Artúr Görgei

Artúr Görgei
de Görgő et Toporc

Artúr Görgei painted by Miklós Barabás
Dictator of Hungary
Acting civil and military authority
In office
11 August 1849 – 13 August 1849
Monarch Francis Joseph I
(unrecognized)
Prime Minister Bertalan Szemere
Preceded by Lajos Kossuth
(Governor-President)
Succeeded by Revolution suppressed
Minister of War
In office
7 May 1849 – 7 July 1849
Prime Minister Bertalan Szemere
Preceded by Lázár Mészáros
Succeeded by Lajos Aulich
Personal details
Born Arthur Görgey
(1818-01-30)30 January 1818
Toporc, Kingdom of Hungary, Austrian Empire
(today Toporec, Slovakia)
Died 21 May 1916(1916-05-21) (aged 98)
Budapest, Austria-Hungary
Nationality Hungarian
Spouse(s) Adéle Aubouin
Children Berta
Kornél
Military service
Allegiance  Hungarian Revolutionary Army
Service/branch Army
Rank General

Arthur Görgey de Görgő et Toporc (Hungarian: görgői és toporci Görgei Artúr, German: Arthur Görgey von Görgő und Toporc; 30 January 1818 – 21 May 1916) was a Hungarian military leader renowned for being one of the best generals of the Hungarian army, main commander of the Hungarian forces, Minister of War during the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49, and in the last days of the revolution, before his surrender to the Russians at Világos, being also the dictator of Hungary.

His relation and conflicts with Lajos Kossuth the foremost politician and president-governor of Hungary, influenced the course of the freedom war and his military career but also his post-revolutionary life until his death. Kossuth's so called Letter from Vidin, unjustfully created in the Hungarians a very long lasting hate against him, many believing that he was a traitor of the Hungarian revolution. Only in the 20th century these unjust accusations started to be replaced with the results of the scientific, objective researches about his life, which proved, despite his minor errors during the Freedom War, that he was the most talented and successful Hungarian general of the 19th century, and that he was a real patriot, who never betrayed the Hungarian cause. It is very little known that Görgei in his youth was a very talented chemist, his work in the field of chemistry being recognized by many renowned Hungarian and European chemists.

Early life

He was born as Johannes Arthur Woldemár Görgey at Toporc (today Toporec) in Upper Hungary on 30 January 1818 to an impoverished Hungarian noble family of originally Zipser German descent who immigrated to the Szepes (today Spiš) region during the reign of king Géza II of Hungary (1141–1162). During the Reformation they were converted to Protestantism. The family name refers to their origin from Görgő village (Hungarian: görgői, lit. "of Görgő"), today Spišský Hrhov in Slovakia.

Equestrian statue of Artúr Görgei

In 1832 he entered in the sapper school from Tulln, profiting from a free place offered by a foundation. Because his family was poor this was a great opportunity for him, although initially he did not want to be a soldier. During this period he wrote to his father that he would prefer to be a philosopher or a scientist, than to be a soldier.[1] He spent almost 13 years in this school receiving military education. He decided to not accept money from his family, eats very little and wears poor clothes, trying to train himself for a hard life.[2] In the school from Tulln the characterizations about him were that his conduct is very good, he has no errors, his natural talents are exceptional, his fervency and sedulity are constant, being very severe with himself but also with the others.[3] Despite this, he wrote in his letters, that he despise the life of a soldier, because he has to obey to officers whom he despises, and that he dreams about a free and active life which he do not finds in the army.[4] He serves in the Nádor Hussar regiment, reaching the rank of adjutant. In 1837 he became lieutenant, entered the Hungarian Noble Guard at Vienna, where he combined military service with a course of study at the university.[2]

Start of a promising career in chemistry

In 1845, on his father's death, he left the army, being very happy to do that feeling that the life of a military is not made for him, to be a student of chemistry at the University of Prague.[1] He loves very much the chemistry, writing this to his friend, Gusztáv Röszler, who recommended him to professor Josef Redtenbacher, a great chemist of those times: "your recommendation to Redtenbacher made me very happy. I am gaining life as never before. The science of chemistry itself but also the leading of it by such a great professor like Redtenbacher, totally conquered me."[5] His works in chemistry from this period are worthy of note: he makes researches about the coconut-oil, discovering the presence of the decanoic acid and lauric acid in it.

Görgei's article about chemistry in the Annalen der Chemie un Pharmazie from Heidelberg 1848

He started his researches in the spring of 1847 in Prague, but he finished the experiments home in Toporc, sending the results of his researches to the Imperial and Royal Academy from Vienna in 21 May 1849.[1] His method for the separation of the fatty acids homologues, was not the traditional way by fractional distillation, but by using the solubility of the barium salts was We can summarize the results of his researches, as it follows:

Right before Görgei started to work on his study, a French chemist, Saint-Évre wrote an article in which he announced the discovery of the undecylic acid. First Görgei was disappointed that with this his work will be pointless, but than he noticed that the French chemist was wrong in thinking that the undecylic acid is an original undiscovered acid, but a mixture of the lauric and decanoic acids, which he demonstrates in his study.[6]

His researches were published by his senior professor from the University of Prague, Redtenbacher with the title: Über die festen, flüchtigen, fetten Säuren des Cocusnussöles (Sitzungsberichte der mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Classe der k. Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien. 1848. 3. H. 208–227. p.), by Justus von Liebig in Heidelberg (Annalen der Chemie und Pharmazie. 1848. 66. Bd. 3.H. 290–314. p.), and after more than 50 years by Lajos Ilosvay in 1907 in the Magyar Kémiai Folyóirat (Hungarian Chemistry Magazine). Görgei's skills and achievements in chemistry were praised by Vojtěch Šafařík and Károly Than.[7] Josef Redtenbacher wanted to hire Görgei as Chemist in the Uinversity of Lemberg, but at the end he retreated to the family domains at Toporc, because his uncle, Ferenc had died and his vidow asked him to come home and help the family.[7] After the defeat of the revolution, in 1851, he received an award and 40 Hungarian pengős as honorarium for his achievements in chemistry, during the 2 and 1/2 years he worked in this field, from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.[1]

Becoming a general

In the days of the Hungarian revolution from March 1848, Görgei was in Vienna and Prague, and was preparing to get married with Adéle Aubouin, a Huguenot-French girl, who was the lady companion of a maiden relative of Josef Redtenbacher. He married her in the Lutheran church from Prague.[2] After he finished his research in chemistry in his home at Toporc, he went to Pest, hearing about the demand of the Hungarian government from 17 May 1848 to the decommissioned officers, to join the newly established Hungarian army, and he is conscripted in the rank of captain in the 5th Hungarian battalion from Győr, to train the new rookies. Shortly after that one of his former companion-in-arms, lieutenant Imre Ivánka, PM Lajos Batthyány's secretary, recommended him to the PM to work in the ministry.[2] He received the mission to go to Istanbul and Smyrna (today Izmir), to buy weapons for the newly conscripted Hungarian troops, but soon it became obvious that the local merchants are not trustworthy. So instead of that, Görgei was sent to Wiener Neustadt to the state factory to buy percussion caps, and to Prague to buy primers from the Sellier & Bellot factory. Görgei accomplished his mission with success.[2] The egalitarian ideas of the revolution made him to change his noble surname from Görgey to Görgei. He first met Kossuth in 30 August 1848, when he proposed to build a fabric to produce percussion caps and primers, to which the politician promised to obtain funds.[8]

He entered the Honvéd Army with the rank of captain, elaborated together with Ivánka, the plan of gathering in four camps of the voluntary mobile national guards, and is named the captain of the national guards camp from Szolnok.[2]

From August 1848, the imminence of an imperial attack against Hungary grew day after day. Finally in the beginning of September, the king Ferdinand the V. of Hungary, the Habsburg emperor under the name Ferdinand I of Austria dismissed the Batthyány Government authorizing the Ban of Croatia Josip Jelačić, which the latter did in 11 September 1848. When the troops of Jelačić crossed the Dráva river, entering in Hungary, Görgei's national guards were ordered to come from Szolnok to the Csepel Island to keep an eye on the movements of the Croatian supplies. Görgei here organizes a peasant movement, organizing the villagers from the region to observe and capture the envoys and supply carriages sent from Croatia to Jelačić and vice versa. The Croatian ban sent in 29 September the pro-Habsburg Hungarian noble, count Ödön Zichy to inform the commanders of the Croatian reserve troops led by Major General Karl Roth and Major General Nicolaus Philippovich von Philippsberg about his decision to attack the Hungarian capitals. Görgei's troops captured and arrested the wealthy Hungarian Count Ödön Zichy. Count Zichy was charged with treason for his pro-Austrian activities, court-martialed, and hanged.[2] This courageous and vigorous act of Görgei impressed Lajos Kossuth, who saw in him a great future leader of the Hungarian armed forces, proposing the 30 years old major to the generalship. Later, when the conflict between the two appeared and started to be more and more serious, Kossuth tried to prevent Görgei to become the leader of the main Hungarian forces, because he saw in the independent, wayward general his greatest opponent, and this conflict caused hardships in the Hungarian struggle for the independence.[2]

In the Autumn and the Winter Campaign

After the Battle of Pákozd, in which the Hungarian troops led by János Móga defeated at 29 September 1848 the troops of Jelačić, saving the Hungarian capitals (Buda and Pest), the troops 2500 strong troops of Görgei, reinforced with 16 500 peasant militia from Tolna county was watching the movements of the Croatian reinforcements troops led by Roth and Philipovich, trying to block their way of retreat and eventually force them to surrender. As his superior was named general Mór Perczel, a nobleman with almost no military experience, lacking Görgei's knowledge in the theory and practice of warfare. Görgei, seeing that some of Perczel's orders were wrong, and could cause the escape of the enemy, he gave the right orders, elaborated by himself to his troops, thus contradicting Perczel's decisions. Perczel was angered, and wanted even to put Görgei in front of an execution squad, but when the latter explained to the officers council the causes of his actions, Perczel pardoned him, accepted his plans, putting them into effect, but he did not liked him afterwards. Thanks to these, at 7th October 1848, the Croatian troops led by Roth and Philipovich were forced to surrender at Ozora, the Hungarians taking almost 10,000 prisoners, together with their weapons, guns and ammunition, this being the most successful pincer maneuver of the Hungarian Freedom War.[9][10]

After the defeat of Jelačić, the people of Vienna revolted on 6 October, forcing the emperor to flee to Olmütz. The Hungarian troops led by János Móga, who defeated Jelačić at Pákozd, was advanced to the Hungarian-Austrian border, and many people taught that it should come in aid of the revolutionaries from the imperial capital, which was at that time surrounded only by the troops of Jelačić, but the officers from the Hungarian army, many of which being foreign, and unsure what to do, said that they will agree this only if the people of Vienna will ask them to do this. But although the Viennese revolutionaries taught about this, but they were reluctant to officially ask for Hungarian aid. In the mean, the Austrian commander Windisch-Grätz crushed the revolution from Prague, than came with the imperial army to Vienna, to crush the revolution there. So the superiority of the imperial overwhelming became overwhelming (80 000 Austrian soldiers against 27 000 Hungarians). Kossuth, waiting in wain the crossing of the Austrian border of the Hungarian troops, decided to go personally there to convince them. In the war council the old commanders under the lead of Móga, declared that an attack of the Austrian border, will be bring with it a Hungarian defeat, pointing at the superiority of the enemy. Kossuth argued that: "Our cause is linked with Vienna - separated from it, nobody will give us any importance." He also said that the conscription period of the national guards from the Hungarian army will be over soon, and if they will not engage the Austrians now, all these people will go home without any fighting. He also said, that if only one of the Hungarian commanders will say that he will attack, showing a plan with which a success can be achieved, he will give the lead to that person. At that moment Görgei stood up, and said that: "We have no other choice that to advance, because if we will not advance, we will lose more than losing three battles." Hearing that Kossuth wanted to give him the main commandment, but Görgei refused. So in the end Móga remained main commander until the end of the battle. In the Battle of Schwechat the troops of Windisch-Grätz and Jelačić routed the Hungarian army composed mainly by inexperienced national guards and peasants. Görgei led the advance guard, and achieved some successes, but lack of experience of the soldiers and the commanders, made all his actions useless, and the panic of the voluntaries who started to flee, sealed the fate of the battle.[11]

From 9 October Görgei is named colonel, than after the battle of Schwechat, at 1 November he is named Genaral and appointed commander of the Army of the Upper Danube, having the duty to watch the western frontier of Hungary against the imminent attack of the imperial army.[12] In the meantime left until the attack (14 December 1848), Görgei reorganizes his army, sending home the national guards and the peasant militias (who were the first to flee from the battlefield after some enemy shootings, in the battle of Schwechat), which had a very low value in fighting against a highly professional army, like the imperial army, and multiply the number of the battalions of the Hungarian Honvéd army, training them for the future battles. He debates with Kossuth about how to organize an effective defense of the border, and is forced to accept Kossuth's idea of aligning his units along the border, although he thinks that grouping them further back from the border would be a much better choice.[2] But when, from the middle of December the Austrian troops under Windisch-Grätz advanced across the Lajta (the border between Austria and Hungary), attacking Hungary in order to crush the revolution, Görgei slowly retreats,[13] angering with this Kossuth, who thinks that he should fight for every toehold of Hungarian territory.[2] Görgei understood that if he would had followed Kossuth's wishes, he would had been certainly crushed by the much more superior imperial army (he had 28 000 inexperienced soldiers against 55 000 imperial troops led by Windisch-Grätz).[14] Kossuth urged every general to engage in fight with the enemy, so when Mór Perczel, before Görgei had arrived, entered in a battle with the imperial troops led by Josip Jelačić, suffered a heavy defeat at 30th December 1848 in the Battle of Mór, thus letting Görgei alone in the hopeless struggle against the hugely superior Austrian armies.[15]

Lajos Kossuth 1848 Prinzhofer

Görgei understood that with his inferior troops he could not stop the main Austrian army, and if he would accept a battle, he would had been suffered a decisive defeat from them, which would had sealed the fate of the Hungarian independence. In the war council held at 2 January 1849 Görgei convinced the other commanders that there is no other way, that to retreat from the capitals.[16] In spite of the remonstrances of his political superior, Lajos Kossuth, who wanted him to accept a decisive battle before the Hungarian capitals, Görgei held to his resolution and retreated upon Vác, letting Buda and Pest in the hand of the enemy, who entered there in 5th December, forcing the Hungarian government to retreat to Debrecen. This caused a negative effect among the officers of the Hungarian army of foreign origin, who left in great numbers the Hungarian army, which menaced with the total dissolution of the Hungarian army. In Vác, irritated by these events, and blaming his defeats on the interference with his strategy to defend Hungary, Görgei issued (5 January 1849) a proclamation (known as the Proclamation of Vác), throwing the blame for the recent defeats and the evacuation of the capitals upon the government (which at one moment was understood by Kossuth as a revolt against his authority), but also declaring that he with his army will not put down the weapons and will fight with all his energy and power against the imperials to defend the Hungarian revolution and the "April laws". This proclamation stopped the dissolution of the army, convincing the majority of the foreign or wavering officers and soldiers to remain in the Hungarian army, and to defend Hungary with all determination.[17][18] After the proclamation Görgei chose to retreat towards East through the Northern Gömör-Szepes Ore and Tátra Mountains and conducted operations on his own initiative, forcing the Austrian commander Windisch-Grätz, to send many troops to follow and encircle him, and to remain with the bulk of his army around Buda and Pest (because he did not knew about the plans of Görgei, and he feared that the latter could turn towards West and attack Vienna),[19] preventing them to attack Debrecen, where the Hungarian government had retreated, and providing time to the Hungarian troops East from Tisza to reorganize themselves. He also gathered the monetary and ore supplies from the so called Mining towns (Körmöcbánya, Selmecbánya, Besztercebánya, etc.) and sent them in Debrecen, providing the supplies which the military struggle of Hungary needed against the imperial armies.[2] In the harsh winter, marching in the mountains, Görgei with his troops escaped several times the encirclement of the Austrian troops (at one point they escaped by opening a formerly closed mine tunnel, crossing it to the other side of the mountain),[20] than in 5 February 1849 broke through the mountain pass of Branyiszkó, defeating General Deym in the Battle of Branyiszkó, and uniting with the Hungarian troops led by György Klapka in the Hungarian plains.[21]

The troops of Görgei crossing the Sturec pass

The supreme command was conferred upon Henryk Dembiński by Kossuth, who did not wanted in any way to give the main commandment to Görgei. Many officers from Görgei's Army of the Upper Danube (György Kmety, Lajos Aulich), were astonished about the decision of Kossuth, of naming Dembiński as main commander, and wanted to protest against it, but Görgei ordered them to stop, and accept this decision.[22] But when Dembiński, after making mistakes after mistakes, lost the Battle of Kápolna in 25-27 February 1849 (in which Görgei's VII. corps could not participate, because of Dembinski's wrong placement of the troops, the VII. corps arriving to the battlefield only after the battle ended),[23] the Hungarian officers revolted against the Polish main commander, demanding the dismissal of Dembiński, and putting in charge of a Hungarian general.[24] Among the generals which the Hungarian officers wanted to be main commander Görgei was the most popular, and in the officers meeting, held in Tiszafüred, in the presence of the governments chief commissary Bertalan Szemere, they elected Görgei as main commander, and this decision was signed also by Szemere. When he heard about this, Kossuth was angered and rushed to the military camp, declaring that he will put Görgei to be executed for this revolt, which he taught that Görgei was its organizer, but when he arrived to Tiszafüred, seeing that the majority of the officers support the latter, Kossuth was forced to accept the situation, but he declared that the final decision about who will be the main commander, will be given after he will present the events to the Parliament.[25] In Debrecen Kossuth, and the politicians who were on his side, ignoring the wish of the Hungarian generals to name Görgei, designated Antal Vetter as main commander.[26] But some weeks later, in the end of March 1849, Görgei was named as main commander (only temporarily) because Vetter got ill. Before this, Kossuth again hesitated, trying to find somebody else, thinking even to take the main command of the army, but when the generals, who were in charge of the Hungarian army corps of the main army (György Klapka, Lajos Aulich, János Damjanich), declared that Görgei is the most able commander for that job, he had to accept it. So Görgei became temporary high commander, only a few days before the start of the Spring Campaign.[27]

Leader of the victorious Spring Campaign

Görgei conducted the Spring Campaign in April and May 1849 brilliantly, defeating Windisch-Grätz, and when the latter, because of these defeats, was replaced with Ludwig von Welden, the new commander was also vanquished in a several battles. Görgei won at Hatvan (2 April), Tápióbicske (4 April), Isaszeg (6 April), Vác (10 April), Nagysalló (19 April), and relieved Komárom (26 April). The brilliant pincer maneuvers of Görgei's troops and the incertitude created in the enemy about the direction of the attack of his troops, corroborated with the successes of the Hungarian armies in the other fronts, forced the much superior armies of the Austrian Empire and its allies, which at the beginning of March, controled around 3/4 of Hungary, to evacuate the country, excepting a narrow landstrip in its western part, Croatia and a few land pockets and forts. In the battle of Isaszeg, Görgei was close to encircle and completely destroy the main Austrian army led by Windisch-Grätz (which could bring with it Hungary's decisive victory in the war), but the refusal of one of his army corps commanders, András Gáspár, to attack from the north, made possible the escape of the enemy. For the failure of making the best of this opportunity, Görgei also had a responsibility, because he did not urged Gáspár to attack, thinking that the latter already started it.[28] Although in the liberation of the country took an important part also the troops of Józef Bem who liberated Transylvania,[29] and Mór Perczel, who liberated much of Southern Hungary, excepting Croatia,[30] Görgei was the commander who achieved the greatest success by defeating the main Austrian armies representing the most operational, and best equipped forces and its main commanders, regarded as among the best commanders which Austria had at that time, forcing them to retreat from the most developped central and western parts of the country, including the capitals.

Hungarian Spring Campaign in 1849

We have to notice that Görgei achieved his successes with a numerically, technologically inferior army (47 500 Hungarian soldiers, having 198 cannons vs 55 000 Austrian soldiers with 214 cannons and rockets),[31] which lacked heavy cavalry (relying almost completely on the light Hussar cavalry), and having very few soldiers fighting in the other types of units common in the armies of that period (chasseurs, grenadiers, lancer cavalry, dragoons, cuirassiers) in comparison with the Austrian army,[32] which had plenty of these, and being every time in shortage of weapons and ammunition,[33] which situation caused that during the battles, the Hungarian infantry to not to engage in long shooting duels with the imperials (which were usually well equipped with bullets and ammunition) but to start bayonet charges, which were repeated if the initially attempt to break through was unsuccessful, which caused of course heavy casualties for them, so the Hungarian infantry had to move forwards and backwards under continuous enemy fire.[34]

During the Spring Campaign, the military attitude of Görgei changed drastically, from an extremely cautious commander, with slow movements, who calculated every of his moves, to a general full of energy, quick in actions, ready to take calculated risks if necessary to achieve his goals. Görgei understood that the main cause of Dembiński's failure was his slowness, extreme cautiousness, which prevented him to group his troops before the Battle of Kápolna in such a way that they could help each others, fearing of being encircled, so he put his units so far from each other, that they could not help each other when attacked.[35] Görgei started the spring campaign as a mature commander, who let his generals (János Damjanich, Lajos Aulich, György Klapka, András Gáspár) who led his four army corps to take decisions in an independent way (but of course they had to follow teh initial campaign plan), and intervening only when needed, like he did in the battles of Tápióbicske and Isaszeg, to turn with his personal presence and decisions the tides of the battles which started to turn towards a negative outcome.[36] He took great risks at the start of both phases of his Spring Campaign, because he let only a few troops in front of the enemy, sending the bulk of his army to make encircling maneuvers, which, if discovered, could had caused a frontal attack of the enemy, which could be resulting in the breaking of the weak Hungarian front line, cutting of his supply lines, and occupation of Debrecen, the temporary Hungarian capital.[37] But Görgei wrote later in his memories, that he knew that he could take these risks against such a weak commander as Windisch-Grätz.[36]

According to József Bánlaky Görgei failed to follow up his successes by taking the offensive against the Austrian frontier, contenting himself with besieging Buda, the Hungarian capital, taking the castle of Buda at 21 May 1849, instead of attacking Vienna, and winning the war.[38]

Mór Than: Görgei and his General staff
Görgei commanding the Hungarian troops in the Battle of Isaszeg

The new generation of the Hungarian historians, like Róbert Hermann, consider that the siege of Buda was not a mistake of Görgei, because at that point he had not enough troops to attack towards Vienna, because the Austrians concentrated around Pozsony a fresh army which was two times bigger than Görgei's troops, and also far more better equipped. To achieve a victory with his tired troops which had almost completely run out of ammunition, was virtually impossible at that moment.[39] Görgei hoped that meanwhile the siege of Buda, new Hungarian troops will be conscripted, the Hungarian generals who were operating in Southern Hungary will send him reinforcements, and and the lack of ammunition will be also resolved, and with this he will have the chance to defeat the Austrian troops concentrated around Pozsony and Vienna. He knew also that until in the castle of Buda has an 5000 strong Austrian garrison, which controled the only stone bridge across the Danube, the Chain Bridge, disturbing the Hungarian supply lines,[40] and menacing to attack the Hungarian troops and supply carriages (so because of that the Hungarians had to make a huge roundabout, which caused days and weeks of delay), and also making impossible the using of the Danube as a transport rute, besides of that, he must deploy a considerable armed force in order to watch the Austrian troops in Buda, thus weakening his troops which could attack westwards. Also the presence in Southern Hungary of the 15 000 strong Austrian troops led by Josip Jelačić, which could came by surprize towards north to help the garrison of Buda, represented a big threat, menacing to cut Hungary in two, by having that stronghold under imperial control, and only the liberation of Buda could diminguish this danger. Kossuth also urged Görgei to take the capital, because he hoped that, this success will convince the European powers to recognize Hungary's independence, and prevent the Russian invasion.[41]

The Battle of Komárom at 26 April 1849
Siege of Buda - 21 May 1849

So all the reasons and military and political advices were in favour of taking Buda first, than to attack towards Vienna. Hungarian Historian Róbert Hermann consideres that the capture of Buda after three weeks of siege (the only siege of the Hungarian Freedom War, which ended in the conquering of a fortress with an assault, the rest of the fortresses and castles being taken, by one or the other side, only after the surrender of the defenders after negociations), one of the greatest Hungarian military successes of the war.[42]

Görgei had refused the medals of military honor, Kossuth's offer of the field-marshal's baton,[43] and was not in sympathy with the new regime. However, he accepted the portfolio of minister of war, while retaining the command of the troops in the field.[44] Meanwhile, at the Parliament from Debrecen, Kossuth had formally proposed the dethronement of the Habsburg dynasty, which the Parliament accepted declaring the total independence of Hungary at 14 April 1849.[45] Görgei was against the dethronement (although he did not protested, when Kossuth divulged his plan to him at Gödöllő after the battle from Isaszeg), because he taught that this will be considered as a provocation, which will urge the Austrians to demand for the Russian intervention. He taught that renouncing to the dethronement and using the great Hungarian military successes he achieved as arguments in an eventual negotiation with the Austrians, could convince them to recognize Hungary's autonomy under the rule of the House of Habsburg, and the April Laws of 1848, because he believed that this is the only choice to convince the Habsburgs to renounce to ask Russia's help against Hungary, which he taught that will cause destruction and a national tragedy. This is why Görgei even tried to talk in secret with the Hungarian Peace Party (who were in favor of a compromise with the Austrians), to help him to make a coup d'état to overthrow Kossuth and the Hungarian Government led by Bertalan Szemere, to achieve the political leadership in order to start the talks with the Habsburgs, but the Peace Party refused to help him, fearing that a military dictatorship will take over the political power, so he had to renounce to this plan.[46][47] However Görgei was wrong when he taught that the Hungarian Declaration of Independence caused the Russian intervention, because the Austrians had asked it, and the tzar accepted to send troops against Hungary before they had learned about the Declaration of Independence from 14 April.[8]

General of the Summer Campaign and dictator of Hungary

The Russians had now intervened in the struggle and made common cause with the Austrians; and starting from the middle of June 1849, the allies were advancing into Hungary on all sides. Görgei saw himself before a much superior united enemy army, because the reinforcements which Kossuth promised him, did not came, because on 7 June general Perczel, the commander of the southern Hungarian army suffered a heavy defeat in the Battle of Káty from the Austro-Croatian army, reinforced with Serbian rebels, led by Josip Jelačić,[48] so Perczel could not send the reinforcements, because he needed them there.[49] Another problem was that many of his experienced generals, which proved their great talents in the Spring Campaign were no more available: (János Damjanich, who broke his leg; Lajos Aulich became ill;[50] András Gáspár) resigned from the Hungarian army because of political reasons[51]) and Görgei was forced to put in their place other officers who were talented soldiers, but were not experienced as army corps leaders, many of them lacking of capacity of acting independently when it needed and they had no order to do so, but the military situation required this.[52] Another problem was that being in the same time high commander and war ministry, he could not fulfill both duties with success. For example because of fulfilling his duties as minister of war, he could not participate in the Battle of Zsigárd on 16 June 1849, when his presence was highly needed, and his troops lost that battle.[53]

Although these problems, Görgei decided to attack Haynau's forces (knowing that he has no other choice for defeating them before the arrival of the Russian main troops led by Paskevich from the north) hoping to break them, and advance towards Vienna, but despite an initial victory in the Battle of Csorna in 13 June,[54] his troops were defeated in the battles of Pered,[55] Győr[56] and the third battle of Komárom,[57] by the numerically much superior united armies of the Austrian main commander Field Marshal Lieutenant Julius Jacob von Haynau and the Russian general Fyodor Sergeyevich Panyutin, managing however to force their almost three times bigger army to retreat in the second battle of Komárom at 2. July, at the end of which he suffered a severe head wound (a shell splinter shot by an enemy cannon made a 12 cm long cut on his skull, opening it, making his brain visible, and despite of this he remained conscious, leading his troops until the end of the battle, and only than he fainted), which caused him to lose consciousness for several days (during which he was operated) preventing him to take advantage from his success won at this battle against Haynau.[58]

Görgei in red, leading the Hungarian hussars to attack, before he got injuried, in the Second battle of Komárom. Painting of Mór Than
Battle of Vác - 15–17 July 1849

Before the battle, because of a misunderstanding, Kossuth revoked Görgei from the high commandment demanding to go to Pest, and named Lázár Mészáros, the former minister of war, who was a weak general, in his place,[59] but when the latter went towards Komárom to inform Görgei of the change, he heard in the way the sound of the cannonade of the battle, and returned to Pest.[2] The cause of Kossuth's drastic act was as it follows. In a letter, Kossuth ordered to Görgei to retreat towards Szeged to unite with the other troops for a decisive battle against the enemy, but before of that Görgei wrote to him, that he will engage the decisive battle at Komárom, than after receiving Kossuth's letter, although he was convinced that this is a big mistake, he accepted to apply Kossuth's plan. The two letters of Görgei were sent in the same day, Kossuth did not controlled their registration number, but he red the letters in the wrong order, reading the second one (which wrote that Görgei will march towards Szeged) first, than the first letter (which wrote that he will engage in battle at Komárom) as second. Thinking that Görgei changed his mind, and chose not to obey to the order about the concentration around Szeged, probably remembering Görgei's refusal, in the Winter Campaign to follow his orders and the proclamation of Vác from 5 January, which he considered an act of revolt, the governor called Görgei as traitor and, as it was shown before, he revoked Görgei from the high commandment, demanding him to come to Pest to take over the ministership, and let Mészáros to lead the army. Because of the fact that Mészáros returned to Pest, Görgei did not learned about his revocation, and, because of Haynau's attack on 2. July, he had to renounce temporary to the application of the retreat towards Szeged, being forced to enter in battle with the enemy, and like it was shown upstairs, he managed to force the much superior opponent to retreat, but in the end, as it was shown before, he lost his conscience for several days. In the meantime, the letter with Görgei's revocation arrived, before he regained his consciousness, but his officers were against this decision.[8] In the meantime Kossuth understood that Görgei did not disobeyed him, but he had no courage to officially recognize his mistake, and to revoke Görgei's dismissal. Although this, in fact Görgei remained the commander of the Northern Danube Army until he would have had the opportunity to hand it over, which meant until he would had arrived to the concentration point from Szeged,[8] but the disastruous military events which happened in the beginning of August in Southern Hungary where he had to lead his army, caused quite the opposite situation for Görgei. On the other hand Kossuth's quietness about his mistake towards Görgei, throws a shadow on the reputation of the great politician.

As a result of his defeat in the third battle of Komárom in 11 July, Görgei was forced to retreat eastwards and to let the capitals to fall again in the enemies hands.[60] Despite of suffering because of his head wound, he managed to stop the two times superior forces of the Russian main commander Ivan Paskevich in the second battle of Vác in the 15–17 July,[61] than, because his way to south, towards Szeged, was closed by the Russian army, in almost the same way like he did in the winter of 1848-1849, he retreated in the northern mountains, luring after himself four times superior Russian forces, diverting them from attacking the main Hungarian troops from the Hungarian plain,[62] than he defeated them in seven defensive engagements[63] (Miskolc - 23-24 July,[64] Alsózsolca - 25 July,[65] Gesztely - 28 July,[66] etc.), losing only one (Debrecen - 2nd August) slowing their advancement, winning time for the rest of the Hungarian army to prepare itself for the decisive battle.[67]

The last Hungarian ministerial council held at 10 August 1849 in Arad, in which Kossuth (in the middle) hands over the political and military powers to Görgei, naming him the dictator of Hungary
Görgei surrenders before Rüdiger at the Szőlős plain near Világos

The Russian tzar, Nicholas I. of Russia was impressed about Görgei's brilliant maneuvers, comparing him twice to Napoleon,[68] writing this to Paskevich:

The fact that Görgei, after retreating from Komárom, got first around our right than around our left wing, making such a huge circle, than he arrived south and united with the main troops, blows my mind. And he managed to do all these against your 120 000 brave and disciplined soldiers.[69]

Görgei and his officers saw that with the Russian intervention the fate of the Hungarian independence was sealed. So he started, with the knowledge of the Hungarian government to do negotiations with the Russian commanders about an eventual Hungarian surrender. So, during his operations and continuous battles with the Russians, he made also negotiations with the Paskevich, hoping that he could make an agreement with the Russians in order to start a conflict between the Austrians and the Russians, or to obtain favorable conditions from them, informing about this also the Hungarian government (it were unfounded rumors and hopes also about an alleged Russian plan to hire Görgei and his generals in the Russian army)[70], but the Russian commander responded to him, that they can talk only about unconditioned surrender.[71]

Although Görgei's successes, in the other theaters of operation, the other Hungarian generals were not so successful, and they were defeated by the enemy. The new main commander chosen by Kossuth, Dembinski (who, as seen before, proved in the battle of Kápolna to be a weak commander), after being defeated in 5 August in the Battle of Szőreg by Haynau,[72] instead of moving his troops towards north (despite of being asked to do this by the Hungarian government),[73] to meet with Görgei, who won a several days distance from the pursuing Russians, and together to engage in a battle with Haynau again, he moved towards south, where the Hungarian main troops suffered a decisive defeat in the Battle of Temesvár in the 9th of August.[74] Thus Dembinski's decision prevented Görgei to take part with his 25 000 troops, in the decisive battle for Hungary from 9 August. After this defeat Kossuth saw the impossibility of continuing the struggle and resigned from his position as regent-president. He gave all the political powers to Görgei in 10 August 1849 at Arad, while he and many of his ministers, politicians and many generals went towards south and entered in Ottoman territory, asking for refuge.[75] Görgei in this situation saw that he could not break through the overwhelmingly superior enemy's lines, and surrendered his army of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry to the Russian general Theodor von Rüdiger at Világos/Nagyszőlős.[76] Days before the surrender he wrote a letter to Rüdiger in which he presented his wish to surrender before the Russian general, who respected him very much for his bravery, and military talent, writing him among other things, why he decided to surrender before the Russian troops and not the Austrians:

You will agree with me, when I declare it solemnly, that I prefer to let my army corps to be destroyed in a desperate battle by a no matter how much superior army, than to put down my weapons in front of such an enemy [the Austrians], who we defeated so many times, and almost at every turn.[77]

Summaries of Görgei's battles

In this chapter were included those battles in which Görgei himself, or those troops and units of which he was their chief commander, took part, even if he did not directly participated in every battle.[78][79][80] [81]

Battle Date Result Opponent Hungarian troop strength Enemy troop strength Hungarian casualties Enemy casualties Notes
The Ozora campaign October 04 – 07, 1848 Victory - Karl Roth &
- Nicolaus Philippovich von Philippsberg 		29,064 (9452 + ? regulars, 16,500 irregulars) 9000 7 9000[82] Görgei’s units together with Mór Perczel’s troops, and the peasant militia from the Tolna County, after relentless harrassments and misleading maneuvres, force to surrender the Croatian reinforcement troops, sent from Croatia in support of Josip Jelačić.
Vanguard skirmishes around Bruck October 17 – 19, 1848 Victory
  • Bruck: Victory
  • Bruck: Defeat
  • Bruck: Victory
  • Wilfleinsdorf: Defeat
  Josip Jelačić 3960 hussars unknown 4 + ? 20 + ? Görgei’s hussars occupy Bruck an der Leitha, taking many prisoners and a big amount of cloths, force the vanguards of Jelačić to retreat behind the ditch from Wiener Neustadt, leaving Lower Austria’s eastern narrow landstrip in Hungarian hands. [83]
Schwechat October 30, 1848 Defeat -  Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz &
-  Josip Jelačić 		27,000 30,000 695 89/96[84] Many of the Hungarian troops were irregulars, armed with forks or scythes. Görgei conducted the vanguards, than, when the defeat became obvious, he protected the retreating troops, preventing them to be crushed. After the battle Kossuth names Görgei as the commander of the Upper Danubian Army to defend the western border.
Nagyszombat & Parndorf December 16, 1848 Defeat  Balthasar von Simunich ~ 8555 17,500[85] 942 40[86][87] Start of the Winter campaign. The imperial forces broke in Hungary from North, Görgei sent Richard Guyon to stop them, but he was defeated at Nagyszombat. At Parndorf the rearguard troops of Zichy Lipót were attacked by Jelačić’s troops and put to flight.
Bábolna December 28, 1848 Defeat  Ferenc Ottinger ~ 4000[88] ? 700 ? Görgei’s retreating right wing led by his cousin, Kornél Görgey, were surpised by the cuirassiers of Ferenc Ottinger, losing many prisoners.
Tétény January 3, 1849 Inconclusive  Ludwig Wallmoden-Gimborn ~4000 ~4200[89] ? ? The result is draw, but tactical Hungarian success. Görgei’s rearguards pushed back Jelačić attacking vanguard units, but retreated after hearing the approach of other enemy troops. This skirmish slowed down the imperial advance, making them more cautious.
Vanguard skirmishes around Verebély & Ipolyság January 11, 1849 Victory
  • Verebély: Victory
  • Ipolyság: Defeat
-  Balthasar von Simunich
-  Felix Jablonowski
-  Franz Wyss		 ~11,013[90] 11,406 + ?[91] 40 + ? 5 + ? Görgei’s rearguard troops manage to stop the enemies advance.
Turcsek January 17, 1849 Inconclusive  Franz Wyss ~5324[92] 3000[93] ? ? Hungarian tactical victory. Görgei’s right wing troops, led by Lajos Aulich forced Götz to retreat.
Szélakna, Selmecbánya, Hodrusbánya January 21-22, 1849 Defeat
  • Szélakna: Defeat
  • Hodrusbánya: Defeat
  Anton Csorich ~6794[94] ~13,198 + ? [95] 700 ? Görgei’s rearguard is defeated and forced to retreat from the “mining towns”.
Branyiszkó February 5, 1849 Victory  Franz Deym von Stritež 4002 1891 150 395 [96] Richard Guyon’s brigade occupies the Branyiszkó mountain pass, ending with success the winter campaign of the Northern Danubian Army led by Görgei.
Szén February 13, 1849 Victory  Franz Schlik ~5446[97] ~1460[98] ? ? The brigade of Sándor Kossuth fell by surprize on Franz Schlik’s rearguards, taking the majority of them as prisoners.
Mezőkövesd February 28, 1849 Victory  Franz Schlik ~17,118 ~5306 ? 58[99] The brigade of György Kmety is attacked by the Austrians, but when other two Hungarian brigades come to the rescue, the imperials retreat, loosing 3 cannons and 29 prisoners.
Hatvan April 2, 1849 Victory  Franz Schlik 14,563 11,000[100] 20 202[101] Start of the Spring Campaign of the main Hungarian troops led by Görgei. The VII. Hungarian corps and the support units sent by Damjanich defeat Schlik’s army.
Tápióbicske April 4, 1849 Victory  Josip Jelačić 22,419 16,000[102] 800-1500 301[103] The I. corps led by György Klapka are surprised by Jelačić’s army corp, but with the arrival of Görgei and the III. corp led by János Damjanich, turns the battle in the favour of the Hungarians.
Isaszeg April 6, 1849 Victory  Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz 31,315 26,000[104] 800-1000 373/369[105] The first decisive battle of the Spring campaign is won by Görgei, forcing Windisch-Grätz to retreat from the Danube–Tisza Interfluve.
1st Vác April 10, 1849 Victory  Christian Götz † 11,592 8,250 150 422[106] The III. corps defeat the Austrians. Among the Austrian casualties is also their commander, Christian Götz.
Nagysalló April 19, 1849 Victory  Ludwig von Wohlgemuth 23,784 20,601 + ? 608 1538[107] The Austrian army corps, led by Wohlgemuth, sent from Italy to help the Austrians in Hungary, is heavily defeated. The Austrians retreat south from the Danube, respectively westwards, near to the Austrian border.
Kéménd April 20, 1849 Victory  Franz Wyss ? ~5296 ? ?[108] The last Austrian troops are forced to retreat behind the Danube.
1st Komárom April 26, 1849 Inconclusive  Balthasar von Simunich &
 Franz Schlik		 18,884 + ? 33,487 800 671[109] Draw, but strategic Hungarian victory. The Austrian siege troops are chased out from the trenches from around the fortress of Komárom, but when the IIId. Austrian corps, which were retreating from Pest, arrive, force the Hungarians to retreat, but only to secure a safe retreat of the main Austrian army towards Vienna. The Hungarians capture much of the siege weapons of the Austrians. The much of Central and Western Hungary is liberated.
Buda April 4-21, 1849 Victory  Heinrich Hentzi † 34,277 4890 368/427 4914[110] The Hungarian troops capture the fortress of Buda. The Austrian commander, Heinrich Hentzi is fatally wounded.
Vanguard skirmishes on the Western front June 9-13, 1849 Victory  Ludwig von Wohlgemuth &
 Anton Csorich		 ~20,304 ~12,946 + ? 18 20 [111] The Hungarian troops push forward to west the Austrian positions.
Csorna June 13, 1849 Victory  Franz Wyss † 5002 2690 271/215 258[112] The start of the summer campaign. A Hungarian detachment led by György Kmety defeats the Austrians, whose commander, Franz Wyss is fatally wounded.
Zsigárd June 16, 1849 Defeat  Ludwig von Wohlgemuth &
 Anton Csorich		 24,480 31,200 765 154[113] In Görgei’s absence (because he was fulfilling his duty as minister of war) the I. and II. corps of his army started an attack, but after initial successes, they had to retreat, suffering heavy losses, because the superior Austrian counter attack. One of the main causes of the defeat was the total inactivity of the III. Hungarian corp.
Pered June 20-21, 1849 Defeat
  • June 20: Victory
  • June 21: Defeat
  Julius Jacob von Haynau,
 Ludwig von Wohlgemuth,
 Anton Csorich &
 Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin 		25,286/23,727 39,500 2878 668 [114][115] This time Görgei led his troops personally. In the first day, despite the fierce Austrian opposition, his troops took control of Pered and other localities too. But the intervention in the second day of the Russian troops of Panyutyin in the battle, decided the imperial victory.
Ihász June 27, 1849 Defeat  Georg Heinrich Ramberg 5700 ~4376 112 277[116][117] The detachment of Kmety is defeated, but causes heavy casualties, than retreats towards southern Hungary.
Győr June 28, 1849 Defeat  Julius Jacob von Haynau &
 Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin 		17,480 69,350 607/706 342[118] In the presence of the emperor, Franz Joseph I of Austria, Haynau occupies Győr, defeating a more than three times lesser Hungarian army. Seeing the fierce Hungarian resistance, and fearing for Franz Joseph’s safety, Haynau asks the emperor to go back to Vienna.
2nd Komárom July 2, 1849 Victory  Julius Jacob von Haynau &
 Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin 		26,884 52,185 1500 890[119] The troops of Haynau initially occupy strategical positions around Komárom, but Görgei’s counter attack force them to retreat. Towards the end of the battle Görgei is heavily wounded, and this prevents him to take advantage from his success.
3nd Komárom July 11, 1849 Defeat  Julius Jacob von Haynau &
 Feodor Sergeyevich Panyutyin 		43,347 men 56,787 400/500/800/1500 813[120] Although initial successes, the Hungarian attack to break the Austrian blockade around Komárom failed, because of the inactivity of two generals: Gusztáv Pikéthy and József Nagysándor, who did not helped Ernő Poeltenberg’s and Károly Leiningen-Westerburg’s attack. Görgei observed the battle from the fortress, but couldn’t personally intervene in it, because he was not fully recovered after his head wound.
2nd Vác July 15-17, 1849 Inconclusive
  • July 15: Victory
  • July 17: Inconclusive
 Ivan Paskevich &
  Theodor von Rüdiger		 27,834 52,831 1400 + 452 [121] Hungarian tactical victory. In the first day Görgei’s troops chase out the Russians from Vác, and in the third day they retreat towards north, repulsing the Russian attacks. The failure of Paskevich to crush Görgei’s army, prevented them to join Haynau’s advancement to south in order to quickly put down the revolution, and prolonged the Hungarian War of Independence for another month.
Battle around Miskolc & Görömböly July 23-24, 1849 Inconclusive
  • July 3: Victory
  • July 24: Inconclusive
 Michail Ivanovich Tscheodayev 8600[122] ~39.886[123] ? 24 [124] Hungarian tactical victory. The VII. corps of Ernő Poeltenberg occupies Miskolc, and on the first day, repulse the Russian attack, than in the second day, after receiving Görgei’s order to retreat (who feared that his general faced the whole Russian army), retreats, repulsing back the Russian charges.
Alsózsolca July 25, 1849 Victory  Michail Ivanovich Tscheodayev~ 17,900 [125] ~39.886[126] ? 35[127] The attack of the Russian IV. corps led by Lieutenant General Tscheodayev was repulsed by the III. and VII. Hungarian corps.
Poroszló July 25, 1849 Defeat  Mikhail Dmitrievich Gorchakov3280[128] ~6634[129] 0 79[130] The Russians cross the Tisza river. The Hungarian detachment, of which only 1100 have fire weapons, cannot stop them.
Gesztely July 28, 1849 Victory  Pavel Hristoforovich Grabbe~9200[131] ~12.887[132] 1 103[133] The attack of the troops of Lieutenant General Grabbe is desorganised by the well hidden Hungarian artillery unit of the III. Hungarian corps, led by Leiningen, putting them to flight.
Debrecen August 2, 1849 Defeat  Ivan Paskevich11,338 62.427 ~1901 337[134] The I. Hungarian corps led by József Nagysándor is defeated by the main Russian forces. Görgei was accused that although he heard the sounds of the cannon shots of the battle, did not went with his other troops to help. But Nagysándor's mission was exactly to hold the enemy in order to enable to Görgei to retreat towards south to unite with Dembinski's troops. The orders towards Nagysándor were not to engage in battle at any costs, but to slow the enemies advancement. He entered in battle because he miscalculated the Russian troops strength. On the other hand, even if Görgei would had tried to march towards the battlefield with the other two Hungarian corps, he would had reached with his tired troops it only after three hours after the battle ended, which would had caused him too a crushing defeat from the three times bigger enemy.[135]

After the defeat of the Revolution

Görgei asked from the Russians to ask mercy for his officers and his soldiers from the Austrians, Görgei saying even that if they want somebody to be hanged, than he would accept this for himself, but in change he wanted his generals to be spared, which Paskevich and the tzar accepted and did, asking forgiveness for Görgei and his men, but initially the Austrians refused to fulfill their allies demand. After a while they accepted that Görgei will not be cort-martialed, and executed, and will be kept in confinement at Klagenfurt, but they did not pardoned his generals, who were executed on 6 October 1849 at Arad. Because of the execution of his 13 generals, Görgei was accused that he betrayed them, and he caused their deaths.[136]

He lived there, chiefly employed in chemical work, until the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, when he was pardoned and returned to Hungary.

Photo of Görgey with his son
Don Pirlone: Görgei presenting Hungary's cut-off head to Russia, 1853
Görgei in old age

The surrender, and particularly the fact that his life was spared while his generals and many of his officers and men were hanged or shot, led to his being accused of treason by public opinion. The main cause of these accusations was the letter written by Kossuth, already in exile, from Vidin in 12 September 1849, declaring unfairly that Görgei betrayed Hungary and its nation, when he put his weapons down.[2]

The letter from Vidin had its sad effects, misleading many people: one of Hungary's greatest poets, Mihály Vörösmarty, who played also a role in the revolution, being a member of the Hungarian Parliament, wrote on 10 October 1849 an angered poem about him, with the title Átok (Curse), naming him "worthless villain", "worm", "traitor" cursing Görgei for his "treason" of the Hungarian land, to be chasen by hate and misfortune and after his death his soul to be damned.[137] The accuses of Kossuth - who after the revolution, became worldwide one of the most respected and beloved politicians, the symbol of the Hungarian revolution and independence - reached even the international general public too, many newspapers and books showing Görgei as a traitor of the revolution and freedom. For example in the Italian book with allegorical drawings Don Pirlone a Roma. Memorie di un Italiano dal 1 Settembre 1848 al 31 dicembre 1850 (Don Pirlone in Rome. Memories of an Italian from 1. September 1848 to 31 December 1850), Görgei is presented as a traitor who hands over Hungary's head to Russia, and receives sacks of gold.[138]

After his release he played no further part in public life, but had to suffer many attacks from his countrymen who believed that he was a traitor. He faced all these accusations with stoicism and resignation. Despite of the accusations caused to him by Kossuth, who never retracted his words about him, Görgei respected the former Governor-President of Hungary, declaring that in 1848 Kossuth was the great man, without whom nothing would had happen, while he (Görgei) was only a bubble thrown on the surface by the wave of the events.[8]

In 1885, an attempt by a large number of his old comrades to rehabilitate him was not favorably received in Hungary. After some years work as a railway engineer he retired to Visegrád, where he lived in retirement. For decades he had been considered a traitor, often humiliated in public places, but in the last years of his life, his very important role during the War and unique military talent became widely acknowledged by his compatriots. But from the accuses about his treason he was definitively discharged only after his death by the historians.[139] General Görgei wrote a justification of his operations (Mein Leben und Wirken in Ungarn 1848–1849, Leipzig, 1852), an anonymous paper under the title Was verdanken wir der Revolution? (1875), and a reply to Kossuth's charges (signed Joh. Demar) in Budapesti Szemle, 1881, pp. 25–26. Amongst those who wrote in his favor were Captain Stephan Görgey (1848–1849 bol, Budapest, 1885), and Colonel Aschermann (Ein offenes Wort in der Sache des Honved-Generals Arthur Görgey, Klausenburg, 1867).

Görgei passed away on 21 May 1916, at the age of 98 in Budapest.

Notes

  1. 1 2 3 4 Szentgyörgyi István / A kémikus Görgey, Korunk. (2004 VII/11)
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Görgei Artúr Életem és működésem Magyarországon 1848-ban és 1849-ben, (2004)
  3. ↑ Pethő 1934, pp. 15.
  4. ↑ Görgey István 1916, pp. 230, 235.
  5. ↑ Görgey I. 1916, pp. 262.
  6. 1 2 Riedel Miklós / Görgey a vegyész-tábornok, Magyar Kémikusok Lapja. (2016 LXXI/12)
  7. 1 2 Móra László / Katonai sikereit elősegítették kémiai tanulmányai 175 éve született Görgey Artúr, Korunk. (2004 VII/11)
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 Hermann Róbert, Kossuth és Görgei, Korunk. (September 2002)
  9. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 94-98.
  10. ↑ Hermann 1999, pp. 5.
  11. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 100-106.
  12. ↑ Bóna 1987, pp. 162.
  13. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 200.
  14. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 180-181.
  15. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 126-132.
  16. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 200-201.
  17. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 202-203.
  18. ↑ Bóna 1987, pp. 30.
  19. ↑ Hermann 1999, pp. 9.
  20. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 204-206.
  21. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 156-162.
  22. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 233.
  23. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 173-184.
  24. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 243-244.
  25. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 244.
  26. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 261.
  27. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 263.
  28. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 257–258.
  29. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 251-257.
  30. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 263-267.
  31. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 268.
  32. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 60.
  33. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 473–474.
  34. ↑ Pászti László / A magyar honvédsereg harcászata az 1848/49-es szabadságharcban, (2009), pp: 136-137
  35. ↑ Hermann 1999, pp. 10.
  36. 1 2 Hermann 1999, pp. 11.
  37. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 270-271, 282.
  38. ↑ Bánlaky József, / A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme, vol XXI
  39. ↑ Hermann Róbert, Buda bevétele, 1849. május 21, Budapesti Negyed 29-30. (2000/3-4)
  40. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 341.
  41. ↑ Hermann 2013, pp. 27.
  42. ↑ Hermann 1999, pp. 12.
  43. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 379–380.
  44. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 325.
  45. ↑ Hermann 1996, pp. 306–307.
  46. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 380.
  47. ↑ Hentaller 1889, pp. 92, 127.
  48. ↑ Hermann (ed.) 2004, pp. 263-268.
  49. ↑ Hermann (ed.) 2001, pp. 320.
  50. ↑ Bóna 1987, pp. 96.
  51. ↑ Bóna 1987, pp. 157.
  52. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 325.
  53. ↑ Hermann 1999, pp. 13.
  54. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 269-276.
  55. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 277-286.
  56. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 287-294.
  57. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 305-312.
  58. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 295-304.
  59. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 344.
  60. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 305-312.
  61. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 321-328.
  62. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 354-355.
  63. ↑ Hermann 1999, pp. 14.
  64. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 597.
  65. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 598.
  66. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 600.
  67. ↑ Hermann 1999, pp. 14.
  68. ↑ Vesztróczy Zsolt, http://ujszo.com/online/panorama/2016/05/21/a-magyar-napoleon-vagy-a-nemzet-judasa/ A magyar Napóleon vagy a „nemzet Júdása”?, Új Szó online, 2016 máj 21
  69. ↑ Hermann (ed.) 1996, pp. 375.
  70. ↑ Rosonczy Ildikó, http://home.hu.inter.net/kortars/0110/rosonczy.htm/ „Újdonságok” az 1849-es orosz beavatkozásról, Kortárs
  71. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 386.
  72. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 365-374.
  73. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 379.
  74. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 375-384.
  75. ↑ Hermann (ed) 1996, pp. 398-400.
  76. ↑ Hermann (ed) 1996, pp. 395-397.
  77. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 677.
  78. ↑ "1848-1849 Hadi események (1848-1849 Military events)". Szegedi Egyetemi Könyvtár Hadtörténeti Gyűjteménye/.
  79. ↑ Hermann 2001.
  80. ↑ Hermann 2004.
  81. ↑ Pusztaszeri 1984.
  82. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 98.
  83. ↑ Hermann 2001, pp. 149.
  84. ↑ Hermann 2004, pp. 106.
  85. ↑ Bánlaky József, / A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme, vol XXI
  86. ↑ Bánlaky József, / A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme, vol XXI
  87. ↑ Bánlaky József, / A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme, vol XXI
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Sources

Political offices
Preceded by
Lázár Mészáros		 Minister of War
1849 		Succeeded by
Lajos Aulich
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