Tameichi Hara
| Tameichi Hara | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Born |
October 16, 1900 Kagawa Prefecture, Japan |
| Died | October 10, 1980 (aged 79) |
| Allegiance | Empire of Japan |
| Rank | Captain |
| Unit |
Destroyer Amatsukaze 27th Destroyer Squadron Cruiser Yahagi |
| Commands held |
 Imperial Japanese Navy |
| Battles/wars |
World War II • Battle of the Java Sea • Battle of Midway • Battle of the Eastern Solomons • Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands • Naval Battle of Guadalcanal • Battle of Vella Gulf • Naval Battle of Vella Lavella • Battle off Horaniu • Battle of Empress Augusta Bay • Operation Ten-Go |
Tameichi Hara (原 為一 Hara Tameichi, October 16, 1900 – October 10, 1980) was an Imperial Japanese naval commander during the Pacific War and the author of the IJN manual on torpedo attack techniques, notable for his high skill, particularly in torpedo warfare and night fighting. Hara was the only IJN destroyer captain at the start of World War II to survived it and his memoirs serve as an important source for historians.
Early life
A native of Kagawa Prefecture and of samurai descent, Hara graduated with the 49th class from the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima in 1921. In 1932 Hara was assigned as a surface warfare instructor and wrote a torpedo attack manual that was accepted as official doctrine. He began the war as the captain of destroyer Amatsukaze.
Military career
Hara commanded a Japanese destroyer or destroyer division in many significant Pacific sea battles. As captain of the Amatsukaze Hara participated in the Battle of the Java Sea, the sinking of the submarine USS Perch (SS-176) and the occupation of Christmas Island. On 13 November 1942 Hara’s Amatsukaze sank the USS Barton (DD-599) during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal but was severely damaged in turn after Hara left his searchlights on too long and drew intense fire from light cruiser USS Helena (CL-50).
After Amatsukaze returned to Japan for repairs Hara was promoted to Captain and given the command of Destroyer Division 27, flying his flag aboard Shigure. While this was technically a four-ship formation the demands on the Imperial navy were such that Hara's ships rarely operated together. While serving aboard Shigure, Hara was involved in several fierce naval engagements during the latter part of the Solomon Islands Campaign. While on a re-supply mission through Blackett Straight on 2 August 1943, Hara noticed a fireball exploding near leading destroyer Amagiri and ordered Shigure's crew to shoot at the burning wreckage of Lt. John F. Kennedy's Motor Torpedo Boat PT-109. During the Battle of Vella Gulf on 6–7 August Shigure was the only one of four Japanese destroyers to escape, though she was later found to have been hit by a torpedo that failed to explode.[1]
Hara's last sortie was as captain of the light cruiser Yahagi as flagship of the destroyer screen accompanying Yamato on her fateful last mission as part of Operation Ten-Go. He ended the war at Kawatana training Japanese sailors to operate Shinyo suicide boats, where he witnessed first hand the effects of the second atomic bombing.
Later Life and Memoirs
Postwar Hara commanded merchant ships which transported salt. Hara was the only IJN destroyer captain at the start of World War II who survived it. This left him the sole surviving witness to several important meetings and conferences which he recounted in his memoirs. Hara's memoirs were translated into English and became an important reference for the Japanese perspective for historians writing about the Pacific Campaign of World War II. In his memoir, Hara objects to compulsory suicide as official doctrine, which he saw as a violation of bushido values. His personal doctrines demonstrate why he survived the war and the Japanese lost it —- they were inflexible, and he was not. His doctrines were "Never ever do the same thing twice" and "If he hits you high, then hit him low; if he hits you low, then hit him high," the latter was also a maxim of Douglas MacArthur's. Hara criticizes his superiors for using cavalry tactics to fight naval battles; never understanding the implications of air power; dividing their forces in the face of enemy forces of unknown strength; basing tactics on what they thought their enemy would do; failing to appreciate the speed with which the enemy could develop new weapons and accepting a war of attrition with a foe more capable of maintaining it.
Notes
References
- D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X.
- Hara, Tameichi (1961). Japanese Destroyer Captain. New York & Toronto: Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-345-27894-1.
External links
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