Militärischer Abschirmdienst

Military Counterintelligence Service Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD)
Logo of the MAD
Active	1956–present
Country	Federal Republic of Germany
Branch	Bundeswehr
Type	Military Intelligence
Size	1213 (as of 2009)
Part of	Streitkräftebasis
Headquarters	Cologne
Commanders
President	Christof Gramm

The Militärischer Abschirmdienst (Military Counterintelligence Service, MAD) or more officially Amt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst (in the past Amt für die Sicherheit der Bundeswehr), is one of the three federal intelligence agencies in Germany and is responsible for military counterintelligence. The other two are the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service, BND), which is the foreign intelligence agency, and the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, BfV) which is the domestic civilian intelligence agency.

The headquarters of the MAD are in Cologne, with twelve groups located in cities throughout Germany. These MAD groups are collectively known to be the Militärischer Abschirmdienst. The agency has about 1,300 military and civilian employees and in 1995 had an annual budget of 74 million euros.

Duties

The MAD is part of the Bundeswehr, the German armed forces. As a domestic intelligence service, it has similar functions within the military as the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz and works closely together with the BfV. The main duties of the MAD are counterintelligence and detection of "anticonstitutional activities" within the Bundeswehr. Other duties include the protection of Bundeswehr properties from sabotage and foreign espionage. Members of the MAD are also involved in planning and construction of buildings with high security requirements. The MAD has no prosecution power. The lead agency for the German military intelligence operations as well as strategic defense-related intelligence is the Bundesverteidigungsministerium (Ministry of Defense) in Berlin.

The legal basis for the MAD is the MAD Law of December 20, 1990,^[1] as amended by Article 8 of the law of April 22, 2005.^[2]

Legal

Logo jurisLogo Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection Law on the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD-law - MADG)

Unofficial Contents MADG

Date of issue: 20.12.1990

Full Quote:

"MAD-law of 20 December 1990 (BGBl. I S. 2954, 2977), last amended by Article 8 of the Law of 20 June 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1602) has been changed"

Was standing: Last amended by Art. 8 G v. 6.20.2013 I 1602

For details on the status information you can find in the menu under Notices Footnote

(+++ Text detection from: 12.30.1990 +++)

The G was I decided in 2954 as a kind of 3 G v 20.12.1990 by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat..; G was announced on 29.12.1990 and is gem. Art. 6 para. 1 G v. 20.12.1990 I 2954 came on the day after its promulgation. Unofficial Contents § 1 Tasks

(1) the task of the Military Counterintelligence of the Ministry of Defense is the collection and analysis of information, in particular of appropriate and personal disclosure, messages and documents through 1. Efforts, which are directed against the free democratic basic order, the existence or security of the Federation or a Land, . 2 unsafe or intelligence activities in the scope of this Act for a foreign power, if these efforts or activities against persons, departments or bodies set up in the Federal Ministry of Defense and going out or going out of people to which belong to this division or in him operate. In addition, the Military Counterintelligence Service is responsible for the collection and analysis of information, in particular of appropriate and personal disclosure, messages and documents, on the participation of members of the division of the Ministry of Defense as well as by people who work in it or working in it be should, in efforts against the idea of international (Article 9 para. 2 of the Basic Law), in particular against the peaceful coexistence of peoples (Article 26 para. 1 of the Basic Law) are directed. § 4 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act shall apply. (2) In addition, the responsibility of the Military Counterintelligence Service to assess the security situation 1. by departments and agencies in the Federal Ministry of Defence and . 2 by departments and agencies of the Allied Forces and the international military headquarters, when the Federal Republic of Germany has taken on commitments to safety of these departments and agencies in international agreements and transmit the assessment of the security situation in the agreement between the Federal Ministry of Defence and the competent supreme Land authorities the Military Counterintelligence Service has been, the evaluation of information on referred to in paragraph 1 policies and activities against these authorities and bodies, including those which are to go out or come from persons who do not belong to the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defence or in him operate. (3) The Military Counterintelligence acts with 1. in him are engaged in the security screening of persons belonging to the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defence or to be and a) where the requirement of confidentiality in the public interest facts, objects or intelligence to be entrusted to who should receive access to it or to give it up, or b) which are used in safety-sensitive areas of the business unit of the Ministry of Defense or should be, . 2 with technical security measures in the Federal Ministry of Defense for the protection of requiring confidentiality in the public interest facts, objects or findings against the assets against compromise. The powers of the Military Counterintelligence Service in the participation by sentence 1 no. 1 letter a and b are in the security clearance of 20 April 1994 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 867) regulated. (4) The Military Counterintelligence allowed a police department can not be attached. (5) The Military Counterintelligence is bound by the general law (Article 20 of the Basic Law). Unofficial Contents § 2 jurisdiction in particular cases

(1) In order to continue tasks according to § 1 para. 1, the Military Counterintelligence, as far as is absolutely necessary in individual cases, his powers to any person to exercise, not belonging to the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defence or not operate in him. This is only permitted 1. against the spouse or partner, and compared with the fiance, also within the meaning of the Civil Partnership Act, a person referred to in § 1 para. 1, or the survivors with her as husband and wife, if it must be assumed that efforts or activities according to § 1 para. 1 and go out from him, . 2 in consultation with the relevant constitution protection authority towards persons where actual evidence exists that they cooperate with an in § 1 para. 1 mentioned person in efforts or activities according to § 1 para. 1, and if otherwise jeopardized further investigation of the facts or would only be possible with excessive costs. (2) In order to protect its employees, equipment, goods and resources against unsafe or intelligence activities, the Military Counterintelligence Service in carrying out its tasks in accordance with § 1 para. 1, insofar as it is absolutely necessary in individual cases, in consultation with the relevant constitution protection authority of its powers with respect to exercise people who do not belong to the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defence or not operate in him. Unofficial Contents § 3 cooperation with the constitutional protection authorities

(1) The Military Counterintelligence and the constitutional protection authorities cooperate in the performance of their duties. The cooperation is also to mutual support and assistance. (2) For continuation of duties in accordance with § 3 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act, a constitution protection authority, insofar as it is absolutely necessary in individual cases, extend in consultation with the Military Counterintelligence measures to persons who belong to the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defence or operate in him and are subject to the jurisdiction of the Military Counterintelligence Service. This is allowed only to persons who there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are cooperating with a person from the jurisdiction of the constitutional protection authorities in efforts or activities according to § 3 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act, and if otherwise jeopardized further investigation of the facts or only with would be possible excessive effort. (3) The Military Counterintelligence and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution shall inform each other on all matters of which knowledge for the performance of their duties is required. Unofficial Contents § 4 Powers of the Military Counterintelligence

(1) The Military Counterintelligence may necessary for the performance of its tasks, including personal data collected, processed and used in accordance with § 8, para. 2, 4 and 5 of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act, unless there are the applicable provisions of the Federal Data Protection Act or special regulations in this law. He is not authorized to collect personal information to fulfill its duties in accordance with § 1, para. 2,. . § 8 paragraph 2, sentence 2 and 3 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act applies; the approval of the Instructions issued by the Federal Ministry of Defence. (2) Police powers or transfer powers are not for the Military Counterintelligence Service; He must also not ask in the course of assistance measures to which he is not authorized the police. Unofficial Contents § 4a Specific requests for information

The §§ 8a and 8b of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act shall apply mutatis mutandis with the proviso that the place of the serious threats to the protected goods referred to in § 3, paragraph 1 of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act serious threats referred to in § 1, paragraph 1 protective goods and the place of the Federal Ministry the Interior transgressed the Federal Ministry of Defence. The basic right of telecommunications secrecy (Article 10 of the Basic Law) shall be restricted. Unofficial Contents § 4b further requests for information

To the extent necessary to fulfill the tasks of the Military Counterintelligence Service, may from that, the business provides telecommunications services or participates in mind, required information about the charges in accordance with §§ 95 and 111 of the Telecommunications Act data according to § 8d of the Federal Constitution Protection Act. The information to be furnished shall be compensated according to § 8d, paragraph 5 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act. The basic right of telecommunications secrecy (Article 10 of the Basic Law) is restricted pursuant to § 8d, paragraph 2 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act. Unofficial Contents § 5 Special forms of data collection

The Military Counterintelligence must information, in particular personal data, according to § 9 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act levy, in so far as it 1. to perform its duties in accordance with § 1 para. 1 and § 2 para. 1 and for the investigation of the necessary resources or . 2 to protect employees, facilities, items and sources of Military Counterintelligence against unsafe or intelligence activities, also pursuant to § 2 para. 2, is required; § 9 para. 2 to 4 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act shall apply mutatis mutandis. Unofficial Contents § 6 storage, alteration and use of personal data

(1) The Military Counterintelligence may store, modify and use personal data in accordance with § 10 of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act, to the extent necessary to perform its duties. To fulfill the tasks according to § 1 para. 2 stored data on individuals who do not belong to the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defence or in him operate, must not be used for other purposes, unless the use would be for the fulfillment of duties in accordance with § 1 para. 1 permitted. (2) In files or about personal guided files stored data on minors after two years to verify that they are necessary to store and delete the latest after five years, unless, that after coming of age more knowledge in accordance with § 1 Abs. 1 or § 2 are incurred. This does not apply if the person concerned is checked in accordance with § 1 para. 3. The storage of personal data on minors under the age of 16 years in guided about personal records and files is prohibited. Unofficial Contents § 7 rectification, erasure and blocking of personal data

(1) The Military Counterintelligence shall rectify the data stored in personal data files, delete and block according to § 12 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act. (2) The Military Counterintelligence has to rectify personal data in files and to terminate pursuant to § 13 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act. Unofficial Contents § 8 file arrangements

The Military Counterintelligence has to meet for every automated personal data filing a file order pursuant to § 14 of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act, which requires the approval of the Ministry of Defense. § 14 para. 2 and 3 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act shall apply. Unofficial Contents § 9 Provision of information to those concerned

The Military Counterintelligence granted the person concerned to his person stored data information in accordance with § 15 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act; the place of the Federal Interior Ministry said there occurs the Federal Ministry of Defence. Unofficial Contents § 10 Provision of information to the Military Counterintelligence Service

(1) The authorities of the Federation and the Federal immediate legal persons of public law teaching from the Military Counterintelligence Service on them have become known facts that can detect unsafe or intelligence activities for a foreign power or aspirations in the scope of this Act, the by application violence or it directed preparatory acts against the in § 1 para. 1 sentence 1 no. 1 and sentence are directed protected assets mentioned 2 if factual indications exist that the information to perform its duties in accordance with § 1 para. 1 and 2 is required. (2) The Military Counterintelligence must in accordance with § 18 para. 3 request of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act any authority to the transmission of the information required to perform its duties, including personal data. As part of the fulfillment of his duties, he may for determining whether a person belongs to the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defence or in his works, the family name, first name, former name, date of birth, the rank, the service center number and the service end of the affected persons out Retrieving the Personalführungs- and information system of the Bundeswehr. The responsibility for the individual polling bears the Military Counterintelligence. The Federal Ministry of Defence checks the admissibility of retrieval only if there is occasion. It regulates in a service provision 1. the circle of the polling dependents of Military Counterintelligence, . 2 the to be observed at a polling method, . 3 the data individually on a fetch or cumulatively be entered including finding with incomplete information, . 4 limiting due to a retrieval to be transmitted person records to the necessary identification for a measure, . 5 the deletion of the transmitted to a call, but no longer needed data and . 6 the logging of all calls and control by the DPO or the DPO. The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection shall be consulted before adoption and before changing the service provision. (3) would be jeopardized by the transmission referred to in paragraph 2 sentence 1, the purpose of the action or impair the affected disproportionately, the Military Counterintelligence Service in the performance of tasks sentence 2 and sentence 2 official register must in accordance with § 1 para. 1 sentence 1 no. See. This inspection requires the consent of the authorities conductor or his representative. (4) § 17 para. 1 and § 18 para. 5 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act shall apply mutatis mutandis. Unofficial Contents § 11 Transfer of personal data by the Military Counterintelligence Service

(1) The Military Counterintelligence must submit personally identifiable information in accordance with § 19 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act. In place of the approval of the Federal Ministry of the Interior shall enter that of the Ministry of Defense. For the constitutional protection of personal data within the meaning of § 18 sent. 1 sentence 1 of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act, § 18 para. 1a sentence 2 to 4 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act accordingly. (2) The Military Counterintelligence transmitted information, including personal data to public prosecutors, police and the Federal Intelligence Service in accordance with § 20 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act. Unofficial Contents § 12 Rules of Procedure for the transmission of information

For the transmission of information under this Act, see the §§ 23 to 26 of the Federal Constitution Protection Act shall apply mutatis mutandis. Unofficial Contents § 13 Application of the Federal Data Protection Act

In fulfilling the tasks specified in § 1 para. 1 to 3, § 2 and § 14, see § 3 para. 2 and 8, sentence 1, § 4 para. 2 and 3, §§ 4b and 4c, and §§ 10 and 13 to 20 of the Federal Data Protection Act does not apply. Unofficial Contents § 14 Special foreign assignments

(1) The Military Counterintelligence accumulated during special foreign assignments of the Bundeswehr within the meaning of § 62 para. 1 of the Soldiers Act or in humanitarian operations by order of the Federal Minister of Defence information, in particular property and personal information, messages and documents submitted to the to ensure operational readiness troops or for the protection of members of the departments and agencies of the division of the Ministry of Defense are needed at home and abroad only in real estate, in which departments and agencies of the troops are, and evaluates them. To this end, public authorities in the country must be asked for information. § 1 para. 2 of the Federal Intelligence Service Act remains unaffected. (2) In addition, the Military Counterintelligence evaluates during special foreign assignments of the Bundeswehr in accordance with paragraph 1 in accordance with § 1 para. 2 identifiable information from persons or groups of persons who do not belong to the Federal Ministry of Defence or in it are active when their aspirations judge or activities against the people, agencies or bodies established. Paragraph 1 sentence 2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis. Is the collection of information in accordance with sentence 1 require, requests the Military Counterintelligence the Federal Intelligence Service to appropriate measures. (3) The Military Counterintelligence acts during special foreign assignments of the Bundeswehr in accordance with paragraph 1 even abroad in the property referred to in paragraph 1 with on checks of persons and technical security measures in accordance with § 1, para. 3, paragraph 1, sentence 2 and 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis. (4) Is it necessary to fulfill the tasks set out in paragraphs 1 to 3, to collect information, including personal data domestically or German nationals, the collection, further processing and use of the information is in accordance with §§ 4 to 8 and 10 to 12. Abroad, special forms of data collection in accordance with § 5 outside the property referred to in paragraph 1 shall be allowed in any case. The collection of information within the country must be carried out in consultation with the relevant constitutional protection authorities and if otherwise jeopardized further investigation of the facts or only with excessive costs would be possible. The behavior can be made for a number equal stored cases. (5) The duties referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3 and the powers are temporally and spatially limited by the foreign use of the Bundeswehr. (6) The notification pursuant to § 10 para. 1 extends to all the information necessary for the tasks of the military counter referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3. The Military Counterintelligence and the Federal Intelligence Service are working together within the framework of its legal powers to fulfill the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 to. 3 The Military Counterintelligence and the Federal Intelligence Service shall inform each other on all matters which are necessary to carry out their duties is required. The details of the cooperation of the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Federal Intelligence Service in particular foreign assignments of the Bundeswehr or in humanitarian operations should be laid down for each use in an agreement between the Military Counterintelligence Service and the Federal Intelligence Service, which requires the approval of the Chief of the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Minister of Defence and on the Parliamentary Control Panel should be informed. (7) The Federal Government shall inform the parliamentary oversight committee prior to the start of the use of military counter abroad. Top of pagePrint this page data protection

Organization

As well as a department for administrative affairs, there are the following specialist departments:

Department I: Central services
Department II: Counter-extremism and counter-terrorism
Department III: Counterespionage and operative security
Department IV: Protection of secrets (personnel and material)
Department V: Technology

The 12 regional offices are in:

History

The MAD developed out of a liaison office between the Allies and the German government and was founded in its present form in 1956, after the Bundeswehr was created. Until 1984, its headquarters was called "Amt für Sicherheit der Bundeswehr" (ASBw, Federal armed forces office of security). As of September 1984, on the basis of the Höcherl report, the service was restructured and more civilian positions were created.

The MAD had 7 groups and 28 regional offices after the former East German army, the NVA (the National People's Army), was incorporated into the Bundeswehr in October 1990. This was reduced to 14 offices in 1994 when there was a reduction of the armed forces.

Scandals

The MAD has been involved in a number of scandals, one of them was the secret surveillance of the home of the secretary of then minister of defence Georg Leber. This was done without Mr. Leber's knowledge. His secretary was suspected of espionage for the East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry of State Security or Stasi). The suspicions turned out to be false. Leber was informed of the illegal surveillance at the beginning of 1978 but did not inform the Bundestag until the magazine Quick published an article on 26 January 1978. Georg Leber retired his position on 16 February 1978 taking sole responsibility for the surveillance scandal. He resigned against the wishes of then chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Another scandal was the Kießling Affair in 1983, when the MAD investigated Günter Kießling, a Bundeswehr four-star general working with NATO (Commander of NATO land forces and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe.). The general was deemed to be a security risk based on allegations of homosexuality originating from questionable sources and was given early retirement by the then defence minister Manfred Wörner. The general was later rehabilitated. The affair had significant consequences for the service: the commander was removed, and a commission was set up under the former minister of the interior Hermann Höcherl (CSU). The Höcherl Commission investigated the way in which the MAD operated and made recommendations for improvement. These recommendations were implemented speedily.

References

↑ Federal Official Gazette (BGBl) I pp 2954, 2977
↑ Federal Official Gazette (BGBl) I p 1106.

External links

Militärischer Abschirmdienst (German)
Geheimdienste.org (German)

National intelligence agencies

Foreign intelligence agencies	Afghanistan: NDS Albania: SHISH Algeria: DRS Argentina: SI Armenia: SNB Australia: ASIS Azerbaijan: MTN Bahrain: NSA Bangladesh: NSI Belarus: KGB RB Belgium: ADIV/SGRS Bosnia and Herzegovina: OSA-OBA Brazil: ABIN Brunei: BRD Cameroon: BMM Canada: CSIS Chad: ANS Chile: ANI China: MSS Croatia: SOA Cuba: DI Czech Republic: ÚZSI Denmark: FE Djibouti: BSRG Ecuador: SENAIN Egypt: GID Estonia: TA France: DGSE Gambia: NIA Georgia: GIS Germany: BND Ghana: BNI, BGU, RDU Greece: EYP Hungary: IH India: RAW Indonesia: BIN Iran: VAJA Iraq: GSD Republic of Ireland: G2 Israel: Mossad Italy: AISE Ivory Coast: NSC Japan: NPA CIRO Jordan: GID Kazakhstan: Syrbar Kenya: NIS Kyrgyzstan: SNB Kuwait: KSS Latvia: SAB Lithuania: VSD Lebanon: GDGS Libya: MJ Republic of Macedonia: UBK Malaysia: MEIO Maldives: NSS Mexico: CISEN Mongolia: GIA Montenegro: ANB Morocco: DGST Mozambique: SISE Netherlands: AIVD New Zealand: NAB Nigeria: NIA Norway: E-tjenesten Pakistan: ISI Papua New Guinea: NIO Philippines: NICA Poland: AW Portugal: SIED Qatar: QSS Romania: SIE Russia: SVR Saudi Arabia: GIP Serbia: BIA Sierra Leone: CISU Singapore: SID Slovakia: SIS Slovenia: SOVA Somalia: NISA South Africa: SSA South Korea: NIS Spain: CNI Sri Lanka: SIS Sudan: JAWM Sweden: KSI Switzerland: NDB Syria: GSD Taiwan: NSB Tajikistan: MoS Thailand: NIA Togo: NIA Tunisia: TIA Turkey: MİT Turkmenistan: KNB Uganda: ISO Ukraine: SZRU United Arab Emirates: UAEI United Kingdom: SIS (MI6) United States: CIA Uzbekistan: SNB Vietnam: TC2

Domestic intelligence agencies	Argentina: SIDE Australia: ASIO Azerbaijan: MTN Bangladesh: SB Belarus: KGB RB Belgium: VS/SE Bosnia and Herzegovina: SIPA Brazil: ABIN Brunei: IRD Canada: CSIS Chile: ANI China: MSS Croatia: SOA Czech Republic: BIS Denmark: PET Egypt: Al Watani Estonia: KAPO Finland: SUPO France: DGSI Germany: BfV Ghana: GPS, CID Greece: EYP Hungary: AH India: IB, CBI, NSC, AIRMS Iran: VAJA, IRGC, PAVA Republic of Ireland: CSB, SDU, NSU Israel: Shin Bet Italy: AISI Kazakhstan: NSC Kenya: NIS Latvia: DP Lithuania: STT Republic of Macedonia: IA Malaysia: SB Japan: NPA PSIA Netherlands: NCTb New Zealand: NZSIS Nigeria: SSS Norway: PST Oman: ISS Pakistan: IB, FIA Philippines: NBI Poland: ABW Portugal: SIS Romania: SRI Russia: FSB Serbia: BIA Singapore: ISD South Africa: SSA South Korea: SPO Sri Lanka: SIS Sweden: SÄPO Switzerland: NDB Syria: GSD Taiwan: MJIB Thailand: ISOC, DSI Turkey: KDGM Ukraine: SBU United Kingdom: Security Service (MI5), NDEDIU, NCA, NBIS United States: FBI Uzbekistan: SNB Venezuela: SEBIN Vietnam: TC5 Zimbabwe CIO

Military intelligence agencies	Australia: DIO Bangladesh: DGFI Belgium: ADIV/SGRS Brazil: DIE Canada: Int Branch China: MID Croatia: VSOA Czech Republic: VZ Denmark: FE Egypt: DMISR Finland: FMIS France: DRM, DGSE Germany: MAD Ghana: MIU Hungary: KNBSZ Iran: IRGC India: DMI, DIA Indonesia: BAIS Republic of Ireland: G2 Israel: Aman Italy: CII Japan: MIC Kazakhstan: NSC Lithuania: AOTD Republic of Macedonia: MSSI Malaysia: DSID Morocco: DGED Netherlands: MIVD New Zealand: DDIS Norway: E-tjenesten Pakistan: MI, NI, AI Philippines: ISAFP Poland: SKW, SWW Portugal: CISMIL Romania: DGIA Russia: GRU Serbia: VOA, VBA Singapore: MIO Slovakia: VSS Slovenia: OVS South Africa: SANDF-ID South Korea: DSC Sri Lanka: DMI Sweden: MUST Switzerland: MND Syria: MI, AFID Taiwan: MND Thailand: AFSC Turkey: GENKUR İ.D.B., JİTEM Ukraine: HUR MO United Kingdom: DI United States: DIA Venezuela: DGCIM Vietnam: TC2

Signals intelligence agencies	Australia: ASD Brazil: 2ª Sch/EMD Canada: CSE China: SIGINT Croatia: OTC Finland: FIRE France: DGSE Germany: BND Ghana: RDU India: JCB,NTRO Indonesia: LEMSANEG Republic of Ireland: CIS Israel: 8200 Japan: DIH Kazakhstan: NSC Netherlands: AIVD New Zealand: GCSB Pakistan: JSIB Philippines: PCG, IACAT Russia: Spetssvyaz South Africa: SSA Sweden: FRA Switzerland: NDB Syria: MI Turkey: MİT-ETİB, MİT-SİB Ukraine: Derzhspetszviazok United Kingdom: GCHQ United States: NSA

Imagery intelligence agencies	Australia: AGO Ghana: RDU New Zealand: GEOINT NZ Portugal: CIGeoE Russia: TsVTI GRU United Kingdom: DGIFC United States: NGA

Related topics	Espionage Global surveillance disclosures Chelsea Manning Snowden leaks WikiLeaks Great Firewall of China Mass surveillance in China Law enforcement Surveillance Big Brother Call detail record Carnivore Dishfire ECHELON PRISM Stone Ghost Turbulence (NSA programme) National security Surveillance issues in smart cities

Authority control	VIAF: 154907369 GND: 7592360-9

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