Formosa Air Battle

Formosa Air Battle Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II Crewmen on USS Hancock (CV-19) move rockets to planes while preparing for strikes on Formosa, 12 October 1944. Date October 12–16, 1944 Location Philippine Sea Result American victory Belligerents  Japan  United States Commanders and leaders Ryūnosuke Kusaka Shigeru Fukudome William Halsey, Jr. Marc Mitscher Units involved Task Force 38 Strength 1,425 fighters/bombers 17 aircraft carriers 6 battleships 4 heavy cruisers 11 light cruisers 57 destroyers Casualties and losses 321 aircraft 89 aircraft 1 heavy cruiser seriously damaged 1 light cruiser damaged

Philippines campaign (1944–45) Major battles in bold Luzon Mindoro Lingayen Gulf Bessang Pass Baguio Kirang Pass Bacsil Ridge Bongabon Gabaldon General Tinio Peñaranda Cabanatuan Bataan Manila Corregidor Los Baños Camarines Catanduanes Palawan Visayas Leyte Panay Simara Negros Cebu City Daanbantayan Samar Mindanao Bukidnon Cotabato and Maguindanao Davao Lanao Naval operations Convoy Hi-71 Shin'yō Maru incident Formosa Leyte Gulf Ormoc Bay Convoy Hi-81 South China Sea raid Action of 24 July 1945

The Formosa Air Battle (Japanese: 台湾沖航空戦, Chinese: 臺灣空戰), 12–16 October 1944, was a series of large-scale aerial engagements between carrier air groups of the United States Navy Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 38), and Japanese land-based air forces of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA).

The battle consisted of American air raids against Japanese military installations on Formosa (Taiwan) during the day and Japanese air attacks at night against American ships. Japanese losses exceeded 300 planes destroyed in the air, while American losses amounted to fewer than 100 aircraft destroyed and two cruisers damaged. This outcome effectively deprived the Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet of air cover for future operations, which proved decisive during the Battle of Leyte Gulf later in October.

Background

Japanese strategic plans for a decisive battle with the U.S. fleet were already established by September 1944.^[1] Anticipating the various options open to American landing forces, the Japanese operational order, code named Sho ("victory"), provided four scenarios to deal with ground invasion stretching from the Philippines to Japan itself.^[2] The plan was problematic for morale, however, because it broke with IJN tradition by assigning overriding importance to sinking U.S. supply vessels rather than U.S. warships. As a result, the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Soemu Toyoda flew out to the front in early October to rally the troops behind Sho.^[3]

By 10 October Toyoda's tour of the front was complete. He intended to depart from Formosa for Japan that same day but was forced to change his plans. Surprise U.S. carrier strikes against the Ryukyu Islands cut off Toyoda's flight path home, grounding the admiral far from Combined Fleet headquarters at a decisive moment. Out of position and with inadequate lines of communication, the response to such overwhelming enemy air power was left to Toyoda's Chief of Staff, Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka.^[4]

Kusaka correctly saw these strikes as a precursor to U.S. troop landings, in part due to Imperial Navy intelligence collected over the previous week.^[5] As such, he chose to execute the air component of Sho 1 or Sho 2 — the planned defense of the Philippines or Formosa respectively — on the morning of 10 October. Sho was a complex plan involving multiple naval surface forces sortieing from bases as far away as Singapore and Japan. It would take these warships time to maneuver into position for a concerted attack. Rather than waiting for the arrival of the fleet for a combination of sea and air power, Kusaka ordered the air forces reserved for Sho to engage the enemy at once. He reinforced this order by implementing Sho-2 in full on the morning of 12 October.^[6]

Many aircraft were available for Sho but were widely dispersed. On 10 October, Admiral Shigeru Fukudome's Sixth Base Air Force consisted of approximately 740 planes spread out from Formosa to Kyushu; Admiral Teraoka's Fifth Base Air Force and Lt. General Tominaga's Fourth Air Army (Imperial Japanese Army Air Service) in the Philippines together had around 440 aircraft. Over the course of the next four days an additional 690 or so planes arrived from Japan and China.^[7]

Although this represented a huge number of available aircraft, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service was still recovering from losses suffered at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June. While units were largely reconstituted in terms of quantity by this time, pilot quality was in clear decline.^[8] Moreover, though the overall number of planes committed to battle by 12 October dwarfed any force that Japan had previously fielded in the air, the U.S. Navy's Fast Carrier Force was capable of committing a much larger, significantly better-trained force.^{[note 1]}

Order of battle

 Imperial Japanese Navy

• Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service: 1,251 fighters/bombers.
  • 1st Air Fleet (Imperial Japanese Navy): based in Manila, Philippines
  • 2nd Air Fleet (Imperial Japanese Navy): based in Takao, Taiwan
  • 3rd Air Fleet(Imperial Japanese Navy): formerly carrier based, moved to land under command of 2nd Air Fleet

 United States Navy

• Third Fleet
  • Task Force 38: 17 aircraft carriers (including 9 light carriers) , 6 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 11 light cruisers, 57 destroyers.
    • First Aircraft Carrier Group: USS Cowpens, USS Hornet, USS Monterey, USS Wasp.
    • Second Aircraft Carrier Group: USS Bunker Hill, USS Cabot (detached), USS Hancock, USS Independence, USS Intrepid.
    • Third Aircraft Carrier Group: USS Essex, USS Langley, USS Lexington, USS Princeton.
    • Fourth Aircraft Carrier Group: USS Belleau Wood, USS Enterprise, USS Franklin, USS San Jacinto.

Battle

Radar-equipped Japanese reconnaissance aircraft sighted various task groups of the Third Fleet throughout the day and night of 11 October, giving area commanders on Formosa and in the Philippines early warning. Knowing that dawn strikes on 12 October were imminent, ground forces were placed on alert and aircraft were readied for early morning intercept.^[9]

Combat experience of U.S. carrier air groups during the battle depended to a considerable degree upon disposition of their task group and assigned strike targets. On the morning of 12 October, the four task groups of the Fast Carrier Task Force were strung out roughly from northwest to southeast. Task Group 38.2, as the northernmost group, was assigned the northern third of Formosa. Task Group 38.3 was next in line and assigned the central portion of the island. Finally, Task Groups 38.1 and 38.4 were jointly assigned southern Formosa.^[10][11]

12 October

All four task groups completed launch of pre-dawn fighter sweeps by around 0600 hours. Because the Japanese were on alert, fighters from all four groups were intercepted by airborne enemy aircraft; moderate to intense anti-aircraft fire was universally reported. Air-to-air engagements were fiercest over northern and central Formosa, where planes from Admiral Gerald F. Bogan's TG 38.2 and Admiral Frederick C. Sherman's TG 38.3 operated. Sherman's USS Lexington and USS Essex claimed almost 50 enemy aircraft shot down between them. Bogan's task group contained three Essex-class carriers—USS Intrepid, USS Bunker Hill and USS Hancock. Intrepid and Bunker Hill claimed over 50 Japanese planes destroyed, making the combined total for the two groups around 100 claimed victories.^{[12][13][14][15]}

American carrier air groups, on the other hand, suffered minimal personnel losses during the early morning fighter sweep: in the above two task groups, only nine U.S. aircraft were shot down with three pilots subsequently recovered by nearby ships/submarines. These lopsided results were in part due to a lack of experience among Japanese pilots. IJAAF fighters stationed to the north of the Philippines, for example, were still in training.^[16] Even though there were some experienced Japanese aviators operating at this time, IJNAF fighter units reconstituted after the Battle of the Philippine Sea were still learning to work together and did not execute the kind of section or division flying that yielded tactical advantage.^[17]

Though subsequent carrier strikes launched throughout the day did significant damage to military installations on Formosa, it proved impossible to completely neutralize Japanese air power based on the island. The Japanese response was well suppressed, however, and the only effective counter-attack to develop against TF 38 came from Japan itself. One of the remaining skilled Navy attack units, T Air Attack Force, moved south to conduct dusk attacks against carrier formations. Groups of T Attack Force aircraft conducted raids throughout the evening, battling night fighters from the carriers as they attempted to torpedo or bomb ships. The ships made smoke for cover and engaged in radical maneuvering to keep enemies astern as Japanese planes dropped flares to illuminate their targets. Eight enemy planes were shot down by ships' guns during the night, and three Mitsubishi G4M Betty bombers were claimed by night fighters from the USS Independence.^[18] No damage from Japanese planes was incurred, though the USS Pritchett suffered damage from friendly fire.^[19][20]

13 October

Weather was more uncooperative than on the previous day. Even though a wider array of targets were assigned to the task groups, from the Pescadores to northern Luzon and Formosa, far fewer enemies were encountered in the air. Results of the day's strike operations were hard to ascertain due to the overcast.^[21] Pilots' reports from these two days of strikes helped uncover a larger network of air bases on Formosa than previously anticipated. This knowledge, combined with radio intercepts and the dusk strikes fended off the previous evening, led Commander Task Force 34 to cancel any strikes scheduled to take off after 1400 hours. Instead, the task groups prepared to defend against another night assault.^[22]

Elements of the T Air Attack Force returned as expected to carry out twilight strikes against U.S. warships. This time, TGs 38.1 and 38.4 found themselves under attack. Japanese formations were spotted via radar at 1640 and intercepted by Combat Air Patrol (CAP) planes from TG 38.4's USS Belleau Wood an hour later. The Belleau Wood fighters put the enemy formation to rout, destroying 10 fighters and bombers before returning to their carrier.^[23]

By 1812, just before sunset, T Attack Force pilots were closing to within range of the task groups. Six more planes were shot down in the vicinity of TG 38.4 in the span of 20 minutes. A subsequent group of six Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers which had penetrated the picket and evaded the CAP made determined attacks on the carriers of TG 38.4, putting four torpedoes in the water before all six were shot down by shipboard anti-aircraft guns. One torpedo ran just ahead of the USS Franklin, another ran too deep and passed beneath the carrier. One of the Bettys attempted to crash into Franklin on its way down but glanced off the flight deck and slid over the starboard edge of the ship into the water.^[24]

TG 38.1 was not as lucky. Ten Yokosuka P1Y "Frances" bombers made contact with the group at 1823 after eluding early radar detection by flying low over the water. Though visual contact was made and shipboard anti-aircraft fire destroyed six planes, one Frances pressed home a determined torpedo attack on the carriers. The pilot was forced off course, missing his chance to torpedo a fleet carrier; however, his torpedo struck the USS Canberra inflicting serious damage upon the cruiser. Both engine rooms flooded and damage was done to the rudder. As a result, Canberra had to be taken in tow as part of a new task group, TG 30.3, composed of ships detached from the carrier groups. Around 2200 USS Wichita began towing the crippled cruiser to the southeast.^[25][26]

14 October

The task groups were forced to stay within enemy air range longer than anticipated due to Canberras situation. Early morning fighter sweeps were launched to suppress air power on Luzon and Formosa while the newly formed task group attempted to escort Canberra to safety.^[27] Some air groups encountered Japanese planes in the strike zones^[28], but no major air-to-air combat developed. Throughout the afternoon, enemy aircraft flew to the perimeter of the task groups to relay sighting reports.^[29]

Another long night at general quarters was anticipated by Commander Task Force 34. This intelligence was proved correct in short order. TGs 38.1, 38.2 and 38.3 all suffered mass enemy air attacks between roughly 1500–1830 hours.^[30]

TG 38.2 was the first group attacked. A formation of 25 Yokosuka D4Y "Judy" dive bombers, using cloud cover to evade detection, was intercepted by the group's combat air patrol. Only a few Japanese planes made it past the American fighters. The surviving bombers were able to put two bombs in the vicinity of the Hancock, and one hit the forward port side gun tub without detonating on impact. No serious damage was inflicted by this attack.^[28]

At around 1700 a large formation of enemies showed up on radar headed towards TG 38.3. As before, a great deal of these were shot down by combat air patrol. The surviving enemy planes flew down to the water level to evade further radar detection. These planes—torpedo bombers and fighters—successfully ambushed the formation just minutes later. Evasive maneuvers, squall weather and poor fighter cover on the part of the Japanese helped TG 38.3 escape without suffering any significant damage.^[31]

Task Group 38.1 had been designated as cover for the retiring Canberra group. At 1615 USS Houston joined TG 38.1 to replace Wichita, which was positioned to port off Wasp's bow before its assignment as tow boat. A large bogie appeared after sunset at 1831. Anti-aircraft batteries of the group's picket ships downed 10 planes as they attempted to close on the carriers, but there were many more who made it to the center of the group.^[32] At least two enemy aircraft put torpedoes into the water in the vicinity of Houston. The ship turned hard to starboard in an attempt to avoid the first torpedo wake that was seen. Though a second torpedo missed the ship to port, the first struck the cruiser amidships between the keel and armor belt.^[33] Flooding in the engine rooms and other interior spaces caused the ship to take on a 16° list. Many of the ship's crew had gone over the side of the wallowing vessel into the water; an order to abandon ship was almost given. Ultimately it was decided that USS Boston would tow the damaged cruiser back east.^[34]

Though attacks against TG 38.1 continued for hours after Houston was hit, no further successes were scored by Japanese raiders.^[35]

15 October

Initially, operations orders called for the task groups to refuel on this date. Given the torpedoing of Houston and Canberra, however, only TGs 38.2 and 38.3 departed for refueling. TG 38.4 was reassigned strikes on Luzon to keep attacking planes at bay, while TG 38.1 continued to function as escort for the group of damaged ships now nicknamed "Crippled Division 1." Faced with the decision to either sink or protect the damaged cruisers, Halsey, swayed by his advisers, ultimately decided to turn a bad situation into an opportunity. Unofficially dubbed "Bait Division," the slow-moving ships and their escorts were used as a lure to draw out the Japanese fleet. Urgent radio transmissions were broadcast on open channels in the hopes of enemy interception. It appeared based on sighting reports that the plan might work: in the morning and evening, cruiser and battleship forces were reported heading south from Japan and southeast from Formosa.^{[36][note 2]}

Meanwhile, enemy air attacks did not slack off despite severe losses suffered by the Japanese over the preceding days. Rather than waiting for nighttime raids, Japanese attack formations, escorted by Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters, conducted strikes on TGs 38.1 and 38.4 from dawn to dusk. Combat air patrol over TG 38.4 had to be augmented with additional fighters to intercept incoming Japanese aircraft. Approximately two dozen Japanese attack and fighter planes were shot down between 1045–1056 hours by a combination of CAP fighters and ships' guns. Fighters from USS San Jacinto accounted for many more planes destroyed throughout the afternoon hours.^[37] Though Franklin took a glancing bomb hit during these battles, the damage proved superficial.^[38] TG 38.4 planes did battle with the enemy over land as well. Air Group 13 (CAG-13) aboard Franklin encountered a large group of enemies at Nielson Field during the morning strikes against Luzon. They claimed at least 20 enemy planes for a loss of just one Grumman F6F Hellcat fighter.^[39]

Once again, TG 38.1 was subject to the most concerted Japanese attacks. No offensive strikes were launched by the group's aircraft. Instead, CAP strength was bolstered as much as possible. Fighting Squadron 14 (VF-14) aboard USS Wasp claimed 30 enemy planes shot down by day's end,^[40] and other carrier fighter groups in the task group downed over a dozen more. Some close bomb hits were recorded by the carriers, but no real damage was done to any U.S. warship during these attacks.^[41]

16 October

Long range searches were conducted in the morning and afternoon by task force aircraft. It was hoped that a Japanese surface fleet would be heading towards the broadcast location of Bait Division. Unfortunately, by the evening it was clear that enemy reconnaissance aircraft had taken stock of remaining U.S. fleet strength. No surface engagement developed from Halsey's "Lure of the Streamlined Bait."^[42]

Though enemy ships did not materialize, Japanese air attacks continued in force throughout the morning and into the afternoon. Dedicated air cover for TG 30.3 was provided by light carriers USS Cowpens and USS Cabot, whose air groups intercepted numerous bogeys. The largest strike arrived around 1330 hours consisting of 75 Japanese attack and fighter planes.^[43] One twin engine plane fought through the CAP and ships' anti-aircraft batteries, surviving just long enough to put a torpedo in the water before the plane itself crashed into the sea.^[44]

The torpedo struck the after portion of the starboard side of Houston, blowing 20 men overboard and spreading gasoline fires in the waters around the cruiser. Initially unsure whether the ship would hold together, the captain ordered the evacuation of 300 crew members while the ship's condition was ascertained. In the end it was determined she would stay afloat. Towing continued as before, slowly moving the task group towards the Navy base at Ulithi.^[45][34]

Aftermath

Surviving Japanese pilots returned with tales of stunning victory. It was reported that practically the whole Third Fleet had been sunk and that the American carrier force was left in shambles. Though some members of IJN command were initially skeptical of such reports, this narrative was carried forward by members of the cabinet until they reached Emperor Hirohito. He congratulated the Navy and Army for their success. Newspapers in particular trumpeted these claims, repeating ad nauseam that the U.S. task force was broken and in retreat. Even those unconvinced members of the IJN, up to and including Admiral Toyoda, believed some kind of victory had been achieved off Formosa.^[46]

In truth, the Formosa Air Battle represented a rout of Japanese air forces and a turning point for future naval operations. Admiral Fukudome, upon realizing the scale of the Japanese defeat, lamented, "Our fighters were nothing but so many eggs thrown at the stone wall of the indomitable enemy formation."^[47]

Freshly constituted carrier units like the 634th Naval Air Group were detached from their ships to serve as land-based air power during the battle. By January 1945 this group had no personnel capable of maintaining flight operations. Reconstituted carrier units like the 653rd Naval Air Group, which had just finished rebuilding after losses suffered during the Battle of the Philippine Sea, were similarly detached and integrated into the land-based 2nd Air Fleet. This air group lost almost half of their aircraft over the course of these five days.^[48]

Between carrier group losses, which deprived Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa's ships of aircraft, and losses of experienced land-based attack units like the T Air Attack Force, there remained no real prospect of providing air cover over the Japanese fleet for the coming Battle of Leyte Gulf. Both historians of the battle and IJN commanders have acknowledged this factor as the primary reason for the Sho plan's failure. H.P. Willmott: "In large measure, the Japanese defeat in the Philippines had assumed substance...prior to the landing operations of 17 and 20 October. This was the case because of the nature and extent of the victory won by American carrier air groups in the course of their operations after 10 October."^[49] Admiral Soemu Toyoda, in response to the question "What would you say was the primary cause for the lack of success in that operation?" responded "Our weakness in air, and...the fact that our pilots under Admiral Ozawa were not sufficiently trained."^[50]

Notes

References

Citations

Bibliography

Primary sources