Peer de Silva

Peer de Silva (died 1978) was a station chief in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). During World War II he served as an army officer and worked in the Manhattan Engineer District, the undercover project which sought to build the first atomic bomb. After the war, he joined a pre-CIA intelligence service, eventually rising to the rank of chief of station (COS) in the CIA. Having learned Russian, he worked in central Europe during the 1950s, then as CIA chief in Vienna. Later, he headed the CIA's station at the American Embassy in Seoul, South Korea, where he played a role in two major events. First was the democratic April Revolution in 1960. Yet in 1961 a successful May coup d'état installed General Pak Chung Hee (head of state, 1961–1979). Following the 1963 military overthrown of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem (head of state, 1954–1963), President Johnson personally selected de Silva as the CIA's new Chief of Station in Saigon.^[1]

Early career

Born and raised in San Francisco, California, de Silva entered the United States Military Academy at West Point, graduating probably in the class of 1941. As an Army officer in personnel security, he protected the scientists and technicians in the Manhattan project. He carried to Tinian, an island in the western Pacific, "the pluonium sphere". It was then assembled into the device that horrifically obliterated central Nagasaki. Following the surrender of Japan, Lieutenant Colonel de Silva escorted a team of civilians who conducted a scientific survey at the sites of the Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In October 1945 de Silva returned to Washington, D.C., for reassignment in the War Department.^[2][3]

John Magruder, U.S. Army. Later OSS & CIA.

The OSS, the major American intelligence agency during World War II, interested de Silva. Although the OSS had been abolished (late 1945), for a time core OSS functions were absorbed by a new military unit in the War Department: the SSU. It was headed by General John Magruder, formerly a deputy director of the OSS. In 1947 these core "operation" functions were folded into the newly created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).^[4][5] In the meantime, General Leslie Groves of the Manhattan Engineer District agreed to transfer de Silva. At SSU, General Magruder assigned de Silva to "X-2" the counterintelligence section. From his war-time work, de Silva knew of the Soviet espionage assault on the Manhattan atomic bomb project. An assignment to Europe was considered for de Silva, in the effort to counter Soviet attempts to malappropriate scientific information.^[6][7]

An opportunity arose, however, for Russian language instruction at Columbia University in a 3-year Army program. In 1946 de Silva obtained a temporary Army transfer and began his study of Russian. In mid-1948 he was sent to Allied-occupied Austria.^[8] There he minded an unpleasant Russian colonel permitted to travel widely in the American zone, in order to speak with displaced persons; the Soviet offered them return to the USSR, an very unpopular option. During 1949 de Silva repeatedly flew between Helsinki and Moscow, while carrying classified documents as a diplomatic courier. Associated with the Army per his Russian language ability, de Silva nonetheless made contact with various CIA agents stationed in central and eastern Europe, very tense terrain during the early years of the Cold War.^[9]

General Major Gehlen in 1945 (Photo: U.S. Army Signal Corps)

As "an Army officer on detail to the CIA" de Silva, from late 1949 to mid-1951, became deputy to the chief at a CIA base in Pullach, near Munich, in the newly independent Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Then CIA was replacing Army intelligence in its role doing liaison work with the reconstituted Gehlen organization, that it had performed during the Allied occupation of Germany. Headquartered in Pullach, this West German intelligence group was administered by Reinhard Gehlen, who had in World War II led German military intelligence in the east.^[10][11]

A major part of de Silva's job in Pullach was to assist in various West German efforts to collect information from the occupied Soviet Zone of Germany. The chief target was the Russian military establiishment, its intentions and capabilities. Deputy de Silva frequently met with Gehlen, a shy introvert, but intense and dedicated. They worked to recruit German agents (known as V-manner), sent to or already living in the Soviet Zone. Awareness of the status of these agents was tricky, as sometimes a V-mann might be turned or doubled by opposing Communist officials, corrupting any subsequent information. In 1956 Gehlen became the first chief of West German intelligence, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).^[12][13][14]

Back at CIA headquarters, then located in Washington near the Lincoln Memorial, de Silva in 1951 briefly worked in the Foreign Intelligence Staff under the veteran Eric Timm. Later de Silva was appointed chief of operations in the Soviet Russia Division. At that time the CIA possessed no assets (intelligence agents) in the USSR. Without much success, the CIA had been parachuting Russian-speaking volunteers into the Soviet Union, with false papers. Almost all of them, however, were being captured and forced to serve the Soviets; any further information received was doctored, or worthless. One CIA operation in Russia that did meet with success involved a joint reconnaissance mission with the Navy, sending a small team to a newly built Soviet airfield in eastern Siberia. On occasion the CIA encountered the defection of a Soviet agent, which caused excitement but required a studied reception, patient observation, and a careful response based on a calibrated trust. In 1955 an increase in defections kept the SR Division busy.^[15][16]

With the purpose of resigning as an Army officer de Silva had in 1951 been interviewed by formidable General Walter Bedell Smith, then the DCI. Routine orders to Army officers could interfere with duties at CIA. In 1953 de Silva spoke with the new DCI Allen Dulles. He was honorably discharged by the Army. Accordingly, de Silva then became a civilian at CIA.^[17]

Chief of Station (COS)

Following his service in the CIA's Soviet Russia Division, Peer de Siva was appointed Chief of Station (COS) at a number of different CIA posts: Austria, South Korea, Hong Kong, South Vietnam, Thailand, and Australia.^[18] The office of the COS was usually located at the American Embassy.

Vienna 1956 to 1959

Austria 1945–1955, to the east: Budapest

In early 1955 Frank Wisner, the head of CIA's Clandestine Service, assigned de Silva to Vienna as deputy COS. The four-power occupation of Austria then came to an end, which required the reduction in the CIA station, and a corresponding reduction of Soviet GRU and KGB intelligence agents. Latter, the CIA's Vienna station managed to surreptitiously overhear the preparations of a neutral power [probably India] for a conference in Moscow. Also accomplished by bugging, the CIA discovered and then doubled several Austrian agents recruited by Soviet intelligence. In 1956 de Silva filled the position of the departing COS. Fraternizing with Soviet agents had been prohibited by the CIA, but changes encouraged and welcomed by de Silva allowed informal meetings between the rival groups of intelligence agents--until the bloody events in Hungary intruded.^[19]

By October the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 had erupted, which caused the CIA to focus great attention on the tense, life-or-death sequence unfolding in Budapest, about 200 kilometers down river. At first CIA headquarters entertained great hopes, some that went beyond what was probable, for the success of the Hungarian challenge to Communist rule. Such excessive zeal de Silva worked to restrain.^[20][21] After the Soviet-led invasion crushed the newly formed Hungarian government, a flood of refugees poured across the border. The aftermath of these events occupied much of the remainder of his tour of duty in Vienna. The very last event for de Silva was the Soviet-funded World Youth Festival held in Vienna in July. De Silva reports that Austrian student groups turned the Festival into a propaganda disaster for its sponsor.^[22]

Seoul 1959 to 1962

After learning that de Silva desired a post in East Asia, Richard Helms then deputy chief in the Clandestine Service assigned him to Seoul as Chief of Station (COS). Syngman Rhee the president had many years before ejected the CIA wholesale from his country due to an unfortunate incident at Yong-do island. Not until 1959 was the CIA officially welcomed back into South Korea.^[23][24]

Chang Myon in 1956

Although the elderly Rhee remained president he was surrounded by "an almost impenetrable 'human curtain' of aides" who ran the country. Widely unpopular, they were notorious for their arrogance and bribery, and the regime's security police for cruelty. One US Ambassador was leaving, another soon to arrive; 50,000 US troop helped keep an uneasy peace after the Korean War (1950–1953). Another Christian politician, Chang Myon, enjoyed a popular following. Unfortunately, the Americans maintained few if any contacts with opposition politicians. Then de Silva obtained permission from the embassy to communicate with Chang Myon, and they established rapport. In early 1960 an election was held, in which Chang most probably bested the corrupt Rhee regime, but for the "fraud and deceit" practices by his aides. Student protests were mounted. The police fired on a protesting crowd in Seoul killing over a hundred, wounding thousands. The populace erupted in anger.^[25][26]

In the Blue House (Kyŏngmudae) the ruling party gathered; their police and army had abandoned the streets to protesting crowds. While the US ambassador waited for instructions from Washington, de Silva telephoned the Blue House and spoke with the Defense Minister Kim Chong Yol, warning him of danger. The unexpected result was the scheduling of a meeting, approved by Washington, with Walter P. McConaughy the new Ambassador. In the embassy car de Silva rode with McConaughy through the teeming streets to the Blue House. There the government agreed to resign; the senile President Rhee would leave the country. At the news the street crowds celebrated. The 1960 April Revolution in South Korea eventually caused new elections, which resulted in a new democratic government led by the then popular Chang Myon.^{[27][28][29][30]}

Pres. Park Jung-hee

In the period following the departure of Rhee but before the new election, American President Dwight Eisenhower came to Seoul on a state visit. He was greeted by Huh Chung of the interim government.^[31] "The Koreans were ecstatic... . ...Seoul was a mass of good-humored, cheering Koreans who took the occasion to shake every American hand they could find." Eisenhower extended his stay. At a breakfast at the US Embassy, de Silva saw an animated U.S. President converse with Korean dignitaries, including the leading candidate Chang Myon. The give-and-take encounter was "articulate, candid, and informative." The CIA's de Silva called the American leader's short visit "highly successful".^[32]

The following year in May ROK General Pak Chung Hee (1917–1979) and accomplice senior officers staged the 1961 South Korean coup d'état, overthrowing the elected regime of Chang Myon. Yet prior to the coup, the American-inspired political order had functioned anemically. The discredited police of the Rhee era could not maintain order, and massive student demonstrations often could manipulate and debilitate the regime's agenda. The incoherent governance impaired an already weak economy. Consequently, the national purpose was obscured by conflict and confusion, which the gentlemanly Chang could not cure.^[33][34]

The ROK Army then moved to reimpose a traditional authoritarian order and its values, undoing the democracy. General Carter Magruder the top American military officer considered General Pak as Communist and the coup as mutiny, defying civilian authority and his own UN command. McConaughy had left Korea, the new US Ambassador had not yet arrived, leaving only the embassy's chargé d'affaires. Chang Myon eventually came to visit de Silva, who had warned Chang before the coup. Yet circumstances compelled de Silva to turn to several ROK Army officers, Captain Pak Chong Gyu and Colonel Kim Chong Pil.^[35] This led to de Silva's first interview with coup-leader General Pak Chung Hee. American intelligence had concluded Pak was not a Communist, and de Silva counseled Pak to initiate an understanding with the Americans. Yet continuing conflicts caused a nationalist ROK battalion to surround the US Embassy. The Pentagon, according to de Silva, now saw the danger in the impasse and Magruder met with Pak. As the new US Ambassador Samuel Berger arrived, the situation became functional.^[36][37][38]

Thereafter the South Korean economy staged its remarkable take off, initiating an usual era of rapid growth.^[39][40] The authoritarian General and later President Pak Chung Hee, however, remains a pivotal, controversial figure in South Korean history.^[41][42]

Hong Kong 1962 to 1963

Hong Kong, with the PRC in grey

Desmond Fitzgerald chief of the CIA's Far East Division told de Silva of his new assignment. In Hong Kong de Silva found the case officers speaking Mandarin or Cantonese and that they were considered "old China hands" having done repeated CIA tours in East Asia. Himself speaking Russian and familiar with Europe, de Silva realized the value of their experience. The British who governed Hong Kong remained mindful of the nearby People's Republic of China (PRC), which not only had substantial business entities located in the city, but also controlled its water supply. Accordingly, de Silva was careful not to upset the delicate, prevailing balance the British had constructed. Nonetheless the CIA conducted espionage activities targeting the mainland. These met with little success, the PRC then being territory difficult for foreign intelligence to penetrate.^[43]

The Kuomintang nationalist Chinese of Taiwan also ran agents into the PRC, or Communist China as it was then often called. In fact, double agents among Chinese-speakers were common. For their part the British when they captured Chinese spies from either side, as was common, diplomatically returned each to their country of origin. "Altogether it was a never-ending burlesque, except that people did die performing it," wrote de Silva. Most of the population in Hong Kong were refugees or escapees from the PRC, or their descendants. Chinese continued trying to escape to Hong Kong, and the British steered a careful path in refusing or accepting such new arrivals. Chinese seeking asylum were interrogated by the British, who thereby gathered "sociological intelligence" on the Communist regime, current information about rations, the economy, and morale. Frequently, de Silva performed routine liaison work vis-á-vis his British counterparts in intelligence and security.^[44][45] Stationed to Hong Kong for a three-year tour, de Silva and his wife stayed only 17 months.^[46]

Saigon 1963 to 1965

John McCone, DCI 1961–1965.

In November 1963, the new chief of CIA's Far East Division William Colby requested that de Silva travel from Hong Kong to Vietnam, meeting him there for an extensive inspection of CIA operations. Colby had recently served as COS in Saigon. Since, John H. Richardson, a "long-time friend" of de Silva, had been COS in Saigon, until that October when he'd been fired by the new Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. In their travels Colby and de Silva investigated the conflict between the government and the Viet Cong insurgency in the cities and in the countryside. It was soon after the military coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem on November 1st. Colby told de Silva his next assignment would probably be Saigon. On December 10, DCI John McCone suddenly ("Upon receipt of this message") transferred him to COS Saigon. Immediately de Silva flew to Washington to see the Director, who took him to the White House. Previously Johnson had made it clear he wanted a "four-star CIA man for the post." Meeting the President in person, de Silva "passed muster".^[47][48][49]

William Colby
of CIA, CORDS.

When de Silva arrived in Saigon as COS the CIA station numbered about 400 people, the largest in the agency. It's personnel performed at least fifteen different lines of professional and technical work. The CIA worked with Vietnamese intelligence to establish National Interrogation Centers, and instructed the National Police on its modern methods. The "soft" technique taught caused the subject being questioned to realize his or her "well-being was best served by responding truthfully". Not effective every time, it was "consistently productive". It worked better than torture. ^[50][51]

Westmoreland was the new military commander, Taylor (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) became the new ambassador, and McNamara was Secretary of Defense. These three then made poor decisions. Taylor instructed Westmoreland to fight a "big war" which was the wrong war, according to de Silva, and led to the 1975 defeat. The Viet Cong enemy had two strategies: 1) ambush the military; and 2) terrorize rural people and civil leaders. The night belonged to the Viet Cong. Torture and murder effectively intimidated the villagers, who thereafter fed them, hid them, informed them, and joined them. The "Vietcong had constant access to excellent intelligence". Not surprisingly, the "idea of counterinsurgency [had became] an instant cult" for some Americans.^[52][53] In 1964 de Silva was actively addressing the political war against the Viet Cong, advocating programs, and writing a CIA report, "Our Counterinsurgency Experiment and its Implications".^[54][55]

[Under construction].

Bangkok 1966 to 1968

Thailand in white, at the edge of war in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam

After some recovery from his wounds, especially the damage to his eyes, de Silva in 1965 was stationed for a year at CIA Headquarters near Washington. Admiral William Raborn, the new DCI, included de Silva on his staff as the first special assistant for Vietnam affairs (SAVA). A meeting on the regional conflict included Admiral Raborn, US Ambassador to Laos William H. Sullivan, Des Fitzgerald the DDP at CIA, William Colby then head of CIA's Far East Division, and the recovering de Silva. During that year the mushrooming increase in the American militarization of the Vietnam conflict "frustrated and baffled" American war aims, as de Silva understood it. A return to the field was what de Silva desired.^{[56][57][58][59]}

Graham Martin, the US Ambassador to Thailand, in 1966 requested de Silva's assignment to Bangkok. When the COS in Bangkok left, Colby heeded Martin's request and recommended de Silva to Fitzgerald the DDP. Marine Colonel Richard Mample came with de Silva as his deputy. Thailand, too, was threatened with an "armed Communist subversive movement" but one relatively small and isolated. Also, Thailand played a key supporting role in the wider Southeast Asian conflict. Martin and de Silva were in fundamental agreement about identifying the mistakes America had made in Vietnam. They persuaded their "Thai counterparts not to militarize the counterinsurgency effort" but to keep their campaign, although armed, under civilian control. The US embassy in Bangkok should be the institution to direct the American support for Thailand, not Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI), the local version of MACV. The next year, however, Martin left for Rome as America's new ambassador. Martin's replacement was more accommodating to Pentagon requests. Once when traveling from Bangkok to Saigon, de Silva had sought without success a meeting with Robert Komer, head of CORDS, in order to challenge his approach to pacification. Then in 1968 de Silva "somewhat bloodied and wearied by [his prior COS] experience in Vietnam" requested return to CIA Headquarters.^[60][61]

Canberra 1971 to 1972

After serving at a CIA post in San Francisco and at Langley Headquarters with the Foreign Intelligence staff, in 1971 de Silva asked for a foreign assignment. He was offered COS in Canberra, Australia. The post was enjoyable if not as exciting as prior assignments. He functioned mostly as liaison with the competent and friendly Australian intelligence services. It was to be de Silva's "tombstone" assignment with CIA, which ran from May, 1971, to December, 1972.^[62]

His book

Following his retirement from the Central Intelligence Agency, Peer de Silva wrote a book on his career. Entitled Sub Rosa it was published in 1978. It had been approved by the CIA's Publications Review Board.^[63][64]

Bibliography

CIA

• Thomas L. Ahern, Jr., Vietnam Declassified. The CIA and counterinsurgency (University of Kentucky 2010).
• William Colby, Honorable Men. My life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster 1978).
• Peer de Silva, Sub Rosa. The CIA and the uses of intelligence (New York: Times Books 1978).
• Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy. The life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1994),
• Richard Helms, A Look over my Shoulder. A life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House 2003).
• Richard H. Immerman, The Hidden Hand. A brief history of the CIA (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell 2014).
• Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Knopf 1974, reprint Laurel 1980).
• Ralph W. McGehee, Deadly Deceits. My 25 yeats in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square 1983).
• Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence (Pennsylvania State University 1992).
• Thomas Powers, The Man who kept the Secrets. Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1979).
• John Prados, William Colby and the CIA. The secret wars of a controversial spymaster (University of Kansas 2003, 2009).
• John Ranelagh, The Agency. The rise and decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster 1986).
• Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes. The history of the CIA (New York: Doubleday 2007).
  • Athan Theoharis, editor, The Central Intelligence Agency. Security under scrutiny (Westport: Greenwood Press 2006).

Other

• Frank Gibney, Korea's Quiet Revolution. From garrison state to democracy (New York: Walker 1992).
• Zalin Grant, Facing the Phoenix. The CIA and the political defeat of the United States in Vietnam (New York: Norton 1991).
• Ki-baik Lee, Han'guksa Sillon (Seoul 1961, 1967, 1976), translated as A New History of Korea (Harvard University 1984).
• John T. McAlister and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and their Revolution (New York: Harper Torchbook 1970).
• David Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, George Bailey, Battleground Berlin. CIA and KGB in the Cold War (Yale University 1997).
• Tran Ngoc Chau, Vietnam Labyrinth. Allies, enemies, and why the U.S. lost the war (Lubbock: Texas Tech University 2012).
• Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program (New York: Avon Books 1990).
  • Byung-kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, editors, The Park Chung Hee Era. The transformation of South Korea (Harvard University 2013).

Notes