Parratt v. Taylor
Parratt v. Taylor | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| |||||||
Argued March 2, 1981 Decided May 18, 1981 | |||||||
Full case name | Parratt, et al. v. Taylor | ||||||
Citations |
101 S. Ct. 1908; 68 L. Ed. 2d 420; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 99; 49 U.S.L.W. 4509 | ||||||
Holding | |||||||
Procedural due process guarantees only a post-deprivation hearing, provision of a right to sue in state court was provision of that hearing. | |||||||
Court membership | |||||||
| |||||||
Case opinions | |||||||
Majority | Rehnquist, joined by Burger, Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Stevens | ||||||
Concurrence | Stewart | ||||||
Concurrence | White | ||||||
Concurrence | Blackmun | ||||||
Concurrence | Powell | ||||||
Concur/dissent | Marshall | ||||||
Overruled by | |||||||
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) |
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court, in which the court considered the applicability of Due Process to a claim brought under Section 1983.
Background
The respondent was an inmate at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex who had ordered hobby materials by mail. When the hobby materials were lost, he brought suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 to recover their value, $23.50.
Opinion of the Court
The Court held that when procedural due process guarantees only a post-deprivation hearing, provision of a right to sue in state court was provision of that hearing.
The Court found that the deprivation did not occur as the result of some established state procedure, but as the result of the unauthorized failure of state agents to follow established state procedure, and because Nebraska had a tort claims procedure that provided a remedy to persons who had suffered a tortious loss at the hands of the State, but which respondent did not use, such procedure could have fully compensated respondent for his property loss and were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
The Court found that although the respondent was deprived of property under color of state law, he had not sufficiently alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court also held that a merely negligent deprivation of property under color of state law was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This holding was overruled by Daniels v. Williams in 1986, which held that a 1983 action only lies for an intentional deprivation of rights.