Amherst's Decree

Amherst's Decree was a general order given by General Jeffery Amherst, commander of British forces in North America, in February 1761. The order halted the longtime tradition of presenting visiting Native American chieftains with gifts, especially gunpowder and lead shot. While gift giving was generally acknowledged as a diplomatic gesture of goodwill, Amherst viewed it as "excessive coddling" which was financially costly to the British government. The decree initiated a period of increasing distrust between British and Native American tribes and is considered by historians as one of the factors leading to Pontiac's Rebellion.

Amherst justified ending the tradition of giving goods and supplies to Indians in terms of defending His Majesty’s interests. Indians would have to spend more time on supplying themselves, thus less time could be spent dissenting from British authority.[1] By strictly limiting Native American’s access to ammunition, Amherst was protecting the British Army from Indian attack.[1]

The decree denied Native groups access to alcohol and limited the amount of gunpowder they could legally obtain. Amherst prohibited British traders from traveling to Native villages and prohibited them from charging excessive prices.[1] Yet, this forced American Indians further out of their local communities due to the need to travel to British forts in order to conduct business necessary for their survival. Due to the lack of transport accessible to Indians, only the fortunate had the horses necessary to transport goods to the British forts. The size of the horses limited the amount of goods Indians could carry to trade and the traders were further compounded by the restrictions on goods they could receive from the British traders.

Background

Indian diplomacy prior to 1761 consisted of peace ceremonies were central to the foundation and consolidation of alliances were the values of reciprocity and generosity. In the second half of the seventeenth century, an Anglo-Indian alliance between British settlers and the Iroquois tribe was consolidated in the Covenant Chain where every word of a proposition was validated by the offering of a gift, during this period it was often wampum deemed highly sacred.[2] This tradition upheld by the Indians’ recently defeated allies, the French. Yet Amherst declared, “It is not by intention… ever to attempt to gain the friendship of Indians by presents.”[3] Amherst had removed the grounds that Anglo- Indian forces had established peace.

Outcomes

Amherst’s policy of restricting the trading of ammunition to Indians made it increasingly difficult for Indians to obtain deerskins that were central to their trade, and thus their economy and livelihood.[2] Tribesmen were forced to revert to bow and arrows, in which their skill of precision had been lost by many years of adaptation to European alternatives, particularly gunpowder. Famine spread, intensified by crop failures and smallpox epidemics throughout he pays d’en haut and the Ohio Country in 1762.[2] Some survivors travelled to English forts in hope of food, some having already resorted to eating their children.[4] Sir William Johnson, Northern Indian superintendent, complained that at Montreal tribes had received less winter gifts than the amount the French gave four families.[4]

With tribesmen unable to provide for their families and the removal of alcohol that was so central to Indian social life, Amherst’s policies managed to inadvertently create a band of sober enemies, united with a common grievance.[1]

Criticisms

One of Amherst’s most outspoken critics to his policies came from his contemporary, Sir William Johnson. Named Warraghiyagey (translated as "A Man who undertakes great Things") by the Mohawk tribe in 1742 and later esteemed with the title “sachem,” Johnson was both respected and experienced in Indian diplomacy.[5] Having been appointed Commissary of Indian Affairs in 1746 after being noted for his close ties with the Six Nations, his success led him to being appointed as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1755.[6] The Albany Congress in 1754 proved that Johnson was indispensable when dealing with Indian affairs.[7]

Sir William Johnson’s success was founded in his adoption and respect for Indian treaty traditions. In a conference in Albany in 1746, Johnson even wore the same apparel and paint as an Indian War-Captain.[6] As the principal negotiator in Indian treaties and publicly esteemed as the leading individual in Indian relations, he vehemently warned Amherst of the dangers of removing the process of gift giving from negotiations.[7] Johnson predicted that an Indian war would be inevitable; in 1763, Indian’s in the Great Lakes Region were driven by their discontent with Amherst’s post-war Indian policies to take part in Pontiac’s Rebellion.

Historians’ perspectives

Fred Anderson argues that Amherst’s principle aim behind the decree was to impose order on North America, thus a rational objective for any professional soldier rather than it being a capricious act of cruelty.[1]

Similarly, Mark Danley identifies Amherst’s lack of understanding of the culture and customs of Native Americans was a central cause of his order.[8] However Danley also criticizes Amherst’s arrogance in dismissing the warnings of his colleagues, who, experienced in the practices of Native diplomacy, warned that the decree would inevitably lead to war.

Likewise, Francis Jennings identifies Amherst’s decree as signaling the inverse relationship between his increasing glory from successes in the Seven Years' War with a decline in his use of logic and cautiousness. While trying to save money by forbidding the practice of giving peace offerings, Amherst aimed to make Indians subsist primarily on hunting, an illogical aim given the control he simultaneously placed on ammunition.[9]

Elizabeth Dubrulle argues that rather than a mere oversight of the complexities of Indian relationships and traditions, Amherst was uninterested in who the Native Americans were; he was only interested in who they could become. To Dubrulle, Amherst’s decree aimed at transforming American Indians into clones of the hardworking British public.[8]

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 Anderson, Fred (2001). Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766. New York: Vintage. p. 455.
  2. 1 2 3 Richter, Daniel (2001). Facing East From Indian Country. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. p. 192.
  3. ↑ Hoxie, Frederick (1988). Indians in American History: An Introduction. Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson. p. 98.
  4. 1 2 Flexner, James Thomas (2015). Mohawk Baronet: A Biography of Sir William Johnson. New York: Syracuse University Press. p. 238.
  5. ↑ O'Toole, Fintan (2005). White Savage: William Johnson and the Invention of America. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p. 69.
  6. 1 2 "The Role of Sir William Johnson In the Colonial Development of America and His Involvement in the Expansionist Policies of the British Imperial Government". Archiving Early America. Retrieved November 30, 2015.
  7. 1 2 Hamilton, Milton (1963). "Sir William Johnson: Interpreter of the Iroquois". Ethnohistory.
  8. 1 2 Tucker, Spencer C. (2011). Encyclopedia of North American Indian Wars, 1607-1890: A Political, Social, and Military History. Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO. p. 16.
  9. ↑ Jennings, Francis (1988). Empire Of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. p. 441.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.