 1933.[1]
He was Recorder of Southampton in 1936-37, and became Justice of the King's Bench Division of the High Court, between 1937 and 1945, receiving the customary knighthood upon his appointment. In 1945, Tucker presided over the trial of William Joyce (Lord Haw Haw) for treason at the Central Criminal Court.[1]
Invested as a Privy Councillor on 30 October 1945, Tucker was Lord Justice of Appeal from 1945 to 1950, became a Honorary Fellow New College Oxford in 1946. He was appointed Lord of Appeal in Ordinary 29 September 1950, and was created a life peer with the title Baron Tucker of Great Bookham in the County of Surrey. In 1961, he retired as Lord of Appeal.
Selected judgments
In Shaw v DPP, (1961) UKHL 1 rendered on 4 May 1961, Tucker said,
| “ | Counsel for the Appellant put in the forefront of his address the submission that there is no such offence known to the law as a conspiracy to corrupt public morals. Before turning to authority I would invite your Lordships to pause to consider for a moment how far-reaching are the consequences of such a proposition if it be correct. It has for long been accepted that there are some conspiracies which are criminal although the acts agreed to be done are not per se criminal or tortious if done by individuals. Such conspiracies form a third class in addition to the well known and more clearly defined conspiracies to do acts which are unlawful, in the tense of criminal or tortious, or to do lawful acts by unlawful means. Assuming that the corruption of public morals by the acts of an individual may not be criminal or tortious does it follow that a conspiracy by two or more persons to this end is not indictable? The difficulty with regard to this third class of conspiracy has always been to define its limits or give it a label which will include all its manifestations. It was referred to by Viscount Simon in Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Company, Limited, and Others v. Veitch and Another [1942] A.C. at page 439, as one in which " the purpose aimed at, though not perhaps specifically illegal, was one which would undermine the principles of commercial or moral conduct ". The late Professor Kenny in the 11th Edition of his Outlines of Criminal Law at page 290, in a passage which is repeated in later editions, wrote:
" An unlawful purpose. The term ' unlawful' is here used in a sense which is unique; and unhappily has never yet been defined precisely. The purposes which it comprises appear to be of the following species: 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... 4 Agreements to do certain other acts which (unlike all those hitherto mentioned) are not breaches of law at all. but which nevertheless are outrageously immoral or else are in some way extremely injurious to the public." He gives a number of examples. An instance in modern times is to be found in the case of Reg v. Newland & ors. [1954] 1 Q.B. 158, where the Appellants had been convicted of conspiring to effect a public mischief by obtaining and distributing on the home market for eventual retail sale decorated domestic pottery which by orders made under the Defence General Regulations manufacturers and registered exporters were permitted to supply for export only. The orders did not in terms deal with persons who obtained such goods from a manufacturer representing that they were for export and then having obtained them sold them on the domestic market. It was contended on behalf of the Appellants that there was no such offence known to the law as set out in the indictment. In delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal Lord Goddard, L.C.J. said: "It is much too late to object that a conspiracy to effect a public mischief is an offence unknown to the law. There have been at least three reported cases during the present century in which that charge has been made and convictions upheld: Rex v. Brailsford [1905] 2 K.B. 730; Rex v. Porter [1910] 1 K.B. 369; and Rex v. Bassey [1931] 47 T.L.R. 222. The Court is well aware of the caution with which they should approach the consideration of an offence which is alleged to consist of doing acts which tend to effect public mischief as, if extended, it might enable judges to declare new offences which should be the business of the legislature. The objections to such a course were forcibly pointed out by Sir Fitzjames Stephen, the most prominent institutional writer on criminal law in the last century, in his History of the Criminal Law, vol. 3, page 359. We think that we may say that the Court should approach the subject at least with the same degree of caution as much be exercised when a plea in a civil action that something has been done contrary to public policy ... No one has ever attempted to define what may or may not constitute a public mischief and we have certainly no desire to increase the number of criminal offences by adding to the category of misdemeanours. But there are two points which in our opinion do not make it necessary for us to consider whether there is here any attempt to create a new offence. In the first place it is well known that there may be many acts which if done by an individual would not be indictable, or even actionable as a tort, and yet may become both actionable and criminal if done by a combination of persons as the result of a conspiracy, and for this really elementary proposition we need only refer to Quinn v. Leathern [1901] AC 495." My Lords, I have referred to this case as in my opinion the decision of the present and other similar cases does not depend upon the label which is to be attached to a particular conspiracy. Can it be doubted that a conspiracy to corrupt public morals is a conspiracy to effect a public mischief? Is it to be said that a conspiracy to sell decorated domestic pottery in the home market by means of devices contrived to evade the object of Board of Trade Orders is a criminal conspiracy but an agreement to do acts calculated to corrupt public morals is not? ... My Lords, if these questions are to be answered in the negative I would expect to find some clear authority during the past centuries which would justify such an answer. I know of none. |
” |
References
- 1 2 Rawlinson, Peter. "Tucker, (Frederick) James, Baron Tucker (1888–1975)". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online ed.). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/ref:odnb/31775. (Subscription or UK public library membership required.)