Far-right politics in Poland

Like in other nations across the world, there are several far-right organizations and parties operating in Poland.

History and ideology

Past

An important element of Polish nationalism has been its identification with the Roman Catholic religion, through this is a relatively recent development, with its roots in the counter-reformation of the 17th century, and one that became established clearly in the interwar period.[1][2][3][4] Although the old Commonwealth was religiously diverse and highly tolerant,[5] the Roman Catholic religious narrative with messianic undertones (the Christ of Nations) became one of the defining characteristics of the modern Polish identity.[6][7][8] Roman Dmowski, a Polish politician of that era, was vital in defining that concept, and has been called the "father of Polish nationalism."[9][10][11] Dmowski was the leader of National Democracy. After his death, more radically inclined youth broke off and created National Radical Camp. Despite previously holding few governmental positions, Polish nationalists mainly entered the mainstream politics in 1937, after the death of an anti far-right autocrat Józef Piłsudski and the creation of Camp of National Unity. One of the far-right policies implemented at that time were the Ghetto benches.

The post-World War II human migrations, with the resultant demographic and territorial changes of Poland that drastically reduced the number of ethnic minorities in Poland, also played a major role in the creation of the modern Polish state and nationality.[12][13]

In communist Poland the regime adopted, modified and used for its official ideology and propaganda some of the nationalist concepts developed by Dmowski. As Dmowski's National Democrats strongly believed in a "national" (ethnically homogenous) state, even if this criterion necessitated a reduced territory, their territorial and ethnic ideas were accepted and practically implemented by the Polish communists, acting with Joseph Stalin's permission. Stalin himself in 1944-45 conferenced with and was influenced by a leading National Democrat Stanisław Grabski, a coauthor of the planned border and population shifts and an embodiment of the nationalist-communist collusion.[14] Consecutive Communist leaders used nationalist and patriotic rhetoric by shifting the public attention from the stagnating economy, these included; Władysław Gomułka with his seeking a "Polish way to socialism";[15] and giving rise to the period known as "Gomułka's thaw", Mieczysław Moczar and others. Their beliefs culminated in the "anti-Zionist" campaign of 1968. In the 1980s, Polish nationalist organizations with the pro- and anti- government ideologies started to emerge.

Modern

National Revival of Poland demonstration led by Catholic-sedevacantist priest Rafał Trytek

Following the collapse of a communist system in the country, the far-right ideology became visible. The pan-Slavic and neopagan Polish National Union (PWN-PSN) political party at its peak was one of the larger groups active in the early 1990s, numbering then some 4,000 members and making international headlines for its anti-Semitism and anti-Catholicism. The National Revival of Poland being a marginal political party, under the leadership of Adam Gmurczyk, operate since the late 1980s. It is a member of European National Front and a co-founder of International Third Position. The organization Association for Tradition and Culture "Niklot" was founded in 1998 by Tomasz Szczepanski, a former NOP member, promoting Slavic supremacy and neopaganism. Since the mid-1990s, the ultra-Catholic Radio Maryja station has been on air with an anti-modernist, nationalist and xenophobic program.[16] All-Polish Youth and National Radical Camp were "recreated" in 1989 and 1993, respectively.

In 1995, the Anti-Defamation League estimated the number of far-right skinheads in Poland at 2,000, the fifth highest number after Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the United States.[17] Since late 2000s, native White power skinhead, White supremacy and Neo-Nazi groups largely were absorbed into more casual and better organized "Autonomous Nationalists".

National Radical Camp march in Kraków, July 2007

On the political level, the biggest victories achieved so far by the far-right were in the 2001, 2005 and 2015 elections. The League of Polish Families won 38 seats in 2001, and 34 in 2005. In 2015, entering parliament from the list of Kukiz'15, the far-right National Movement gained 5 seats out of Kukiz's 42. In April 2016 National Movement leadership decided to break-off with Kukiz's movement, but only one MP followed party's instructions. The ones that decided to stay with Kukiz'15, together with few other Kukiz's MPs, formed parliamentary nationalist association called "National Democracy" (Endecja).[18]

Examples of influence

Anxiety about Islam

There have been reports of hate crimes targeting Muslim minority in Poland. Far-right and right-wing populist political parties and organizations fuel fear and hatred towards Islam and Muslims.[19] Hate crimes such as arson and physical violence have occurred in Poland (despite having a Muslim population of only 0.1%, that is 30,000 out of 38 million).[20][21] Politicians have also made racist and anti-Muslim comments when discussing European migrant crisis;[22] in 2015, Jarosław Kaczyński claimed that Poland "can't" accept any refugees because "they could spread infectious diseases."[23] In 2017, the First Deputy Minister of Justice Patryk Jaki stated that "stopping islamization is his Westerplatte".[24]

Russophobia

According to the latest national census, there is only 13,000 Russians (including dual citizens) living in the country. Due to the complex nature of historical Poland–Russia relations, the 2010 Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash and PiS' Atlanticist and anti-Russian foreign policy,[25] Russophobia is widespread in the country, including among the far-right movement. The National Revival of Poland cooperates with Ukrainian Svoboda[26] and the Right Sector, whilst Association for Tradition and Culture "Niklot" and "Autonomous Nationalists" even sent members to fight in War in Donbass within the ranks of far-right Azov Battalion.[27][28]

After the 2015 elections

In May 2016, despite criticism from Human Rights NGOs, opposition parties and left-wing organizations, to the appeasement of the far-right, the majority elected right-wing government of Law and Justice (PiS) disbanded governmental advisory and coordinating body that dealt with "racial discrimination, xenophobia and related to them, intolerance" (Rada ds. Przeciwdziałania Dyskryminacji Rasowej, Ksenofobii i związanej z nimi Nietolerancji), by claiming that its mission was "useless".[29] As a Polish Ombudsman, Adam Bodnar is under the constant pressure from the PiS' government and its controlled media; his operative budget was cut by 10 mln złotych, he is labeled as a "traitor" for presenting critical report on the situation of the human rights in Poland to the UN, and the government owned and publicly paid TV channels air documentaries that claim his alleged connections to the UN lawyers.[30] Mainstream clothing with nationalist and far-right themes (for example, Celtic cross or slogans such as "Death to the enemies of the Fatherland") is widespread among the Polish youth. Western experts warn that PiS' actions only embolden the previously marginal far-right making their extreme views seem socially acceptable, ordinary and mainstream.[31]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Geneviève Zubrzycki (15 October 2009). The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland. University of Chicago Press. pp. 35–36. ISBN 978-0-226-99305-8. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  2. ↑ Stefan Auer (22 January 2004). Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe. Routledge. p. 58. ISBN 978-1-134-37860-9. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  3. ↑ Stefan Auer (22 January 2004). Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe. Routledge. p. 61. ISBN 978-1-134-37860-9. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  4. ↑ Geneviève Zubrzycki (15 October 2009). The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland. University of Chicago Press. pp. 41–43. ISBN 978-0-226-99305-8. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  5. ↑ Karin Friedrich; Barbara M. Pendzich (2009). Citizenship and Identity in a Multinational Commonwealth: Poland-Lithuania in Context, 1550-1772. BRILL. p. 150. ISBN 978-90-04-16983-8. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  6. ↑ Thomas K. Nakayama; Rona Tamiko Halualani (21 March 2011). The Handbook of Critical Intercultural Communication. John Wiley & Sons. p. 296. ISBN 978-1-4443-9067-4. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  7. ↑ Geneviève Zubrzycki (15 October 2009). The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland. University of Chicago Press. p. 76. ISBN 978-0-226-99305-8. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  8. ↑ Geneviève Zubrzycki (15 October 2009). The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland. University of Chicago Press. pp. 45–46. ISBN 978-0-226-99305-8. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  9. ↑ Jóhann Páll Árnason; Natalie Doyle (2010). Domains and Divisions of European History. Liverpool University Press. p. 93. ISBN 978-1-84631-214-4. Retrieved 20 September 2013.
  10. ↑ Laura Ann Crago (1993). Nationalism, religion, citizenship, and work in the development of the Polish working class and the Polish trade union movement, 1815-1929: a comparative study of Russian Poland's textile workers and upper Silesian miners and metalworkers. Yale University. p. 168. Retrieved 20 September 2013.
  11. ↑ Stefan Auer (22 January 2004). Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe. Routledge. pp. 62–63. ISBN 978-1-134-37860-9. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  12. ↑ Norman Davies (24 February 2005). God's Playground A History of Poland: Volume II: 1795 to the Present. Oxford University Press. p. 11. ISBN 978-0-19-925340-1. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  13. ↑ Stefan Auer (22 January 2004). Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe. Routledge. p. 63. ISBN 978-1-134-37860-9. Retrieved 23 September 2013.
  14. ↑ Timothy Snyder (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations. Yale University Press. pp. 179–231. ISBN 978-0-300-10586-5.
  15. ↑ "Rebellious Compromiser". Time Magazine. 10 December 1956. Retrieved 2006-10-14.
  16. ↑ Liang (2007), p. 265f.
  17. ↑ Suall et al., The Skinhead International (1995), p. 1.
  18. ↑ Powstało stowarzyszenie Endecja z udziałem posłów Kukiza rp.pl, 19 May 2016
  19. ↑ Hume, Tim (9 May 2017). "Poland's populist government let far-right extremism explode into mainstream" – via news.vice.com.
  20. ↑ "Why are Polish people so wrong about Muslims in their country?". openDemocracy. 13 January 2017.
  21. ↑ "European Islamophobia Report" (PDF). SETA. 2015.
  22. ↑ 'Poles don't want immigrants. They don't understand them, don't like them'
  23. ↑ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-poland-idUSKCN0S918B20151015
  24. ↑ http://www.rp.pl/Kraj/305099893-Partia-Wolnosc-chce-zakazac-Koranu.html#ap-2
  25. ↑ http://russia-insider.com/en/politics/will-polands-russophobic-elite-drag-europe-war/ri14158
  26. ↑ http://www.nop.org.pl/2011/07/31/warszawa-robocze-spotkanie-nop-i-swobody/
  27. ↑ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28951324
  28. ↑ http://russia-insider.com/en/politics_ukraine/2014/11/07/01-04-44pm/polish_mercenaries_and_arms_flood_ukraine_media_looks_other
  29. ↑ http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114871,20020698,rzecznik-rzadu-rada-ds-walki-z-rasizmem-i-ksenofobia-nie-wykazala.html
  30. ↑ https://pl.sputniknews.com/opinie/201612054360739-rzecznik-prawa-obywatelskie-atakowany-przez-pis/
  31. ↑ Hume, Tim (9 May 2017). "Poland's populist government let far-right extremism explode into mainstream" – via https://news.vice.com.

Bibliography

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