Spanish–American War

Spanish–American War
Part of the Philippine Revolution and the Cuban War of Independence

Clockwise from top left: US troops raising the Stars and Stripes over Fort San Antonio Abad after the Battle of Manila; The capture of El Caney; 1st Marine Battalion raising the United States flag at Guantánamo Bay; 3rd Wisconsin Volunteer Battalion awaits orders to charge the Spanish; USS Olympia entering Manila Bay; Charge of the Rough Riders at San Juan Hill
DateApril 25, 1898 – August 12, 1898
(3 months, 2 weeks and 4 days)
LocationCuba and Puerto Rico (Caribbean)
Philippines and Guam (Asia-Pacific)

American victory

Spain relinquishes sovereignty over Cuba, cedes Puerto Rico and Guam and the Philippine Islands to the United States for $20 million

United States United States
 Cuba[lower-alpha 1]
First Philippine Republic Philippine Republic[lower-alpha 1]

Katipunan[lower-alpha 2][1][2]

Spain Spain:

Commanders and leaders
United States William McKinley
United States Nelson A. Miles
United States Theodore Roosevelt
United States William R. Shafter
United States George Dewey
United States William Sampson
United States Wesley Merritt
United States Joseph Wheeler
Dominican Republic Máximo Gómez
Cuba Demetrio Castillo Duany
First Philippine Republic Emilio Aguinaldo
First Philippine Republic Apolinario Mabini
Spain Maria Christina
Spain Práxedes Sagasta
Spain Patricio Montojo
Spain Pascual Cervera
Spain Arsenio Linares
Spain Manuel Macías
Spain Ramón Blanco
Spain Antero Rubín
Spain Valeriano Weyler
Spain Fermín Jáudenes

Cuban Republic:
Cuba 30,000 irregulars[3]:19
United States:
United States 300,000 regulars and volunteers[3]:22
Philippine Republic:

First Philippine Republic 60,000[lower-alpha 3]

Spanish Army:

Spain 278,447 regulars and militia[3]:20 (Cuba),
Spain 10,005 regulars and militia[3]:20 (Puerto Rico),
Spain 51,331 regulars and militia[3]:20 (Philippines)
Casualties and losses

Cuban Republic:
Cuba 10,665 dead[3]:20
United States:[3]:67
United States 2,910 dead

345 from combat
Army: 280
Navy: 16
Other: 49
2,565 from disease

United States 1,577 wounded

Army: 1,509
Navy: 68

Philippine Republic:
First Philippine Republic 30 killed [3]:67


Spanish Navy:

560 dead,
300–400 wounded[3]:67

Spanish Army:

3,000 dead or wounded
6,700 captured,[4](Philippines)
13,000 diseased[3]
10,000 dead from combat[5]
50,000 dead from disease[5](Cuba)
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      The Spanish–American War (Spanish: Guerra hispano-estadounidense) was a conflict in 1898 between Spain and the United States, the result of U.S. intervention in the Cuban War of Independence. U.S. attacks on Spain's Pacific possessions led to involvement in the Philippine Revolution and ultimately to the Philippine–American War.[6]

      Revolts against Spanish rule had been occurring for some years in Cuba. There had been war scares before, as in the Virginius Affair in 1873. In the late 1890s, US public opinion was agitated by anti-Spanish propaganda led by journalists such as Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst which used yellow journalism to call for war. However, the Hearst and Pulitzer papers circulated among the working class in New York City and did not reach a national audience. Historians of the 1930s blamed them for stirring up a war frenzy but more recent scholars have not accepted that theory.[7][8]

      After the mysterious sinking of the US Navy battleship Maine in Havana harbor, political pressures from the Democratic Party pushed the administration of Republican President William McKinley into a war he had wished to avoid.[9] Spain promised time and again it would reform but never delivered. The United States sent an ultimatum to Spain demanding it surrender control of Cuba. First Madrid, then Washington, formally declared war.[10]

      Although the main issue was Cuban independence, the ten-week war was fought in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. US naval power proved decisive, allowing expeditionary forces to disembark in Cuba against a Spanish garrison already brought to its knees by nationwide Cuban insurgent attacks and further wasted by yellow fever.[11] Numerically superior Cuban, Philippine, and US forces obtained the surrender of Santiago de Cuba and Manila despite the good performance of some Spanish infantry units and fierce fighting for positions such as San Juan Hill.[12] With two obsolete Spanish squadrons sunk in Santiago de Cuba and Manila Bay and a third, more modern fleet recalled home to protect the Spanish coasts, Madrid sued for peace.[13]

      The result was the 1898 Treaty of Paris, negotiated on terms favorable to the US, which allowed it temporary control of Cuba, and ceded ownership of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippine islands. The cession of the Philippines involved payment of $20 million ($568,880,000 today) to Spain by the US to cover infrastructure owned by Spain.[14]

      The defeat and collapse of the Spanish Empire was a profound shock to Spain's national psyche, and provoked a thorough philosophical and artistic revaluation of Spanish society known as the Generation of '98.[13] The United States gained several island possessions spanning the globe and a rancorous new debate over the wisdom of expansionism.[15]

      The war began exactly fifty-two years after the beginning of the Mexican–American War. It was one of only five US wars to have been formally declared by Congress.[16]

      Historical background

      Spain's attitude towards its colonies

      The combined problems arising from the Peninsular War (1807–1814), the loss of most of its colonies in the Americas in the early 19th-century Spanish American wars of independence, and three Carlist Wars (1832–1876) effected a new interpretation of Spain's remaining empire. Liberal Spanish elites like Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and Emilio Castelar offered new interpretations of the concept of "empire" to dovetail with Spain's emerging nationalism. Cánovas made clear in an address to the University of Madrid in 1882[17][18] his view of the Spanish nation as based on shared cultural and linguistic elements – on both sides of the Atlantic – that tied Spain's territories together.

      Cánovas saw Spanish imperialism as markedly different in its methods and purposes of colonization from those of rival empires like the British or French. Spaniards regarded the spreading of civilization and Christianity as Spain's major objective and contribution to the New World.[19] The concept of cultural unity bestowed special significance on Cuba, which had been Spanish for almost four hundred years, as an integral part of the Spanish nation. The focus on preserving the empire would have negative consequences for Spain's national pride in the aftermath of the Spanish–American War.

      American interest in the Caribbean

      In 1823, U.S. President James Monroe enunciated the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that the United States would not tolerate further efforts by European governments to colonize land or interfere with states in the Americas; however, Spain's colony in Cuba was exempted. Before the Civil War Southern interests attempted to have the U.S. purchase Cuba and make it new slave territory. The proposal failed, and national attention shifted to the Civil War.

      After the US Civil War and Cuba's Ten Years' War, US businessmen began monopolizing the devalued sugar markets in Cuba. By 1894, 90% of Cuba's total exports went to the US. Additionally, 40% of Cuba's imports came from the US.[20] Cuba's total exports to the US were almost twelve times larger than the export to her mother country, Spain.[21] US business interests indicated that while Spain still held political authority over Cuba, economic authority in Cuba, acting-authority, was shifting to the US.

      The U.S. became interested in a canal either in Nicaragua, or in Panama, where the Panama Canal would eventually be built, and realized the need for naval protection. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan was an especially influential theorist; his ideas were much admired by Theodore Roosevelt, as the U.S. rapidly built a powerful fleet in the 1890s. Roosevelt served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1897–98 and was an aggressive supporter of a war with Spain over Cuba.

      Meanwhile, the Cuba Libre movement, led by Cuban intellectual José Martí, had established offices in Florida[22] and New York to buy and smuggle weapons. It mounted a large propaganda campaign to generate sympathy that would lead to official pressure on Spain. Protestant churches and Democratic farmers were supportive, but business interests called on Washington to ignore them.[23]

      Although Cuba attracted American attention, little note was made of the Philippines, Guam, or Puerto Rico.[24]

      Historians see little popular demand for an empire, but note that Britain, France, Germany and Japan had expanded their overseas empires dramatically, in Africa, Asia and the Pacific.[25]

      Path to war

      Cuban struggle for independence

      The first serious bid for Cuban independence, the Ten Years' War, erupted in 1868 and was subdued by the authorities a decade later. Neither the fighting nor the reforms in the Pact of Zanjón (February 1878) quelled the desire of some revolutionaries for wider autonomy and ultimately independence. One such revolutionary, José Martí, continued to promote Cuban financial and political autonomy in exile. In early 1895, after years of organizing, Martí launched a three-pronged invasion of the island.[26]

      The plan called for one group from Santo Domingo led by Máximo Gómez, one group from Costa Rica led by Antonio Maceo Grajales, and another from the United States (preemptively thwarted by U.S. officials in Florida) to land in different places on the island and provoke an uprising. While their call for revolution, the grito de Baíre, was successful, the result was not the grand show of force Martí had expected. With a quick victory effectively lost, the revolutionaries settled in to fight a protracted guerrilla campaign.[26]

      Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the architect of Spain's Restoration constitution and the prime minister at the time, ordered General Arsenio Martínez-Campos, a distinguished veteran of the war against the previous uprising in Cuba, to quell the revolt. Campos's reluctance to accept his new assignment and his method of containing the revolt to the province of Oriente earned him criticism in the Spanish press.[27]

      The mounting pressure forced Cánovas to replace General Campos with General Valeriano Weyler, a soldier who had experience in quelling rebellions in overseas provinces and the Spanish metropole. Weyler deprived the insurgency of weaponry, supplies, and assistance by ordering the residents of some Cuban districts to move to reconcentration areas near the military headquarters.[27] This strategy was effective in slowing the spread of rebellion. In the United States, this fueled the fire of anti-Spanish propaganda.[28] In a political speech President William McKinley used this to ram Spanish actions against armed rebels. He even said this "was not civilized warfare" but "extermination".[29][30]

      Spanish attitude

      A Spanish satirical drawing published in La Campana de Gràcia (1896), criticizing U.S. behavior regarding Cuba by Manuel Moliné. Text below reads (in Catalan): "Keep the island so it won't get lost."

      The Spanish Government regarded Cuba as a province of Spain rather than a colony, and depended on it for prestige and trade, and as a training ground for the army. Prime minister Antonio Cánovas del Castillo announced that "the Spanish nation is disposed to sacrifice to the last peseta of its treasure and to the last drop of blood of the last Spaniard before consenting that anyone snatch from it even one piece of its territory."[31] He had long dominated and stabilized Spanish politics. He was assassinated in 1897 by Italian anarchist Michele Angiolillo,[32] leaving a Spanish political system that was not stable and could not risk a blow to its prestige.[33]

      U.S. response

      The eruption of the Cuban revolt, Weyler's measures, and the popular fury these events whipped up proved to be a boon to the newspaper industry in New York City, where Joseph Pulitzer of the New York World and William Randolph Hearst of the New York Journal recognized the potential for great headlines and stories that would sell copies. Both papers denounced Spain, but had little influence outside New York. American opinion generally saw Spain as a hopelessly backward power that was unable to deal fairly with Cuba. American Catholics were divided before the war began, but supported it enthusiastically once it started.[34][35]

      The U.S. had important economic interests that were being harmed by the prolonged conflict and deepening uncertainty about the future of Cuba. Shipping firms that relied heavily on trade with Cuba suffered losses as the conflict continued unresolved.[36] These firms pressed Congress and McKinley to seek an end to the revolt. Other American business concerns, specifically those who had invested in Cuban sugar, looked to the Spanish to restore order.[37] Stability, not war, was the goal of both interests. How stability would be achieved would depend largely on the ability of Spain and the U.S. to work out their issues diplomatically.

      While tension increased among the Cubans and Spanish Government, popular support of intervention began to spring up in the United States, due to the emergence of the "Cuba Libre" movement and that many Americans began to envision the Cuban people as themselves from just over a century before. The American people drew parallels between the American Revolution and the Cuban revolt, and saw the Spanish Government as the tyrannical colonial oppressor. Historian Louis Pérez notes that "The proposition of war in behalf of Cuban independence took hold immediately and held on thereafter. Such was the sense of the public mood." At the time many poems and songs were written in the United States to express support of the "Cuba Libre" movement.[38]

      President McKinley, well aware of the political complexity surrounding the conflict, wanted to end the revolt peacefully. Threatening to consider recognizing Cuba's belligerent status, and thus allowing the legal rearming of Cuban insurgents by U.S. firms, he sent Stewart L. Woodford to Madrid to negotiate an end to the conflict. Spain made vague promises but was unable to deliver on them. The Spanish political system was highly unstable and compromise with the U.S. was seen as dangerous. The major European powers, especially Britain, France and Russia, generally supported the American position and urged Spain to give in.[39] Spain repeatedly promised specific reforms that would pacify Cuba but failed to deliver; American patience ran out.[40]

      USS Maine

      Main article: USS Maine (ACR-1)
      The sunken USS Maine in Havana harbor

      McKinley sent the USS Maine to Havana to ensure the safety of American citizens and interests and to underscore the urgent need for reform. Naval forces were moved in position to attack simultaneously on several fronts if the war was not avoided. As Maine left Florida, a large part of the North Atlantic Squadron was moved to Key West and the Gulf of Mexico. Others were also moved just off the shore of Lisbon, and still others were moved to Hong Kong.[41]

      At 9:40 on the evening of February 15, 1898, Maine sank in Havana Harbor after suffering a massive explosion. While McKinley urged patience and did not declare that Spain had caused the explosion, the deaths of 266 out of 355 sailors on board focused American attention. McKinley asked Congress to appropriate $50 million for defense, and Congress unanimously obliged. Most American leaders took the position that the cause of the explosion was unknown, but public attention was now riveted on the situation and Spain could not find a diplomatic solution to avoid war. Spain appealed to the European powers, most of whom advised it to accept U.S. conditions for Cuba in order to avoid war.[42] Germany urged a united European stand against the United States but took no action.[43]

      The U.S. Navy's investigation, made public on March 28, concluded that the ship's powder magazines were ignited when an external explosion was set off under the ship's hull. This report poured fuel on popular indignation in the U.S., making the war inevitable.[44] Spain's investigation came to the opposite conclusion: the explosion originated within the ship. Other investigations in later years came to various contradictory conclusions, but had no bearing on the coming of the war. In 1974, Admiral Hyman George Rickover had his staff look at the documents and decided there was an internal explosion. A study commissioned by National Geographic magazine in 1999, using AME computer modelling, stated that the explosion could have been caused by a mine, but no definitive evidence was found.[45]

      Declaring war

      United States Army officer Colonel Charles A. Wikoff was the most senior U.S. military officer killed in the Spanish–American War.

      After the Maine was destroyed,[46] newspaper publishers Hearst and Pulitzer decided that the Spanish were to blame, and they publicized this theory as fact in their New York City papers using sensationalistic and astonishing accounts of "atrocities" committed by the Spanish in Cuba by using headlines in their newspapers, such as "Spanish Murderers" and "Remember The Maine". Their press exaggerated what was happening and how the Spanish were treating the Cuban prisoners.[47] The stories were based on factual accounts, but most of the time, the articles that were published were embellished and written with incendiary language causing emotional and often heated responses among readers. A common myth falsely states that when illustrator Frederic Remington said there was no war brewing in Cuba, Hearst responded: "You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war."[48]

      This new "yellow journalism" was, however, uncommon outside New York City, and historians no longer consider it the major force shaping the national mood.[49] Public opinion nationwide did demand immediate action, overwhelming the efforts of President McKinley, Speaker of the House Thomas Brackett Reed, and the business community to find a negotiated solution.

      A speech delivered by Republican Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont on March 17, 1898 thoroughly analyzed the situation, concluding that war was the only answer. The speech helped provide one final push for the United States to declare war.[3]:210 Many in the business and religious communities which had until then opposed war, switched sides, leaving McKinley and Speaker Reed almost alone in their resistance to a war.[50][51] On April 11, McKinley ended his resistance and asked Congress for authority to send American troops to Cuba to end the civil war there, knowing that Congress would force a war.

      The American transport ship Seneca, a chartered vessel that carried troops to Puerto Rico and Cuba

      On April 19, while Congress was considering joint resolutions supporting Cuban independence, Republican Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado proposed the Teller Amendment to ensure that the U.S. would not establish permanent control over Cuba after the war. The amendment, disclaiming any intention to annex Cuba, passed the Senate 42 to 35; the House concurred the same day, 311 to 6. The amended resolution demanded Spanish withdrawal and authorized the President to use as much military force as he thought necessary to help Cuba gain independence from Spain. President McKinley signed the joint resolution on April 20, 1898, and the ultimatum was sent to Spain.[52] In response, Spain severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 21. On the same day, the U.S. Navy began a blockade of Cuba.[53] Spain declared war on April 23. On April 25, Congress declared that a state of war between the U.S. and Spain had existed since April 21, the day the blockade of Cuba had begun.[53]

      The Navy was ready, but the Army was not well-prepared for the war and made radical changes in plans and quickly purchased supplies. In the spring of 1898, the strength of the Regular U.S. Army was just 28,000 men. The Army wanted 50,000 new men but received over 220,000, through volunteers and the mobilization of state National Guard units.[54]

      Pacific theater


      The Pacific theatre of the Spanish–American War

      In the 333 years of Spanish rule, the Philippines developed from a small overseas colony governed from the Viceroyalty of New Spain to a land with modern elements in the cities. The Spanish-speaking middle classes of the 19th century were mostly educated in the liberal ideas coming from Europe. Among these Ilustrados was the Filipino national hero José Rizal, who demanded larger reforms from the Spanish authorities. This movement eventually led to the Philippine Revolution against Spanish colonial rule. The revolution had been in a state of truce since the signing of the Pact of Biak-na-Bato in 1897, with revolutionary leaders having accepted exile outside of the country.

      The first battle between American and Spanish forces was at Manila Bay where, on May 1, Commodore George Dewey, commanding the U.S. Navy's Asiatic Squadron aboard USS Olympia, in a matter of hours defeated a Spanish squadron under Admiral Patricio Montojo. Dewey managed this with only nine wounded.[55][56] With the German seizure of Tsingtao in 1897, Dewey's squadron had become the only naval force in the Far East without a local base of its own, and was beset with coal and ammunition problems.[57] Despite these problems, the Asiatic Squadron not only destroyed the Spanish fleet but also captured the harbor of Manila.[57]

      Following Dewey's victory, Manila Bay was filled with the warships of Britain, Germany, France and Japan.[57] The German fleet of eight ships, ostensibly in Philippine waters to protect German interests, acted provocatively – cutting in front of American ships, refusing to salute the United States flag (according to customs of naval courtesy), taking soundings of the harbor, and landing supplies for the besieged Spanish.[58]

      The Germans, with interests of their own, were eager to take advantage of whatever opportunities the conflict in the islands might afford.[60] There was a fear at the time that the islands would become a German possession.[61] The Americans called the bluff of the Germans, threatening conflict if the aggression continued, and the Germans backed down.[60][62] At the time, the Germans expected the confrontation in the Philippines to end in an American defeat, with the revolutionaries capturing Manila and leaving the Philippines ripe for German picking.[63]

      Commodore Dewey transported Emilio Aguinaldo, a Filipino leader who had led rebellion against Spanish rule in the Philippines in 1896, from exile in Hong Kong to the Philippines to rally more Filipinos against the Spanish colonial government.[64] By June, U.S. and Filipino forces had taken control of most of the islands, except for the walled city of Intramuros. On June 12, Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the Philippines.[65][66]

      On August 13, with American commanders unaware that a cease-fire had been signed between Spain and the U.S. on the previous day, American forces captured the city of Manila from the Spanish in the Battle of Manila.[64][67] This battle marked the end of Filipino–American collaboration, as the American action of preventing Filipino forces from entering the captured city of Manila was deeply resented by the Filipinos. This later led to the Philippine–American War,[68] which would prove to be more deadly and costly than the Spanish–American War.

      Spanish prisoners of war in Manila

      The U.S. had sent a force of some 11,000 ground troops to the Philippines. Armed conflict broke out between U.S. forces and the Filipinos when U.S. troops began to take the place of the Spanish in control of the country after the end of the war, resulting in the Philippine–American War. On August 14, 1899, the Schurman Commission recommended that the U.S. retain control of the Philippines, possibly granting independence in the future.[69]


      Main article: Capture of Guam

      On June 20, a U.S. fleet commanded by Captain Henry Glass, consisting of the protected cruiser USS Charleston and three transports carrying troops to the Philippines, entered Guam's Apra Harbor, Captain Glass having opened sealed orders instructing him to proceed to Guam and capture it. Charleston fired a few cannon rounds at Fort Santa Cruz without receiving return fire. Two local officials, not knowing that war had been declared and believing the firing had been a salute, came out to Charleston to apologize for their inability to return the salute as they were out of gunpowder. Glass informed them that the U.S. and Spain were at war.[70]

      The following day, Glass sent Lt. William Braunersruehter to meet the Spanish Governor to arrange the surrender of the island and the Spanish garrison there. Some 54 Spanish infantry were captured and transported to the Philippines as prisoners of war. No U.S. forces were left on Guam, but the only U.S. citizen on the island, Frank Portusach, told Captain Glass that he would look after things until U.S. forces returned.[70]

      Caribbean theater


      The Spanish armored cruiser Cristóbal Colón, which was destroyed during the Battle of Santiago on July 3, 1898
      Detail from Charge of the 24th and 25th Colored Infantry and Rescue of Rough Riders at San Juan Hill, July 2, 1898 depicting the Battle of San Juan Hill

      Theodore Roosevelt advocated intervention in Cuba, both for the Cuban people and to promote the Monroe Doctrine. While Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he placed the Navy on a war-time footing and prepared Dewey's Asiatic Squadron for battle. He also worked with Leonard Wood in convincing the Army to raise an all-volunteer regiment, the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry. Wood was given command of the regiment that quickly became known as the "Rough Riders".[71]

      The Americans planned to capture the city of Santiago de Cuba to destroy Linares' army and Cervera's fleet. To reach Santiago they had to pass through concentrated Spanish defenses in the San Juan Hills and a small town in El Caney. The American forces were aided in Cuba by the pro-independence rebels led by General Calixto García.

      Cuban sentiment

      For quite some time the Cuban public believed the United States government to possibly hold the key to its independence, and even annexation was considered for a time, which historian Louis Pérez explored in his book, "Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy." The Cubans harbored a great deal of discontent towards the Spanish Government, due to years of manipulation on the part of the Spanish. The prospect of getting the United States involved in the fight was considered by many Cubans as a step in the right direction. While the Cubans were wary of the United States' intentions, the overwhelming support from the American public provided the Cubans with some peace of mind, because they believed that the United States was committed to helping them achieve their independence. However, with the imposition of the Platt Amendment of 1903 after the war, as well as economic and military manipulation on the part of the United States, Cuban sentiment towards the United States became polarized, with many Cubans disappointed with continuing American interference.[72]

      Land campaign

      From June 22 to 24, the Fifth Army Corps under General William R. Shafter landed at Daiquirí and Siboney, east of Santiago, and established an American base of operations. A contingent of Spanish troops, having fought a skirmish with the Americans near Siboney on June 23, had retired to their lightly entrenched positions at Las Guasimas. An advance guard of U.S. forces under former Confederate General Joseph Wheeler ignored Cuban scouting parties and orders to proceed with caution. They caught up with and engaged the Spanish rearguard of about 2,000 soldiers led by General Antero Rubín[73] who effectively ambushed them, in the Battle of Las Guasimas on June 24. The battle ended indecisively in favor of Spain and the Spanish left Las Guasimas on their planned retreat to Santiago.

      The U.S. Army employed Civil War-era skirmishers at the head of the advancing columns. Three of four of the U.S. soldiers who had volunteered to act as skirmishers walking point at the head of the American column were killed, including Hamilton Fish II (grandson of Hamilton Fish, the Secretary of State under Ulysses S. Grant), and Captain Allyn K. Capron, Jr., whom Theodore Roosevelt would describe as one of the finest natural leaders and soldiers he ever met. Only Oklahoma Territory Pawnee Indian, Tom Isbell, wounded seven times, survived.[74]

      The Battle of Las Guasimas showed the U.S. that quick-thinking American soldiers would not stick to the linear tactics which did not work effectively against Spanish troops who had learned the art of cover and concealment from their own struggle with Cuban insurgents, and never made the error of revealing their positions while on the defense. Americans advanced by rushes and stayed in the weeds so that they, too, were largely invisible to the Spaniards who used un-targeted volley fire to try to mass fires against the advancing Americans. While some troops were hit, this technique was mostly a waste of bullets as the Americans learned to duck as soon as they heard the Spanish word Fire, "Fuego" yelled by the Spanish officers. Spanish troops were equipped with smokeless powder arms that also helped them to hide their positions while firing.

      Receiving the news of the surrender of Santiago

      Regular Spanish troops were mostly armed with modern charger-loaded 1893 7mm Spanish Mauser rifles and using smokeless powder. The high-speed 7×57mm Mauser round was termed the "Spanish Hornet" by the Americans because of the supersonic crack as it passed overhead. Other irregular troops were armed with Remington Rolling Block rifles in .43 Spanish using smokeless powder and brass-jacketed bullets. US regular infantry were armed with the .30-40 Krag–Jørgensen, a bolt-action rifle with a complex rotating magazine. Both the US regular cavalry and the volunteer cavalry used smokeless ammunition. In later battles, state volunteers used the .45–70 Springfield a single-shot black powder rifle.[74]

      On July 1, a combined force of about 15,000 American troops in regular infantry and cavalry regiments, including all four of the army's "Colored" regiments, and volunteer regiments, among them Roosevelt and his "Rough Riders", the 71st New York, the 2nd Massachusetts Infantry, and 1st North Carolina, and rebel Cuban forces attacked 1,270 entrenched Spaniards in dangerous Civil War-style frontal assaults at the Battle of El Caney and Battle of San Juan Hill outside of Santiago.[75] More than 200 U.S. soldiers were killed and close to 1,200 wounded in the fighting, thanks to the high rate of fire the Spanish were able to put down range at the Americans.[76] Supporting fire by Gatling guns was critical to the success of the assault.[77][78] Cervera decided to escape Santiago two days later.

      The Spanish forces at Guantánamo were so isolated by Marines and Cuban forces that they did not know that Santiago was under siege, and their forces in the northern part of the province could not break through Cuban lines. This was not true of the Escario relief column from Manzanillo,[79] which fought its way past determined Cuban resistance but arrived too late to participate in the siege.

      After the battles of San Juan Hill and El Caney, the American advance halted. Spanish troops successfully defended Fort Canosa, allowing them to stabilize their line and bar the entry to Santiago. The Americans and Cubans forcibly began a bloody, strangling siege of the city.[80] During the nights, Cuban troops dug successive series of "trenches" (raised parapets), toward the Spanish positions. Once completed, these parapets were occupied by U.S. soldiers and a new set of excavations went forward. American troops, while suffering daily losses from Spanish fire, suffered far more casualties from heat exhaustion and mosquito-borne disease.[81] At the western approaches to the city, Cuban general Calixto Garcia began to encroach on the city, causing much panic and fear of reprisals among the Spanish forces.

      Naval operations

      The Santiago Campaign (1898)
      Crewmen pose under the gun turrets of Iowa in 1898

      The major port of Santiago de Cuba was the main target of naval operations during the war. The U.S. fleet attacking Santiago needed shelter from the summer hurricane season; Guantánamo Bay, with its excellent harbor, was chosen. The 1898 invasion of Guantánamo Bay happened between June 6 and 10, with the first U.S. naval attack and subsequent successful landing of U.S. Marines with naval support.

      The Battle of Santiago de Cuba on July 3, was the largest naval engagement of the Spanish–American War and resulted in the destruction of the Spanish Caribbean Squadron (also known as the Flota de Ultramar). In May, the fleet of Spanish Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete had been spotted by American forces in Santiago harbor, where they had taken shelter for protection from sea attack. A two-month stand-off between Spanish and American naval forces followed.

      When the Spanish squadron finally attempted to leave the harbor on July 3, the American forces destroyed or grounded five of the six ships. Only one Spanish vessel, the new armored cruiser Cristóbal Colón, survived, but her captain hauled down her flag and scuttled her when the Americans finally caught up with her. The 1,612 Spanish sailors who were captured, including Admiral Cervera, were sent to Seavey's Island at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, where they were confined at Camp Long as prisoners of war from July 11 until mid-September.

      During the stand-off, U.S. Assistant Naval Constructor, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson Hobson had been ordered by Rear Admiral William T. Sampson to sink the collier USS Merrimac in the harbor to bottle up the Spanish fleet. The mission was a failure, and Hobson and his crew were captured. They were exchanged on July 6, and Hobson became a national hero; he received the Medal of Honor in 1933, retired as a Rear Admiral and became a Congressman.

      U.S. withdrawal

      Yellow fever had quickly spread amongst the American occupation force, crippling it. A group of concerned officers of the American army chose Theodore Roosevelt to draft a request to Washington that it withdraw the Army, a request that paralleled a similar one from General Shafter, who described his force as an "army of convalescents". By the time of his letter, 75% of the force in Cuba was unfit for service.[82]

      On August 7, the American invasion force started to leave Cuba. The evacuation was not total. The U.S. Army kept the black Ninth Infantry Regiment in Cuba to support the occupation. The logic was that their race and the fact that many black volunteers came from southern states would protect them; this logic led to these soldiers being nicknamed "Immunes". Still, when the Ninth left, 73 of its 984 soldiers had contracted the disease.[82]

      Puerto Rico

      Main article: Puerto Rican Campaign
      Puerto Rican and Spanish troops in Guayama, Puerto Rico

      In May 1898, Lt. Henry H. Whitney of the United States Fourth Artillery was sent to Puerto Rico on a reconnaissance mission, sponsored by the Army's Bureau of Military Intelligence. He provided maps and information on the Spanish military forces to the U.S. government prior to the invasion.

      The American offensive began on May 12, 1898, when a squadron of 12 U.S. ships commanded by Rear Adm. William T. Sampson of the United States Navy attacked the archipelago's capital, San Juan. Though the damage inflicted on the city was minimal, the Americans were able to establish a blockade in the city's harbor, San Juan Bay. On June 22, the cruiser Isabel II and the destroyer Terror delivered a Spanish counterattack, but were unable to break the blockade and the Terror was damaged.

      The land offensive began on July 25, when 1,300 infantry soldiers led by Nelson A. Miles disembarked off the coast of Guánica. The first organized armed opposition occurred in Yauco in what became known as the Battle of Yauco.[83]

      This encounter was followed by the Battle of Fajardo. The United States was able to seize control of Fajardo on August 1, but were forced to withdraw on August 5 after a group of 200 Puerto Rican-Spanish soldiers led by Pedro del Pino gained control of the city, while most civilian inhabitants fled to a nearby lighthouse. The Americans encountered larger opposition during the Battle of Guayama and as they advanced towards the main island's interior. They engaged in crossfire at Guamaní River Bridge, Coamo and Silva Heights and finally at the Battle of Asomante.[83][84] The battles were inconclusive as the allied soldiers retreated.

      A battle in San Germán concluded in a similar fashion with the Spanish retreating to Lares. On August 9, 1898, American troops that were pursuing units retreating from Coamo encountered heavy resistance in Aibonito in a mountain known as Cerro Gervasio del Asomante and retreated after six of their soldiers were injured. They returned three days later, reinforced with artillery units and attempted a surprise attack. In the subsequent crossfire, confused soldiers reported seeing Spanish reinforcements nearby and five American officers were gravely injured, which prompted a retreat order. All military actions in Puerto Rico were suspended on August 13, after U.S. President William McKinley and French Ambassador Jules Cambon, acting on behalf of the Spanish Government, signed an armistice whereby Spain relinquished its sovereignty over Puerto Rico.[84]

      Making peace

      Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in the U.S., signing the memorandum of ratification on behalf of Spain

      With defeats in Cuba and the Philippines, and both of its fleets destroyed, Spain sued for peace and negotiations were opened between the two parties. After the sickness and death of British consul Edward Henry Rawson-Walker, American admiral George Dewey requested the Belgian consul to Manila, Édouard André, to take Rawson-Walker's place as intermediary with the Spanish Government.[85][86][87]

      Hostilities were halted on August 12, 1898, with the signing in Washington of a Protocol of Peace between the United States and Spain.[88] After over two months of difficult negotiations, the formal peace treaty, the Treaty of Paris, was signed in Paris on December 10, 1898,[89] and was ratified by the United States Senate on February 6, 1899.

      The United States gained all of Spain's colonies outside of Africa in the treaty, including the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico but with the exception of Cuba, which became a U.S. protectorate.[89] The treaty came into force in Cuba April 11, 1899, with Cubans participating only as observers. Having been occupied since July 17, 1898, and thus under the jurisdiction of the United States Military Government (USMG), Cuba formed its own civil government and gained independence on May 20, 1902, with the announced end of USMG jurisdiction over the island. However, the U.S. imposed various restrictions on the new government, including prohibiting alliances with other countries, and reserved the right to intervene. The U.S. also established a perpetual lease of Guantánamo Bay.


      With the end of the war, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt musters out of the U.S. Army after the required 30-day quarantine period at Montauk, Long Island, in 1898.

      The war lasted ten weeks.[90] John Hay (the United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom), writing from London to his friend Theodore Roosevelt, declared that it had been "a splendid little war".[91][92] The press showed Northerners and Southerners, blacks and whites fighting against a common foe, helping to ease the scars left from the American Civil War.[93]

      The war marked American entry into world affairs. Since then, the U.S. has had a significant hand in various conflicts around the world, and entered many treaties and agreements. The Panic of 1893 was over by this point, and the U.S. entered a long and prosperous period of economic and population growth, and technological innovation that lasted through the 1920s.[94]

      The war redefined national identity, served as a solution of sorts to the social divisions plaguing the American mind, and provided a model for all future news reporting.[95]

      The idea of American imperialism changed in the public's mind after the short and successful Spanish–American War. Due to the United States' powerful influence diplomatically and militarily, Cuba's status after the war relied heavily upon American actions. Two major developments emerged from the Spanish–American War: one, it greatly enforced the United States' vision of itself as a "defender of democracy" and as a major world power, and two, it had severe implications for Cuban–American relations in the future. As historian Louis Pérez argued in his book Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos, the Spanish–American War of 1898 "fixed permanently how Americans came to think of themselves: a righteous people given to the service of righteous purpose".[96]

      The war greatly reduced the Spanish Empire. Spain had been declining as an imperial power since the early 19th century as a result of Napoleon's invasion. The loss of Cuba caused a national trauma because of the affinity of peninsular Spaniards with Cuba, which was seen as another province of Spain rather than as a colony. Spain retained only a handful of overseas holdings: Spanish West Africa (Spanish Sahara), Spanish Guinea, Spanish Morocco, and the Canary Islands.

      The Spanish soldier Julio Cervera Baviera, who served in the Puerto Rican Campaign, published a pamphlet in which he blamed the natives of that colony for its occupation by the Americans, saying, "I have never seen such a servile, ungrateful country [i.e., Puerto Rico].... In twenty-four hours, the people of Puerto Rico went from being fervently Spanish to enthusiastically American.... They humiliated themselves, giving in to the invader as the slave bows to the powerful lord."[97] He was challenged to a duel by a group of young Puerto Ricans for writing this pamphlet.[98]

      A cartoon of Uncle Sam seated in restaurant looking at the bill of fare containing "Cuba steak", "Porto Rico pig", the "Philippine Islands" and the "Sandwich Islands" (Hawaii).

      Culturally, a new wave called the Generation of '98 originated as a response to this trauma, marking a renaissance in Spanish culture. Economically, the war benefited Spain, because after the war large sums of capital held by Spaniards in Cuba and America were returned to the peninsula and invested in Spain. This massive flow of capital (equivalent to 25% of the gross domestic product of one year) helped to develop the large modern firms in Spain in the steel, chemical, financial, mechanical, textile, shipyard, and electrical power industries.[99] However, the political consequences were serious. The defeat in the war began the weakening of the fragile political stability that had been established earlier by the rule of Alfonso XII.

      The Teller Amendment, which was enacted on April 20, 1898, was a promise from the United States to the Cuban people that it was not declaring war to annex Cuba, but to help it gain its independence from Spain. The Platt Amendment was a move by the United States' government to shape Cuban affairs without violating the Teller Amendment.[100]

      The cover of Puck from April 6, 1901. Caricatures an Easter bonnet made out of a warship that alludes to the gains of the Spanish–American War.

      The U.S. Congress had passed the Teller Amendment prior to the war, promising Cuban independence. However, the Senate passed the Platt Amendment as a rider to an Army appropriations bill, forcing a peace treaty on Cuba which prohibited it from signing treaties with other nations or contracting a public debt. The Platt Amendment was pushed by imperialists who wanted to project U.S. power abroad (in contrast to the Teller Amendment which was pushed by anti-imperialists who called for a restraint on U.S. rule). The amendment granted the United States the right to stabilize Cuba militarily as needed. In addition, the Platt Amendment permitted the United States to deploy marines to Cuba if its freedom and independence was ever threatened or jeopardized by an external or internal force. The Platt Amendment also provided for a permanent American naval base in Cuba. Guantánamo Bay was established after the signing of treaties between Cuba and the U.S. beginning in 1903. Thus, despite that Cuba technically gained its independence after the war ended, the United States government ensured that it had some form of power and control over Cuban affairs.

      The U.S. annexed the former Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam. The notion of the United States as an imperial power, with colonies, was hotly debated domestically with President McKinley and the Pro-Imperialists winning their way over vocal opposition led by Democrat William Jennings Bryan, who had supported the war. The American public largely supported the possession of colonies, but there were many outspoken critics such as Mark Twain, who wrote The War Prayer in protest.

      Roosevelt returned to the United States a war hero, and he was soon elected governor and then vice president.

      1900 Campaign poster

      The war served to further repair relations between the American North and South. The war gave both sides a common enemy for the first time since the end of the Civil War in 1865, and many friendships were formed between soldiers of northern and southern states during their tours of duty. This was an important development, since many soldiers in this war were the children of Civil War veterans on both sides.[101]

      Segregation in the U.S. military, 1898

      The African-American community strongly supported the rebels in Cuba, supported entry into the war, and gained prestige from their wartime performance in the Army. Spokesmen noted that 33 African-American seamen had died in the Maine explosion. The most influential Black leader, Booker T. Washington, argued that his race was ready to fight. War offered them a chance "to render service to our country that no other race can", because, unlike Whites, they were "accustomed" to the "peculiar and dangerous climate" of Cuba. One of the Black units that served in the war was the 9th Cavalry Regiment. In March 1898, Washington promised the Secretary of the Navy that war would be answered by "at least ten thousand loyal, brave, strong Black men in the south who crave an opportunity to show their loyalty to our land, and would gladly take this method of showing their gratitude for the lives laid down, and the sacrifices made, that Blacks might have their freedom and rights."[102]

      In 1904, the United Spanish War Veterans was created from smaller groups of the veterans of the Spanish American War. Today, that organization is defunct, but it left an heir in the Sons of Spanish–American War Veterans, created in 1937 at the 39th National Encampment of the United Spanish War Veterans. According to data from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, the last surviving U.S. veteran of the conflict, Nathan E. Cook, died on September 10, 1992, at age 106. (If the data is to be believed, Cook, born October 10, 1885, would have been only 12 years old when he served in the war.)

      The Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) was formed in 1914 from the merger of two prior veterans organizations which both arose in 1899: the American Veterans of Foreign Service and the National Society of the Army of the Philippines.[103] The former was formed for veterans of the Spanish–American War, while the latter was formed for veterans of the Philippine–American War. Both organizations were formed in response to the general neglect veterans returning from the war experienced at the hands of the government.

      To pay the costs of the war, Congress passed an excise tax on long-distance phone service.[104] At the time, it affected only wealthy Americans who owned telephones. However, the Congress neglected to repeal the tax after the war ended four months later, and the tax remained in place for over 100 years until, on August 1, 2006, it was announced that the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the IRS would no longer collect the tax.[105]

      Postwar American investment in Puerto Rico

      The change in sovereignty of Puerto Rico, like the occupation of Cuba, brought about major changes in both the insular and U.S. economies. Prior to 1898 the sugar industry in Puerto Rico was in decline for nearly half a century. In the second half of the nineteenth century technological advances increased the capital requirements to remain competitive in the sugar industry. Agriculture began to shift toward coffee production, which required less capital and land accumulation. However, these trends were reversed with U.S. hegemony. Early U.S. monetary and legal policies made it both harder for local farmers to continue operations and easier for American businesses to accumulate land.[106] This, along with the large capital reserves of American businesses, led to a resurgence in the Puerto Rican sugar industry in the form of large American owned agro-industrial complexes.

      At the same time, the inclusion of Puerto Rico into the U.S. tariff system as a customs area, effectively treating Puerto Rico as a state with respect to internal or external trade, increased the codependence of the insular and mainland economies and benefitted sugar exports with tariff protection. In 1897 the United States purchased 19.6 percent of Puerto Rico's exports while supplying 18.5 percent of its imports. By 1905 these figures jumped to 84 percent and 85 percent, respectively.[107] However, coffee was not protected, as it was not a product of the mainland. At the same time, Cuba and Spain, traditionally the largest importers of Puerto Rican coffee, now subjected Puerto Rico to previously nonexistent import tariffs. These two effects led to a decline in the coffee industry. From 1897 to 1901 coffee went from 65.8 percent of exports to 19.6 percent while sugar went from 21.6 percent to 55 percent.[108] The tariff system also provided a protected market place for Puerto Rican tobacco exports. The tobacco industry went from nearly nonexistent in Puerto Rico to a major part of the country's agricultural sector.

      Spanish–American War in film and television

      The Spanish–American War was the first U.S. war in which the motion picture camera played a role.[109] The Library of Congress archives contain many films and film clips from the war.[110] In addition, a few feature films have been made about the war. These include

      Military decorations

      U.S. Army "War with Spain" campaign streamer

      United States

      The United States awards and decorations of the Spanish–American War were as follows:

      Wartime service and honors
      Postwar occupation service

      Other countries

      The governments of Spain and Cuba also issued a wide variety of military awards to honor Spanish, Cuban, and Philippine soldiers who had served in the conflict.

      See also



      1. 1 2 Unrecognized as participants by the primary belligerents.
      2. The United States was informally allied with Katipunan forces under Emilio Aguinaldo from the time of Aguinaldo's return to Manila on May 19, 1898 until those forces were absorbed into a government proclaimed May 24, 1898, and continued to be informally allied with government forces until the end of the war.
      3. Philippine Revolution

      Source citations

      1. Guevara, Sulpicio, ed. (2005), "Philippine Declaration of Independence", The laws of the first Philippine Republic (the laws of Malolos) 1898–1899, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library (published 1972), retrieved January 2, 2013. (English translation by Sulpicio Guevara)
      2. Guevara, Sulpicio, ed. (2005), "Facsimile of the Proclamation of the Philippine Independence at Kawit, Cavite, June 12, 2017", The laws of the first Philippine Republic (the laws of Malolos) 1898–1899, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Library (published 1972), retrieved January 2, 2013. (Original handwritten Spanish)
      3. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Dyal 1996
      4. Trask 1996, p. 371
      5. 1 2 Arriba España Twentieth-Century Spain Politics and Society in Spain, 1898–1998, Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, 1999, pg. 19, MacMillan Distribution Ltd, ISBN 0-333-71694-9
      6. Some recent historians prefer a broader title to encompass the fighting in Cuba and the Philippine Islands.
      7. Mark Barnes (2010). The Spanish–American War and Philippine Insurrection, 1898–1902. Routledge. p. 67.
      8. W. Joseph Campbell, Yellow journalism: Puncturing the myths, defining the legacies (2001).
      9. Beede 1994, p. 148.
      10. Beede 1994, p. 120.
      11. Pérez 1998, p. 89 states: "In the larger view, the Cuban insurrection had already brought the Spanish army to the brink of defeat. During three years of relentless war, the Cubans had destroyed railroad lines, bridges, and roads and paralyzed telegraph communications, making it all but impossible for the Spanish army to move across the island and between provinces. [The] Cubans had, moreover, inflicted countless thousands of casualties on Spanish soldiers and effectively driven Spanish units into beleaguered defensive concentrations in the cities, there to suffer the further debilitating effects of illness and hunger."
      12. "Military Book Reviews". Retrieved March 22, 2011.
      13. 1 2 Dyal 1996, pp. 108–109.
      14. Benjamin R. Beede (2013). The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions, 1898T1934: An Encyclopedia. Taylor & Francis. p. 289.
      15. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign relations since 1776 (2008) ch. 8
      16. "U.S. Senate: Official Declarations of War by Congress". June 29, 2015.
      17. Baycroft & Hewitson 2006, pp. 225–226
      18. Antonio Cánovas del Castillo (November 1882). "Discurso sobre la nación" (in Spanish). & Hewitson 2006, pp. 225–226
      19. Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher (2008). The Conquest of History: Spanish Colonialism and National Histories in the Nineteenth Century. Pitt Latin American series. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 34–42. ISBN 9780822971092. Retrieved February 12, 2014.
      20. Perez, Jose, Jr, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. p149
      21. Perez, Jose, Jr, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. p138
      22. Gary R. Mormino, "Cuba Libre, Florida, and the Spanish American War," Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal (2010) Vol. 31 Issue 1/2, pp. 43–54
      23. G. Wayne King, "Conservative Attitudes in the United States toward Cuba (1895–1898)," Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association, (1973) pp. 94–104
      24. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (2008)
      25. Edward P. Crapol, "Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth-Century. American Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 16 (Fall 1992): 573–97; Hugh DeSantis, "The Imperialist Impulse and American Innocence, 1865–1900," in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review (1981), pp. 65–90; James A. Field, Jr., "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book," American Historical Review 83 (June 1978): 644–68
      26. 1 2 Trask 1996, pp. 2–3
      27. 1 2 Jonathan Krohn, "Review of Tone, John Lawrence, War and Genocide in Cuba 1895–1898. "H-War, H-Net Reviews." May 2008. online
      28. Trask 1996, pp. 8–10; Carr 1982, pp. 379–388.
      29. "William McKinley : First Annual Message". The American Presidency Project. December 6, 1897.
      30. James Ford Rhodes (2007), The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations 1897–1909, READ BOOKS, pp. 44, ISBN 978-1-4067-3464-5, citing an annual message delivered December 6, 1897 from French Ensor Chadwick (1968), The relations of the United States and Spain: diplomacy, Russell & Russell
      31. Quoted in Trask 1996, p. 6
      32. Angiolillo Died Bravely, August 22, 1897, The New York Times.
      33. Octavio Ruiz, "Spain on the Threshold of a New Century: Society and Politics before and after the Disaster of 1898," Mediterranean Historical Review (June 1998), Vol. 13 Issue 1/2, pp 7–27
      34. Scott Wright, "The Northwestern Chronicle and the Spanish–American War: American Catholic Attitudes Regarding the 'Splendid Little War,'" American Catholic Studies 116#4 (2005): 55-68.
      35. However three Catholic newspapers were critical of the war after it began. Benjamin Wetzel, "A Church Divided: Roman Catholicism, Americanization, and the Spanish–American War." Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 14#3 (2015): 348-366.
      36. Trade with Cuba had dropped by more than two thirds from a high of 100 Million USD. Offner 2004, p. 51.
      37. David M. Pletcher, The Diplomacy of Trade and Investment: American Economic Expansion in the Hemisphere, 1865–1900 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998).
      38. Louis A. Pérez Jr. (2000). The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography. p. 24.
      39. John L. Offner (2014). An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895-1898. pp. 54–69.
      40. Offner, An Unwanted War pp 86-110
      41. Offner 2004, p. 56.
      42. Keenan, Jerry (2001). Encyclopedia of the Spanish–American & Philippine–American Wars. ABC-CLIO. p. "european+powers" 372. ISBN 978-1-57607-093-2.
      43. Tucker, Spencer (2009). The Encyclopedia of the Spanish–American and Philippine–American Wars: A Political, Social, and Military History. ABC-CLIO. p. 614. ISBN 978-1-85109-951-1.
      44. Offner 2004, p. 57. For a minority view that downplays the role of public opinion and asserts that McKinley feared the Cubans would win their insurgency before the U.S. could intervene, see Louis A. Pérez, "The Meaning of the Maine: Causation and the Historiography of the Spanish–American War," The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 58, No. 3 (Aug. 1989), pp. 293–322.
      45. For a summary of all the studies see Louis Fisher, "Destruction of the Maine (1898)" (2009)
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      49. Smythe 2003, p. 192.
      50. Offner 1992, pp. 131–35; Michelle Bray Davis and Rollin W. Quimby, "Senator Proctor's Cuban Speech: Speculations on a Cause of the Spanish–American War," Quarterly Journal of Speech 1969 55(2): 131–141.
      51. Paul T. McCartney, "Religion, the Spanish–American War, and the Idea of American Mission", Journal of Church and State 54 (Spring 2012), 257–78.
      52. Resolution 24, 33 Stat. 738
      53. 1 2 Trask 1996, p. 57
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      57. 1 2 3 James A. Field, Jr. (June 1978), "American Imperialism: the Worst Chapter in Almost Any Book", The American Historical Review (American Historical Association) 83 (3): 659, doi:10.2307/1861842, JSTOR 1861842
      58. Dewey characterized the German interests as a single import firm; Admiral Otto von Diederichs responded with a list of eleven.[59]
      59. Wionzek 2000, p. x.
      60. 1 2 Seekins, Donald M. (1991), "Historical Setting—Outbreak of War, 1898", in Dolan, Ronald E., Philippines: A Country Study, Washington: Library of Congress (Call Number DS655.P598 1993), retrieved April 28, 2013 External link in |publisher= (help)
      61. Susan K. Harris (June 1, 2011). God's Arbiters: Americans and the Philippines, 1898-1902. Oxford University Press, USA. p. 133. ISBN 978-0-19-978107-2.
        Benjamin R. Beede; Vernon L. Williams; Wolfgang Drechsler (1994). The War of 1898, and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia. Taylor & Francis. pp. 201–202. ISBN 978-0-8240-5624-7.
        David F. Trask (1981). The War with Spain in 1898. U of Nebraska Press. p. 284. ISBN 0-8032-9429-8.
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        ^ What ifs in Philippine history, Conclusion, Manila Times, September 22, 2006, archived from the original on October 30, 2007, retrieved October 19, 2007
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      72. Mary Beth Norton; et al. (2014). A People and a Nation, Volume II: Since 1865. Cengage Learning. p. 582.
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      86. Cooling 2007, p. 99, "Fearful of what the Filipinos might do, the American and Spanish authorities anxiously negotiated a way out of the thorny issue of Manila City. Aided by Belgian consul Edouard Andre, Dewey, Merritt, and Augustin"
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      90. Brands Breen Williams Gross, American Stories "A History of the United States", Pearson, p. 536, ISBN 9780205243617
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      92. Millis 1979, p. 340
        This source provides a more complete quote:
        It has been a splendid little war; begun with the highest motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit, favored by the fortune which loves the brave. It is now to be concluded, I hope, with that firm good nature which is after all the distinguishing trait of our American character.
      93. Montoya 2011, p. 78.
      94. Bailey 1961, p. 657
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      107. Bergad 1978, p. 76.
      108. Bergad 1978, p. 74.
      109. The Spanish American War in Motion Picture, U.S. Library of Congress.
      110. Early Motion Pictures, 1897–1920, U.S. Library of Congress


      Further reading

      • Bradford, James C. ed., Crucible of Empire: The Spanish–American War and Its Aftermath (1993), essays on diplomacy, naval and military operations, and historiography.
      • Dobson, John M. Reticent Expansionism: The Foreign Policy of William McKinley. (1988).
      • Fry, Joseph A. "William McKinley and the Coming of the Spanish–American War: A Study of the Besmirching and Redemption of an Historical Image," Diplomatic History 3 (Winter 1979): 77–97
      • Gould, Lewis. The Spanish–American War and President McKinley (1980) excerpt and text search
      • Foner, Philip, The Spanish–Cuban–American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895–1902 (1972)
      • Hamilton, Richard. President McKinley, War, and Empire (2006).
      • Harrington, Fred H. "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898–1900," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Sep. 1935), pp. 211–230 in JSTOR
      • Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (2008), the latest survey
      • Hoganson, Kristin. Fighting For American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish–American and Philippine–American Wars (1998)
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