Battle of Le Cateau

Battle of Le Cateau
Part of the Great Retreat on the Western Front of World War I

British dead at the Battle of Le Cateau.
Date26 August 1914
LocationLe Cateau-Cambrésis, France
50°06′15″N 03°32′40″E / 50.10417°N 3.54444°E / 50.10417; 3.54444Coordinates: 50°06′15″N 03°32′40″E / 50.10417°N 3.54444°E / 50.10417; 3.54444
Result German victory
Belligerents
 German Empire  United Kingdom
France France
Commanders and leaders
German Empire Friedrich Bertram Sixt von Armin
German Empire Georg von der Marwitz		 United Kingdom Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien
Units involved
IV Corps
Höhere Kavallerie-Kommando 2		 II Corps
Strength
23 infantry battalions
18 cavalry regiments (9 at half strength)
6 divisional cavalry squadrons
162 guns (27 batteries)
84 machine-guns		 40 infantry battalions
12 cavalry regiments
2 divisional cavalry squadrons
246 guns (41 batteries)
c. 80 machine-guns
Casualties and losses
2,900 7,812 (700 killed, 2,600 captured)
38 guns

The Battle of Le Cateau was fought on 26 August 1914, after the British and French retreated from the Battle of Mons and had set up defensive positions in a fighting withdrawal against the German advance at Le Cateau-Cambrésis.

Battle

On the morning of 26 August, the Germans arrived and attacked II Corps (General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien). Unlike the Battle of Mons, where the majority of casualties inflicted by the British were from rifle fire, Le Cateau was an artilleryman's battle, demonstrating the devastating results which modern quick-firing artillery using shrapnel shells could have on infantry advancing in the open.[1] The British deployed their artillery in the open, about 50–200 metres (55–219 yd) behind their infantry, while the German artillery used indirect fire from concealed positions.[2] With the guns so close to their infantry, the British had unintentionally increased the effectiveness of the German artillery-fire, because shells aimed at the British infantry could just as easily hit the British artillery.[3]

Modern map of the Le Cateau area (commune FR insee code 59136)

The British 5th Division was positioned on the right flank, on the southern side of the Le Cateau–Cambrai road between Inchy and Le Cateau. The 3rd Division was in the centre, holding the ground between Caudry and Inchy. The 4th Division was on the left flank, on the northern bank of the Warnelle. This was a poor choice of terrain on the part of the British, because the road was sunken in places, providing inadequate long-range firing positions. In fact, in most cases, the Germans could march close up to the British positions, which is what they often did. This was especially true at the weakest point in the British line, the right flank west of Le Cateau, where the Germans simply marched straight down the road from the north, all the way to Le Cateau. The British position was on the forward slope and consequently, casualties were heavy during the withdrawal.[4]

At 03:30, Smith-Dorrien decided to "strike the enemy hard and after he had done so, continue the retreat". The purpose of the operation was unclear to his subordinates. A "hold at all costs" mentality was evident in the 5th Division on the British right flank. The commander of the 2nd Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry was given a written order that "There will now be NO retirement for the fighting troops; fill up your trenches, with water, food and ammunition as far as you can." The order was confirmed by a colonel from the II Corps staff, who, upon arriving, repeated it.[5]

Smith-Dorrien's delaying operation never occurred because the order to defend arrived at the front line about the same time the Germans did, sometimes later. Nor were the conditions of a doctrinal delay observed, such as refusing to let British units become decisively engaged with the enemy. He did not choose positions with adequate fields-of-fire and with prepared and hidden routes of withdrawal.[5]

According to the German official history the IV Corps commander, Sixt von Armin, issued an order at 11:15 that turned the regimental- and brigade-level fights into a centrally coordinated battle but there is no evidence of German command and control above the divisional level. 75 percent of IV Corps troops were in contact before they received this order and the rest never made it to the battlefield. The IV Corps commander did not control the other half of the German forces, II Cavalry Corps, which fought independently.[5]

Holding their ground despite many casualties, the British right and then the left flank began to break around midday, under unrelenting pressure from the Germans. The arrival of the Cavalry Corps (General André Sordet) acted as a shield for the British left flank and supported a highly co-ordinated tactical withdrawal, despite German attempts to infiltrate and outflank the retreating British forces.[6][7]

That night, the Allies withdrew to Saint-Quentin. Of the 40,000 British troops fighting at Le Cateau, 7,812 British casualties were incurred, including 2,600 taken prisoner.[8] Thirty-eight guns were abandoned, most having their breech blocks removed and sights disabled by the gunners first.[9]

Aftermath

Modern map of the St. Quentin area (commune FR insee code 02691)

II Corps retreated on the morning of 27 August and in two days of marching, broke contact with the Germans.[5] Having lost 7,000 of its infantry at Le Cateau and 2,500–3,000 footsore and exhausted men who had to be evacuated to Le Mans for recuperation, II Corps was not battleworthy for at least two days.[5] Although credited at the time by Field Marshal Sir John French for having saved the BEF, Smith-Dorrien was later criticized for his decision to stand at Le Cateau by French.[10][11] German losses were 2,900.[12]

The Germans were pleased with their victory. The historian of Infantry Regiment 93 wrote

The battle of Beaumont-Inchy will always be one of the most glorious days in the history of the regiment, which demonstrated that in a frontal attack against an enemy that was heretofore considered unbeatable, the crack troops of the British Army, the 93rd was not merely their equal, it was superior." 75th Field Artillery Regiment said that the battle "strengthened the self-confidence of the German troops … all the more so because the British army was made up almost exclusively of long-service active army troops, who were superbly trained and equipped.
— Historian, IR 93[5]

but German pleasure with the victory in part arose from a mistaken belief that they had defeated the entirety of the BEF, not knowing that they had in fact only faced one corps and one of the cavalry brigades. It was this mistake which allowed II Corps to retire as German troops were given a night of rest instead of being sent to pursue the British forces.[13]

See also

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Edmonds 1926, pp. 141–160.
  2. ↑ Bailey 2004, pp. 212–213.
  3. ↑ Zuber 2011, p. 235.
  4. ↑ Zuber 2011, p. 215.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Zuber 2011.
  6. ↑ Edmonds 1926, pp. 161–174.
  7. ↑ Humphries & Maker 2013, pp. 259–265.
  8. ↑ Edmonds 1926, p. 182.
  9. ↑ Edmonds 1926, pp. 176–187.
  10. ↑ Beckett & Corvi 2006, p. 200.
  11. ↑ Humphries & Maker 2013, pp. 260–261.
  12. ↑ Zuber 2011, p. 257.
  13. ↑ Gardner 2003, p. 60.

References

  • Bailey, J. B. A. (2004). Field Artillery and Firepower. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-029-0. 
  • Beckett, Ian F. W.; Corvi, Steven J. (2006). Haig's Generals. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-84415-169-1. 
  • Edmonds, J. E. (1926). Military Operations France and Belgium, 1914: Mons, the Retreat to the Seine, the Marne and the Aisne August–October 1914. History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. II (2nd ed.). London: Macmillan. OCLC 58962523. 
  • Gardner, Nikolas (2003). Trial by Fire: Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914. Contributions in Military Studies. Westport, CT: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-313-32473-4. 
  • Humphries, M. O.; Maker, J. (2013). Der Weltkrieg: 1914, The Battle of the Frontiers and Pursuit to the Marne. Germany's Western Front: Translations From the German Official History of the Great War. I. Part 1. Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. ISBN 978-1-55458-373-7. 
  • Zuber, Terence (2011) [2010]. The Mons Myth. Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press. ISBN 978-0-7524-7628-5. 

Further reading

  • Battle of Le Cateau 26th August, 1914. Tour of the Battlefield. By Command of the Army Council (Naval & Military Press repr. ed.). London: HMSO. 2005 [1934]. ISBN 978-1-84574-033-7. 
  • Becke, Major A. F. (2006) [1919]. The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau, Wednesday, 26th August 1914 (Naval & Military Press reprint ed.). Woolwich: Royal Artillery Inst. Print. House. ISBN 978-1-84342-545-8. 
  • Bird, Antony (2008). Gentlemen, We Will Stand and Fight: Le Cateau 1914. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. ISBN 978-1-84797-062-6. 
  • Brown, Malcolm (1993). The Imperial War Museum book of the Western Front. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. ISBN 978-0-283-06140-0. 
  • Cave, Nigel; Sheldon, Jack (2008). Le Cateau. Battlefield Europe. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books. ISBN 978-0-85052-842-8. 
  • Evans, M. M. (2004). Battles of World War I. Devizes: Select Editions. ISBN 978-1-84193-226-2. 
  • Gavaghan, Michael (1999). Illustrated Pocket Guide to Mons, 1914. Forgotten Battles. Leyland: M & L. ISBN 978-0-9524464-5-3. 
  • Gavaghan, Michael (2000). Illustrated Pocket Guide to Le Cateau, 1914. Forgotten Battles. Preston: M & L. ISBN 978-0-9524464-6-0. 
  • Jones, Nigel H. (1983). The War Walk: A Journey Along the Western Front. London: Robert Hale. ISBN 978-0-7090-1174-3. 
  • Lomas, David (1997). Mons – 1914. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84176-142-8. 
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