Battle of Diu (1509)

Battle of Diu
Part of Portuguese battles in the Indian Ocean
Portuguese-Mamluk War

Fort Diu, built in 1535
Date3 February 1509
LocationDiu, India
Result Decisive Portuguese victory
Belligerents
Portuguese Empire Gujarat Sultanate
Mamluk Sultanate
Zamorin of Calicut
Ottoman auxiliaries
Supported by:
Ottoman Empire
 Republic of Venice
Republic of Ragusa
Commanders and leaders
Dom Francisco de Almeida Amir Husain Al-Kurdi
Malik Ayyaz
Kunjali Marakkar
Strength
9 naus[1]
6 caravels[1]
2 galleys and 1 brigantine
800 Portuguese soldiers[1]
400 Hindu-Nairs[2]		 10 carracks[1]
6 galleys
30 light galleys [1]
70-150 war-boats
450 Mamluks[1]
4000 to 5000 Gujaratis [3]
Casualties and losses
30 dead, 300 wounded[1] All Mamluks killed but 22 [1]
All Mamluk ships sunk or captured [1]
4 Gujarati carracks captured [1]
1300 Gujaratis dead[1]
Portuguese battles in the Indian Ocean

The Battle of Diu, was a naval battle fought on 3 February 1509 in the Arabian Sea, in the port of Diu, India, between the Portuguese Empire and a joint fleet of the Sultan of Gujarat, the Mamlûk Burji Sultanate of Egypt, the Zamorin of Calicut with support of the Republic of Venice.[4]

The Portuguese victory was critical: the Mamluks were soundly defeated, easing the Portuguese strategy of controlling the Indian Ocean to route trade down the Cape of Good Hope, circumventing the traditional spice route controlled by the Arabs and the Venetians through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. After the battle, Portugal rapidly captured key ports in the Indian Ocean like Goa, Ceylon, Malacca and Ormuz, crippling the Mamluk Sultanate and the Gujarat Sultanate, greatly assisting the growth of the Portuguese Empire and establishing its trade dominance for almost a century, until it was lost at the Battle of Swally during the Dutch-Portuguese War, over a hundred years after.

The Battle of Diu was a battle of annihilation alike Lepanto and Trafalgar, and one of the most important of universal naval history, for it marks the beginning of European dominance over Asian seas that would last until World War Two.[5]

Background

Just two years after Vasco da Gama reached India by sea, the Portuguese realized that the prospect of developing trade such as that which they had practiced in west Africa had become an impossibility, due to the opposition of Muslim merchant elites in the western coast of India, who incited attacks against Portuguese feitorias, ships and merchants, and lead the massacre of the Portuguese in Calicut in 1500.[6]

Thus, the Portuguese signed an alliance with a rebellious vassal of Calicut instead, the raja of Cochin, who allowed them to establish headquarters. The Zamorin of Calicut attempted to fight back and invaded Cochin, but the Portuguese were able to devastate the lands and cripple the trade of Calicut, which at the time served as the main exporter of spices back to Europe, through the Red Sea. In December 1504, the Portuguese destroyed the Zamorin's yearly merchant fleet bound to Egypt, laden with spices.[7]

When King Manuel I of Portugal received news of these developments, he decided to nominate Dom Francisco de Almeida as the first viceroy of India with expressed orders not just limited to safeguarding Portuguese feitorias, but also to curb hostile Muslim shipping[8]. Dom Francisco departed from Lisbon in March 1505 with twenty ships and his 20 year son, Dom Lourenço, who was himself nominated capitão-mor do mar da Índia or captain-major of the sea of India. [9]

In 1507, Portuguese forces under the command of Afonso de Albuquerque, tasked to blockade the Red Sea, had conquered Socotra, Oman and Ormuz in the Persian Gulf. Portuguese intervention was seriously disrupting Muslim trade in the Indian Ocean, threatening Venetian interests as well, as the Portuguese became able to undersell the Venetians in the spice trade in Europe.

Unable to oppose the Portuguese, the Muslim communities of traders in India as well as the sovereign of Calicut, the Zamorin, sent envoys to Egypt pleading for aid against the Portuguese.[2]

Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean around early 16th century

The Mamluk Sultante of Egypt

16th century Mamluks

The Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt was, in the beginning of the 16th century, the main middleman between the spice producing regions of India, and the Venetian buyers in the Mediterranean, mainly in Alexandria, who then sold the spices in Europe at a great profit. Egypt was otherwise mostly an agrarian society with little ties to the sea.[10] Venice broke diplomatic relations with Portugal and started looking for ways to counter its intervention in the Indian Ocean, sending an ambassador to the Mamluk court and suggested that "rapid and secret remedies" be taken against the Portuguese.[11]

Mamluk soldiers had little expertise in naval warfare, so the Mamluk Sultan, Al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghawri requested Venetian support, in exchange for lowering tariffs to facilitate competition with the Portuguese.[11] Venice supplied the Mamluks with Mediterranean-type carracks and war galleys manned by Greek sailors, which Venetian shipwrights helped disassemble in Alexandria and reassemble on the Suez. The galleys could mount cannon fore and aft, but not along the gunwales because the guns would interfere with the rowers. The native ships (dhows), with their sewn wood planks, could carry only very light guns.

Command of the expedition was entrusted to a Kurdish Mamluk, former governor of Jeddah Amir Hussain Al-Kurdi, Mirocem in Portuguese. The expedition (referred to by the Portuguese the generic term "the rumes"[12]) included not only Egyptian Mamluks, but also a large number of Turkish mercenaries, as well as Nubians, Ethiopians and Venetian gunners[10] Hence, most of the coalition's artillery were archers, whom the Portuguese could easily outshoot.

The fleet left Suez in November 1505, 1100 men strong.[10] They stopped to fortify Jeddah against a possible Portuguese attack and quell rebellions around Mecca. They had to spend the monsoon season on the island of Kamaran and called at Aden at the tip of the Red Sea, where they got involved in costly local politics with the Tahirid Emir. Hence only in 1508, did they finally cross the Indian Ocean to the port of Diu, a city at the mouth of the Gulf of Khambhat.[13]

The Battle of Chaul

In March 1508, commanded by Mamluk admiral Mirocem (Amir Husain Al-Kurdi or Admiral Husain Al-Kurdi), the Mamluk fleets arrived at Chaul in India, where they surprised a Portuguese fleet commanded by Lourenço de Almeida, son of the Portuguese viceroy. Joined by Gujarat admiral Malik Ayyaz, governor of Diu, they fought for over three days and won the Battle of Chaul. The Mamluk fleet isolated Lourenço de Almeida's ship, but let the others escape. They killed the Portuguese commander and took nine captives back to Diu. The Mirat Sikandari, a Persian account of the Kingdom of Gujarat, details this battle as a minor skirmish.[14] Having taken the prisoners, they headed to Diu.

Enraged at the death of his son, the Portuguese viceroy Francisco de Almeida sought revenge.

Precursor to the battle

Diu was a critical outpost in the overall spice trade from India. The Portuguese attempt to establish trade with India would require the breaking of this strongly defended and lucrative trade network. In addition to enforcing Portuguese rule, the battle was undertaken as a personal issue by Portuguese viceroy Francisco de Almeida to avenge the death of his son Lourenço at the hands of the Mirocem (Amir Husain Al-Kurdi). He was so enraged at his son's death that he is supposed to have said, "He who ate the chick must also eat the rooster, or pay for it". Francisco de Almeida had rushed to chase the Mamluks fleet because Afonso de Albuquerque arrived on 6 December 1508 with orders from the King of Portugal to replace him as the next viceroy. His plan was such a personal issue that he threw Afonso de Albuquerque in jail after being informed of the King's orders, then advanced to the battle.

Aware of the danger facing his city, Malik Ayyaz prepared his defence and wrote to appease the viceroy, stating that he had the prisoners and how bravely his son had fought, adding a letter from the Portuguese prisoners stating that they were well treated.[15] The viceroy answered Malik Ayyaz (referred to as Meliqueaz in Portuguese) with a respectful but menacing letter, stating his intention of revenge, that they had better join all forces and prepare to fight or he would destroy Diu:

“ I the Viceroy say to you, honored Meliqueaz captain of Diu, that I go with my knights to this city of yours, taking the people who were welcomed there, who in Chaul fought my people and killed a man who was called my son, and I come with hope in God of Heaven to take revenge on them and on those who assist them, and if I don't find them I will take your city, to pay for everything, and you, for the help you have done at Chaul. This I tell you, so that you are well aware that I go, as I am now on this island of Bombay, as he will tell you the one who carries this letter. (in Portuguese) ”

In a double bind — Malik Ayyaz fearing the destruction of his city, and Mirocem beset in it — they faced the Portuguese forces.

Battle

The Portuguese had eighteen ships commanded by the Viceroy, with about 1,500 Portuguese soldiers and 400 local combatants from Cochin. The Allied side had one hundred ships, but only twelve were major vessels; the rest were small shallow-draught craft. After detecting the Portuguese, who approached from Cochin to the north, and fearing their technical superiority, the Mamluks decided to take advantage of the port of Diu and its fort, which had its own artillery. It was therefore decided to stay anchored at the port and await an attack from the Portuguese. This may also have been due to the training of the Mamluks, who were used to the more sheltered bays in the Mediterranean. There they also relied upon land-based artillery reinforcements to defeat the enemy. The Portuguese started the battle with a massive naval bombardment using their on board artillery, followed by hand-to-hand combat in the harbour of Diu.

These Portuguese ships had guns of greater calibre, better artillery crews, and were better manned and better built. The Portuguese naval infantry also had an advantage over the Mamluks, not only because they were heavily armed and equipped (armour, arquebuses and a type of grenade made of clay with gunpowder inside), but also because they were seasoned professional seamen.

The tough state-of-the art multi-rigged Portuguese carracks and smaller fast caravels had been developed over the previous decades to cope with the storms of the Atlantic Ocean and were bristling with cannons. The smaller Indian Ocean dhows and Mediterranean-type galleys launched by the coalition of the Samoothiri Raja, Gujarat and Mamluk were no match. The Portuguese ships were able to shoot their powerful cannons and thus dissuade the smaller craft from coming near them. Even when they did come near, the smaller galleys and dhows were low in the water, and so unable to board the Portuguese ships, while being sprayed from above with small arms, grenades and smaller calibre cannon.

Aftermath

Diu Fort eventually built in 1535 after a defence alliance was sealed between the Portuguese and Sultan Bahadur Shah by the Treaty of Bassein (1534), when Mughal Emperor Humayun waged war to annex the territory. 1521 and 1531 Portuguese attempts to seize the island by force had failed.
Diu city and the Portuguese fort (British engraving, 1729).

The battle ended in victory for the Portuguese, with terrible losses on the Gujarat-Mamluk-Kozhikode side, who fought bravely but were at a loss as to how to counter a naval force, the like of which they had never seen before. After the battle, Malik Ayyaz handed over the prisoners of Chaul, dressed and well fed. To his surprise, Francisco de Almeida, who was ending his term as viceroy, refused his offer to allow a Portuguese fortress be established in Diu, an offer that the Portuguese soon sought ardently, and which Ayyaz managed to stall as long as he was governor of Diu.

The spoils of the battle included three royal flags of the Mamlûk Sultan of Cairo that were sent to Portugal and are even today displayed in the Convento de Cristo, in the town of Tomar, spiritual home of the Knights Templar. The Viceroy extracted a payment of 300,000 gold xerafins, but rejected the offer of the city of Diu which he thought would be expensive to maintain, although he left a garrison there. The Portuguese prisoners from the Battle of Chaul were also rescued. The treatment of the Mameluk captives by the Portuguese was brutal. The Viceroy ordered most of them to be hanged, burned alive or torn to pieces by tying them to the mouths of the cannons, in retaliation for his son's death. Commenting on the battle after winning it, Almeida said: "As long as you may be powerful at sea, you will hold India as yours; and if you do not possess this power, little will avail you a fortress on the shore."[16] Interestingly, after handing over the Viceroy's post to his successor, Dom Afonso de Albuquerque, Almeida left for Portugal in November, 1509, and in December, 1509 was himself killed by the Khoikhoi tribe, near the Cape of Good Hope, Africa.

This battle did not end the Portuguese-Ottoman rivalry. A second naval battle occurred 30 years later in the Siege of Diu in 1538 when the Ottoman laid siege with 54 ships to the fortress which was built by the Portuguese in 1535, but then after suffering terrible defeats they lifted the siege. Suleiman I the Magnificent sent his admiral Hussein Pasha for another siege of the fortress at Diu in 1547 which, upon failing, marked the end of Ottoman attempts to expand their influence in the Indian Ocean.

Order of battle

Mamluk-Gujarat-Calicut Fleet

Portuguese ships

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu -1508 e 1509 - O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.96-97
  2. 1 2 Malabar manual by William Logan p.316, Books.Google.com
  3. ↑ "Conquerors: How Portugal seized the Indian Ocean and forged the first Global Empire" by Roger Crowley p.228
  4. ↑ Rogers, Clifford J. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, San Francisco:Westview Press, 1995, pp. 299–333 at Angelfire.com
  5. ↑ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I - The First World Sea Power p. 273
  6. ↑ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I - The First World Sea Power p. 153-155
  7. ↑ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I - The First World Sea Power p. 200-206
  8. ↑ Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu -1508 e 1509 - O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.25
  9. ↑ Saturnino Monteiro (2011), Portuguese Sea Battles Volume I - The First World Sea Power p. 207
  10. 1 2 3 Pissarra, José (2002). Chaul e Diu -1508 e 1509 - O Domínio do Índico Lisbon, Tribuna da História, pg.26
  11. 1 2 Foundations of the Portuguese empire, 1415–1580 Bailey Wallys Diffie pp. 230–31ff
  12. ↑ Ozbaran, Salih, "Ottomans as 'Rumes' in Portuguese sources in the sixteenth century" Portuguese Studies, Annual, 2001
  13. ↑ Brummett, Palmira.Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery, SUNY Press, New York, 1994, ISBN 0-7914-1701-8 , pp. 35, 171,22
  14. ↑ Bayley, Edward C. The Local Muhammadan Dynasties: Gujarat, London, 1886, 222
  15. ↑ Michael Naylor Pearson, "Merchants and rulers in Gujarat: the response to the Portuguese in the sixteenth century", p. 70 University of California Press, 1976. ISBN 0-520-02809-0
  16. ↑ Ghosh, Amitav The Iman and the Indian: Prose Pieces, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 2002, ISBN 81-7530-047-7, 377 pp, 107

Further reading

Coordinates: 20°N 71°E / 20°N 71°E / 20; 71

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