Background and causes of the Iranian Revolution

Part of a series on the
History of the
Iranian Revolution

The Iranian Revolution was a populist, nationalist and Shi'a Islamic revolution that replaced a dictatorial monarchy with a theocracy based on "Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists" (or velayat-e faqih).

Its causes – why the last Shah of Iran (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) was overthrown and why he was replaced by an Islamic Republic – are the subject of historical debate. The revolution was in part a conservative backlash against the westernization, modernization and secularization efforts of the Western-backed Shah,[1] and a more popular reaction to social injustice and other shortcomings of the ancien régime.[2] The Shah was perceived by many Iranians as beholden to – if not a puppet of – non-Muslim Western powers (in particular the United States)[3][4] whose culture was contaminating that of Iran. The Shah's regime was seen as oppressive, brutal,[5][6] corrupt and extravagant;[5][7] it also suffered from basic functional failures, like overly ambitious economic programs that brought economic bottlenecks, shortages and inflation.[8]

Background 1906–1977

Shi'a clergy (or Ulema,) have had a significant influence in Iran. The clergy first showed themselves to be a powerful political force in opposition to Iran's monarch with the 1891 Tobacco Protest boycott that effectively destroyed an unpopular concession granted by the shah giving a British company a monopoly over buying and selling Tobacco in Iran. To some the incident demonstrated that the Shia ulama were "Iran's first line of defense" against colonialism.[9]

Reza Shah

The dynasty that the revolution overthrew – the Pahlavi dynasty – was known for its autocracy, its focus on modernization and Westernization and for its disregard for religious[10] and democratic measures in Iran's constitution.

The founder of the dynasty, army general Reza Pahlavi, replaced Islamic laws with western ones, and forbade traditional Islamic clothing, separation of the sexes and veiling of women (hijab).[11] Women who resisted his ban on public hijab had their chadors forcibly removed and torn. In 1935 a rebellion by pious Shi'a at the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad was crushed on his orders with dozens killed and hundreds injured,[12] rupturing relations between the Shah and pious Shia in Iran.[13][14]

The last Shah of Iran comes to power

Reza Shah was deposed in 1941 by an invasion of allied British and Soviet troops who believed him to be sympathetic with the allies' enemy Nazi Germany. His son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was installed by the allies as monarch. Prince Pahlavi (later crowned shah) reigned until the 1979 revolution with one brief interruption. In 1953 he fled the country after a power-struggle with his Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Mossadegh is remembered in Iran for having been voted into power through a democratic election, nationalizing Iran's British-owned oil fields, and being deposed in a military coup d'état organized by an American CIA operative and aided by the British MI6. Thus foreign powers were involved in both the installation and restoration of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The shah maintained a close relationship with the United States, both regimes sharing a fear of/opposition to the expansion of Soviet/Russian state, Iran's powerful northern neighbor. Leftist and Islamist groups attacked his government (often from outside Iran as they were suppressed within) for violating the Iranian constitution, political corruption, and the political oppression by the SAVAK (secret police).

Rise of Ayatollah Khomeini

Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, first came to political prominence in 1963 when he led opposition to the Shah and his program of reforms known as the "White Revolution", which aimed to break up landholdings owned by some Shi’a clergy, allow women to vote and religious minorities to hold office, and grant women legal equality in marital issues.

Khomeini declared that the Shah had "embarked on the destruction of Islam in Iran"[15] and publicly denounced the Shah as a "wretched miserable man." Following Khomeini's arrest on June 5, 1963, three days of major riots erupted throughout Iran, with Khomeini supporters claiming 15,000 were killed by police fire[16] Khomeini was detained and kept under house arrest for 8 months. After his release he continued his agitation against the Shah, condemning the regimes's close cooperation with Israel and its "capitulations" – the extension of diplomatic immunity to American government personnel in Iran. In November 1964, Khomeini was re-arrested and sent into exile where he remained for 14 years until the revolution.

A period of "disaffected calm" followed.[17] Despite political repression the budding Islamic revival began to undermine the idea of Westernization as progress that was the basis of the Shah's secular regime and form the ideology of the revolution. Jalal Al-e-Ahmad's idea of Gharbzadegi – that Western culture was a plague or an intoxication to be eliminated;[18] Ali Shariati's vision of Islam as the one true liberator of the Third World from oppressive colonialism, neo-colonialism, and capitalism;[19] and Morteza Motahhari's popularized retellings of the Shia faith, all spread and gained listeners, readers and supporters.[18] Most importantly, Khomeini preached that revolt, and especially martyrdom, against injustice and tyranny was part of Shia Islam,[20] and that Muslims should reject the influence of both capitalism and communism with the slogan "Neither East, nor West - Islamic Republic!" (Persian: نه شرقی نه غربی جمهوری اسلامی‎‎)

One of Tehran's major hospitals is named after Iranian Islamist leftist Ali Shariati

To replace the shah's regime Khomeini developed the ideology of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) as government, that Muslims – in fact everyone – required "guardianship," in the form of rule or supervision by the leading Islamic jurist or jurists.[21] Such rule would protect Islam from deviation from traditional sharia law, and in so doing eliminate poverty, injustice, and the "plundering" of Muslim land by foreign unbelievers.[22] Establishing and obeying this Islamic government was "actually an expression of obedience to God", ultimately "more necessary even than prayer and fasting" in Islam,[23] and a commandment for all the world, not one confined to Iran.[24]

Publicly, Khomeini focused on the socio-economic problems of the shah's regime (corruption, unequal income and development),[25] not his solution of rule by Islamic jurists.

He believed a propaganda campaign by Western imperialists had prejudiced most Iranians against theocratic rule.[26][27]

But his book was widely distributed in religious circles, especially among Khomeini's students (talabeh), ex-students (clerics), and traditional business leaders (bazaari). A powerful and efficient network of opposition began to develop inside Iran,[28] employing mosque sermons, smuggled cassette speeches by Khomeini, and other means. Added to this religious opposition were secular and Islamic modernist students and guerrilla groups[29] who admired Khomeini's history of resistance, though they were to clash with his theocracy and be suppressed by his movement after the revolution.

Opposition groups and organizations

Constitutionalist, Marxist, and Islamist groups opposed the Shah:

The very first signs of opposition in 1977 came from Iranian constitutionalist liberals. Based in the urban middle class, this was a section of the population that was fairly secular and wanted the Shah to adhere to the Iranian Constitution of 1906 rather than religious rule.[30] Prominent in it was Mehdi Bazargan and his liberal, moderate Islamic group Freedom Movement of Iran, and the more secular National Front.

The clergy were divided, allying variously with the liberals, Marxists and Islamists. The various anti-Shah groups operated from outside Iran, mostly in London, Paris, Iraq, and Turkey. Speeches by the leaders of these groups were placed on audio cassettes to be smuggled into Iran. Khomeini, who was in exile in Iraq, worked to unite clerical and secular, liberal and radical opposition under his leadership[31] by avoiding specifics – at least in public – that might divide the factions.[32]

Marxists groups were illegal and heavily suppressed by SAVAK internal security apparatus. They included the communist Tudeh Party of Iran; two armed organizations, the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG) and the breakaway Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (IPFG); and some minor groups.[33] The guerillas aim was to defeat the Pahlavi regime by assassination and guerilla war. Although they played an important part in the 1979 overthrow of the regime, they had been weakened considerably by government repression and factionalization in the first half of the 1970s.[34]

Islamists were divided into several groups. The Freedom Movement of Iran, made up of religious members of the National Front of Iran who wanted to use lawful political methods against the Shah and led by Bazargan and Mahmoud Taleghani. The People's Mujahedin of Iran, a quasi-Marxist armed organization that opposed the influence of the clergy and later fought Khomeini's Islamic government.

The Islamist group that ultimately prevailed was that containing the core supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. Amongst them were some minor armed Islamist groups which joined together after the revolution in the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization. The Coalition of Islamic Societies was founded by religious bazaaris[35] (traditional merchants). The Combatant Clergy Association comprised Morteza Motahhari, Mohammad Beheshti, Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Mofatteh, who later became the major leaders of the Islamic Republic. They used a cultural approach to fight the Shah.

Because of internal repression, opposition groups abroad, like the Confederation of Iranian students, the foreign branch of Freedom Movement of Iran and the Islamic Association of Students, were important to the revolution.

1970–1977

Several events in the 1970s set the stage for the 1979 revolution:

In October 1971, the 2,500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire was held at the site of Persepolis. Only foreign dignitaries were invited to the three-day party whose extravagances included over one ton of caviar, and preparation by some two hundred chefs flown in from Paris. Cost was officially $40 million but estimated to be more in the range of $100–120 million.[36] Meanwhile, drought ravaged the provinces of Baluchistan, Sistan, and even Fars where the celebrations were held. "As the foreigners reveled on drink forbidden by Islam, Iranians were not only excluded from the festivities, some were starving."[37]

By late 1974 the oil boom had begun to produce not "the Great Civilization" promised by the Shah, but an "alarming" increase in inflation and waste and an "accelerating gap" between the rich and poor, the city and the country.[38] Nationalistic Iranians were angered by the tens of thousand of skilled foreign workers who came to Iran, many of them to help operate the already unpopular and expensive American high-tech military equipment that the Shah had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on.

The next year the Rastakhiz party was created. It became not only the only party Iranians were permitted to belong to, but one the "whole adult population" was required to belong and pay dues to.[39] The party attempted to take a populist stand fining and jailing merchants in its "anti-profiteering" campaigns, but this proved not only economically harmful but also politically counterproductive. Inflation morphed into a black market and business activity declined. Merchants were angered and politicized.[40]

In 1976, the Shah's government angered pious Iranian Muslims by changing the first year of the Iranian solar calendar from the Islamic hijri to the ascension to the throne by Cyrus the Great. "Iran jumped overnight from the Muslim year 1355 to the royalist year 2535."[41] The same year the Shah declared economic austerity measures to dampen inflation and waste. The resulting unemployment disproportionately affected the thousands of recent poor and unskilled migrants to the cities. As cultural and religious conservatives, many of these people, already disposed to view the Shah's secularism and Westernization as "alien and wicked",[42] went on to form the core of revolution's demonstrators and "martyrs".[43]

In 1977 a new American president, Jimmy Carter, was inaugurated. Carter sought to make American post-Vietnam foreign policy and power exercise more benevolent, and created a special Office of Human Rights. It sent the Shah a "polite reminder" of the importance of political rights and freedom. The Shah responded by granting amnesty to 357 political prisoners in February, and allowing Red Cross to visit prisons, beginning what is said to be 'a trend of liberalization by the Shah'. Through the late spring, summer and autumn liberal opposition formed organizations and issued open letters denouncing the regime.[44] Later that year a dissent group (the Writers' Association) gathered without the customary police break-up and arrests, starting a new era of political action by the Shah's opponents.[45]

That year also saw the death of the very popular and influential modernist Islamist leader Ali Shariati, allegedly at the hands of SAVAK, removing a potential revolutionary rival to Khomeini. Finally, in October Khomeini's son Mostafa died. Though the cause appeared to be a heart attack, anti-Shah groups blamed SAVAK poisoning and proclaimed him a 'martyr.' A subsequent memorial service for Mostafa in Tehran put Khomeini back in the spotlight and began the process of building Khomeini into the leading opponent of the Shah.[46][47]

General causes

The Iranian Revolution had a number of unique and significant characteristics. It produced profound change at great speed;[48] and replaced an ancient monarchy with a theocracy based on Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists (or velayat-e faqih). Its outcome – an Islamic Republic "under the guidance of an 80-year-old exiled religious scholar from Qom" – was, as one scholar put it, "clearly an occurrence that had to be explained.…"[49]

Surprise and absence of customary causes

The revolution was unique for the surprise it created throughout the world,[50] and followed the maxim of appearing "impossible" until it seemed "inevitable".[51]

Some of the customary causes of revolution that were lacking include

The regime it overthrew was thought to be heavily protected by a lavishly financed army and security services.[53][54] As one observer put it: "Few expected the regime of the Shah, which had international support and a modern army of 400,000, to crumble in the face of unarmed demonstrators within a matter of months."[55]

Another historian noted the revolution was "unique in the annals of modern world history in that it brought to power not a new social group equipped with political parties and secular ideologies, but a traditional clergy armed with mosque pulpits and claiming the divine right to supervise all temporal authorities, even the country's highest elected representatives."[56]

Causes

Explanations advanced for why the revolution happened and took the form it did include actions of the Shah and the mistakes and successes of the different political forces:

Policies and political mistakes of the Shah

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Queen Farah

Failures and successes of other Iranian political or cultural forces

Failures and successes of foreign forces

External factors

Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union long competed with each other for the domination of Iran. Britain maintained its control of the Iranian oil industry for a long time using its alliance with power bloc, landlords and courts and was able to reduce the power of the US and the Soviets in Iran. On the other hand, the United States and the Soviet Union were mainly interested in logistically important location of Iran and wanted an oil concession in northern part of Iran. The United States used its influence in the army and courts while the Soviet Union had the total support of the Tudeh Party and the CCFTU. The Shah himself was very interested in involving the United States in Iran’s affair to reorganize the army and boost the economy with the US assistance. The US also, could reduce the influence of the communism in Iran by its more open presence in Iran .[108] By the late 1950s the US was fed up with the widespread corruption in Iranian government and started reducing in its financial assistance to Iran. In 1958, the US also attempted, although turned out to be unsuccessful, to replace the Shah with Iran’s chief of staff, a reform orientated politician, to push for the social reform in Iran .[109] As Shah realized that his government and the Iranian economic health were depended on the US, he decided to liberalize his policies. Therefore, the Shah, with some pressure from the Kennedy administration, opted for Amini group, which had no popular base, but a full US support and a clear reform program.

Amini’s agenda was to broadcast land reform, reduce corruption, stabilize the economy, limit the power of the Shah and reduce the size and influence of the Army.. Despite having a reformist ideology, Amini did not gain popular support from the National Front, identified with Mossadegh, and the Tudeh Party. Amini’s government was very distrusted by the people because of his infamous backing of the Consortium agreement and was widely criticized by the Tudeh Party as spreading anti communism and being an American puppet. Amini’s government fell apart after fifteen months of struggle with economic dilemmas, popular distrust and the Shah trying to convince Kennedy to shift his support from Amini to him. In 1962, Amini resigned and Alam, a faithful friend of the shah who had no intention of reform but to consolidate the power of the monarchy, became the new prime minister and laid the ground for the Shah to reestablish his dictatorship in early 1963.[110]

In the mid 1970s, the Shah was once again taken under the US pressure for violation of the human rights and mistreatment of the political prisoners. The paralyzing crisis of the state made the Shah concerned about the future of his throne. Although, very undesirable for Shah to introduce another round of liberalization policies, the first round being in the early 1960s, he had no other choice but to do so. Therefore, in the early 1977 Shah announced liberalization policies to gain the US support once again and resolve the crises of the state. In the mid 1977, Shah allowed open discussion forum for the Rastakhiz Party to discuss the social issues publicly. As Amjad quotes Tocqueville in his book, the political liberalization following a long period of repression results in a social upheaval and revolution. In the Iranian case, although the aim of the policy was to appease the oppositions and gain the US support, instead it provided the suitable condition for the opposition to organize its forces against the regime. Following the liberalization policies, the network of 80,000 mosques run by 180,000 mullahs played a crucial role in mobilizing the people against the regime.

Doubts about causes

Charles Kurzman, author of The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran [111] has postulated that the explanations offered by observers for why the revolution occurred "are only partially valid," and that "the closer we listen to the people who made the revolution - the more anomalies we find." [112]

Kurzman points out that one explanation for the Shah's overthrow - the 40-day (Arba'een) cycle of commemorating deaths of protesters - "came to a halt" on June 17, 1978, a half year before the revolution's culmination. Moderate religious leaders (Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari) called for calm and a stay-at-home strike which prevented more casualties to commemorate 40 days later.[113] Kurzman also argues that the mourning rituals in Iran had been a political act only once before.

Could we have said in early 1977 that because Iranian culture includes a forty-day mourning cycle, the country was more likely than other countries to undergo a revolution? I think not. Rather, a knowledgeable observer would probably have noted that this mourning cycle had been put to protest purposes only once in Iranian history, in 1963, and that movement had come to naught.[114]

Alexis de Tocqueville's idea that "steadily increasing prosperity, far from tranquilizing the population, everywhere promoted a spirit of unrest", has been offered by several observers as an explanation for the 1978–79 revolt. But this does not explain why "there was very little oppositional activity" in the recession of 1975–76 when unemployment and inflation were at similar levels to those of 1978.[115] Furthermore, revolutions were conspicuously absent in other "high-growth autocracies" – Venezuela, Algeria, Nigeria, Iraq – in the 1970s and 1980s despite the fact that those countries also suffered from oil wealth problems (corruption, debt, fraud, repression).[116]

Another cause, or partial cause, in doubt is the Shah's liberalization as a result of the encouragement of President Jimmy Carter. Kurzman points out that "even as the shah arrived in Washington" for a state visit in late 1977, "his regime's partial tolerance of oppositional activity was disappearing. ... In November 1977, as the shah ingratiated himself with Jimmy Carter, liberals were in retreat." [117]

Another author, Moojan Momen, questions whether Carter "could have said or done" anything to save the Shah – aside from foregoing his human rights policy – since "any direct interference by America would only have increased resentment" against the pro-American Shah.[92]

Special theories

Skocpol's cultural theory

Theda Skocpol, an American socialist specializing in study of social revolutions, proposed an unprecedented cultural theory to account for the unique aspects of the Iranian Revolution which she admit falsified her past history-based theories on causes of social revolutions.

Skocpol argued that the revolution diverges from past revolutions in three distinct ways:

  1. The revolution does seem to have been solely caused by excessively rapid modernization by the state that led to social disruption. Skocpol’s studies on the past modern social revolutions had falsified this popular but simplistic theory.
  2. In a departure from historical precedents, the regime’s large, modern army and the police were defeated by an internal revolution without the occurrence of a military defeat in foreign war and without external pressures aimed at causing fracture between the state and the dominant social classes.
  3. The Iranian Revolution is the only modern revolution which was deliberately and coherently fomented by a revolutionary movement consisting of different social classes united under the leadership of a senior Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This was achieved through demonstrations and strikes advancing with fervor against even lethal military repression. As thus the revolution achieved “what the Western socialists had long only dreamed of doing.”

Although the Shah’s regime had several political vulnerabilities none of them could have mattered as the Shah was still wealthy and powerful enough to overcome waves of social discontent just as other even wealthy Third world despots had been able to. The fact that the revolution was successful can be only explained by reference to sustained extraordinary efforts by the urban Iranians to wear down and undermine the regime.

Despite the negative impact of Shah’s hectic modernization on the traditional form of urban life, it caused more people, consisting of the displaced villagers and farmers, to come into contact with members of traditional urban communities such as bazaaris and artisans. Bazaars in particular became centers of associational life, with Islamic groups and occasions tying people together through clerics' interpreting Islamic laws to settle commercial disputes and taxing the well-to-do to provide welfare for devout poorer followers. An endless succession of prayer-meetings and rituals were organized by both clergy and the laity. Bazaars also enjoyed ties with more modern sectors of Iranians society as many Iranian university students were from the merchant class. But since 1970s, Shah aroused the defense and oppositions of the bazaar by attempts at bring under control their autonomous councils and marginalizing the clergy by taking over their educational and welfare activities.

In the mass revolutionary movements during 1977-8 the traditional urban communities played an indispensable role in making sustained mass struggle possible. The workers relied on economic aid from bazaar during their strikes and the secular opponents depended on alliance with clerics and lay leaders of the bazaar to mobilize the masses. Without these autonomous sources of support and sustenance, successful resistance against the modern political and economic power holders would’ve been impossible.

The next question is how as part of a unique historical precedence, millions of Iranians were willing to face death in the mass demonstrations against brutal suppression by the army and how the clerics could rise as the leaders of the revolution. This is explained by the potential role of the Shia beliefs and clerical organization in the Iranian society. Shi'a Islam embodies substantial symbolic content to inspire resistance against unjust rule and to justify religious leaders as alternative to secular authority. As Shah aimed to marginalize the Shia clergy and eliminate their influence by its modernization policies, clerics in Qom and their followers developed a populist, anti-Imperialist interpretation of Shia theology to delegitimize Shah for his injustice and his reliance on the anti-Islamic foreign imperialists. The story of Husayn's just revolt against the usurper caliph, Yazid I, and his eventual martyrdom, as well as the belief in the Islamic Messiah, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who clerics claim to represent during his Occultation, were particularly influential in victory of the revolution. As protests against the Shah began, the Shi'a clerics could claim legitimate leadership of the protests and the Husayn legend provided a framework for characterizing the Shah as a modern incarnation of the tyrant Yazid. The revolution also attracted secular Iranians who saw Shi'a Islam and Khomeini's unwavering moral leadership as an indigenous way to express common opposition to an arrogant monarch too closely associated with foreigners. Khomeini’s message and appeal spread through existing networks of social links with the urban life and gradually resonated with the majority who saw Shah as being subservient to foreign powers instead of the indigenous demands of his own people. With the inspiration found in Hussein, the devout Iranians consistently defied the army with an audacity unprecedented in European revolutions and despite sustaining casualties. This sustained resistance, gradually undermined the morale of the military rank-and-file and their willingness to continue shooting into the crowds, until the state and the army succumbed before the revolution. As such a very "traditional" part of Iranian life could forge a very modern-looking revolutionary movement. This represented the first revolution to ever be deliberately “made” by a revolutionary ideology and organization that mobilize mass followings.[118]

See also

References and notes

  1. ↑ Del Giudice, Marguerite (August 2008). "Persia: Ancient Soul of Iran". National Geographic.
  2. ↑ Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, (1982), 534-5
  3. 1 2 Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001).
  4. 1 2 Shirley, Know Thine Enemy (1997), p. 207.
  5. 1 2 3 Harney, The Priest (1998), pp. 37, 47, 67, 128, 155, 167.
  6. ↑ Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, p.437
  7. 1 2 Mackay, Iranians (1998), pp. 236, 260.
  8. 1 2 Graham, Iran (1980), pp. 19, 96.
  9. ↑ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p. 117
  10. ↑ http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Iran_const_1906.doc
  11. ↑ Mackey, The Iranians, (1996) p.184
  12. ↑ Bakhash, Shaul, Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution by Shaul, Bakhash, Basic Books, c1984 p.22
  13. ↑ Taheri, Amir, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution, Adler and Adler, c1985, p. 94-5
  14. ↑ Rajaee, Farhang, Islamic Values and World View: Farhang Khomeyni on Man, the State and International Politics, Volume XIII Archived 2009-03-26 at the Wayback Machine. (PDF), University Press of America. ISBN 0-8191-3578-X
  15. ↑ Nehzat by Ruhani vol. 1 p. 195, quoted in Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 75.
  16. ↑ Islam and Revolution, p. 17; Later, much lower estimates of 380 dead can be found in Moin, Baqer, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatolla, (2000), p. 112.
  17. ↑ Graham, Iran 1980, p. 69.
  18. 1 2 Mackay, Iranians (1996) pp. 215, 264–5.
  19. ↑ Keddie, Modern Iran, (2003) pp. 201-7
  20. ↑ The Last Great Revolution Turmoil and Transformation in Iran, by Robin WRIGHT.
  21. ↑ Dabashi, Theology of Discontent (1993), p.419, 443
  22. ↑ Khomeini; Algar, Islam and Revolution, p.52, 54, 80
  23. ↑ See: Velayat-e faqih (book by Khomeini)#Importance of Islamic Government
  24. ↑ khomeinism
  25. ↑ Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism : Essays on the Islamic Republic, Berkeley : University of California Press, c1993. p.30,
  26. ↑ See: Hokumat-e Islami : Velayat-e faqih (book by Khomeini)#Why Islamic Government has not been established
  27. ↑ Khomeini and Algar, Islam and Revolution (1981), p.34
  28. ↑ Taheri, The Spirit of Allah (1985), p. 196.
  29. ↑ Graham, Iran (1980), p. 213.
  30. ↑ Abrahamian, Iran Between (1980), pp. 502–3.
  31. ↑ Mackay, Iranians (1996), p. 276.
  32. ↑ Abrahamian, Iran Between (1980), pp. 478–9
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  34. ↑ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, (2004), p. 145-6
  35. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), p.80
  36. ↑ Hiro, Dilip. Iran Under the Ayatollahs. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1985. p. 57.
  37. ↑ Wright, Last (2000), p. 220.
  38. ↑ Graham, Iran (1980) p. 94.
  39. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 174.
  40. ↑ Graham, Iran (1980), p. 96.
  41. ↑ Abrahamian, Iran (1982), p. 444.
  42. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 163.
  43. ↑ Graham, Iran (1980), p. 226.
  44. ↑ Abrahamian, Iran (1982), pp. 501–3.
  45. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), pp. 183–4.
  46. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), pp. 184–5.
  47. ↑ Taheri, Spirit (1985), pp. 182–3.
  48. ↑ Amuzegar, Jahangir, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution, SUNY Press, p.10
  49. ↑ Benard, "The Government of God" (1984), p. 18.
  50. ↑ Amuzegar, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution, (1991), p.4, 9-12
  51. ↑ Sachs, Albie (1990). The Soft Vengeance of a Freedom Fighter. University of California Press. p. 164. Retrieved 21 July 2016.
  52. ↑ Arjomand, Turban (1988), p. 191.
  53. ↑ Harney, Priest (1998), p. 2.
  54. ↑ Abrahamian Iran (1982), p. 496.
  55. ↑ Iran’s tide of history: counter-revolution and after. Fred Halliday, 17 July 2009
  56. ↑ Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, p.430-5
  57. ↑ Mackay, Iranians (1998), pp. 259, 261.
  58. ↑ Khomeini's speech against capitalism, IRIB World Service.
  59. ↑ Persian pilgrimages By Afshin Molavi
  60. ↑ Taheri, The Spirit of Allah (1985), p. 136.
  61. ↑ Arjomand Turban (1998), p. 192.
  62. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 178.
  63. ↑ Hoveyda Shah (2003) p. 22.
  64. ↑ Abrahamian, Iran (1982), pp. 533–4.
  65. ↑ Mackay, Iranians (1998), p. 219.
  66. ↑ Katouzian (1981), The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926–1979.
  67. ↑ Kapuscinski, Shah of Shahs (1985).
  68. 1 2 3 Taheri, The Spirit of Allah (1985) pp. 234–5.
  69. ↑ Harney, The Priest (1998), p. 65.
  70. ↑ economist Jahangir Amuzegar quoted Tocqueville in his book, Dynamics The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy, SUNY, 1991, p.241, 243.
  71. ↑ According to Kurzman, scholars writing on the revolution who have mentioned this include:
    • Sick, All Fall Down, p.187;
    • Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1980, p.189;
    • Keddie, `Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective,` American Historical Review, 1983, v.88, p.589;
    • Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, p.13
  72. ↑ Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (1982) pp. 442–6.
  73. ↑ Taheri, The Spirit of Allah (1985) p. 205.
  74. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 188.
  75. 1 2 3 Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, (p.107)
  76. ↑ Graham, Iran (1980) p. 231.
  77. ↑ Graham, Iran (1980) p. 228.
  78. ↑ Harney, The Priest (1998).
  79. 1 2 Graham, Iran (1980), p. 235.
  80. ↑ The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution By Abbas Milani, pp. 292-293
  81. ↑ Seven Events That Made America America, By Larry Schweikart, p.
  82. ↑ The Iranian Revolution of 1978/1979 and How Western Newspapers Reported It By Edgar Klüsener, p. 12
  83. ↑ Cultural History After Foucault By John Neubauer, p. 64
  84. ↑ Islam in the World Today: A Handbook of Politics, Religion, Culture, and Society By Werner Ende, Udo Steinbach, p. 264
  85. ↑ The A to Z of Iran, By John H. Lorentz, p. 63
  86. ↑ Islam and Politics By John L. Esposito, p. 212
  87. ↑ Arjomand, Turban (1998), pp. 189–90.
  88. ↑ Taheri, The Spirit of Allah (1985), p. 233.
  89. ↑ Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini (2001), pp. 44, 74–5.
  90. ↑ Momen, Moojan, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, Yale University Press, 1985, p.288
  91. ↑ Taheri, The Spirit of Allah (1985), p. 238.
  92. 1 2 Momen, Moojan, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, Yale University Press, 1985, p.287
  93. ↑ Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran (1997), pp. 293–4.
  94. ↑ Schirazi, Asghar, The Constitution of Iran : politics and the state in the Islamic Republic, London ; New York : I.B. Tauris, 1997, p.292
  95. ↑ Zabih, Sepehr, Iran Since the Revolution, Johns Hopkins Press, 1982, p.9
  96. ↑ Moin, Khomeini (2000), p. 200.
  97. ↑ Harney, The Priest (1998), p. 177.
  98. ↑ Graham, Iran (1980) p. 233.
  99. ↑ Zabih, Blah Blah Iran (1982), p. 16.
  100. ↑ Andrew Scott Cooper. The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. Simon & Schuster, 2011. ISBN 1439155178.
  101. ↑ Marenches, Alexander de. The Evil Empire: The Third World War Now, Interviewed by Christine Ockrent, trans Simon Lee and Jonathan Marks, London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1988, p.125
  102. ↑ Air Force Commander Amir-Hossein Rabi'i quoted in Arjomand, Said Amir, The Turban for the Crown, Oxford University Press, 1988, p.114
  103. ↑ a survey of which found the leading explanation for the Iranian revolution to be foreign plots, [Hakimfar, Bahram Bob `The Downfall of Late King Muhammad Reza Pahlavi: View of the Iranian Community in Southern California` Ph. D. dissertation, U.S. International University
  104. ↑ [interviews with the families of Iran-Iraq War Casualties, according to a sermon by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, December 20, 2002, translated by BBC Worldwide Monitoring.]
  105. ↑
    • Amuzegar, Jahangir, The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991, p.79-96
    • Daneshvar, Parviz, Revolution in Iran, St. Martin's Press, 1996, p.94, 126
    • Moshiri, Farrokh, The State and Social Revolution in Iran, NY, Peter Lang, 1985, p.220 ] *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, (p.13)
  106. ↑ Iran Since the Revolution by Sepehr Zabih Johns Hopkins Press, 1982 p.12-15
  107. ↑ dead link
  108. ↑ Amjad, Mohammed. Iran from Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy. New York : Greenwood Press, Inc., 1989. p. 52
  109. ↑ Amjad, Mohammed. Iran from Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy. New York : Greenwood Press, Inc., 1989. p. 74
  110. ↑ Amjad, Mohammed. Iran from Royal Dictatorship to Theocracy . New York : Greenwood Press, Inc. , 1989.p.74-79
  111. ↑ Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Harvard University Press, 2004)
  112. ↑ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, p. 163
  113. ↑ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, (p.51)
  114. ↑ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, (p.57)
  115. ↑ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, p. 99
  116. ↑ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, p. 93
  117. ↑ Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, (2004), p. 25
  118. ↑ Skocpol, Teda. "Rentier state and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution (Chapter 10) - Social Revolutions in the Modern World". Cambridge Core. Retrieved 2017-06-24.

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