Georges Clemenceau

Georges Clemenceau
Prime Minister of France
In office
16 November 1917 – 20 January 1920
President Raymond Poincaré
Preceded by Paul Painlevé
Succeeded by Alexandre Millerand
In office
25 October 1906 – 24 July 1909
President Armand Fallières
Preceded by Ferdinand Sarrien
Succeeded by Aristide Briand
Minister of War
In office
16 November 1917 – 20 January 1920
Preceded by Paul Painlevé
Succeeded by André Joseph Lefèvre
Minister of the Interior
In office
14 March 1906 – 24 July 1909
Prime Minister Ferdinand Sarrien
Preceded by Fernand Dubief
Succeeded by Aristide Briand
Personal details
Born Georges Benjamin Clemenceau
28 September 1841
Mouilleron-en-Pareds, Vendée
Died 24 November 1929(1929-11-24) (aged 88)
16th arrondissement, Paris
Political party Radical Republican
(before 1901)
Radical-Socialist Party
(1901-1929)
Spouse(s) Mary Eliza Plummer
(1869–1891; divorced)
Profession Journalist
Physician
Nickname(s) «Father of Victory»
«The Tiger»

Georges Benjamin Clemenceau[1] (French pronunciation: ​[ʒɔʁʒ bɛ̃ʒamɛ̃ klemɑ̃so];[2] 28 September 1841 – 24 November 1929) was a French statesman who led the nation in the First World War. A leader of the Radical Party, he played a central role in politics during the Third Republic. Clemenceau served as the Prime Minister of France from 1906 to 1909, and again from 1917 to 1920. In favour of a total victory over the German Empire, he militated for the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France. He was one of the principal architects of the Treaty of Versailles at the France Peace Conference of 1919. Nicknamed "Père la Victoire" (Father Victory) or "Le Tigre" (The Tiger), he took a harsh position against defeated Germany, though not quite as much as President Poincaré, and won agreement on Germany's payment of large sums for reparations.

Early years

Clemenceau was a son of the Vendée, born at Mouilleron-en-Pareds. In Revolutionary times, the Vendée had been a hotbed of monarchist sympathies. By his birth, its people were fiercely republican. The region was remote from Paris, rural and poor. His mother Sophie Eucharie Gautreau (1817–1903) was of Huguenot descent. His father Benjamin Clemenceau (1810–1897) came from a long line of physicians, but he lived off his lands and investments and did not practice medicine. The father had a reputation as an atheist and a political activist; he was arrested and briefly held in 1851 and again in 1858. He instilled in his son a love of learning, devotion to the Revolution, and a hatred of Catholicism.[3]

After his studies in the Nantes Lycée, Georges received his French baccalaureate of letters in 1858. He went to Paris to study medicine but did not practice there because he did not graduate.[4]

Journalism and exile

In Paris, the young Clemenceau became a political activist and writer. In December 1861, he co-founded a weekly newsletter, Le Travail, along with some friends. On 23 February 1862, he was arrested by the police for having placed posters summoning a demonstration. He spent 77 days in the Mazas Prison.

He graduated as a doctor on 13 May 1865, founded several literary magazines, and wrote many articles, most of which attacked the imperial regime of Napoleon III. Clemenceau left France for the United States when the Imperial agents began cracking down on dissidents, sending most of them to the bagne de Cayennes (Devil's Island Penal System) in French Guiana.

Clemenceau worked in New York City 1865-69, following the American Civil War. He maintained a medical office but spent much of his time on political journalism for a Parisian newspaper. He taught French at the home of Calvin Rood in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, and also taught and rode horseback at a private girls' school in Stamford, Connecticut.

Marriage and family

Mary Clémenceau (Ferdinand Roybet)

On 23 June 1869, he married one of his students, Mary Eliza Plummer (1848-1923), in New York City. She was the daughter of William Kelly Plummer and wife Harriet A. Taylor. The Clemenceaus had three children together before the marriage ended in a contentious divorce.[5]

During this time he joined French exile clubs in New York opposing the imperial regime.[6]

The beginning of the Third Republic

He returned to Paris after the defeat at Sedan and the fall of the Second Empire. In 1870 he was appointed Mayor of the 18th arrondissement of Paris, including Montmartre, and was also elected to the National Assembly for the 18th arrondissement. When the Paris Commune seized power in March 1871, he tried unsuccessfully to find a compromise between the more radical leaders and the commune and the more conservative French government. The Commune declared that he had no legal authority to be Mayor, and seized the city hall of the 18th arrondissement. He ran for election to the Paris Commune council, but received less than eight hundred votes, and took no part in its governance. He was in Bordeaux when the Commune was suppressed by the French Army in May 1871.[7]

After the fall of the Commune, he was elected to the Paris municipal council on 23 July 1871 for the Clignancourt quarter, and retained his seat till 1876, passing through the offices of secretary and vice-president, and becoming president in 1875.

Chamber of Deputies

In 1876 Clemenceau stood again for the Chamber of Deputies, and was elected for the 18th arrondissement. He joined the far left, and his energy and mordant eloquence speedily made him the leader of the Radical section. In 1877, after the Seize Mai crisis, he was one of the republican majority who denounced the de Broglie ministry. He led resistance to the anti-republican policy of which the Seize Mai incident was a manifestation. In 1879 his demand for the indictment of the de Broglie ministry brought him prominence.

Portrait of Clemenceau by Édouard Manet, c. 1879–80

In 1880 Clemenceau started his newspaper, La Justice, which became the principal organ of Parisian Radicalism. From this time, throughout Jules Grévy's presidency, he became widely known as a political critic and destroyer of ministries (le Tombeur de ministères) who avoided taking office himself. Leading the Far Left in the National Assembly, he was an active opponent of Jules Ferry's colonial policy (which he opposed on moral grounds and also as a form of diversion from the “Revenge against Germany”) and of the Opportunist party. In 1885 his criticism of the Tonkin disaster contributed strongly to the fall of the Ferry cabinet.

At the elections of 1885 he advocated a strong Radical programme, and was returned both for his old seat in Paris and for the Var, district of Draguignan, selecting the latter. Refusing to form a ministry to replace the one he had overthrown, he supported the Right in keeping Freycinet in power in 1886, and was responsible for the inclusion of General Boulanger in the Freycinet cabinet as War Minister. When Boulanger showed himself as an ambitious pretender, Clemenceau withdrew his support and became a vigorous opponent of the heterogeneous Boulangist movement, though the Radical press and a section of the party continued to patronize the general.

By his exposure of the Wilson scandal, and by his personal plain speaking, Clemenceau contributed largely to Jules Grévy's resignation of the presidency in 1887. He had declined Grévy's request to form a cabinet on the downfall of Maurice Rouvier's Cabinet. by advising his followers to vote for neither Floquet, Ferry, or Freycinet, he was primarily responsible for the election of an "outsider", Sadi Carnot, as president.

The split in the Radical party over Boulangism weakened his hand, and its collapse meant that moderate Republicans did not need his help. A further misfortune occurred in the Panama affair, as Clemenceau's relations with Cornelius Herz led to his being included in the general suspicion. He remained the leading spokesman of French Radicalism, but his hostility to the Russian alliance so increased his unpopularity that in the 1893 election, he was defeated for his Chamber seat, after having held it continuously since 1876.

Dreyfus Affair

Duel between Georges Clemenceau and Paul Déroulède

After his 1893 defeat, Clemenceau confined his political activities to journalism. His career was further clouded by the long-drawn-out Dreyfus case, in which he took an active part as a supporter of Émile Zola and an opponent of the anti-Semitic and Nationalist campaigns. In all, Clemenceau published 665 articles defending Dreyfus during the affair.[8]

On 13 January 1898 Clemenceau, as owner and editor of the Paris daily newspaper L'Aurore, published Émile Zola's "J'accuse" on the front page. He decided to run the controversial article, which would become a famous part of the Dreyfus Affair, in the form of an open letter to the President, Félix Faure.

In 1900 he withdrew from La Justice to found a weekly review, Le Bloc, to which he was practically the sole contributor. Le Bloc lasted until 15 March 1902. On 6 April 1902 he was elected senator for the Var, district of Draguignan, although he had previously called for the suppression of the Senate, as he considered it a strong-house of conservatism. He served as senator of Draguignan until 1920.

He sat with the Radical-Socialist Party and moderated his positions, although he still vigorously supported the Combes ministry, who spearheaded the anti-clericalist Republican struggle. In June 1903 he undertook the direction of the journal L'Aurore, which he had founded. In it he led the campaign to revisit the Dreyfus affair, and to create a separation of Church and State. The latter was implemented by the 1905 Act.[9]

In cabinet

In March 1906 the Rouvier ministry fell, owing to the riots provoked by the inventories of church property, and to the Radicals' victory during the 1906 legislative election. The new government of Ferdinand Sarrien appointed Clemenceau as Minister of the Interior in the cabinet. On a domestic level, Clemenceau reformed the police forces and ordered repressive policies towards the workers' movement. He supported the formation of scientific police by Alphonse Bertillon, and founded the Brigades mobiles (French for "mobile squads") led by Célestin Hennion. These squads were nicknamed Brigades du Tigre ("The Tiger's Brigades") after Clemenceau himself.

The miners' strike in the Pas de Calais after the disaster at Courrieres, which resulted in more than one thousand dead, threatened wide disorder on 1 May 1906. Clemenceau ordered the military against the strikers and repressed the wine-growers' strike in the Languedoc-Roussillon. His actions alienated the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO) socialist party, from which he definitively broke in his notable reply in the Chamber to Jean Jaurès, leader of the SFIO, in June 1906.

His speech positioned him as the strong man of the day in French politics; when the Sarrien ministry resigned in October, Clemenceau became premier. During 1907 and 1908, he led the development of a new Entente cordiale with Britain, which gave France a successful role in European politics. Difficulties with Germany, and criticism by the Socialist party in connection with Morocco (First Moroccan Crisis in 1905–06, were settled at the Algeciras Conference).

Clemenceau was defeated on 20 July 1909 in a discussion in the Chamber on the state of the Navy, in which bitter words were exchanged between him and Théophile Delcassé, the former president of the Council whose downfall Clemenceau had aided. Refusing to respond to Delcassé's technical questions, Clemenceau resigned after his proposal for the order of the day vote was rejected. He was succeeded as premier by Aristide Briand, with a reconstructed cabinet.

Between 1909 and 1912, Clemenceau dedicated his time to travels, conferences and also to the treatment of his sickness. He went to South America in 1910, traveling to Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina (where he went as far as Santa Ana de Tucuman in the North-West of Argentina). There, he was amazed by the influence of French culture and of the French Revolution on local elites.[10] In 1912, he had his prostate operated on.

He published the first issue of the Journal du Var on 10 April 1910. Three years later on 6 May 1913, he founded L'Homme libre ("The Free Man") newspaper in Paris, for which he wrote a daily editorial. In these media, Clemenceau focused increasingly on foreign policy, and condemned the Socialists' anti-militarism.

When the First World War broke out, his newspaper was one of the first to be censored by the government; it was suspended from 29 September 1914 to 7 October. In response, Clemenceau changed the newspapers' name to L'Homme enchaîné ("The Chained Man"). He criticized the government for its lack of transparency and its ineffectiveness, while defending the patriotic union sacrée against the German Empire.

First World War

A painting from 1887 depicting a French child being taught about the "lost" province of Alsace-Lorraine in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War. Regaining those provinces was the main goal of Clemenceau and the French in general

When the First World War broke out in 1914 Clemenceau advised Interior Minister Malvy to invoke Carnet B, a list of known and suspected subversives who were supposed to be arrested on mobilisation. The Prefect of Police gave the same advice. In the event the government did not do so and 80% of the 2,501 people listed volunteered for service.[11] He declined to join the government of national unity as Justice Minister in autumn 1914.[12]

He was a vehement critic of the government, complaining that it was never doing enough to win the war. His inflexibility was driven by a will to regain the province of Alsace-Lorraine, a view shared by public opinion. The autumn of 1917 saw the disastrous Italian defeat at Caporetto, the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, and rumours that Caillaux and Malvy might have engaged in treason. Prime Minister Painlevé was inclined to open negotiations with Germany. Clemenceau argued that even German restitution of Alsace-Lorraine and the liberation of Belgium would not be enough to justify France abandoning her Allies. This forced Ribot and Briand (both the previous two Prime Ministers, of whom the latter was by the far more powerful politician and had been approached by a German diplomat) to agree in public that there would be no separate peace. For many years Clemenceau was blamed for having blocked a possible compromise peace, but it is now clear from examination of German documents that Germany had no serious intention of handing over Alsace-Lorraine.[13] The prominence of his opposition made him the best known critic and the last man standing when the others had failed.[14] “Messieurs, les Allemands sont toujours à Noyon” (Gentlemen, the Germans are still at Noyon) wrote Clemenceau’s paper endlessly.[15]

Prime Minister again

Clemenceau as Prime Minister of France

In the darkest hours of November 1917 Clemenceau was appointed prime minister. Unlike his predecessors, he discouraged internal disagreement and called for peace among the senior politicians.

1917

Clemenceau governed not from the Matignon (the Prime Minister’s office) but from the Ministry of War in the Rue Saint-Dominique. Almost his first act as Prime Minister was to sack Sarrail (because of his links with the socialist politicians Caillaux and Malvy, now suspected of treasonable contacts with the Germans) from command at Salonika. This was the main topic of discussion at the first meeting of the War Committee (6 December), where he said “Sarrail cannot remain there”.[16][17]

Churchill later wrote that Clemenceau "looked like a wild animal pacing to and fro behind bars" in front of "an assembly which would have done anything to avoid putting him there, but, having put him there, felt they must obey".[18]

When Clemenceau became Prime Minister in 1917 victory seemed to be a long way off. There was little activity on the Front because it was believed that there should be limited attacks until the American support arrived. At this time, Italy was on the defensive, Russia had virtually stopped fighting – and it was believed (correctly - see the Treaty of Brest Litovsk) that they would be making a separate peace with Germany. At home the government had to combat increasing resentment against the war. They also had to handle increasing demonstrations against the war, scarcity of resources and air raids – which were causing huge physical damage to Paris as well as damaging the morale of its citizens. It was also believed that many politicians secretly wanted peace. It was a challenging situation for Clemenceau, because after years of criticizing other men during the war, he suddenly found himself in a position of supreme power. He was also isolated politically. He did not have close links with any parliamentary leaders (especially after years of criticism) and so had to rely on himself and his own circle of friends.

Clemenceau's ascension to power meant little to the men in the trenches at first. They thought of him as "Just another Politician", and the monthly assessment of troop morale found that only a minority found comfort in his appointment. Slowly, however, as time passed, the confidence he inspired in a few began to grow throughout all the fighting men. They were encouraged by his many visits to the trenches. This confidence began to spread from the trenches to the home front and it was said "We believed in Clemenceau rather in the way that our ancestors believed in Joan of Arc." After years of criticism against the French army for its conservatism and Catholicism, Clemenceau would need help to get along with the military leaders in order to achieve a sound strategic plan. He nominated general Henri Mordacq to be his military chief of staff. Mordacq helped to inspire trust and mutual respect from the army to the government which proved essential to the final victory.

Clemenceau was also well received by the media because they felt that France was in need for strong leadership. It was widely recognized that throughout the war he was never discouraged and he never stopped believing that France could achieve total victory. There were skeptics, however, that believed that Clemenceau, like other war time leaders, would have a short time in office. It was said that "Like everyone else … Clemenceau will not last long- only long enough to clean up [the war]."

1918: Clemenceau's crackdown

As the situation worsened in early 1918, Clemenceau continued to support the policy of total war – "We present ourselves before you with the single thought of total war" – and the policy of "la guerre jusqu'au bout" (war until the end). His 8 March speech advocating this policy was so effective it left a vivid impression on Winston Churchill, who would make similar speeches on becoming British Prime Minister in 1940. Clemenceau's war policy encompassed the promise of victory with justice, loyalty to the fighting men, and immediate and severe punishment of crimes against France.

Joseph Caillaux, a former French prime minister, disagreed with Clemenceau's policies. He wanted to surrender to Germany and negotiate a peace. Clemenceau saw Caillaux as a threat to national security. Unlike previous ministers, Clemenceau publicly moved against Caillaux. As a result, the parliamentary committee decided that Caillaux would be arrested and imprisoned for three years. Clemenceau believed, in the words of Jean Ybarnégaray, that Caillaux's crime "was not to have believed in victory [and] to have gambled on his nation's defeat".

It was believed by some in Paris that the arrest of Caillaux and others was a sign that Clemenceau had begun a Reign of Terror. The many trials and arrests aroused great public excitement, one newspaper ironically reported "The war must be over, for no one is talking about it anymore". These trials, far from making the public fear the government, inspired confidence as they felt that for the first time in the war, action was being taken and they were being firmly governed. The claims that Clemenceau's "firm government" was a dictatorship found little support. Clemenceau was still held accountable to the people and media. He relaxed censorship on political views as he believed that newspapers had the right to criticize political figures – "The right to insult members of the government is inviolable". The only powers that Clemenceau assumed were those that he thought necessary to win the war.

In 1918, Clemenceau thought that France should adopt Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, mainly because of its point that called for the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. This meant that victory would fulfill the war aim that was crucial for the French public. Clemenceau was however sceptical about some other points, including those concerning the League of Nations, as he believed that the latter could succeed only in a utopian society.

As war minister Clemenceau was also in close contact with his generals. However, he did not always make the most effective decisions concerning military issues (though he did heed the advice of the more experienced generals). As well as talking strategy with the generals he also went to the trenches to see the poilus, the French infantrymen. He would speak to them and assure them that their government was actually looking after them. The poilus had great respect for Clemenceau and his disregard for danger as he often visited soldiers only yards away from German frontlines.The government was worried about the visits of Clemenceau in the war field, as he was most of the time risking his own life by insulting and threatening the German soldiers in person directly from the trenches. These visits, his speech, and his verbal threats directly to the enemy impressed the soldiers and contributed to Clemenceau's title "Père la Victoire" (Father of Victory).

1918: the German spring offensive

On 21 March the Germans began their great Spring Offensive. Clemenceau was heard to say "Sacrebleu the Germans marched in backwards and we thought they were leaving". The Allies were caught off-guard and a gap was created in the British/French lines – giving them access to Paris. This defeat cemented Clemenceau's belief, and that of the other allies, that a coordinated, unified command was the best option. It was decided that Ferdinand Foch would be appointed as Generalissimo.

The German line continued to advance and Clemenceau believed that they could not rule out the fall of Paris. It was believed that if "the tiger" as well as Foch and Philippe Pétain stayed in power, for even another week, France would be lost. It was thought that a government headed by Aristide Briand would be beneficial to France because he would make peace with Germany on advantageous terms. Clemenceau adamantly opposed these opinions and he gave an inspirational speech to parliament and "the chamber" voted their confidence in him 377 votes to 110.

1918: the Allied counter-offensive and the Armistice

As the Allied counter-offensives began to push the Germans back, it became clear that the Germans could no longer win the war. Although they still occupied allied territory, they did not have sufficient resources and manpower to continue the attack. As countries allied to Germany began to ask for an armistice, it was obvious that Germany would soon follow. On 11 November an armistice with Germany was signed. Clemenceau was embraced in the streets and attracted admiring crowds. He was a strong, energetic, positive leader who was key to the allied victory of 1918.

Paris Peace Conference

It was decided that a peace conference would be held in Paris, France. (The treaty signed by both parties was signed in the Palace of Versailles, but deliberated upon in Paris). On 13 December U.S. president Woodrow Wilson received an enormous welcome. His Fourteen Points and the concept of a League of Nations had made a big impact on the war weary French. Clemenceau realized at their first meeting that he was a man of principle and conscience.

It was decided that since the conference was being held in France, Clemenceau would be the most appropriate president. He also spoke both English and French, the official languages of the conference.

The Conference progress was much slower than anticipated and decisions were constantly being tabled. It was this slow pace that induced Clemenceau to give an interview showing his irritation to an American journalist. He said he believed that Germany had won the war industrially and commercially as its factories were intact and its debts would soon be overcome through ‘manipulation’. In a short time, he believed, the German economy would be much stronger than the French.

France's diplomatic position at the Paris Peace Conference was repeatedly jeopardized by Clemenceau's mistrust of David Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, and his intense dislike of French President Raymond Poincaré. When negotiations reached a stalemate, Clemenceau had a habit of shouting at the other heads of state and storming out of the room rather than participating in further discussion.

Attempted assassination

On 19 February 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, as Clemenceau was leaving his apartment in the Rue Benjamin-Franklin to drive to a meeting with House and Balfour at the Crillon, a man jumped out and fired several shots at the car. One bullet hit Clemenceau between the ribs, just missing his vital organs. Too dangerous to remove, the bullet remained with him for the rest of his life. Clemenceau's assailant, anarchist Émile Cottin, was seized by the crowd following the leader's procession and nearly lynched. Taken back to his house, Clemenceau's faithful assistant found him pale but conscious. "They shot me in the back," Clemenceau told him. "They didn't even dare to attack me from the front."[19]

Clemenceau often joked about the "assassin's" bad marksmanship – “We have just won the most terrible war in history, yet here is a Frenchman who misses his target 6 out of 7 times at point-blank range. Of course this fellow must be punished for the careless use of a dangerous weapon and for poor marksmanship. I suggest that he be locked up for eight years, with intensive training in a shooting gallery."

Rhineland and the Saar

Clemenceau in his office

When Clemenceau returned to the council of ten on 1 March he found that little had changed. One issue that had not changed was a dispute over the long running Eastern Frontier and control of the German province Rhineland. Clemenceau believed that Germany's possession of the territory left France without a natural frontier in the East and so simplified invasion into France for an attacking army. The British ambassador reported in December 1918 on Clemenceau's views on the future of the Rhineland: "He said that the Rhine was a natural boundary of Gaul and Germany and that it ought to be made the German boundary now, the territory between the Rhine and the French frontier being made into an Independent State whose neutrality should be guaranteed by the great powers".[20]

The issue was finally resolved when Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson guaranteed immediate military assistance if Germany attacked without provocation.[21] It was also decided that the Allies would occupy the territory for fifteen years, and that Germany could never rearm the area.[22] Lloyd George insisted on a clause allowing for the early withdrawal of Allied troops if the Germans fulfilled the treaty; Clemenceau inserted Article 429 into the treaty that permitted the Allied occupation beyond the fifteen years if adequate guarantees for Allied security against unprovoked aggression were not met. This was in case the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty of guarantee, thereby making null and void the British guarantee as well as that was dependent on the Americans being part of it. This is, in fact, what did occur. Article 429 ensured that a refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaties of guarantee would not weaken them.[23]

President Poincaré and Marshal Ferdinand Foch both repeatedly pressed for an autonomous Rhineland state. At a Cabinet meeting on 25 April Foch spoke against the deal Clemenceau had brokered and pushed for a separate Rhineland. On 28 April Poincaré sent Clemenceau a long letter detailing why he thought Allied occupation should continue until Germany had paid all her reparations. Clemenceau replied that the alliance with America and Britain was of more value than an isolated France which held onto the Rhineland: "In fifteen years I will be dead, but if you do me the honour of visiting my tomb, you will be able to say that the Germans have not fulfilled all the clauses of the treaty, and that we are still on the Rhine".[24] Clemenceau said to Lloyd George in June: "We need a barrier behind which, in the years to come, our people can work in security to rebuild its ruins. The barrier is the Rhine. I must take national feelings into account. That does not mean that I am afraid of losing office. I am quite indifferent on that point. But I will not, by giving up the occupation, do something which will break the willpower of our people".[25] He said later to Jean Martel: "The policy of Foch and Poincaré was bad in principle. It was a policy no Frenchman, no republican Frenchman could accept for a moment, except in the hope of obtaining other guarantees, other advantages. We leave that sort of thing to Bismarck".[26]

There was increasing discontent among Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson about slow progress and information leaks surrounding the Council of Ten. They began to meet in a smaller group, called the Council of Four, Vittorio Orlando of Italy being the fourth, though less weighty, member. This offered greater privacy and security and increased the efficiency of the decision making process. Another major issue which the Council of Four discussed was the future of the German Saar province. Clemenceau believed that France was entitled to the province and its coal mines after Germany deliberately damaged the coal mines in Northern France. Wilson, however, resisted the French claim so firmly that Clemenceau accused him of being ‘pro German’. Lloyd George came to a compromise and the coal mines were given to France and the territory placed under French administration for 15 years, after which a vote would determine whether the province would rejoin Germany.[27]

Although Clemenceau had little knowledge of the Austrian-Hungarian empire, he supported the causes of its smaller ethnic groups and his adamant lead to the stringent terms in the Treaty of Trianon which dismantled Hungary. Rather than recognizing territories of the Austrian-Hungarian empire solely within the principles of self-determination, Clemenceau sought to weaken Hungary just as Germany and remove the threat of such a large power within Central Europe. The entire Czechoslovakian state was seen a potential buffer from Communism and this encompassed majority Hungarian territories.

Reparations

Clemenceau was not experienced in the fields of economics or finance, but was under strong public and parliamentary pressure to make Germany's reparation bill as large as possible. It was generally agreed that Germany should not pay more than it could afford, but the estimates of what it could afford varied greatly. Figures ranged between £2,000 million which was quite modest compared to another estimate of £20,000 million. Clemenceau realised that any compromise would anger both the French and British citizens and that the only option was to establish a reparations commission which would examine Germany's capacity for reparations. This meant that the French government was not directly involved in the issue of reparations.

Defence of the Treaty

The Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919. Clemenceau now had to defend the treaty against critics who viewed the compromises Clemenceau had negotiated as inadequate for French national interests. The French Parliament debated the treaty and Louis Barthou on 24 September claimed that the U.S. Senate would not vote for the treaty of guarantee or of Versailles and therefore it would have been wiser to have the Rhine as a frontier. Clemenceau replied that he was sure the Senate would ratify both and that he had inserted Article 429 into the treaty, providing for "new arrangements concerning the Rhine". This interpretation of Article 429 was disputed by Barthou.[28]

Clemenceau's main speech on the treaty was delivered on 25 September. He said that he knew the treaty was not perfect but that the war had been fought by a coalition and therefore the treaty would express the lowest common denominator of those involved. He claimed criticisms of the details of the treaty were misleading; they should look at the treaty as a whole and see how they could benefit from it:

The treaty, with all its complex clauses, will only be worth what you are worth; it will be what you make it...What you are going to vote to-day is not even a beginning, it is a beginning of a beginning. The ideas it contains will grow and bear fruit. You have won the power to impose them on a defeated Germany. We are told that she will revive. All the more reason not to show her that we fear her...M. Marin went to the heart of the question, when he turned to us and said in despairing tones, ‘You have reduced us to a policy of vigilance.’ Yes, M. Marin, do you think that one could make a treaty which would do away with the need for vigilance among the nations of Europe who only yesterday were pouring out their blood in battle? Life is a perpetual struggle in war, as in peace...That struggle cannot be avoided. Yes, we must have vigilance, we must have a great deal of vigilance. I cannot say for how many years, perhaps I should say for how many centuries, the crisis which has begun will continue. Yes, this treaty will bring us burdens, troubles, miseries, difficulties, and that will continue for long years.[29]

The Chamber of Deputies ratified the treaty by 372 votes to 53, with the Senate voting unanimously for its ratification. On 11 October he gave his last parliamentary speech, to the Senate. He said that any attempt to partition Germany would be self-defeating and that France must find a way of living with sixty million Germans. He also said that the bourgeoisie, like the aristocracy before them in the ancien régime, had failed as a ruling class. It was now the turn of the working class to rule. He advocated national unity and a demographic revolution: "The treaty does not state that France will have many children, but it is the first thing that should have been written there. For if France does not have large families, it will be in vain that you put all the finest clauses in the treaty, that you take away all the Germans guns, France will be lost because there will be no more French".[30]

Domestic policies

Clemenceau's final tenure as prime minister witnessed the implementation of various reforms aimed at regulating the hours of labour. A general 8-hour-day law passed in April 1919 amended the French Labour Code, and in June that year existing legislation concerning the duration of the working day in the mining industry was amended by extending the eight-hour day to all classes of workpeople, “whether employed underground or on the surface.” Under a previous law of December 1913, the eight-hour limit had only applied to workpeople employed underground. In August 1919, a similar limit was introduced for all those employed in French vessels. Another law passed in 1919 (which came into operation in October 1920) prohibited employment in bakeries between the hours of 10 P.M. and 4 A.M. A decree of May 1919 introduced the 8-hour day for workers on trams, railways, and in inland waterways, and a second of June 1919 extended this provision to the State railways.[31] In April 1919, an enabling Act was approved for an eight-hour day and a six-day week, although farmworkers were excluded from the Act.[32]

Presidential bid

Georges Clemenceau by Cecilia Beaux (1920).

In 1919 France adopted a new electoral system and the legislative election gave the National Bloc (a coalition of right-wing parties) a majority. Clemenceau only intervened once in the election campaign, delivering a speech on 4 November at Strasbourg, praising the manifesto and men of the National Bloc and urging that the victory in the war needed to be safeguarded by vigilance. In private he was concerned at this huge swing to the right.[33]

His friend Georges Mandel urged Clemenceau to stand for the Presidency in the upcoming election and on 15 January 1920 he let Mandel announce that he would be prepared to serve if elected. However Clemenceau did not intend to campaign for the post, instead he wished to be chosen by acclaim as a national symbol. The preliminary meeting of the republican caucus (a forerunner to the vote in the National Assembly) chose not Clemenceau but Paul Deschanel by 408 votes to 389. In response Clemenceau refused to be put forward for the vote in the National Assembly because he did not want to win by a small majority but by a near-unanimous vote. Only then, he claimed, could he negotiate with confidence with the Allies.[34]

In his last speech to the Cabinet on 18 January he said: "We must show the world the extent of our victory, and we must take up the mentality and habits of a victorious people, which once more takes its place at the head of Europe. But all that will now be placed in jeopardy...It will take less time and less thought to destroy the edifice so patiently and painfully erected than it took to complete it. Poor France. The mistakes have begun already".[35]

Last years

Clemenceau resigned as Prime Minister as soon as the Presidential election was held and took no further part in politics. In private he condemned the unilateral occupation by French troops of the German city of Frankfurt in 1920 and said if he had been in power he would have persuaded the British to join it.[35]

He took a holiday in Egypt and the Sudan from February to April 1920, then embarking for the Far East in September, returning to France in March 1921. In June he visited England and received an honorary degree from Oxford. He met Lloyd George and said to him that after the Armistice he had become the enemy of France. Lloyd George replied: “Well, was not that always our traditional policy?” He was joking but after reflection Clemenceau took it seriously. After Lloyd George's fall from power in 1922 Clemenceau remarked: “As for France, it is a real enemy who disappears. Lloyd George did not hide it: at my last visit to London he cynically admitted it”.[36]

In late 1922 Clemenceau gave a lecture tour in the major cities of the American north east. He defended the policy of France, including war-debts and reparations, and condemned American isolationism. He was well received and attracted large audiences but America's policy remained unchanged. On 9 August 1926 he wrote an open letter to the American President Calvin Coolidge, arguing against France paying all its war-debts: "France is not for sale, even to her friends". This appeal went unheard.[37]

He condemned Poincaré's occupation of the Ruhr as undoing of the entente between France and Britain.[35]

He wrote two short biographies of the Greek orator Demosthenes and the French painter Claude Monet. He also penned a huge two-volume tome, covering philosophy, history and science, titled Au Soir de la Pensée. Writing this occupied most of his time between 1923 and 1927.[38]

During his last months he wrote his memoirs, despite declaring previously that he would not write them. He was spurred into doing so by the appearance of Marshal Foch's memoirs which were highly critical of Clemenceau, mainly for his policy at the Paris Peace Conference. He only had time to finish the first draft and it was published posthumously as Grandeurs et Misères d'une Victoire (The Grandeur and Misery of Victory). He was critical of Foch and also of his successors who had allowed the Versailles treaty to be undermined in the face of Germany's revival. He burned all his private letters.

Clemenceau died on 24 November 1929 and was buried at Mouchamps.

Clemenceau's First Ministry, 25 October 1906 – 24 July 1909

Changes

Clemenceau's Second Ministry, 16 November 1917 – 20 January 1920

Changes

Personal life

Clemenceau was a long-time friend and supporter of the impressionist painter Claude Monet. He was instrumental in persuading Monet to have a cataract operation in 1923, and for over a decade encouraged Monet to complete his donation to the French state of Les Nymphéas(Water Lilies) paintings that are now on display in Paris' Musée de l'Orangerie in specially constructed oval galleries (which opened to the public in 1927).[39][40]

Legacy

Clemenceau portrait by Nadar.

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Clemenceau's name is spelled with an (e) and not with the (é) that is normally required in French for the pronunciation /e/.
  2. ↑ Clemenceau rather preferred the pronunciation kləmɑ̃so, but current usage has adopted the vowel [e] (by analogy with the name Clément). See P. Fouché, Traité de prononciation française, Paris, 1956, p. 65.
  3. ↑ David Watson, Georges Clemenceau: A Political Biography (1976) pp. 16-22.
  4. ↑ Watson (1976), pp. 16-22.
  5. ↑ Watson (1976), pp. 23-32.
  6. ↑ David Watson (1976), pp. 23-32.
  7. ↑ Milza, Pierre, L'année terrible - La Commune (mars-juin 1871)
  8. 1 2 Musée Clemenceau
  9. ↑ See the 30 September 1906 discourse, La Roche-sur-Yon (French)
  10. ↑ G. Clemenceau, Notes de voyage dans l'Amérique du Sud, Hachette, 1911
  11. ↑ Tuchman 1962, p93
  12. ↑ Tuchman 1962, p342
  13. ↑ Watson 1974, pp265-8
  14. ↑ Watson, Georges Clemenceau (1974) pp 249-72
  15. ↑ Tuchman 1962, p425
  16. ↑ Doughty 2005, p403
  17. ↑ Palmer 1998, p157
  18. ↑ Terraine 1978, p25
  19. ↑ Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, Random House: New York, (2003) 150
  20. ↑ Watson, p. 337.
  21. ↑ Watson, p. 347.
  22. ↑ Watson, p. 350.
  23. ↑ Watson, p. 351.
  24. ↑ Watson, pp. 351-352.
  25. ↑ Watson, p. 352.
  26. ↑ Watson, p. 353.
  27. ↑ Watson, pp. 349-350.
  28. ↑ Watson, p. 360.
  29. ↑ Watson, p. 361.
  30. ↑ Watson, p. 362.
  31. ↑ The Encyclopedia Britannica: a dictionary of arts, sciences, literature and general information, Volume 31 by Hugh Chisholm
  32. ↑ https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=U4joCO368pYC&pg=PA131&dq=france+The+Eight-hour+Act+of+April+23+1919&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ZSVqVcDGFsiosAGCjYPABg&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=france%20The%20Eight-hour%20Act%20of%20April%2023%201919&f=false
  33. ↑ Watson, p. 385.
  34. ↑ Watson, p. 386.
  35. 1 2 3 Watson, p. 387.
  36. ↑ Watson, p. 388.
  37. ↑ Watson, p. 389.
  38. ↑ Watson, pp. 390-391.
  39. ↑ Smith, Roberta (10 September 2009). "Serenade in Blue". New York Times. Retrieved 28 June 2010.
  40. ↑ __________. Monet: Le cycle des ‘Nymphéas’ (Paris : Musée national de l’Orangerie, 1999).

References

External links

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