Communications-based train control

An underground station with two tracks in Madrid. A blue and white subway train is entering the station on the left.
CBTC deployment in Madrid Metro, Spain
An elevated station in Sao Paolo has a design like a cable-stayed bridge.
Santo Amaro station on Line 5 of the partially CBTC-enabled São Paulo Metro
Some of the top 30 world's busiest metros in terms of annual passenger rides[1] utilise a CBTC system

Communications-based train control (CBTC) is a railway signaling system that makes use of the telecommunications between the train and track equipment for the traffic management and infrastructure control. By means of the CBTC systems, the exact position of a train is known more accurately than with the traditional signaling systems. This results in a more efficient and safe way to manage the railway traffic. Metros (and other railway systems) are able to improve headways while maintaining or even improving safety.

A CBTC system is a "continuous, automatic train control system utilizing high-resolution train location determination, independent from track circuits; continuous, high-capacity, bidirectional train-to-wayside data communications; and trainborne and wayside processors capable of implementing Automatic Train Protection (ATP) functions, as well as optional Automatic Train Operation (ATO) and Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) functions.", as defined in the IEEE 1474 standard.[2]

Background and origin

The main objective of CBTC is to increase capacity by reducing the time interval (headway) between trains.

Traditional signalling systems detect trains in discrete sections of the track called 'blocks', each protected by signals that prevent a train entering an occupied block. Since every block is a fixed section of track, these systems are referred to as fixed block systems.

In a moving block CBTC system the protected section for each train is a "block" that moves with and trails behind it, and made to the system as a whole by continuous communication of the train's exact position via some kind of communication like such as radio or inductive loop.[3]

SFO AirTrain, in San Francisco Airport, was the first radio-based CBTC system

As a result, Bombardier opened the world's first radio-based CBTC system at San Francisco airport's Automated People Mover (APM) in February 2003. A few months later, in June 2003, Alstom introduced the railway application of its radio technology on the Singapore North East Line. Previously, CBTC has its former origins in the loop based systems developed by Alcatel SEL (now Thales) for the Bombardier Automated Rapid Transit (ART) systems in Canada during the mid-1980s. These systems, which were also referred to as Transmission-Based Train Control (TBTC), made use of inductive loop transmission techniques for track to train communication, introducing an alternative to track circuit based communication. This technology, operating in the 30–60 kHz frequency range to communicate trains and wayside equipment, was widely adopted by the metro operators in spite of some electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) issues, as well as other installation and maintenance concerns. See SelTrac for further information regarding Transmission-Based-Train-Control.

As with new application of any technology, some problems arose at the beginning mainly due to compatibility and interoperability aspects.[4][5] However, there have been relevant improvements since then, and currently the reliability of the radio-based communication systems has grown significantly.

Moreover, it is important to highlight that not all the systems using radio communication technology are considered to be CBTC systems. So, for clarity and to keep in line with the state-of-the-art solutions for operator's requirements,[5] this article only covers the latest moving block principle based (either true moving block or virtual block, so not dependent on track-based detection of the trains)[2] CBTC solutions that make use of the radio communications.

Main features

CBTC and moving block

CBTC systems are modern railway signaling systems that can mainly be used in urban railway lines (either light or heavy) and APMs, although it could also be deployed on commuter lines. For main lines, a similar system might be the European Railway Traffic Management System ERTMS Level 3 (not yet fully defined). In the modern CBTC systems the trains continuously calculate and communicate their status via radio to the wayside equipment distributed along the line. This status includes, among other parameters, the exact position, speed, travel direction and braking distance. This information allows calculation of the area potentially occupied by the train on the track. It also enables the wayside equipment to define the points on the line that must never be passed by the other trains on the same track. These points are communicated to make the trains automatically and continuously adjust their speed while maintaining the safety and comfort (jerk) requirements. So, the trains continuously receive information regarding the distance to the preceding train and are then able to adjust their safety distance accordingly.

Source: Bombardier Transportation for Wikimedia Commons
Safety distance (safe-braking distance) between trains in fixed block and moving block signalling systems

From the signalling system perspective, the first figure shows the total occupancy of the leading train by including the whole blocks which the train is located on. This is due to the fact that it is impossible for the system to know exactly where the train actually is within these blocks. Therefore, the fixed block system only allows the following train to move up to the last unoccupied block's border.

In a moving block system as shown in the second figure, the train position and its braking curve is continuously calculated by the trains, and then communicated via radio to the wayside equipment. Thus, the wayside equipment is able to establish protected areas, each one called Limit of Movement Authority (LMA), up to the nearest obstacle (in the figure the tail of the train in front).

It is important to mention that the occupancy calculated in these systems must include a safety margin for location uncertainty (in yellow in the figure) added to the length of the train. Both of them form what is usually called 'Footprint'. This safety margin depends on the accuracy of the odometry system in the train.

CBTC systems based on moving block allows the reduction of the safety distance between two consecutive trains. This distance is varying according to the continuous updates of the train location and speed, maintaining the safety requirements. This results in a reduced headway between consecutive trains and an increased transport capacity.

Levels of automation

Modern CBTC systems allow different levels of automation or Grades of Automation (GoA), as defined and classified in the IEC 62290-1.[6] In fact, CBTC is not a synonym for "driverless" or "automated trains" although it is considered as a basic technology for this purpose.

The grades of automation available range from a manual protected operation, GoA 1 (usually applied as a fallback operation mode) to the fully automated operation, GoA 4 (Unattended Train Operation, UTO). Intermediate operation modes comprise semi-automated GoA 2 (Semi-automated Operation Mode, STO) or driverless GoA 3 (Driverless Train Operation, DTO).[7] The latter operates without a driver in the cabin, but requires an attendant to face degraded modes of operation as well as guide the passengers in the case of emergencies. The higher the GoA, the higher the safety, functionality and performance levels must be.[7]

Main applications

CBTC systems allow optimal use of the railway infrastructure as well as achieving maximum capacity and minimum headway between operating trains, while maintaining the safety requirements. These systems are suitable for the new highly demanding urban lines, but also to be overlaid on existing lines in order to improve their performance.[8]

Of course, in the case of upgrading existing lines the design, installation, test and commissioning stages are much more critical. This is mainly due to the challenge of deploying the overlying system without disrupting the revenue service.[9]

Main benefits

The evolution of the technology and the experience gained in operation over the last 30 years means that modern CBTC systems are more reliable and less prone to failure than older train control systems. CBTC systems normally have less wayside equipment and their diagnostic and monitoring tools have been improved, which makes them easier to implement and, more importantly, easier to maintain.[7]

CBTC technology is evolving, making use of the latest techniques and components to offer more compact systems and simpler architectures. For instance, with the advent of modern electronics it has been possible to build in redundancy so that single failures do not adversely impact operational availability.

Moreover, these systems offer complete flexibility in terms of operational schedules or timetables, enabling urban rail operators to respond to the specific traffic demand more swiftly and efficiently and to solve traffic congestion problems. In fact, automatic operation systems have the potential to significantly reduce the headway and improve the traffic capacity compared to manual driving systems.[10][11]

Finally, it is important to mention that the CBTC systems have proven to be more energy efficient than traditional manually driven systems.[7] The use of new functionalities, such as automatic driving strategies or a better adaptation of the transport offer to the actual demand, allows significant energy savings reducing the power consumption.

Risks

The primary risk of an electronic train control system is that if the communications link between any of the trains is disrupted then all or part of the system might have to enter a failsafe state until the problem is remedied. Depending on the severity of the communication loss, this state can range from vehicles temporarily reducing speed, coming to a halt or operating in a degraded mode until communications are re-established. If communication outage is permanent some sort of contingency operation must be implemented which may consist of manual operation using absolute block or, in the worst case, the substitution of an alternative form of transportation.[12] As a result, high availability of CBTC systems is crucial for proper operation, especially if we consider that such systems are used to increase transport capacity and reduce headway. System redundancy and recovery mechanisms must then be thoroughly checked to achieve a high robustness in operation. With the increased availability of the CBTC system is very bad and it must also be considered the need for an extensive training and periodical refresh of system operators on the recovery procedures. In fact, one of the major system hazards in CBTC systems is the probability of human error and improper application of recovery procedures if the system becomes unavailable.

Communications failures can result from equipment malfunction, electromagnetic interference, weak signal strength or saturation of the communications medium.[13] In this case, an interruption can result in a service brake or emergency brake application as real time situational awareness is a critical safety requirement for CBTC and if these interruptions are frequent enough it could seriously impact service. This is the reason why, historically, CBTC systems first implemented radio communication systems in 2003, when the required technology was mature enough for critical applications.

In systems with poor line of sight or spectrum/bandwidth limitations a larger than anticipated number of transponders may be required to enhance the service. This is usually more of an issue with applying CBTC to existing transit systems in tunnels that were not designed from the outset to support it. An alternate method to improve system availability in tunnels is the use of leaky feeder cable that, while having higher initial costs (material + installation) achieves a more reliable radio link.

CBTC systems that make use of wireless communications link have a much larger attack surface and can be subject to various types of hacking including intrusion of the communications network and tampering with safety critical messages that, in the worst case, could result in a safety hazard. These attacks can to some extent be mitigated using defensive techniques such as those prescribed by standard EN 50159-2.[14]

With the emerging services over open ISM radio bands (i.e. 2.4 GHz and 5.8 GHz) and the potential disruption over critical CBTC services, there is an increasing pressure in the international community (ref. report 676 of UITP organization, Reservation of a Frequency Spectrum for Critical Safety Applications dedicated to Urban Rail Systems) to reserve a frequency band specifically for radio-based urban rail systems. Such decision would help standarize CBTC systems across the market (a growing demand from most operators) and ensure availability for those critical systems.

As a CBTC system is required to have high availability and particularly, allow for a graceful degradation, a secondary method of signaling might be provided to ensure some level of non-degraded service upon partial or complete CBTC unavailability.[15] This is particularly relevant for brownfield implementations (lines with an already existing signalling system) where the infrastructure design cannot be controlled and coexistence with legacy systems is required, at least, temporarily. For example, the New York City Canarsie Line was outfitted with a backup automatic block signaling system capable of supporting 12tph, compared with the 26tph of the CBTC system. Although this is a rather common architecture for resignalling projects, it can negate some of the cost savings of CBTC if applied to new lines. This is still a key point in the CBTC development (and is still being discussed), since some providers and operators argue that a fully redundant architecture of the CBTC system may however achieve high availability values by itself.[16]

In principle, CBTC systems may be designed with centralized supervision systems in order to improve maintainability and reduce installation costs. If so, there is an increased risk of a single point of failure that could disrupt service over an entire system or line. Fixed block systems usually work with distributed logic that are normally more resistant to such outages. Therefore, a careful analysis of the benefits and risks of a given CBTC architecture (centralized vs. distributed) must be done during system design.

When CBTC is applied to systems that previously ran under complete human control with operators working on sight it may actually result in a reduction in capacity (albeit with an increase in safety). This is because CBTC operates with less positional certainty than human sight and also with greater margins for error as worst-case train parameters are applied for the design (e.g. guaranteed emergency brake rate vs. nominal brake rate). For instance, CBTC introduction in Philly's Center City trolley tunnel resulted initially in a marked increase in travel time and corresponding decrease in capacity when compared with the unprotected manual driving. This was the offset to finally eradicate vehicle collisions which on-sight driving cannot avoid and showcases the usual conflicts between operation and safety.

Architecture

The typical architecture of a modern CBTC system comprises the following main subsystems:

  1. Wayside equipment, which includes the interlocking and the subsystems controlling every zone in the line or network (typically containing the wayside ATP and ATO functionalities). Depending on the suppliers, the architectures may be centralized or distributed. The control of the system is performed from a central command ATS, though local control subsystems may be also included as a fallback.
  2. CBTC onboard equipment, including ATP and ATO subsystems in the vehicles.
  3. Train to wayside communication subsystem, currently based on radio links.

Thus, although a CBTC architecture is always depending on the supplier and its technical approach, the following logical components may be found generally in a typical CBTC architecture:

Projects

CBTC technology has been (and is being) successfully implemented for a variety of applications as shown in the figure below (mid 2011). They range from some implementations with short track, limited numbers of vehicles and few operating modes (such as the airport APMs in San Francisco or Washington), to complex overlays on existing railway networks carrying more than a million passengers each day and with more than 100 trains (such as lines 1 and 6 in Metro de Madrid, line 3 in Shenzhen Metro, some lines in Paris Metro, New York City Subway and Beijing Subway, or the Sub-Surface network in London Underground).[17]

Radio-based CBTC moving block projects around the world. Projects are classified with colours depending on the supplier; those underlined are already into CBTC operation[note 1]


Despite the difficulty, the table below tries to summarize and reference the main radio-based CBTC systems deployed around the world as well as those ongoing projects being developed. Besides, the table distinguishes between the implementations performed over existing and operative systems (brownfield) and those undertaken on completely new lines (Greenfield).

One must take into account that the transmission technology based on inductive loops (referred to as TBTC in this article) is now being less and less used. That is why, for clarity, all the projects listed here are modern radio-based CBTC systems making use of the moving block concept as described above.

List

This list is sortable, and is initially sorted by year. Click on the icon on the right side of the column header to change sort key and sort order.

Location/System Lines Supplier Solution Commissioning km No. of trains Type of Field Level of Automation[note 2] Notes
Detroit Detroit People Mover
Thales
SelTrac
1987
4.7
12
Brownfield UTO
San Francisco Airport AirTrain
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2003
5
38
Greenfield UTO
Seattle-Tacoma Airport Satellite Transit System
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2003
3
22
Brownfield UTO
Singapore MRT North East Line
Alstom
Urbalis
2003
20
43
Greenfield UTO with train attendants who drive trains in the event of a disruption.
Hong Kong MTR West Rail Line
Thales
SelTrac
2003
35.4
29
Greenfield STO
Las Vegas Monorail
Thales
SelTrac
2004
6
36
Greenfield UTO
Wuhan Metro 1
Thales
SelTrac
2004
27
32
Greenfield STO
Hong Kong MTR Ma On Shan Line
Thales
SelTrac
2004
11.4
15
Greenfield STO
Dallas-Fort Worth Airport DFW Skylink
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2005
10
64
Greenfield UTO
Hong Kong MTR Disneyland Resort Line
Thales
SelTrac
2005
3
3
Greenfield UTO
Lausanne Metro M2
Alstom
Urbalis
2008
6
17
Greenfield UTO
London Heathrow Airport Heathrow APM
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2008
1
9
Greenfield UTO
Madrid Metro 1, 6
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2008
48
143
Brownfield STO
McCarran Airport McCarran Airport APM
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2008
2
10
Brownfield UTO
Barcelona Metro 9 , 11
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2009
46
50
Greenfield UTO
Beijing Subway 4
Thales
SelTrac
2009
29
40
Greenfield STO
New York City Subway BMT Canarsie Line
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2009
17
69[note 3]
Brownfield STO
Shanghai Metro 6, 7, 8, 9, 11
Thales
SelTrac
2009
238
267
Greenfield and Brownfield STO
Singapore MRT Circle Line
Alstom
Urbalis
2009
35
64
Greenfield UTO with train attendants who drive trains in the event of a disruption. These train attendants are also on standby between Botanic Gardens and Caldecott stations.
Taipei Metro Neihu-Mucha
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2009
26
76
Greenfield and Brownfield UTO
Washington-Dulles Airport Dulles APM
Thales
SelTrac
2009
8
29
Greenfield UTO
Vancouver Skytrain Canada Line
Thales
SelTrac
2009
19.2
20
Greenfield UTO
Beijing Subway Daxing Line
Thales
SelTrac
2010
22
Greenfield STO
Beijing Subway 15
Nippon Signal
SPARCS
2010
41.4
28
Greenfield UTO
Guangzhou Metro Zhujiang New Town APM
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2010
4
19
Greenfield DTO
Guangzhou Metro 3
Thales
SelTrac
2010
67
40
Greenfield DTO
London Underground Jubilee line
Thales
SelTrac
2010
37
63
Brownfield STO
London Gatwick Airport Terminal Transfer APM
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2010
1
6
Brownfield UTO
Milan Metro 1
Alstom
Urbalis
2010
27
68
Brownfield STO
Philadelphia SEPTA SEPTA Light Rail Green Line
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2010
8
115
STO
Shenyang Metro 1
Ansaldo STS
CBTC
2010
27
23
Greenfield STO
B&G Metro Busan-Gimhae Light Rail Transit
Thales
SelTrac
2011
23.5
25
Greenfield UTO
Dubai Metro Red, Green
Thales
SelTrac
2011
70
85
Greenfield UTO
Madrid Metro 7 Extension MetroEste
Invensys
Sirius
2011
9
?
Brownfield STO
Paris Métro 1
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2011
16
53
Brownfield DTO
Sacramento International Airport Sacramento APM
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2011
1
2
Greenfield UTO
Shenzhen Metro 3
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2011
42
43
STO
Shenzhen Metro 2, 5
Alstom
Urbalis
2010 - 2011
76
65
Greenfield STO
Shenyang Metro 2
Ansaldo STS
CBTC
2011
21.5
20
Greenfield STO
Xian Metro 2
Ansaldo STS
CBTC
2011
26.6
22
Greenfield STO
Yongin EverLine
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2011
19
30
UTO
Algiers Metro 1
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2012
9
14
Greenfield STO
Chongqing Metro 1, 6
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2011 - 2012
94
80
Greenfield STO
Guangzhou Metro 6
Alstom
Urbalis
2012
24
27
Greenfield ATO
Istanbul Metro Kadıköy-Kartal Line
Thales
SelTrac
2012
21.7
Greenfield
Mexico City Metro 12
Alstom
Urbalis
2012
25
30
Greenfield STO
New York City Subway IND Culver Line
Thales & Siemens
Various
2012
Greenfield A test track was retrofitted in 2012; the line's other tracks will be retrofitted by the early 2020s.
Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport PHX Sky Train
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2012
3
18
Greenfield UTO
Riyadh KAFD Monorail
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2012
4
12
Greenfield UTO
Metro Santiago 1
Alstom
Urbalis
2012
20
42
Greenfield and Brownfield DTO
São Paulo Commuter Lines 8, 10, 11
Invensys
Sirius
2012
107
136
Brownfield UTO
São Paulo Metro 1, 2, 3
Alstom
Urbalis
2012
62
142
Greenfield and Brownfield UTO Only line 2 is in operation with CBTC
Tianjin Metro 2, 3
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2012
52
40
STO
Beijing Subway 8, 10
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2013
84
150
STO
Caracas Metro 1
Invensys
Sirius
2013
21
?
Brownfield
Kunming Metro 1, 2
Alstom
Urbalis
2013
42
38
Greenfield ATO
Málaga Metro 1, 2
Alstom
Urbalis
2013
17
15
Greenfield ATO
Paris Métro 3, 5
Ansaldo STS / Siemens
Inside RATP's
Ouragan project
2010, 2013
26
40
Brownfield STO
Paris Métro 13
Thales
SelTrac
2013
23
66
Brownfield STO
Toronto Subway 1
Alstom
Urbalis
2013
31
39
Brownfield STO
Wuhan Metro 2, 4
Alstom
Urbalis
2013
60
45
Greenfield STO
Budapest Metro M2, M4
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2013 (M2)
2014 (M4)
17
41
Line M2: STO

Line M4: UTO

Dubai Metro Al Sufouh LRT
Alstom
Urbalis
2014
10
11
Greenfield STO
Edmonton Light Rail Transit Capital Line Metro Line
Thales
SelTrac
2014
24 double track
94
Brownfield DTO
Helsinki Metro 1
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2014
35
?
Greenfield and Brownfield STO[18]
Hong Kong MTRC Hong Kong APM
Thales
SelTrac
2014
4
14
Brownfield UTO
Incheon Subway 2
Thales
SelTrac
2014
29
37
Greenfield UTO
Jeddah Airport King Abdulaziz APM
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2014
2
6
Greenfield UTO
London Underground Northern line
Thales
SelTrac
2014
58
106
Brownfield STO
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Ashmont–Mattapan High Speed Line
Argenia
SafeNet CBTC
2014
6
12
Greenfield STO
Munich Airport Munich Airport T2 APM
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2014
1
12
Greenfield UTO
Nanjing Metro Nanjing Airport Rail Link
Thales
SelTrac
2014
36
15
Greenfield STO
NeoTrans Co. Ltd. Shinbundang Line
Thales
SelTrac
2014
30.5
12
Greenfield UTO
Ningbo Metro 1
Alstom
Urbalis
2014
21
22
Greenfield ATO
Panama Metro 1
Alstom
Urbalis
2014
13.7
17
Greenfield ATO
São Paulo Metro 15
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2014
25
54
Greenfield UTO Only 2 stations
Shenzhen Metro 9
Thales Saic Transport
SelTrac
2014
25.38
Greenfield
Xian Metro 1
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2013 - 2014
25.4
80
Greenfield STO
Amsterdam Metro L50, L51, L52, L53, L54
Alstom
Urbalis
2015
62
85
Greenfield and Brownfield STO
Beijing Subway 1, 2, 6, 9, Fangshan Line, Airport Express
Alstom
Urbalis
From 2008 to 2015
159
240
Brownfield and Greenfield STO and DTO
Chengdu Metro L4, L7
Alstom
Urbalis
2015
22.4
Greenfield ATO
Delhi Metro Line 7
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2015
55
Nanjing Metro 2, 3, 10, 12
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
From 2010 to 2015
137
140
Greenfield
São Paulo Metro 5
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2015
20
34
Brownfield & Greenfield UTO Not implemented yet
São Paulo Metro 17
Thales
SelTrac
2015
17.7
24
Greenfield UTO in construction
Shanghai Metro 10, 12, 13, 16
Alstom
Urbalis
From 2010 to 2015
120
152
Greenfield UTO and STO
Taipei Metro Circular
Ansaldo STS
CBTC
2015
15
17
Greenfield UTO
Wuxi Metro 1, 2
Alstom
Urbalis
2015
58
46
Greenfield STO
Buenos Aires Underground H
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2016
8
20
? ?
Buenos Aires Underground C
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2016
4.5
18
TBD TBD
Hong Kong MTR South Island Line
Alstom
Urbalis
2016
7
10
Greenfield UTO
Hyderabad Metro Rail L1, L2, L3
Thales
SelTrac
2016
72
57
Greenfield STO
Kochi Metro L1
Alstom
Urbalis
2016
26
25
Greenfield ATO
New York City Subway IRT Flushing Line
Thales
SelTrac
2016
17
46[note 4]
Brownfield and Greenfield STO
Kuala Lumpur Metro (LRT) Ampang Line
Thales
SelTrac
2016
45.1
50
Brownfield UTO
Kuala Lumpur Metro (LRT) Kelana Jaya Line
Thales
SelTrac
2016
46.4
76
Brownfield UTO
Kuala Lumpur Metro (LRT) Bandar Utama-Klang Line
Thales
SelTrac
2020
36
Brownfield UTO
Singapore MRT Downtown Line
Invensys
Sirius
2013
42
92
Greenfield UTO with train attendants who drive trains in the event of a disruption.
Walt Disney World Walt Disney World Monorail System
Thales
SelTrac
2016
22
15
Brownfield UTO
Klang Valley Metro (MRT) SBK Line
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2017
51
74
Greenfield UTO
Delhi Metro LIne-8 Nippon Signal SPARCS 2017 Greenfeild UTO
Lille Metro 1
Alstom
Urbalis
2017
15
27
Brownfield UTO
Lucknow Metro L1
Alstom
Urbalis
2017
23
20
Greenfield ATO
New York City Subway IND Queens Boulevard Line
Siemens/Thales
Trainguard MT CBTC
2017–
[note 5]
21.9
[note 6]
Brownfield ATO
Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) All lines
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2017
22.2
50
Brownfield ATO
Stockholm Metro Red line
Ansaldo STS
CBTC
2017
41
30
Brownfield STO->UTO
Taichung Metro Green
Alstom
Urbalis
2017
18
29
Greenfield UTO
Singapore MRT North South Line
Thales
SelTrac
2017
100
186
Brownfield UTO[19] with train attendants who drive trains in the event of a disruption. These train attendants are on standby in the train.
Singapore MRT East West Line
Thales
SelTrac
2017-2018
[note 7]
100
186
Brownfield
Greenfield
(Tuas West Extension only)
UTO[20] with train attendants who drive trains in the event of a disruption. These train attendants are on standby in the train.
Copenhagen S-Train All lines
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2018
170
136
Brownfield STO
Doha Metro L1
Thales
SelTrac
2018
33
35
Greenfield ATO
Gimpo Gimpo Goldline
Nippon Signal
SPARCS
2018
23.63
Greenfield UTO
Ottawa Light Rail Confederation Line
Thales
SelTrac
2018
12.5
34
Greenfield STO
Rennes ART B
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2018
12
19
Greenfield UTO
Riyadh Metro L4, L5 and L6
Alstom
Urbalis
2018
64
69
Greenfield ATO
Buenos Aires Underground D
TBD
TBD
2019
11
26
TBD TBD
Hong Kong MTR East Rail Line
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
2019
41.5
37
Brownfield STO
Panama Metro 2
Alstom
Urbalis
2019
21
21
Greenfield ATO
Singapore MRT Thomson-East Coast Line
Alstom
Urbalis
2019
43
91
Greenfield UTO
Sydney Rapid Transit
Alstom
Urbalis
2019
37
22
Brownfield UTO
Hong Kong MTR Kwun Tong Line, Tsuen Wan Line, Island Line, Tung Chung Line, Tseung Kwan O Line, Airport Express
Thales
SelTrac
2020
158
Brownfield STO & DTO
Klang Valley Metro (MRT) SSP Line
Bombardier
CITYFLO 650
2021
52.2
Greenfield UTO
São Paulo Metro Line 6
Nippon Signal
SPARCS
2021
15
24
Greenfield UTO
London Underground Metropolitan, District, Circle, Hammersmith & City
Thales
SelTrac
From 2021 to 2022
310
192
Brownfield STO
Guangzhou Metro 4, 5
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
?
70
?
Marmaray Lines Commuter Lines
Invensys
Sirius
?
77
?
Greenfield STO
São Paulo Metro 4
Siemens
Trainguard MT CBTC
?
13
14
Greenfield UTO 4 stations under construction
Tokyo Jōban Line[21]
Thales
SelTrac
?
30
70
Brownfield STO
Ahmedabad MEGA Nippon Signal SPARCS ? 39.259 96 coaches(Rolling Stock) Green Feild UTO

Notes and references

Notes

  1. Only radio-based projects using the moving block principle are shown.
  2. UTO = Unattended Train Operation. STO = Semi-automated Operation Mode
  3. This is the number of four-car train sets available. The BMT Canarsie Line runs trains with eight cars.
  4. This is the number of eleven-car train sets available. The IRT Flushing Line runs trains with eleven cars, though they are not all linked together; they are arranged in five- and six-car sets.
  5. Work being done in phases
  6. Includes a 1.48 km "express bypass" where non-stopping express trains take a different route than stopping local trains.
  7. Work being done in 2 phases. The first and greenfield phase began operations on 18 June 2017

References

  1. Busiest Subways. Matt Rosenberg for About.com, Part of the New York Times Company. Accessed July 2012.
  2. 1 2 IEEE Standard for CBTC Performance and Functional Requirements (1474.1-1999). IEEE Rail Transit Vehicle Interface Standards Committee of the IEEE Vehicular Technology Society, 1999. Accessed January 2011.
  3. Digital radio shows great potential for Rail Bruno Gillaumin, International Railway Journal, May 2001. Retrieved by findarticles.com in June 2011.
  4. CBTC Projects. www.tsd.org/cbtc/projects, 2005. Accessed June 2011.
  5. 1 2 CBTC radios: What to do? Which way to go? Tom Sullivan, 2005. www.tsd.org. Accessed May 2011.
  6. IEC 62290-1, Railway applications - Urban guided transport management and command/control systems - Part 1: System principles and fundamental concepts. IEC, 2006. Accessed February 2014
  7. 1 2 3 4 Semi-automatic, driverless, and unattended operation of trains . IRSE-ITC, 2010. Accessed through www.irse-itc.net in June 2011
  8. CITYFLO 650 Metro de Madrid, Solving the capacity challenge. Archived 2012-03-30 at the Wayback Machine. Bombardier Transportation Rail Control Solutions, 2010. Accessed June 2011
  9. Madrid's silent revolution. in International Railway Journal, Keith Barrow, 2010. Accessed through goliath.ecnext.com in June 2011
  10. CBTC: más trenes en hora punta. Comunidad de Madrid, www.madrig.org, 2010. Accessed June 2011
  11. How CBTC can Increase capacity - communications-based train control. William J. Moore, Railway Age, 2001. Accessed through findarticles.com in June 2011
  12. ETRMS Level 3 Risks and Benefits to UK Railways, pg 19 Transport Research Laboratory. Accessed December 2011
  13. ETRMS Level 3 Risks and Benefits to UK Railways, Table 5 Transport Research Laboratory. Accessed December 2011
  14. Communications security concerns in communications based train control M. Hartong, R. Goel & D. Wijesekera. Accessed December 2011
  15. ETRMS Level 3 Risks and Benefits to UK Railways, pg 18 Transport Research Laboratory. Accessed December 2011
  16. CBTC World Congress Presentations, Stockholm, November 2011 Global Transport Forum. Accessed December 2011
  17. Bombardier to Deliver Major London Underground Signalling. Press release, Bombardier Transportation Media Center, 2011. Accessed June 2011
  18. Helsinki Metro automation ambitions are scaled back. Railway Gazette International, Urban Rail News, 2012. Accessed January 2012
  19. "gov.sg | Full-day signalling tests on North-South Line to start on Sunday [TODAY Online]". www.gov.sg. Retrieved 2017-06-13.
  20. "gov.sg | Full-day signalling tests on North-South Line to start on Sunday [TODAY Online]". www.gov.sg. Retrieved 2017-06-13.
  21. Briginshaw, David (January 8, 2014). "JR East selects Thales to design first Japanese CBTC". hollandco.com. Holland. Retrieved January 9, 2014.

Further reading

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