Firestone and Ford tire controversy

The Firestone and Ford tire controversy was a period of unusually high failures of P235/75R15 ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires used on the Ford Explorer and other related vehicles.

The tire failures are linked to 271 fatalities and over eight hundred injuries,[1][2] it led Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford Motor Company to recall and replace 27 million tires, it cut the market value of Bridgestone/Firestone in half[3], Firestone closed the Decatur factory where the tires were manufactured, it lead Congress to pass the TREAD Act[4], and it brought an end to the nearly 100 year corporate relationship between Ford Motor Company and Firestone.

Problem detection

As early as 1996 personal injury lawyers were aware of high speed tread separation in Firestone tires leading to accidents, injuries and fatalities.[5] Lawyers and traffic safety researchers decided not to contact the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) because they lacked confidence in the agency and feared that an investigation might conclude that there were no defects thereby compromising existing personal injury lawsuits. All but 13 of the 271 fatalities from these tires took place after 1996.[5]

Internal Firestone documents showed a rise in injury claims for ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires as early as 1997.[6]

In July 1998 Samuel Boyden, a researcher for State Farm Insurance, received a call from a claims handler asking for information about tread separation in Firestone tires. The researcher found 21 cases of accidents caused by tread separation and forwarded the information to the NHTSA.[7] In 1999 he found an additional 30 cases and forwarded that information to the NHTSA.[8]

Sean Kane, a researcher at Strategic Safety Consulting, found documents showing that Ford had been replacing Firestone tires in Venezuela starting in 1998 where 46 deaths had occurred.[9][10] Firestone was aware of tire defects in Venezuela as early as 1999.[11] A Ford dealer in Saudi Arabia noticed high failure rates of Firestone tires in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait starting in 1997 and in July 1999 began replacing Firestone tires on unsold Ford Explorers and to offer a 75% discount for replacement tires when customers came in for maintenance.[12] Ford and Firestone began testing tires in late 1997 or 1998 and began a limited recall in the Middle East, Venezuela, Malaysia, and Thailand in 1999 and the spring of 2000 but did not notify the NHTSA.[13]

On February 7, 2000 KHOU-TV in Houston Texas ran a 9 minute story about high speed Firestone tire failures on Ford Explorers that led to 30 deaths.[10][14] KHOU was overwhelmed by phone calls from concerned citizens and started directing callers to contact the NHTSA.

Clarence Ditlow; Executive Director for the Centre for Auto Safety in his statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation in Washington D.C., September 20, 2000[15] stated "Emerging Information shows that both Ford and Firestone had early knowledge of tread separation in Firestone Tires fitted to Ford Explorer vehicles but at no point informed the NHTSA of their findings". [16]

Investigation and Possible Causes

Cumulative failure rates of Firestone tires manufactured at different plants.

In May 2000, the NHTSA began an investigation concerning the high incidence of tire failures and accidents of Ford Explorers and other light trucks and SUV's fitted with Firestone Radial ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness tires.[2]

Ford and Firestone both issued root cause analyses that differed on the degree to which the design of the Ford Explorer led to these accidents.[2] Firestone argued that Ford's recommended 26 psi inflation pressure was too low and should have been 30 psi.[6] In addition Firestone argued that the Explorer was abnormally dangerous in the event of a tire failure, leading to more injuries and fatalities. Ford argued that the Explorer was no more dangerous than any other SUV[17] and that the accident rate for Explorers with Goodyear tires was far lower than for Explorers with Firestone tires.[18]

Some outside observers have speculated about the blame worthiness of both parties;[13] Firestone's tires being prone to tread separation and failure, and the Explorer being especially prone to rolling over if a tire fails at speed compared to other vehicles.[19]

Ford Explorer

The Ford Explorer was first offered for sale in March 1990.[20] The Explorer was originally designed by taking an SUV cabin and attaching it to a Ford Ranger undercarriage. This cut the cost of producing the new Explorer because Ford could use existing facilities, parts, and robots and wouldn't have to design everything from scratch.[21] This created problems though. Because the Explorer was taller like a pickup truck, it had a higher center of gravity and was more likely to rollover in the event of accident. It was also more likely to sway during sharp turns especially because it used the same leaf spring suspension that is found on the Ranger.[21] Ford came up with three options for correcting this problem; use shorter suspension springs to lower the vehicle half an inch in the front and 1 inch in the back, lower the tire pressure to give the Explorer a more car-like ride, or widen the wheel base by two inches which would involve a substantial redesign.[21] After the Explorer rolled over in company tests prior to production Ford decided to lower the suspension and remove air from the tires to 26 psi compared to 35 psi for the same tires on the Ranger.[22][23] They did not widen the wheel base. One consequence of lowering the tire pressure is increased tire temperatures which could lead to a tire failure.[24]

After Ford Motor Company voluntarily recalled 13 million Firestone tires on May 21, 2001, Firestone requested that the NHTSA investigate the handling and safety of Ford Explorers following a tread separation. Firestone argued that the Explorer is poorly designed and exhibits dangerous oversteer in the foreseeable event that a tire fails while driving. Firestone hired a consulting engineer to analyze the performance of the Ford Explorer and other SUV's during a tread separation, this report showed that the Explorer had a greater tendency to oversteer following a tread separation than other SUV's.[25] The NHTSA examined this report as well as real-world accident data and data provided by Ford concerning the design of the Explorer and denied Firestone's request. The NHTSA stated that "[t]he many crashes following tread separations of tires on these vehicles that are documented in the Firestone claims database and that have been reported to ODI by consumers and others demonstrate that such a tire failure can lead to loss of control, particularly when it is a rear tire that fails and the vehicle is being driven at high speed. However, the fact that a vehicle exhibits linear range oversteer characteristics following a rear tire tread separation does not, in itself, indicate that the vehicle contains a safety-related defect. Moreover, the data available to ODI does not indicate that Explorers... are more likely to exhibit linear range oversteer characteristics following a rear tire tread separation than many of their peers."[25]

The Explorer was redesigned for the 2002 model year. The tire pressure was raised to 30 psi, it was widened by 2.5 inches, the suspension was lowered, and independent rear suspension and electronic stability control were added.[21][26]

Firestone Tires

The failures all involved tread separation[27][28]—the tread peeling off followed often by tire disintegration.[29] Tread separation, due to the interaction of steel and rubber tire elements, has been a challenge in radial tire design since their development by Michelin in 1946. In 1968, Michelin proposed a nylon cap over the steel elements to counteract this, and Firestone adopted this nylon cap design in 2000, following hearings held by the United States Congress.[30]

If tread separation happened while a vehicle was running at speed, there was a possibility that an SUV or light truck might roll over,[31][32] because they have high centers of gravity. [33]

United Rubber Workers Strike

The P235/75R15 ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires that failed were primarily manufactured at Firestone’s Decatur, Illinois factory[34] during a time of labor unrest and a strike against Firestone carried out by the United Rubber Workers (URW) and the United Steel Workers of America (USWA).[3][35]

In January 1994 Firestone and the URW entered into new contract negotiations with Firestone demanding considerable concessions from the union. These concessions included switching from an 8 hour workday to 12 hour alternating shift so the factory could remain in operation 24 hours a day, a pay cut by 30 percent for new hires, a seven day workweek instead of five days, hourly workers would contribute to their healthcare plan, a switch from a piece-rate system to a performance based system, and senior workers were to lose two weeks of vacation time. [36]

By April 1994 the existing labor contract ended and workers continued to work at the factory until the URW called a general strike in July at Decatur and four other Firestone facilities. Almost immediately Firestone began hiring replacement workers at all their facilities and by January 1995 Firestone had hired 2,300 replacement workers who were paid thirty percent less. Over time union workers started to cross the picket line and by May 1995 there were 1,048 replacement workers and 371 permanent workers at Decatur. At that time the URW voted to unconditionally end the strike to block Firestone[37] from hiring even more replacement workers and then holding a union decertification election. While the strike ended the labor negotiations continued. In July 1995 the URW had run out of money and was absorbed by the USWA.[38] During the time period from May 1995 and December 1996 union workers worked alongside non-union replacements. Labor negotiations between Firestone and the USWA continued but many union workers couldn’t return to work because their jobs had been replaced. The union described that time period as "brutal." The USWA continued to negotiate specifically trying to get Firestone to allow all union workers to return to their jobs. In December of 1996 USWA finally reached an agreement and all union workers were allowed to return to work.

Tires with the highest rates of failure were manufactured in the months right before the union went on strike but after labor negotiations had begun and later after union workers began to cross the picket line and work without a contract alongside replacement workers.[3] Other Firestone factories (Joliette, Quebec and Wilson, North Carolina) also produced the same tire models but had far lower failure rates.[3] Failure rates at the Decatur plant before the labor negotiations began, while the replacement workers worked without union workers, and after the labor negotiations ended were comparable to the failure rate of tires manufactured at the Joliette and Wilson plants.[3]

Other studies have found that labor unrest reduces the quality of work by union members[39][40][41][3] suggesting that there should be additional inspections and heightened scrutiny by regulators during strikes.

Recall

A product recall was announced by Ford and Firestone on August 9, 2000, covering 14.4 million P235/75 R15 Firestone ATX and ATX II tires and P235/75R15 Wilderness AT tires manufactured after 1991 and 1996 respectively and originating from Firestone's Decatur, IL plant. [42] The same tire models manufactured in Joliette, Quebec and Wilson, North Carolina were not included in the recall. On August 21, 2000 Ford halted production at three truck assembly plants so that 70,000 tires could be diverted towards the recall effort. P235/75 R15 tires were sold out nationwide and both Ford and Firestone looked for replacement tires internationally.

Ford announced a second recall on May 22, 2001 for all Wilderness AT tires of 15, 16, and 17 inches installed on all Ford trucks and SUV's. This covered an additional 13 million Firestone tires and cost Ford $3 billion.[12]

In November 2013, two recalled Wilderness AT tires were found in Atlanta, Georgia.[43] One of the tires was offered for sale as new at a used tire retail shop.[43]

Fallout

Injuries and Fatalities

Two hundred and seventy one people were killed and 823 people were injured as a result of these failures.[44] The large majority of accidents took place in California, Arizona, Texas, and Florida.[45]

Lawsuits

A large number of lawsuits[22][46][47][26][48] were filed against both Ford and Firestone. Lawyers for the plaintiffs have argued that both Ford and Firestone knew of the dangers but did nothing, and that specifically Ford knew that the Explorer was highly prone to rollovers. Ford denies these allegations.

Because of the number of lawsuits the plaintiffs’ attorneys became concerned that the tire company would not have enough money to pay all of the claims[49] and began looking for other sources of revenue.

In November 2001 Firestone agreed to pay $41.5 million to end state lawsuits against Firestone.[50] In 2003 Firestone settled a class action lawsuit by agreeing to pay $15.5 million for consumer education focusing on tire safety and $19 million in legal fees and $2,500 each to 45 plaintiffs.[51]

Congressional Investigation

Congress began hearings in September 2000 to find out why it took so long for the NHTSA to discover these tire defects and why Ford and Firestone were aware of tire failures as early as 1996 but never reported the information to the NHTSA. The investigation led Congress to pass the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act or TREAD Act on October 11, 2000 which was signed into law on November 1.[52]

Ford/Firestone corporate relations

Relations between Ford and Bridgestone/Firestone deteriorated after the NHTSA began investigating the tire failures in May 2000. Ford first accused Firestone of withholding data that Ford needed to determine which tires might be unsafe. Firestone then accused Ford of withholding safety data concerning the design of the Explorer. After Firestone agreed to the initial recall of 14.4 million tires on August 9, 2000 the NHTSA continued to push Firestone to recall all ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires regardless of where they were manufactured. Ford executives were concerned that the NHTSA might decide that the Wilderness AT tires wouldn't meet future safety standards and decided to recall these tires on their own.[13] Before Ford could publicly announce this decision John T. Lampe (Chairman & CEO of Bridgestone/Firestone) announced on May 21, 2001 in a public letter to Jacques Nasser (Ford Motor Company chief executive) that Bridgestone/Firestone would no longer enter into new contracts with Ford Motor Company, effectively ending a 100-year supply relationship.[53] The letter included accusations that the Ford Explorer was unsafe and called on the NHTSA to investigate design flaws in the SUV.[12] On May 22, 2001, angry that Firestone wouldn't expand the recall, Jacques Nasser at Ford announced a voluntary recall of all Wilderness AT tires that were not subject to the original recall.[13] In 2005 Firestone paid Ford $240 million to settle claims related to the recall.[54] The bitter public fight between Ford and Firestone was also a contributing factor in Ford's decision to fire Jacques Nasser in November 2001.[55]

Firestone's Decatur Plant

Firestone's Decatur plant was closed in December 2001 and all 1,500 employees were laid off.[56] Firestone cited a decline in consumer demand for Firestone tires and the age of the Decatur plant as the reasons for closing that facility.[57]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Francis, David R. (2003-07-21). "Strikes hurt product safety". Christian Science Monitor. ISSN 0882-7729. Retrieved 2017-05-02.
  2. 1 2 3 "Engineering Analysis Report and Initial Decision Regarding EA00-023: Firestone Wilderness AT Tires" (PDF). National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. October 2001.
  3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Krueger, Alan B.; Mas, Alexander (April 2004). "Strikes, Scabs, and Tread Separations: Labor Strife and the Production of Defective Bridgestone/Firestone Tires" (PDF). The Journal of Political Economy. 112: 253–289.
  4. ↑ "REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF DEFECTS INVESTIGATION National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Report Number: MH-2002-071" (PDF). Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation. January 3, 2002. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
  5. 1 2 Bradsher, Keith (2001-06-24). "S.U.V. TIRE DEFECTS WERE KNOWN IN '96 BUT NOT REPORTED". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-07-03.
  6. 1 2 Bradsher, Keith (2000-09-08). "Documents Show Firestone Knew of Rising Warranty Costs". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  7. ↑ "Firestone's Tire Recall" (PDF). University of New Mexico, Daniels Fund Ethics Initiative. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
  8. ↑ "Congress grills Ford, Firestone, NHTSA". usatoday30.usatoday.com. Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  9. ↑ Bradsher, Keith (2000-09-02). "Warning Issued On More Tires From Firestone". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-07-03.
  10. 1 2 "American Journalism Review". ajrarchive.org. Retrieved 2017-07-03.
  11. ↑ JONES, TERRIL YUE (2000-08-29). "Ford Urges Firestone to Recall Tires in Venezuela". Los Angeles Times. ISSN 0458-3035. Retrieved 2017-07-03.
  12. 1 2 3 O'Rourke, J. (2001-10-01). "Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. and Ford Motor Company: How a Product Safety Crisis Ended a Hundred-Year Relationship". Corporate Reputation Review. 4 (3): 255–264. ISSN 1363-3589. doi:10.1057/palgrave.crr.1540147.
  13. 1 2 3 4 Greenwald, John (2001-05-29). "Inside the Ford/Firestone Fight". Time.com. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  14. ↑ Rutenberg, Jim (2000-09-11). "MEDIA; Local TV Uncovered National Scandal". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-07-03.
  15. ↑ Senate Committee On Commerce, Science And Transportation, Washington D.C., September 12, 2000 (from the Internet Archive)
  16. ↑ Corona, Dana L.; Komendanchik, Megan E. (April 2008). "Bridgestone/Firestone Recall: A Case Study in Public Relations" (PDF). Louisiana State University. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  17. ↑ "Firestone And Ford Place Blame". Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  18. ↑ News, A. B. C. (2006-01-07). "Congress Grills Ford, Firestone Over Tire Tests". ABC News. Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  19. ↑ http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811617.pdf
  20. ↑ "Unsafe On Any Tire - Chronology - Rollover". Frontline - PBS. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  21. 1 2 3 4 Bradsher, Keith (2000-12-07). "RISKY DECISION/A special report.; Study of Ford Explorer's Design Reveals a Series of Compromises". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-07-21.
  22. 1 2 Greenwald, John (2001-05-29). "Inside the Ford/Firestone Fight". Time. ISSN 0040-781X. Retrieved 2017-07-03.
  23. ↑ "Ford Explorer-Firestone Tire". Center for Autosafety. 2012-08-27. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  24. ↑ "Tire 101". Kendatire.com. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  25. 1 2 "Analysis of a Request for a Defect Investigation Submitted by Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.". The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. February 4, 2002. Retrieved July 17, 2017.
  26. 1 2 "Behind Fords Recent $131 Million Rollover Judgment". Autoblog. Retrieved 2017-07-24.
  27. ↑ ANSBERRY, CLARE (February 5, 2001). "In Firestone Tire Study, Expert Finds Vehicle Weight Was Key in Failure". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 6 September 2016.
  28. ↑ "Firestone Tire Defects". Floridatirelawyer.com. 2000-08-09. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  29. ↑ "Tire Tread Separations, Defects and Blowouts". Tirefailures.com. 2002-05-24. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  30. ↑ Rowell, John D. "Tire Tread Separation - Two Theories of Liability" (PDF). cdrb-law.com. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  31. ↑ "Auto Accidents Caused by Mechanical Failures". Aa1car.com. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  32. ↑ "Underinflated and Worn Tires Increase Likelihood of Crash". Consumerreports.org. 2012-05-15. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  33. ↑ Gary J. Heydinger et al. "Measured Vehicle Inertial Parameters - NHTSA’s Data Through November 1998" page 16+18. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1999
  34. ↑ "Ford and Firestone: Screeching to a halt". The Economist. May 24, 2001. Retrieved July 4, 2017.
  35. ↑ "Problems At Tire Plant Alleged". tribunedigital-chicagotribune. Retrieved 2017-04-29.
  36. ↑ "Permanent Replacements Being Hired For Strikers At Bridgestone-firestone". tribunedigital-chicagotribune. Retrieved 2017-04-29.
  37. ↑ "Rubber Workers Vote to End Strike : Labor: But a Bridgestone-Firestone spokesman won't say how many will be called back". The Los Angeles Times. May 10, 1995. Retrieved April 29, 2017.
  38. ↑ Gilpin, Kenneth N. (1995-05-13). "Rubber Workers' Union Acts To Merge With Steelworkers". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-04-29.
  39. ↑ Baker, Michael. "Industrial Actions in Schools: Strikes and Student Achievement" (PDF). doi:10.3386/w16846.
  40. ↑ Gruber, Jonathan; Kleiner, Samuel. "Do Strikes Kill? Evidence from New York State" (PDF). doi:10.3386/w15855.
  41. ↑ Mas, Alexandre. "Labor Unrest and the Quality of Production: Evidence from the Construction Equipment Resale Market" (PDF). doi:10.3386/w13138.
  42. ↑ "Firestone Tire Recall". National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. September 1, 2000. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
  43. 1 2 Channel 2 Investigation Finds Recalled Tires for Sale, November 4, 2013 Archived November 5, 2013, at the Wayback Machine.
  44. ↑ "NHTSA Press Release Firestone Recalls". National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. October 4, 2001. Retrieved July 3, 2017.
  45. ↑ "Firestone recalls 6.5 million SUV tires - Aug. 9, 2000". money.cnn.com. Retrieved 2017-07-05.
  46. ↑ "USATODAY.com - Judge expands lawsuit vs. Ford, Firestone". usatoday30.usatoday.com. Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  47. ↑ Winerip, Michael (2001-01-09). "Ford and Firestone Settle Suit Over Explorer Crash". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  48. ↑ "CNN.com - First Firestone trial opens in Texas - August 14, 2001". www.cnn.com. Retrieved 2017-08-08.
  49. ↑ "USATODAY.com - Firestone settles tire lawsuit for $7.85M". usatoday30.usatoday.com. Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  50. ↑ "Ford, Firestone Settle Rollover Suit". Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  51. ↑ Reuters (2003-07-25). "Firestone Settlement Is Approved". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  52. ↑ McDonald, Kevin (Fall 2001). "Don't TREAD on Me: Faster Than a Tire Blowout, Congress Passes Wide-Sweeping Legislation That Treads on the Thirty-Five Year Old Motor Vehicle Safety Act". Buffalo Law Review. 49: 1163 – via SSRN.
  53. ↑ "Text of Letter to Ford From Bridgestone". New York Times. 2001-05-22. Retrieved 2016-03-19.
  54. ↑ The Associated Press (2005-10-13). "Bridgestone and Ford Settle Dispute Over Defective Tires". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-07-04.
  55. ↑ "Jacques knifed". The Economist. 2001-11-01. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 2017-07-05.
  56. ↑ Kilborn, Peter T. (2001-12-14). "An Illinois Tire Plant Closes and a Way of Life Fades". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-04-29.
  57. ↑ Barboza, David (2001-06-28). "Bridgestone/Firestone to Close Tire Plant at Center of Huge Recall". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2017-04-29.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.