Intent (military)

Intent is a key capability in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates initiative (U.S Army 2003, para.1-69),[1] self-synchronisation (Alberts et al. 1999, pp. 175–180)[2] and collaboration and cooperation (Alberts and Hayes 2007,pp. 109–114)[3] amongst team members in joint operations.[4]

Intent content

In the reviewed open military doctrine literature intent is a critical component for command and control. The many definitions that exist of intent are mostly similar but the actual intent content differs and is unclear. Intent content can mainly be found as concept descriptions in doctrinal handbooks relating to development or impact usage of intent.[4]

The following examples represent United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, United States, and NATO doctrinal view of intent.

Intent in military doctrinal handbooks is expressing a variety of definitions of what intent consist of. The identified intent artefacts generally express the initial state and situation, the desired end state and outcome, and how to get to the desired end state. Artefacts describing the initial situation are: own and other forces, adversaries, operating environment, terrain, time, preparation for future operations. Artefacts describing the outcome are: purpose, goals, mission, effects and end state. Artefacts describing how to reach the outcome are: concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, risk willing, how results might enable transition to future operations, objectives, transition conditions, restrictions in conducting operations, allocation of resources, and expectations of force usage.

Another way is to identify intent artefacts are from how people actually communicate intent. Klein (1998, pp. 225–229)[15] present the results of information types that is identified in intent communication. The seven information types of intent are according to Klein (1998, p. 226):[15] 1) Purpose of task which describes why the task is performed, 2) objective of task, presents a picture of the desired outcome 3) sequence of steps in the plan. Klein identifies this to be a source of problem since to detailed descriptions may limit the subordinates initiative, 4) rational for plan includes all the information that where present when making the decision 5) key decisions that may have to be made, i.e. if there is a choice to be made the commander can provide the intent in how he wants it to be conducted 6) antigoals, describe unwanted outcomes 7) constraints and other considerations describes weather and rule of engagement etc.

Intent content definition

The doctrinal artefacts are mapped into the structure provided by Klein and the resulting seven facets are grouped in: a) Initial Situation describing initial situation and state and consists of Kleins rational for the plan; b) Outcome is describing outcomes and consists of Kleins Purpose of task, objective of task, and antigoals; and c) Execution that is describing how to reach the outcome and consists of Kleins sequence of steps, key decisions and constraints and other considerations. Intent is then defined to consist of the following eight facets.

Intent in command and control

Commander's intent

Commander’s intent is an intent describing military focused operations and it is a publicly stated description of the end-state as it relates to forces (entities, people) and terrain, the purpose of the operation, and key tasks to accomplish. It is developed by a small group, e.g. staff, and a commander.

Commander's intent (CSI) plays a central role in military decision making and planning. CSI acts as a basis for staffs and subordinates to develop their own plans and orders to transform thought into action, while maintaining the overall intention of their commander. The commander’s intent links the mission and concept of operations. It describes the end state and key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates’ initiative. Commanders may also use the commander’s intent to explain a broader purpose beyond that of the mission statement. The mission and the commander’s intent must be understood two echelons down. (U.S Army 2003, para.4-27)[11] Pigeau and McCann (2006)[18] state that intent is more than an aim or a purpose; they state that Intent contains the aim and purpose together with all implications. Hence, CSI is not only to describe the End-State but also a concise expression of the purpose of the operation. CSI may also include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. This view is supported by Klein (1998, p. 225)[19] CSI originates from one commander’s mind and is disseminated to the echelons below. CSI rarely gets reviewed and updated. For a short duration mission, such as a deliberate attack, the original statement may remain valid throughout planning. But for longer phases, in order to be agile the CSI might be changing in phase with the unfolding of the situation. Commanders must develop their intent within the bounds of a whole hierarchy of guiding principles that limit the types of solutions that they can entertain (Pigeau & McCann 2006)).[18]

Common intent

Common intent is an intent that is shared and understood by all participants, i.e. there is no discrepancy between the intent of the participating humans. Common intent is an idealized view of intent.

In today’s operational environment teams need to work together towards a desired End-State. Pigeau and McCann (2000)[20] define Command and Control: “Command and Control: The establishment of common intent to achieve coordinated action”. Common intent is the combination of explicit intent and implicit intent. Pigeau and McCann (2006)[18] put forward that for a realizable Common Intent there need to be a single shared objective, together with a clear understanding in how that objective can be attained. They continue that Common Intent is an idealized concept where maximum overlap, with minimum scattering, exists between the intent of the commander and the intents of his subordinates. Knowledge known by the commander and his subordinates needs to be shared at all levels, guiding principles, reasoning ability, and to express similar levels of commitment. Intent is then not only something for a commander to disseminate but to exchange and learning the team members’ intent. Farrell and Lichacz (2004)[21] state that common intent describes a socio-psychological phenomenon that seems to be evident amongst a team that achieves a common objective. The CSI is a sort of a one person’s view, but as said in the introduction “every individual have intent of her own” implies that it may not just be enough to disseminate intent amongst staff members and subordinates. A conclusion of the work of Farrell (2006)[22] is that teams with different military and civilian cultures would need that all team members establish a common understanding of the mission objectives and the Commander's intent with respect to their own competencies, authorities, and responsibilities. Pigeau and McCann (2006, pp. 85–108)[18] state that diverse team members need to have a high degree of common intent to perform effectively. In such teams the commander needs to ensure that the intent is perceived and understood by all team members (Pigeau & McCann 2000;[20] Farrell & Lichacz 2004;[21] Pigeau & McCann 2006;[18] Farrell 2006[22]). Alberts and Hayes (2007)[3] say that in order to allow subordinates’ initiative the operations order focuses on describing the CSI/CI so that flexibility in coordination and collaboration in the dynamic environment is entailed. There is a need for the commander to connect the subordinates’ human potential (reason, opinions, questions, seek information regarding the mission) to align and be a support to the commanders own intent (Pigeau & McCann 2006, p. 102).[18]

Command intent

Command intent (CI) is a practical view of common intent, meaning that it is not plausible to expect that all individuals during a whole mission in all situations will share the same intent. CI will be developed for specific parts of missions and shared amongst the participants. To establish CI the involvement of all participants is necessary, e.g. compare with football or soccer teams where the overall intent is formalized by coaches in collaboration with the players and where each player knows what the other players’ intentions are.

Pigeau and McCann (2000)[20] states that “In reality, it is presumed true that it is impossible to have common intent”. For a specific mission bounded for a certain time an overlap of intent ought to be achievable, e.g. as illustrated by the players in a soccer team where all have individual goals with their lives and families, but on the soccer field they have the common intent to win the game. This means that during the game, and in training and exercises prior to and after the game their common intent is to perform well according to the mission declared by the coach (Farrell & Lichacz 2004;[21] Farrell 2006;[22] Gustavsson et al. 2008d).[16] A workable version of common intent is command intent that is directed for a specific situation, bounded by participating organization, space and time, i.e. for the operation at hand the intent is common but other intent and goals of the participating humans may differ. Much of the coordination can be done locally, i.e. on a lower level, without explicit orders. Brehmer (2009)[23] proposes that the higher levels of command will have the time to consider other aspects of the problems facing them. Brehmer continues that there is the loss of combat power inherent in top-down command-directed synchronization. By NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) as presented by Alberts, Garstka & Stein (1999, pp. 87–93)[2] this is overcome by a high-speed continuum. Brehmer (2009)[23] however says that the main responsibility of the commander and his staff is to articulate intent and crafting rules of engagement. For armed forces that have mission command as their principal doctrine this is not a new concept, but Brehmer further envisions that with articulated intent larger units will be able to co-ordinate with other units and conduct the mission without any explicit directions from higher headquarters. Command Intent is then an outline of a plan, objectives to be achieved, responsibilities, linkages and schemas of manoeuvre, and constraints. Establishing command intent also involves more than one person. Traditional Commander's intent is then replaced by an intent that arises from dialogue between commanders and key staff at more than one level. Command intent is to allow self-synchronization and to provide understanding of the complex causes and effects. To enable self-synchronization the subordinates must be given the mandate to operate on their own initiatives, within the boundary of the mission. In “Rethinking Command and Control” by Curts and Cambell (2006),[24] the authors address this fine line between delegating authority and maintaining and controlling hierarchy The commander delegating authority must refrain from directing the actions of subordinates, yet must also maintain some command structure. The subordinates must have the ability to work independently or within a team to achieve the mission goals. To create this empowerment the commander’s information should be shared with everyone. Autonomy is created by setting boundaries and hierarchy then can be replaced by self-directed teams. CI acts as a basis for staffs and subordinates to develop their own plans and orders that transform thought into action, while maintaining the overall intention of their commanders (Gustavsson et al. 2008d;[16] 2009[25]).

Explicit and implicit intent

Explicit intent is an intent that is publicly stated and made available for the participants. Implicit intent is an intent that is not publicly stated. Implicit intent can be made explicit by the mechanism described below.

Shattuck and Woods (2000)[26] examined the role of communicating intent. In the study, company commanders received a battalion order including the battalion Commander's intent. Then changes to the situation were introduced and the actions performed by the company commanders were compared with the intent of the battalion commander. The result was that the company commanders matched their battalion commander's intent in only 34% of the cases. Pigeau and McCann (2000)[20] introduced that intent consists of an explicit part and an implicit part.

Explicit intent is the one that is publicly stated for all the headquarters (HQ) staff and subordinates to perceive, think about, and act upon. The explicit intent is either vocalized (i.e. made publicly) in doctrine, orders, statements or can be derived from questions and answers. Theoretically, each staff and subordinate member should be able to reiterate the commander’s intent at any point during the process.

Implicit intent consists of all the un-vocalized expectations that the commander and all team members have. The implicit intent is developed over a longer time, prior to the mission, and develops from the style of how the commander is conducting the operations with respect to experience, risk willing, use of power and force, diplomacy, ethics, social values, moral, norms, creativity and unorthodox behaviour and the concepts, policies, laws and doctrine agreed to by military, civil, organizations, agencies, nations and coalitions. Farell and Lichacz (2004)[21] proposed that implicit intent is an internal expectation of Commander's intent. The example used by Farell & Lichacz (2004)[21] is that with an explicit intent “to capture the hill” the implicit intent might be “to capture the hill with minimal battle damage” or “to capture the hill with Air Force assets only.” The implicit expectations depend on how the members interpret Commander's intent from personal expectations based on their style and experience, (Pigeau & McCann 2000),[20] and with the staff position (e.g., planner, operator, commander, etc.), (cf. Farrell & Lichacz 2004).[21] Farell and Lichacz (2004)[21] provided a way of finding implicit intent by asking questions of the form “from perspective x, how do you interpret Commander’s intent?” Implicit intent can be made explicit by transforming the implicit into explicit statements. The commander can vocalize the Personal, Military or Cultural implicit intent. The commander can be monitored, e.g. by his subordinates, and his team members, who then draw conclusions about the commanders implicit intent. In the same way a commander can draw conclusions regarding his subordinates. Pigeau and McCann (2000)[20] presented some mechanisms of making original implicit intent made explicit. They are: 1) Externalization is when a commander or subordinate make the internal intents explicit declared; 2) Internalization is a version of tacit learning, when a commander presents the intent and the mouth is saying something and the body language signals something different, or add context and meaning that are put into the mental model and affects the implicit intent; 3) Socialization is meeting and talking and performing exercises together, teaming, i.e. is to find the implicit intent and motives etc.; and 4) Dialogue is the explicit stated, publicly vocalized available description of an individual’s intent.

Computational models of intent

See also

Models of intent

References

  1. ↑ U.S Army (2003) Field Manual 6.0 - Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army. para.1-69 Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dticasd/sbir/sbir043/a30a.pdf [Accessed March 10, 2009].
  2. 1 2 Alberts, D.S., Garstka, J.J. and Stein, F.P. (1999) Network Centric Warfare 6th ed. Washington , D.C. DoD Command and Control Research Program. pp.175-180 Available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_NCW.pdf ISBN 1-57906-019-6.
  3. 1 2 Alberts, D.S. and Hayes, R. (2007) Planning: Complex Endeavours Washington, D.C.: DoD Command and Control Research Program. Available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_Planning.pdf [Accessed July 4, 2008]. ISBN 1-893723-20-8.
  4. 1 2 Gustavsson Per M. (2011-to appear) PhD Thesis "Modelling, Formalising, and implementing Intent in Command and Control Systems" De Montfort University Leicester, UK
  5. ↑ Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2010) Army Doctrine Publication - Operations Shrivenham, "6 Command of Operations", Operations (pdf), UK: Ministry of Defence, p. 11
  6. ↑ Josefsson, A. (2007) Ledningskoncept för integrerad dynamisk ledning (IDC2) C2 concept for integrated dynamic command and control.) Stockholm: Swedish Armed Forces.
  7. ↑ Chief of the Defence Staff (2008) The Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process (OPP) Available at: http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/cfwc-cgfc/Index/JD/Pub_Eng/J5%20Publications/CF%20Joint%20Doctrine%20B-GJ-005%20FP-000%20-%20Operation%20Planning%20Process-%20En.pdf.
  8. ↑ U.S. Army (2010) Field Manual 5.0 - The Operations Process U.S. Department of the Army. Available at: https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm5-0.pdf [Accessed January 20, 2011].
  9. ↑ NATO (2010) AJP-01 - Allied Joint Doctrine D. Brussels, Belgium: NATO. Available at: http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/zPublic/ap/AJP-01(D).pdf.
  10. ↑ US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2010) Joint Publication 3-0 - Joint Operations. , March 2010 . Available at: https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf [Accessed January 20, 2011].
  11. 1 2 U.S Army (2003) Field Manual 6.0 - Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dticasd/sbir/sbir043/a30a.pdf [Accessed March 10, 2009].
  12. ↑ Headquarters, Department of the Army (22 February 2011) [27 February 2008]. FM 3–0, Operations (with included Change 1) (PDF). Washington, DC: GPO. Retrieved 19 August 2013.
  13. ↑ SwAF (2009) Reglemente för markoperationer (RMO) "Regulations for Ground Operations" M. P. Svensson, (ed.) 3rd ed. Stockholm: Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters. M7739-350009.
  14. ↑ The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (2006) United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational terms and Definitions 7th ed. Ministry of Defence. Available at: http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/E8750509-B7D1-4BC6-8AEE-8A4868E2DA21/0/JDP0011Ed7.pdf.
  15. 1 2 Klein (1998, pp.225-229)
  16. 1 2 3 Gustavsson, P.M., Hieb, M.R., Niklasson, L., Eriksson, P. and Moore, P. (2008d) Machine Interpretable Representation of Commander's Intent. In: Proceedings of the 13th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS). Bellevue, Washington, USA. Available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/events/13th_iccrts_2008/CD/html/papers/188.pdf. 188.
  17. 1 2 Gustavsson, P.M., Hieb, M.R., Moore, P.R., Eriksson, P. and Niklasson, L. (2011) Operations Intent and Effects Model. The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology, January 2011 8(1), pp. 37-59. 10.1177/1548512910379477.
  18. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Pigeau, R. and McCann, C. (2006) Establishing Common Intent: The Key to Co-Ordinated Military Action. In: The Operational Art : Canadian Perspectives : Leadership and Command, 2006, Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Defence Academy Press, pp. 85-108.
  19. ↑ Klein, G. (1998) Sources of Power - How People Make Decisions Cambridge, MA: The Mit Press. ISBN 0-262-11227-2.
  20. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Pigeau, R. and McCann, C. (2000) Redefining Command and Control. In: R. Pigeau and C. McCann, (eds.) The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience, 2000, New York, NY, USA: Academic/Plenum Publishers, pp. 165-184. ISBN 978-0-306-46366-2.
  21. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Farrell, P.S.E. and Lichacz, F. (2004) Measuring Common Intent during Effects Based Planning. In: 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies, 2004.
  22. 1 2 3 Farrell, P.S.E. (2006) Common Intent and Information Processing Frameworks applied to Effect Based Approaches to Operations. In: 2006, Cambridge, UK: CCRP.
  23. 1 2 Brehmer, B. (2009) Command without Commanders. In: June 2009, Washington D.C.: CCRP.
  24. ↑ Curts, R.J. and Cambell, D.E. (2006) Rethinking Command and Control. In: March 2006, San Diego, CA: CCRP. Available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/papers/005.pdf [Accessed March 16, 2009].
  25. ↑ Gustavsson, P.M. and Hieb, M.R. (2009) Supporting Collaboration in Collective Endeavours with a Model of Operations Intent and Effects. In: Proceedings of the 14th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, June 2009, Washington D.C.: CCRP. Available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/events/14th_iccrts_2009/papers/055.pdf. 055.
  26. ↑ Shattuck, L.G. and Woods, D.D. (2000) Communication Of Intent In Military Command and Control Systems. In: C. McCann and R. Pigeau, (eds.) The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience, 2000, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, pp. 279-292. Available at: http://csel.eng.ohio-state.edu/woods/C2/shattuck_Nato.pdf [Accessed July 14, 2008].
  27. ↑ Galvin, K., Hieb, M.R., Tolk, A., Turnitsa, C. and Blais, C. (2005) Coalition Battle Management Language Study Group Final Report. In: September 30, 2005, Orlando, FL: SISO/IEEE.
  28. ↑ Blais, C., Abbott, J., Turnitsa, C., Diallo, S., Levine, S., Nero, E. and Gustavsson, P.M. (2009) Coalition Battle Management Language (C-BML) Phase 1 Specification Development: An Update to the M&S Community. In: Proceedings of the Spring Simulation Interoperability Workshop, April 2009, Orlando, Florida, U.S.A: SISO/IEEE CS Press. ISBN 978-1-60560-798-6. 09S-SIW-002.
  29. ↑ Blais, C., Brown, D., Chartrand, S., Diallo, S.Y., Gupton, K., Gustavsson, P.M., Heffner, K. and Pullen, M.J. (2011) Coalition Battle Management Language Trial Use package SISO - C-BML Product Development Group. Available at: http://c-bml.org/?attachment_id=255.
  30. ↑ Schade, U. and Hieb, M. (2006b) Development of Formal Grammars to Support Coalition Command and Control: A Battle Management Language for Orders, Requests, and Reports. In: 11th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), June 2006b, Cambridge, UK: Command and Control Research Program (CCRP). Available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/events/11th_ICCRTS/html/papers/069.pdf.
  31. ↑ Schade, U. and Hieb, M. (2008) A Linguistic Basis For Multi-Agency Coordination. In: 13th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), June 2008, Bellevue, Washington, U.S.A: Command and Control Research Program (CCRP). Available at: http://www.dodccrp.org/events/13th_iccrts_2008/CD/html/papers/152.pdf. 152.
  32. ↑ Schade, U., Hieb, M.R., Frey, M. and Rein, K. (2010) Command and Control Lexcial Grammar (C2LG) Specification Fraunhofer FKIE. Technischer Bericht FKIE-IFT 2010/02.
  33. ↑ U.S. Army (2005) Field Manual 5.0 - Army Planning and Orders Production U.S. Department of the Army. Available at: http://www.usu.edu/armyrotc/Tools/Army%20Planning%20and%20Orders%20Production%20FM%205-0.pdf.

Based on the PhD Thesis by Gustavsson Per M. (2011) "Modelling, Formalising, and Implementing Intent in Command and Control Systems", De Montfort University Leicester, UK

External links

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