Black September

Black September
أيلول الأسود
Part of the Arab Cold War

The hijacked Dawson's Field aircraft blown up by Palestinian guerillas in Zarqa, 6 September 1970.
Date6 September 1970–17 July 1971
(main phase 16–29 September 1970)
LocationJordan
Result

Jordanian military victory:

Belligerents

Palestine Liberation Organization PLO


 Syria

  Jordan (JAF)
Commanders and leaders
Palestine Liberation Organization Yasser Arafat
Palestine Liberation Organization Khalil Al-Wazir
Palestine Liberation Organization Abu Ali Iyad
Palestine Liberation Organization George Habash
Palestine Liberation Organization Nayef Hawatmeh
Syria Salah Jadid		 Jordan King Hussein
Jordan Habis Al-Majali
Jordan Zaid ibn Shaker
Jordan Wasfi Al-Tal
Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq
Strength
Palestine Liberation Organization 15,000–40,000[1]
Syria 10,000[2]
300 tanks
1 mechanized infantry brigade[3]		 Jordan 65,000-74,000[4]
Casualties and losses
PLO: 3,400 dead[5][6]
Syria: 600 Syrian casualties (dead and injured)[1]
120 tanks and APCs lost		 Jordan: 82 dead

Black September (Arabic: أيلول الأسود‎‎; Aylūl Al-Aswad) was the conflict fought in Jordan between the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), under the leadership of King Hussein, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, fought primarily between 16 and 27 September 1970, with certain actions continuing until 17 July 1971.

After Jordan lost control of the West Bank in 1967, the Palestinian fedayeen (self-sacrificers) moved their bases to Jordan and stepped up their attacks on Israeli occupied territories. One Israeli retaliation on a PLO camp based in Karameh, a borderline town along Jordan's border with the West Bank, developed into a full-scale battle. The perceived joint Jordanian-Palestinian victory in the 1968 Battle of Karameh, led to an upsurge of support to Palestinian fighters in Jordan from the Arab World. PLO's strength in Jordan grew, and by the beginning of 1970, the groups started to openly call for the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy. Acting as a "state within a state", they disregarded local laws and regulations, and even attempted to assassinate King Hussein twice, leading to violent confrontations between them and the Jordanian army. Hussein wanted to oust the Fedayeen from the country, but hesitated to strike because he did not want to be seen as massacring the Palestinians. PLO actions in Jordan culminated in the Dawson's Field hijackings incident on 10 September, in which the Fedayeen hijacked three civilian aircraft and forced their landing in Zarqa, taking foreign nationals as hostages, and later bombing the planes in front of international press. Hussein saw this as the last straw, and ordered his army to move.[7]

On 17 September, the Jordanian army surrounded cities with PLO presence including Amman and Irbid, and began bombing the Fedayeen, who established themselves in Palestinian refugee camps. The next day, a force from Syria with Palestine Liberation Army markings, started advancing towards Irbid, which the Fedayeen declared a "liberated" city. On 22 September, the Syrians withdrew after the Jordanian army launched an air-ground offensive that inflicted heavy Syrian losses, and after Israeli Air Force jets symbolically flew over Syrian units in support of Hussein, but did not engage. Mounting pressures from Arab countries led Hussein to halt the fighting. On 13 October he signed an agreement with Arafat to regulate the Fedayeen's presence. However, the Jordanian army attacked again in January 1971. The Fedayeen were driven out of cities, one by one, until 2,000 Fedayeen surrendered after being encircled in a forest near Ajloun on 17 July, marking the end of the conflict.[7]

Jordan allowed the Fedayeen to leave for Lebanon through Syria, later leading up to the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. Black September Organization was founded the same year, named after the conflict. The organization claimed responsibility for the assassination of Jordanian prime minister Wasfi Al-Tal in 1971, and the highly publiclized 1972 Munich massacre against Israeli athletes.

Background

Palestinians in Jordan

View of the Al-Hussein Palestinian refugee camp in Amman.

After Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1951, it transferred its citizenship to the West Bank Palestinians.[8] The combined population of the West Bank and Jordan consisted of two-thirds Palestinians (one-third in the West Bank and one-third in the East Bank) and one-third Jordanians.[9][8] Jordan provided Palestinians with seats mounting to half the parliament.[9] Palestinians alongside Jordanians, enjoyed equal opportunities in all sectors of the Jordanian state.[9] The demographic change influenced Jordanian politics.[10] King Hussein considered that the Palestinian problem would remain the country's overriding national security issue.[10]

King Hussein feared an independent West Bank under PLO administration would threaten the autonomy of his Hashemite kingdom.[11] The Palestinian factions were supported variously by many Arab governments, most notably Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who gave political support.[11] The Palestinian nationalist organization Fatah started organizing cross-border attacks against Israel in January 1965, often drawing severe Israeli reprisals on Jordan.[12] The Samu Incident launched by Israel on 13 November 1966, was one such reprisal after three Israeli soldiers were killed by a Fatah landmine.[13] The Israelis inflicted heavy Jordanian casualties.[13] Israeli writer Avi Shlaim argues that Israel's disproportionate retaliation exacted revenge on the wrong party, as Israeli leaders knew from their coordination with Hussein, that he was doing everything he could to prevent such attacks.[13] The Incident drew fierce local criticism at Hussein who felt he was betrayed by the Israelis,[14] it is also thought to have contributed to Hussein's decision to join Egypt and Syria's war against Israel in 1967.[14] In June 1967, Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan during the Six-Day War.[15]

PLO's growing strength after the Battle of Karameh

After Jordan lost the West Bank, Fatah under the PLO stepped up their guerrilla attacks against Israel from Jordanian soil, taking the border town of Karameh as their headquarters.[16] On 18 March 1968, an Israeli school bus was blown up by a mine near Be'er Ora in the Arava, killing two adults and wounding ten children.[17] This was the 38th Fatah operation in little more than three months.[17] On 21 March, Israel Defense Forces units entered Jordan and launched an attack on the village of Karameh, where a PLO camp was based.[18] The reprisal developed into a full-scale battle that lasted a day. The PLO suffered some 200 killed and another 150 taken prisoner. 40-84 Jordanian soldiers were also killed. Israeli casualties stood at around 30 killed and 69–161 wounded, leaving behind several vehicles.[19]

King Hussein after checking an abandoned Israeli tank, on 21 March 1968 during the events of the Battle of Karameh. The perceived joint Palestinian-Jordanian victory led to an upsurge of support to the Fedayeen in Jordan.

Both sides declared victory: Israel fulfilled its objective of destroying the Karameh camp, but failed to capture Arafat; while Jordan and the PLO exacted relatively heavy Israeli casualties.[20] Although the Palestinians had limited success in inflicting Israeli casualties, King Hussein let them take credit.[20] The Fedayeen used the battle's wide acclaim and recognition in the Arab world to establish their national claims.[21] The Karameh operation highlighted the vulnerability of bases close to the Jordan River, so the PLO moved their bases farther into the mountains. Further Israeli attacks targeted Palestinian militants residing among the Jordanian civilian population, giving rise to friction between Jordanians and guerrillas.[22] Palestinians and Arabs generally considered the battle a psychological victory over the IDF, which had been seen as 'invincible' until then, and recruitment to guerilla units soared.[23]

Fatah reported that 5,000 volunteers applied to join within 48 hours of the events at Karameh.[21] By late March, there were nearly 20,000 fedayeen in Jordan.[24] Iraq and Syria offered training programs for several thousand guerrillas.[24] The Persian Gulf states, led by Kuwait, raised money for them through a 5% tax on the salaries of their tens of thousands of resident Palestinian workers, and a fund drive in Lebanon raised $500,000 from Beirut alone.[24] The Palestinian organizations began to guarantee a lifetime support for the families of all guerrillas killed in action.[24] Within a year after the battle, Fatah had branches in about eighty countries.[25] Fatah gained control over the PLO from Egypt after the Battle.[26]

Palestinian fedayeen from Syria and Lebanon, started to converge on Jordan, mostly in Amman.[27] In Palestinian enclaves and refugee camps in Jordan, the Jordanian Police and army were losing their authority.[26] The Wehdat and Al-Hussein refugee camps came to be referred as "independent republics".[27] The Fedyaeen established administrative autonomy by setting up local governments under the control of uniformed armed PLO militants.[28] They set up checkpoints, and attempted to extort "taxes" from civilians.[28]

Seven-point agreement

In early November 1968, the Jordanian army stroke at a Fedayeen group named "Al-Nasr" (meaning victory) after it attacked Jordanian police.[27] Not all Palestinians were supportive of Al-Nasr's actions, but the Jordanian response meant to send a message that there are consequences for challenging the regime's authority.[27] Immediately after the incident, a seven-point agreement was reached between King Hussein and Palestinian organizations, that restrained unlawful and illegal fedayeen behavior.[29]

The PLO could not live up to the agreement, and came to be seen more and more as a state within a state in Jordan.[27] Fatah's Yasser Arafat replaced Ahmad Shukeiri as the PLO's leader in February 1969.[27] Discipline in the different Palestinian groups was poor, and the PLO had no central power to control the different groups.[30] A scene developed of fedayeen groups rapidly spawning, merging, and splintering, sometimes trying to behave radically in order to attract recruits.[30] Hussein went in March 1969 to the United States for talks with Richard Nixon, the new American president.[31] His argument was based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in which Israel returns territories it occupied in 1967 in return for peace.[32] Palestinian factions were suspicious of Hussein as this meant withdrawal from the policy of resisting Israel by force, and the suspicions were further fumed by statements from Washington claiming that Hussein would be able to liquidate the Fedayeen movement in his country after a resolution to the conflict was reached.[32]

Fedayeen of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Jordan, early 1969.

Fatah favored not intervening in internal affairs of other Arab countries, however, although it assumed the leadership of the PLO, more radical left-wing Palestinian movements refused to abide by that policy.[33] By 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) led by Nayef Hawatmeh, began to openly question the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy and call for its overthrow and replacement with a revolutionary regime.[33] Other left-wing groups included the Syrian Arab Socialist Ba'ath's As-Sa'iqa, and the Iraqi Arab Socialist Ba'ath's Arab Liberation Front.[33] These radical groups saw Hussein as "a puppet of Western imperialism", " a reactionary", and "a Zionist tool".[33] They claimed that the road to Tel Aviv passed through Amman, which they sought to transform into the Hanoi of Arabia.[33] They also stirred up conservative and religious feelings with provocative anti-religious statements and actions, putting up Marxist and Leninist slogans on mosques' walls.[30]

According to Shlaim, growing power was accompanied by growing arrogance and insolence.[33] He quotes an observer describing the PLO in Jordan,

"They drove noisily around Amman in jeeps with loaded weapons, like an army of occupation; they extorted financial contributions from individuals, sometimes foreigners, in their homes and in public places; they disregarded routine traffic regulations, failed to register and license their vehicles, and refused to stop at army checkpoints; they boasted about their role of destiny against Israel and belittled the worth of the army. Their very presence in Amman, far from the battlefield, seemed like a challenge to the regime."[33]

Palestinians claimed there were numerous agents provocateurs from Jordanian or other security services present among the fedayeen, deliberately trying to upset political relations and provoke justification for a crackdown.[30] There were frequent kidnappings and acts of violence against civilians.[30] Chief of the Jordanian Royal Court (and subsequently a prime minister) Zaid al-Rifai claimed that in one extreme instance, "the fedayeen killed a soldier, beheaded him, and played football with his head in the area where he used to live".[30]

Ten-point edict and June confrontations

The situation placed Hussein in a severe dilemma: if he used force to oust the Fedayeen, he would alienate himself from the Palestinians in the country and the Arab World.[34] However, if he refused to act strike back at the Fedayeen, he would lose the respect of Jordanians, and more seriously, that of the army, the backbone of the regime, which already started to pressure Hussein to act against them.[34] In February 1970, King Hussein visited Egyptian president Nasser in Cairo, and won his consent for taking a tougher stance against the Fedayeen.[34] Nasser also agreed to influence the Fedayeen to reduce escalating against Hussein's regime.[34] Upon his return, he published a ten-point edict restricting activities of the Palestinian organizations, which included: prohibition of carrying arms publicly, the storing of ammunitions in villages, and the holding of demonstrations and meetings without prior governmental consent.[34] The Fedayeen reacted violently to efforts for curbing their power, which led Hussein to freeze the new regulations.[34] Hussein acquiesced to Fedayeen demands of dismissing the perceived anti-Palestinian interior minister Muhammad Al-Kailani.[34] Hussein's policy of giving concessions to the fedayeen was to gain time, but Western newspapers started floating sensationalized stories that Hussein is losing control over Jordan and that he might abdicate soon.[34]

Yasser Arafat, Nayef Hawatmeh and Kamal Nasser speaking at a press conference in Amman after the June events, 1970.

Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who were openly supporting the Fedayeen, also sent Jordan financial subsidies, placing Hussein in a difficult position.[35] Hussein saw no external forces to support him other than the United States and Israel.[34] But that would act as fuel for fedayeen propaganda against Hussein, him being a "Western puppet" and a "Zionist tool".[34] On 17 February 1970, the American embassy in Tel Aviv relayed three questions from Hussein to Israel asking about Israel's stance if Jordan chose to confront the fedayeen.[36] Israel replied positively to Hussein, and committed that they will not take advantage if Jordan withdraws troops from the borders for any potential confrontation.[36]

Israeli artillery and airforce attacked Irbid on 3 June as reprisal for a fedayeen attack on Beit Shean, leaving seven killed and twenty-six civilians injured, and one soldier killed.[36] The Jordanian army retaliated and shelled Tiberias for the first time in 22 years, Hussein ordered the shelling but realized it was the start of a dangerous cycle of violence.[36] Consequently, he sent a request to the Israelis through the American embassy in Amman a period of time in which they do not retaliate so that he could take a strong measure against the fedayeen.[36] The message stated, "the Jordanian government was doing everything it could to prevent fedayeen rocket attacks on Israel. King deeply regrets the rocket attacks. Jordan Army under orders to shoot to kill any fedayeen attempting to fire rockets and fedayeen leaders had been told again evening of June 3 that violators would be shot on sight".[37] Israel accepted Hussein's request after being subjected to American pressure.[37]

During the summer, the Jordanian army was on the verge of losing its patience with the fedayeen.[37] After a provocation from the fedayeen, a tank battalion moved from the Jordan Valley without orders to Amman, intending to retaliate against the fedayeen.[37] It took Hussein and Sharif Shaker's, the commander of the 3rd Armored Division, personal intervention by blocking the road with their cars to stop its onslaught.[38]

We had thousands of incidents of breaking the law, of attacking people. It was a very unruly state of affairs in the country and I continued to try. I went to Egypt, I called in the Arabs to help in any way they could—particularly as some of them were sponsoring some of these movements in one form or another—but without much success, and towards the end I felt I was losing control. In the last six months leading up to the crisis the army began to rebel. I had to spend most of my time running to those units that had left their positions and were going to the capital, or to some other part of Jordan, to sort out people who were attacking their families or attacking their soldiers on leave. I think that the gamble was probably the army would fracture along Palestinian-Jordanian lines. That never happened, thank God.

Hussein later recalling the events[38]

Fighting broke out between the fedayeen and the army in Zarqa on 7 June.[38] Two days later, the fedayeen opened fire on the General Intelligence Directorate's (Mukhabarat) headquarters.[38] Hussein went to visit the mukhabarat's HQ after the incident, but his motorcade came under heavy fedayeen fire that killed one of his guards.[38] Bedouin units of the army retaliated for the assassination attempt against their King by shelling Al-Wehdat and Al-Hussein camps, which developed into a conflict that lasted three days.[38] An Israeli army meeting discussed the events in Jordan, according to the director of Israel's Military Intelligence, there were around 2,000 fedayeen in Amman armed with mortars and Katyusha rockets.[39] Hussein's advisors were divided: some were urging him to finish the job, while others urging restraint as it could only be accomplished at the cost of thousands of lives which was unacceptable.[39] Hussein halted the fighting, and the three day conflict's toll was around 300 dead and around 700 wounded, including civilians.[39] A ceasefire was announced by Hussein and Arafat, but the PFLP did not abide.[39] It immediately held around 68 foreign nationals as hostages in two Amman hotels, threatening to blow them up in the buildings if Sharif Zaid and Sharif Nasser were not dismissed and the Special Forces unit was not disbanded.[39] Arafat did not agree with the PFLP, but had to play along as he feared losing his stance in public opinion.[39]

Hussein compromised and reduced tensions by appointed Mashour Haditha Al-Jazy, a person described to be a moderate general, as army chief of staff, and appointed Abdelmunim Al-Rifai as prime minister, who included six Palestinians as ministers in his government.[39] Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's security advisor, gave the following assessment of the events in Jordan:

“ "The authority and prestige of the Hashemite regime will continue to decline. The international credibility of Jordan will be further compromised.. Greater fedayeen freedom of action will inevitably result in more serious breaches of the ceasefire in the Jordan Valley.. Hussein faces an uncertain political future.[40]" ”

June 1970 became one of the most uncertain periods of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, most foreign diplomats saw that the events favored the fedayeen, and that the downfall of the Monarchy was just a matter of time.[40] Although Hussein was confident, members of his family started to wonder how long will the situation last.[41] 72-year old Prince Zeid bin Hussein, the only son of Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, that did not become a king, was visiting Amman during June and stayed with Hussein in the royal palace.[41] He saw Hussein's management with the events, and before he left, told his son that he viewed Hussein to be the "most genuine, able and courageous Hashemite he had ever met", as well as "the greatest leader among all the Hashemite kings."[42]

Another ceasefire agreement was signed between Hussein and Arafat on 10 July, it recognized and legalized fedayeen presence in Jordan, and established a committee to observe fedayeen's behavior.[42] The American-sponsored Rogers Plan for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was publicized during July, based on Security Council Resolution 242. Nasser and Hussein accepted the plan, but Arafat refused it on 26 July, claiming that it was a plan to liquidate his movement.[42] The PFLP and DFLP were more uncompromising, they vehemently rejected the plan and denounced Nasser and Hussein.[42] A ceasefire was reached between Egypt and Israel on 7 August, formally ending the War of Attrition.[42] On 15 August, Arafat was alleged to have said that "We have decided to convert Jordan into a cemetery for all conspirators—Amman shall be the Hanoi of the revolution."[4] But Arafat had warned Habash and Hawatmeh, leaders of the PFLP and the DFLP, of provoking the regime, as it enjoyed military superiority, and would liquidate their existence in Jordan anytime.[43] But his calls went unheeded, and they started to call more openly for overthrowing the Hashemites, as a "prelude to the launching of a popular war for the liberation of Palestine."[4] Another engagement between the army and the fedayeen occurred at the end of August,[4] after the fedayeen ambushed army vehicles and staged an armed attack on the capital's post office.[43]

Black September

Second assassination attempt on Hussein

Hussein's motorcade came under fire on 1 September for the second time in three months, and the incident triggered several clashes between the army and the fedayeen in Amman until 6 September.[44] There was a 17,000 Iraqi force stationed in the eastern Jordanian desert since the 1967 Six Day War, it threatened to intervene on the behalf of the Palestinians if the shelling did not stop.[44] Had such a situation ensued, Israel was expected to intervene against the Iraqi forces which they viewed as a threat to themselves.[44] However, the Americans dissuaded Israel from such an act as it would have alienated Hussein from the Arabs.[44]

Aircraft hijackings

Dawson's Field aircraft moments before they were blown up by Palestinian guerillas.

On 6 September, in the series of Dawson's Field hijackings, three planes were hijacked by the PFLP: SwissAir and TWA jets that were landed in Jordan's Azraq, and a Pan Am jet that was flown to Cairo and immediately blown up after passengers were let away.[45] The two jets that landed in Jordan had 310 passengers, the PFLP threatened to them up if fedayeen from European and Israeli prisons were not released.[45] On 9 September, a third BOAC flight from Bahrain with 115 passengers was hijacked to Zarqa.[45] The PFLP announced that the hijackings were intended "to bring special attention to the Palestinian problem".[45] After 371 hostages were removed, the planes were dramatically blown up in front of TV cameras.[45] However, 54 hostages were kept by the organization for around two weeks.[45] Arab regimes and Arafat were not content with the hijackings, the latter considered the hijackings to have caused more harm to the Palestinian issue.[45] But Arafat could not dissociate himself from the hijackings, again because of Arab public opinion.[45]

Jordanian army attacks

On 15 September, King Hussein appointed Field Marshal Habis al Majali commander in chief of the armed forces and declared martial law. The head of a Pakistani training mission to Jordan, Brigadier Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (later Chief of Army Staff and President of Pakistan), played a key role in planning the offensives.[46] The next day, Jordanian tanks of the 60th Armored Brigade attacked the headquarters of Palestinian organizations in Amman; the army also attacked camps in Irbid, Salt, Sweileh, Baq'aa, Wehdat and Zarqa. However, the Jordanians could not devote all their attention to the Palestinians. The 3rd Armoured Division of the Iraqi Army had remained in Jordan after the 1967 war. The Iraqi government sympathised with the Palestinians, and it was unclear whether the division would intervene on behalf of the Palestinians. Thus the 99th Brigade of the Jordanian 3rd Armoured Division had to be retained to watch the Iraqi division. Furthermore, the 40th Armored Brigade, 2nd infantry division, and other supporting units positioned in northern Jordan could not devote all their efforts to the PLO due to concerns of Syrian invasion.[47] Finally, political and economic pressure on Jordan by Arab leaders who sympathized with the PLO limited the success of this first offensive. Nevertheless, the Jordanian army regained control of key cities and intersections in the country before accepting the ceasefire agreement brokered by Egypt's Nasser on 27 September.[48] By late November, the Jordanians had regrouped and were ready to resume their campaign to expel the PLO. The King placed Brig. Gen. Zid bin Shaker in charge of the operation. Under his command, the Jordanians conducted a systematic and meticulous campaign against the PLO. First, the army regained control of all major cities with PLO presence. Second, the army forced the PLO into the mountains of Ajloun and Jarash. Finally, the army besieged the PLO in the mountains, and between fighting and surrenders the PLO was completely eradicated.[49]

Arafat later claimed that the Jordanian army killed between 10,000 and 25,000 Palestinians, although more conservative estimates put the number between 1,000 and 2,000.[50][51]

Hostage David Raab described the initial military actions in Black September this way:

"We were in the middle of the shelling since Ashrafiyeh was among the Jordanian Army's primary targets. Electricity was cut off, and again we had little food or water. Friday afternoon, we heard the metal tracks of a tank clanking on the pavement. We were quickly herded into one room, and the guerrillas threw open the doors to make the building appear abandoned so it wouldn't attract fire. Suddenly, the shelling stopped."

The armored troops were inefficient in narrow city streets and thus the Jordanian army conducted house to house sweeps for Palestinian fighters and became immersed in heavy urban warfare with the Palestinian fighters.

Amman experienced the heaviest fighting in the Black September uprising. Syrian tanks rolled across the Yarmouk River into northern Jordan and began shelling Amman and other northern urban areas. Outdated missiles fired by the PLO struck Amman for more than a week. Jordanian infantry pushed the Palestinian fedayeen out of Amman after weeks of bitter fighting.

Syrian intervention

Map showing Fedayeen concentrations in Jordan prior to September 1970, and the Syrian invasion.

On 18 September, during the time of turmoil, Syria tried to intervene on behalf of the Palestinian guerrillas. President Hafez al-Assad told his biographer, Patrick Seale, that Syria's intervention was only to protect the Palestinians from a massacre. The Syrians sent in armored forces equivalent to a brigade, with tanks, some of them allegedly hastily rebranded from the regular Syrian army for the purpose. Other Syrian units were the 5th Infantry Division (with the 88th and 91st Tank Brigades and the 67th Mechanised Brigade with over 200 T-55 tanks) and Commandos. They were under the command of the Palestine Liberation Army's (PLA) Syrian branch, whose headquarters were located in Damascus, and which was controlled by the government. They were met by the 40th Armored Brigade of the Jordanian Army. The Syrian Air Force, under orders of Assad, never entered the battle. This has been variously attributed to power struggles within the Syrian Baathist government (pitting Assad against Salah Jadid), and to the threat of Israeli military intervention. Joel S. Migdal argues that Israel made these threats (including IDF troop movements and buzzing of Syrian convoys) at the behest of the United States under Nixon and Kissinger.[52]

As King Hussein dealt with threats by both Palestinian refugees in his country and invading Syrian forces, the king asked "the United States and Great Britain to intervene in the war in Jordan, asking the United States, in fact, to attack Syria." Timothy Naftali said: "Syria had invaded Jordan and the Jordanian king, facing what he felt was a military rout, said please help us in any way possible."[53] A telegram indicates that Hussein himself called a U.S. official at 3 a.m. to ask for American or British help. "Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion", the document said. "I request immediate physical intervention both land and air... to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Jordan. Immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarter plus air cover are imperative."[53]

On 21 September the Syrian 5th Division broke through the defenses of the Jordanian 40th Armoured Brigade, and pushed it back off the Ar Ramtha crossroads. On 22 September, the Royal Jordanian Air Force began attacking Syrian forces, which were badly battered as a result. The constant airstrikes broke the will of the Syrian force, and on the late afternoon of 22 September, the 5th Division began to retreat.[54] Whatever the case, the swift Syrian withdrawal was a severe blow to Palestinian hopes. Jordanian armored forces steadily pounded their headquarters in Amman, and threatened to break them in other regions of the kingdom as well. The Palestinians agreed to a cease-fire. Hussein and Arafat attended the meeting of leaders of Arab countries in Cairo, where Arafat won a diplomatic victory. On 27 September, Hussein was forced to sign an agreement which preserved the right of the Palestinian organizations to operate in Jordan. For Jordan, it was humiliating that the agreement treated both sides to the conflict as equals.

Foreign involvement

U.S. and Soviet involvement

Yasser Arafat and Gamal Abdel Nasser discuss Black September civil war situation at emergency Arab League summit.

The U.S. Navy's 6th Fleet was positioned off the coast of Israel, near Jordan. At the beginning of September, Nixon sent an additional carrier task force and the Marine assault ship USS Guam to supplement the 6th Fleet. Two Royal Navy aircraft carriers arrived in the vicinity of Malta as well. By 19–20 September, the U.S. Navy had concentrated a powerful force in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its official mission was to protect American interests in the region and to respond to the capture of about 50 German, British, and U.S. citizens in Jordan by PLO forces.

The Soviets asserted that the goal of the U.S. deployment was to take control of the West Bank of the Jordan river in support of an upcoming Israel incursion into the neighboring territories of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. To protect Soviet interests in the area and to assist Syria, the 5th Mediterranean Squadron of the Soviet Navy was increased to about twenty surface warships and six submarines. By mutual agreement with Syria, Soviet landing troops were ordered to respond to the expected U.S. landing and assist in demarcation of Syrian national boundaries with Israel.

On 19–20 September, a particularly busy time of confrontation, U.S. landing ships entered Haifa's outer harbour and prepared to disembark U.S. Marines, who stood on deck in full gear, ready to load into helicopters. However, after the Soviet landing ships ran for Tartus, preparations for disembarcation were rolled back.

The 82nd Airborne had been alerted on 15 September. On 19 September, they were loaded into C-141s. They were to drop into the Amman Airport, and secure and hold it for follow-up units. Within minutes after the first C-141s became airborne the mission was aborted and all returned to Pope AFB/Fort Bragg.

U.S. Forces remained on alert in the area throughout September and October. Tensions gradually decreased once it became clear, around 23–24 September, that the Syrian drive into Jordan had failed.[55]

Iranian guerillas

Two Iranian leftist guerilla organizations, namely Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG) and People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI) were involved in the conflict against Jordan. Their "collaboration with the PLO was particularly close, and members of both movements even fought side by side in Jordan during the events of Black September and trained together in Fatah camps in Lebanon".[56]

On 3 August 1972, PMOI operatives bombed the Jordan embassy in Tehran during King Hussein's state visit as a means to revenge unleashing his troops on the PLO in 1970.[57]

Hussein–Arafat Cairo agreement

Three important seated men conferring. The first man from the left is wearing a checkered headdress, sunglasses and jodhpurs, the second man is wearing a suit and tie, and the third is wearing military uniform. Standing behind them are suited men.
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser on the day prior to his death, brokering a ceasefire between Yasser Arafat of the PLO (left) and King Hussein of Jordan (right) at the emergency Arab League summit in Cairo on 27 September 1970.

Meanwhile, both Hussein and Arafat attended the emergency meeting of leaders of Arab countries in Cairo and on 27 September, Hussein signed an agreement that treated both sides as equals and acknowledged the right of the Palestinian organizations to operate in Jordan, but which required them to leave the cities and stay in the fronts.

On 28 September, Nasser died of a sudden heart attack. As a result, the PLO lost its protection, and King Hussein continued the attack.

Casualties

Estimates of the number of the people killed in the ten days of Black September range from three thousand to more than five thousand, although exact numbers are unknown. The Palestinian death toll in 11 days of fighting was estimated by Jordan at 3,400, while Palestinian sources often cite the number 5,000, mainly civilians, killed. Arafat at some point claimed that 10,000 had been killed.[58][59] The Western reporters were concentrated at the Intercontinental Hotel, away from the action. Nasser's state-controlled Voice of the Arabs radio service from Cairo reported genocide. One cameraman was shot dead in the Intercontinental Hotel; Jordanian tanks fired straight through the hotel and there was a heavy machine gun firing from the roof of the hotel.

After September 1970

On 31 October 1970, Yasser Arafat signed a five-point agreement, which was similar to that signed in November 1968, and was designed to return control of the country exclusively to King Hussein. The agreement stated that members of the Palestinian organizations were expected to honor Jordanian laws, instructed them to dismantle their bases, and forbade them to walk around armed and in uniform in the cities and villages.

Had the Palestinians honored that agreement, Hussein would have had difficulties in continuing to act against them. But the PFLP and the DFLP – the two organizations to the left of Arafat – refused to accept its conditions. They called on their members to ignore the Jordanian government, and at a meeting of the Palestinian National Council, they were responsible for prompting the acceptance of the proposal that Transjordan would be part of the Palestinian state to be established in the future.

The open defiance caused renewed conflict between the Palestinians and the Jordanian army, whose commanders were in any case eager to finish the work they had begun in September. At the beginning of November 1970, incidents of fighting erupted between members of the PFLP and DFLP and the Jordanian security forces. On 9 November, Jordanian prime minister Wasfi al-Tal announced that in accordance with the agreement signed a month earlier, the authorities would no longer allow the Palestinians to walk around with weapons or to store explosives. The announcement was not honored, and the security forces received instructions to confiscate the Palestinians' weapons.

Until January 1971, the Jordanian army heightened its control in all the central cities. At the beginning of that month, the Jordanian army began an attack against the Palestinian bases along the highway between Amman and Jerash to cut them off from the other cities and to take over the roads linking their strongholds. In response to the operation, the Palestinians agreed to hand over their weapons to the Jordanians. This agreement was not honored either.

Toward the end of March, after a Palestinian arms warehouse was discovered in Irbid, the Jordanian army placed a curfew on the city, arrested some of the Palestinian activists, and expelled others. The takeover of Irbid was completed at the beginning of April. Afterward, many senior members of the Palestinian organizations, who were aware of their weakness, began to withdraw from Amman as well.

Yet, despite the series of defeats, the Palestinian organizations did not give in. On 5 June, the senior Palestinian organizations, including Yasser Arafat's Fatah, came out with a declaration on Radio Baghdad in which they called for the deposition of King Hussein. The reason they gave for this was that deposing him was the only way to prevent the signing of "a peace agreement between Israel and Jordan."

In mid-June 1971, after three tense months during which the sides made efforts to fortify their positions by political means, Jordan embarked on the final campaign against the Palestinians. The Jordanian army, which for almost 10 months had been pushing the Palestinian organizations out of the major cities, used large forces to expel them from the mountainous regions of the cities of Jerash and Ajlun, in the north of the kingdom, where about 3,000 armed Palestinians were located.

The members of Fatah declared that they preferred to die in battle rather than surrender to the Jordanian dictates. After four days of battle, the Jordanian army overcame the last pockets of resistance. King Hussein held a press conference and declared that there was now "absolute quiet" in the kingdom. Seventy-two Palestinians fled to the West Bank and surrendered to IDF soldiers. The commander of Fatah's forces in northern Jordan, Abu Ali Iyad, was captured and killed by the Jordanian Army.[60]

The Palestinian rout was complete. King Hussein had removed the threat to his throne, and had strengthened his control over the kingdom.

Violations of international law

According to Benjamin Clarke et al., the PLO knowingly breached international law and threatened the legitimate Jordanian government but was unprepared for the massive response on the part of the Kingdom of Jordan:[61]

"... where the international community has been unwilling or unable to prevent crimes against international law (such as wars of aggression, genocide, brutal occupation, war crimes and crimes against humanity) victims of such crimes have often taken matters into their own hands. They do so in pursuit of justice, retribution and an end to dispossession. Self help measures aimed at securing an end to violations of fundamental rights, can however escalate beyond what the founders of resistance struggle intended or planned. PLO terrorism in Jordan in 1970 is one example. It led to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan the following year."

Aftermath and regional consequences

Palestinians: The group Black September was established by Fatah members in 1971 to serve as a terrorist organization for revenge operations and international strikes after the September events. On 28 November 1971, in Cairo, four of its members assassinated Wasfi al-Tal.[62] The group would go on to perform other strikes against Jordan, and against Israeli and Western citizens and property outside of the Middle East, such as the Munich massacre in 1972. The Black September Organization was later disbanded in 1973–1974 as the PLO sought to exploit the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and pursue a diplomatic strategy. Fatah has always publicly denied its responsibility for Black September operations, but by the 2000s (decade), numerous high-ranking Fatah and Black September activists openly acknowledged the relationship. Only a few years later, in 1974, the Arab League (and then the United Nations) would recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Lebanon: In the September fighting, the PLO lost its main base of operations. Fighters were driven to Southern Lebanon to regroup. The enlarged PLO presence in Lebanon and the intensification of fighting on the Israeli–Lebanese border stirred up internal unrest in Lebanon, where the PLO fighters added dramatically to the weight of the Lebanese National Movement, a coalition of Muslims, Arab nationalists and leftists who opposed the rightist, Maronite-dominated government. These developments helped precipitate the Lebanon Civil War, in which the PLO would be engrossed from 1975 until well after the mid-1980s.

Jordan: King Hussein of Jordan was maligned throughout the Arab world for having attacked the Palestinian resistance, and although he had now averted the physical threat to his throne, his legitimacy had suffered a crippling blow among Palestinian refugees and on the regional Arab scene.

Syria: The September events set alight the smouldering conflict between Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid in Syria. This culminated in Assad's Corrective Movement of November 1970, in which he deposed Jadid and seized power, after Jadid had tried to fire him over the Black September debacle and other issues.

Pakistan: According to Major General Aboobaker Osman Mitha, it was General Gul Hasan in 1971 who saved then Brigadier General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq from being court martialed. General Yahya Khan received a signal from Major General Nawazish, the head of the Pakistan military mission in Amman, asking that Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq be court martialled for disobeying GHQ orders by commanding a Jordanian armoured division against the Palestinians, as part of an action in which thousands were killed. Gul Hasan's intercession on Zia-ul-Haq's behalf saved the Brigadier's career, and allowed Brigadier Zia-ul-Haq to advance his own military career. This culminated in his political appointment as Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, and his subsequent coup against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

Zia's performance as a military leader for Jordan was part of what convinced President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to promote him to Chief of Army Staff in 1976. Haq later staged a coup d'état, executed Bhutto and, aided by the United States, was instrumental in supporting mujahideen such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar during the Soviet Afghan war.[63][64]

Iraq: According to Abu Iyad, Iraq encouraged the PLO to overthrow King Hussein.[65] However, Iraq took no action to assist the PLO during Black September, even though it had "25,000 troops stationed in Jordan." In his 2012 memoir, Jack O'Connell, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency's Station in Amman, recounted that Iraqi defector Abud Hassan provided falsified documents to Iraqi officials suggesting that the United States planned to enter the conflict militarily on Jordan's side, which convinced Iraqi Defense Minister Hardan al-Tikriti to order "his troops to positions near the Iraqi border, thereby cutting them off from operations taking place near Amman." Arafat sent a message to Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, stating: "History will not forgive those who failed [to] support [the] fedayeen." In the aftermath, Tikriti was removed from his civilian and military positions by Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council on 5 October, neutralizing a potential rival to Saddam Hussein's ascension to power.[66]

See also

References

  1. 1 2 Katz, Samuel M. (1995). Arab Armies of the Middle East Wars 2. New York: Osprey Publishing. p. 10. ISBN 0-85045-800-5.
  2. ↑ Dunstan, Simon (2003). The Yom Kippur War 1973: Golan Heights Pt.1. Elsm Court, Chapel Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 9LP, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing Ltd. ISBN 1 84176 220 2.
  3. ↑ Shlaim 2008, p. 326.
  4. 1 2 3 4 Shlaim 2008, p. 321.
  5. ↑ Massad, Joseph Andoni (2001). Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 342. ISBN 0-231-12323-X.
  6. ↑ Bailey, p.59, The Making of a War, John Bulloch, p.67
  7. 1 2 Shlaim 2008, p. 311-340.
  8. 1 2 "King Hussein of Jordan". The Telegraph. The Telegraph. 8 February 1999. Retrieved 1 July 2017.
  9. 1 2 3 Nils August Butenschon; Uri Davis; Manuel Sarkis Hassassian (2000). Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications. Syracuse University Press. Retrieved 18 October 2015.
  10. 1 2 "The IDF raid on Samu': the turning-point in Jordan's relations with Israel and the West Bank Palestinians". Moshe Shemesh. Israel Studies. 22 March 2002. Retrieved 9 August 2017.
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  13. 1 2 3 Shlaim 2008, p. 223.
  14. 1 2 Shlaim 2008, p. 224.
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  18. ↑ "Debacle in the desert". Haaretz. 29 March 1968. Retrieved 13 May 2011.
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  21. 1 2 Neff. "Battle of Karameh Establishes Claim of Palestinian Statehood". Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (March 1998). pp. 87–88. Archived from the original on 19 July 2008. Retrieved 3 September 2008.
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  30. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Arafat's War by Efraim Karsh, p. 28
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  32. 1 2 Salibi 2008, p. 232.
  33. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Shlaim 2008, p. 312.
  34. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Shlaim 2008, p. 313.
  35. ↑ Saliba 2008, p. 233.
  36. 1 2 3 4 5 Shlaim 2008, p. 314.
  37. 1 2 3 4 Shlaim 2008, p. 315.
  38. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Shlaim 2008, p. 316.
  39. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Shlaim 2008, p. 317.
  40. 1 2 Shlaim 2008, p. 318.
  41. 1 2 Shlaim 2008, p. 319.
  42. 1 2 3 4 5 Shlaim 2008, p. 320.
  43. 1 2 Saliba 2008, p. 235.
  44. 1 2 3 4 Shlaim 2008, p. 322.
  45. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Salibi 2008, p. 236.
  46. ↑ "Islam and imperialism". socialistreviewindex.org.uk.
  47. ↑ Mobley, Richard (2009). Syria's 1970 Invasion of Jordan (PDF).
  48. ↑ "Armed Conflict Year Index". onwar.com.
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  51. ↑ Miller, Judith (12 November 2004). "Yasir Arafat, Palestinian Leader and Mideast Provocateur, Is Dead at 75". The New York Times. Retrieved 26 April 2010.
  52. ↑ Migdal, Joel (2014). "4. Finding a Place in the Middle East: A New Partnership Develops out of Black September". Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East. Columbia University Press (published February 2014). ISBN 9780231166720. Archived from the original on 9 December 2014. Retrieved 20 December 2014.
  53. 1 2 "Nixon Papers". CNN. 28 November 2007. Retrieved 26 April 2010.
  54. ↑ Pollack, Arabs at War, 2002, pp. 339–340
  55. ↑ Советский десант готовился к высадке в Сирию. (in Russian)
  56. ↑ Arie Perliger, William L. Eubank (2006), "Terrorism in Iran and Afghanistan: The Seeds of the Global Jihad", Middle Eastern Terrorism, Infobase Publishing, pp. 41–42, ISBN 9781438107196
  57. ↑ Ervand Abrahamian (1989), Radical Islam: the Iranian Mojahedin, Society and culture in the modern Middle East, 3, I.B.Tauris, p. 140), ISBN 9781850430773
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  60. ↑ Seale, Patrick. Abu Nidal, a gun for hire. 1992. pp. 81–82.
  61. ↑ Benjamin Clarke, T. Brian Mooney, Dr Robert Imre. Responding to Terrorism: Political, Philosophical and Legal Perspectives: p.33. "... where the international community has been unwilling or unable to prevent crimes against international law (such as wars of aggression, genocide, brutal occupation, war crimes and crimes against humanity) victims of such crimes have often taken matters into their own hands. They do so in pursuit of justice, retribution and an end to dispossession (see Pape 2005). Self help measures aimed at securing an end to violations of fundamental rights, can however escalate beyond what the founders of resistance struggle intended or planned. PLO terrorism in Jordan in 1970 is one example. It led to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan the following year."
  62. ↑ Becker, Jillian (1984). The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. ISBN 0-297-78299-1.
  63. ↑ A.H. Amin "Remembering Our Warriors: Maj Gen (Retd) Tajammal Hussain Malik" Archived 3 March 2016 at the Wayback Machine. Defence Journal, September 2001
  64. ↑ Edward Girardet, Killing the Cranes, published by Chelsea Green
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  66. ↑ Gibson, Bryan R. (2015). Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 113, 127–128, 232, 249. ISBN 978-1-137-48711-7.

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