International Military Tribunal for the Far East

"Tokyo Trial" redirects here. For the 1983 film, see Tokyo Trial (1983 film). For the 2006 film, see Tokyo Trial (2006 film).
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East was convened at Ichigaya Court, formerly the Imperial Japanese Army HQ building, in Ichigaya, Tokyo.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), also known as the Tokyo Trials, the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, or simply the Tribunal, was convened on April 29, 1946, to try the leaders of the Empire of Japan for three types of war crimes. "Class A" crimes were reserved for those who participated in a joint conspiracy to start and wage war, and were brought against those in the highest decision-making bodies; "Class B" crimes were reserved for those who committed "conventional" atrocities or crimes against humanity; "Class C" crimes were reserved for those in "the planning, ordering, authorization, or failure to prevent such transgressions at higher levels in the command structure".

Twenty-eight Japanese military and political leaders were charged with waging aggressive war and with responsibility for conventional war crimes. More than 5,700 lower-ranking personnel were charged with conventional war crimes in separate trials convened by Australia, China, France, The Netherlands, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States. The charges covered a wide range of crimes including prisoner abuse, rape, sexual slavery, torture, ill-treatment of labourers, execution without trial and inhumane medical experiments. China held 13 tribunals, resulting in 504 convictions and 149 executions.

The Japanese Emperor Hirohito and all members of the imperial family, such as career officer Prince Yasuhiko Asaka, were not prosecuted for involvement in any of the three categories of crimes. Herbert Bix explained, "the Truman administration and General MacArthur both believed the occupation reforms would be implemented smoothly if they used Hirohito to legitimise their changes".[1] As many as 50 suspects, such as Nobusuke Kishi, who later became Prime Minister, and Yoshisuke Aikawa, head of Nissan, were charged but released in 1947 and 1948. Shiro Ishii received immunity in exchange for data gathered from his experiments on live prisoners. The lone dissenting judge to exonerate all indictees was Indian jurist Radhabinod Pal.

The tribunal was adjourned on November 12, 1948.

Background

The Tribunal was established to implement the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, the Instrument of Surrender, and the Moscow Conference. The Potsdam Declaration had called for trials and purges of those who had "deceived and misled" the Japanese people into war. However, there was major disagreement, both among the Allies and within their administrations, about whom to try and how to try them. Despite the lack of consensus, General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, decided to initiate arrests. On September 11, a week after the surrender, he ordered the arrest of 39 suspects—most of them members of General Hideki Tōjō's war cabinet. Tōjō tried to commit suicide, but was resuscitated with the help of U.S. doctors.

Creation of the court

The judges

On January 19, 1946, MacArthur issued a special proclamation ordering the establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). On the same day, he also approved the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (CIMTFE), which prescribed how it was to be formed, the crimes that it was to consider, and how the tribunal was to function. The charter generally followed the model set by the Nuremberg Trials. On April 25, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the CIMTFE, the original Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East with amendments were promulgated.[2][3][4]

Judges

MacArthur appointed a panel of 12 judges, nine from the nations that signed the Instrument of Surrender.

Country Judge Background Opinion
Australia Sir William Webb Justice of the High Court of Australia
President of the Tribunal		 Separate
Canada Edward Stuart McDougall Justice of the Court of King's Bench of Quebec
China Mei Ju-ao Attorney and Member of the Legislative Yuan
France Henri Bernard Avocat-General (Solicitor-General) at Bangui
Chief Prosecutor, First Military Tribunal in Paris		 Dissenting
India Radhabinod Pal Lecturer, University of Calcutta Law College
Judge of the Calcutta High Court		 Dissenting
Netherlands Professor Bert Röling Professor of Law, Utrecht University Dissenting
New Zealand Erima Harvey Northcroft Judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand; former Judge Advocate General of the New Zealand Army
Philippines Colonel Delfin Jaranilla Attorney General
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines		 Separate
United Kingdom The Honourable Lord Patrick Judge (Scottish), Senator of the College of Justice
United States John P. Higgins Chief Justice, Massachusetts Superior Court
United States Major-General Myron C. Cramer Judge Advocate General of the United States Army
Replaced Judge Higgins in July 1946
Soviet Union Major-General I. M. Zaryanov Member of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR

The famous legal scholar Roscoe Pound was also apparently favourably disposed to replacing John P. Higgins as a judge but an appointment did not eventuate.[5]

Prosecutors

The chief prosecutor, Joseph B. Keenan of the United States, was appointed by President Harry S. Truman.

Country Prosecutor Background
United States Joseph Keenan Assistant Attorney General of the United States
Director of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice of the United States
Australia Mr. Justice Alan Mansfield Senior Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland
Canada Brigadier Henry Nolan Vice-Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Army
China Hsiang Che-chun Minister of Justice and Foreign Affairs
France Robert L. Oneto
India P. Govinda Menon Crown Prosecutor and Judge, Supreme Court of India
Netherlands W.G. Frederick Borgerhoff-Mulder
New Zealand Brigadier Ronald Henry Quilliam Deputy Adjutant-General of the New Zealand Army
Philippines Pedro Lopez Associate Prosecutor of the Philippines
United Kingdom Arthur Strettell Comyns Carr British MP and Barrister
Soviet Union Minister and Judge Sergei Alexandrovich Golunsky

Defendants

The defendants

Twenty-eight defendants were charged, mostly military officers and government officials.

Civilian officials

Military officers

Other defendants

Tokyo War Crimes Trial

View of the Tribunal in session: the bench of judges is on the right, the defendants on the left, and the prosecutors in the back.

Following months of preparation, the IMTFE convened on April 29, 1946. The trials were held in the War Ministry office in Tokyo.

On May 3 the prosecution opened its case, charging the defendants with conventional war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. The trial continued for more than two and a half years, hearing testimony from 419 witnesses and admitting 4,336 exhibits of evidence, including depositions and affidavits from 779 other individuals.

Charges

Following the model used at the Nuremberg Trials in Germany, the Allies established three broad categories. "Class A" charges, alleging crimes against peace, were to be brought against Japan's top leaders who had planned and directed the war. Class B and C charges, which could be leveled at Japanese of any rank, covered conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity, respectively. Unlike the Nuremberg Trials, the charge of crimes against peace was a prerequisite to prosecution—only those individuals whose crimes included crimes against peace could be prosecuted by the Tribunal.

The indictment accused the defendants of promoting a scheme of conquest that "contemplated and carried out...murdering, maiming and ill-treating prisoners of war (and) civilian internees...forcing them to labor under inhumane conditions...plundering public and private property, wantonly destroying cities, towns and villages beyond any justification of military necessity; (perpetrating) mass murder, rape, pillage, brigandage, torture and other barbaric cruelties upon the helpless civilian population of the over-run countries."

Keenan issued a press statement along with the indictment: "War and treaty-breakers should be stripped of the glamour of national heroes and exposed as what they really are—plain, ordinary murderers".

Count Offence
1 As leaders, organisers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law
27 Waging unprovoked war against China
29 Waging aggressive war against the United States
31 Waging aggressive war against the British Commonwealth (Crown colonies and protectorates of the United Kingdom in the Far East and South Asia, Australia and New Zealand)
32 Waging aggressive war against the Netherlands (Dutch East Indies)
33 Waging aggressive war against France (French Indochina)
35, 36 Waging aggressive war against the USSR
54 Ordered, authorised, and permitted inhumane treatment of prisoners of war and others
55 Deliberately and recklessly disregarded their duty to take adequate steps to prevent atrocities

Evidence and testimony

The prosecution began opening statements on May 3, 1946, and took 192 days to present its case, finishing on January 24, 1947. It submitted its evidence in fifteen phases.

The Charter provided that evidence against the accused could include any document "without proof of its issuance or signature" as well as diaries, letters, press reports, and sworn or unsworn out-of-court statements relating to the charges.[6] Article 13 of the Charter read, in part: "The tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence...and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value".[7]

Wartime press releases of the Allies were admitted as evidence by the prosecution, while those sought to be entered by the defense were excluded. The recollection of a conversation with a long-dead man was admitted. Letters allegedly written by Japanese citizens were admitted with no proof of authenticity and no opportunity for cross examination by the defense.[8]

The Tribunal embraced the best evidence rule once the Prosecution had rested.[9] The best evidence rule dictates that the "best" or most authentic evidence must be produced (For example, a map instead of a description of the map; an original instead of a copy; and a witness instead of a description of what the witness may have said). Justice Pal, one of two justices to vote for acquittal on all counts, observed, "in a proceeding where we had to allow the prosecution to bring in any amount of hearsay evidence, it was somewhat misplaced caution to introduce this best evidence rule particularly when it operated practically against the defense only".[9]

To prove their case, the prosecution team relied on the doctrine of "command responsibility". This doctrine was that it did not require proof of criminal orders. The prosecution had to prove three things: that war crimes were systematic or widespread; the accused knew that troops were committing atrocities; and the accused had power or authority to stop the crimes.

The prosecution argued that a 1927 document known as the Tanaka Memorial showed that a "common plan or conspiracy" to commit "crimes against peace" bound the accused together. Thus, the prosecution argued that the conspiracy had begun in 1927 and continued through to the end of the war in 1945. The Tanaka Memorial is now considered by most historians to have been a forgery; however, it was not regarded as such at the time.

Defense

The defendants were represented by over a hundred attorneys, three-quarters of them Japanese and one-quarter American, plus a support staff. The defense opened its case on January 27, 1947, and finished its presentation 225 days later on September 9, 1947.

The defense argued that the trial could never be free from substantial doubt as to its "legality, fairness and impartiality".[10]

The defense challenged the indictment, arguing that crimes against peace, and more specifically, the undefined concepts of conspiracy and aggressive war, had yet to be established as crimes in international law; in effect, the IMTFE was contradicting accepted legal procedure by trying the defendants retroactively for violating laws which had not existed when the alleged crimes had been committed. The defense insisted that there was no basis in international law for holding individuals responsible for acts of state, as the Tokyo Trial proposed to do. The defense attacked the notion of negative criminality, by which the defendants were to be tried for failing to prevent breaches of law and war crimes by others, as likewise having no basis in international law.

The defense argued that Allied Powers' violations of international law should be examined.

Former Foreign Minister Shigenori Tōgō maintained that Japan had had no choice but to enter the war for self-defense purposes. He asserted that "[because of the Hull Note] we felt at the time that Japan was being driven either to war or suicide".

Judgment

The IMT spent six months reaching judgment and drafting its 1,781-page opinion. On the day the judgment was read, five of the eleven justices released separate opinions outside the court.

In his concurring opinion Justice William Webb of Australia took issue with Emperor Hirohito's legal status, writing, "The suggestion that the Emperor was bound to act on advice is contrary to the evidence". While refraining from personal indictment of Hirohito, Webb indicated that Hirohito bore responsibility as a constitutional monarch who accepted "ministerial and other advice for war" and that "no ruler can commit the crime of launching aggressive war and then validly claim to be excused for doing so because his life would otherwise have been in danger...It will remain that the men who advised the commission of a crime, if it be one, are in no worse position than the man who directs the crime be committed".[11]

Justice Delfin Jaranilla of the Philippines disagreed with the penalties imposed by the tribunal as being "too lenient, not exemplary and deterrent, and not commensurate with the gravity of the offence or offences committed".

Justice Henri Bernard of France argued that the tribunal's course of action was flawed due to Hirohito's absence and the lack of sufficient deliberation by the judges. He concluded that Japan's declaration of war "had a principal author who escaped all prosecution and of whom in any case the present Defendants could only be considered as accomplices",[12] and that a "verdict reached by a Tribunal after a defective procedure cannot be a valid one".

"It is well-nigh impossible to define the concept of initiating or waging a war of aggression both accurately and comprehensively", wrote Justice Röling of the Netherlands in his dissent. He stated, "I think that not only should there have been neutrals in the court, but there should have been Japanese also." He argued that they would always have been a minority and therefore would not have been able to sway the balance of the trial. However, "they could have convincingly argued issues of government policy which were unfamiliar to the Allied justices". Pointing out the difficulties and limitations in holding individuals responsible for an act of state and making omission of responsibility a crime, Röling called for the acquittal of several defendants, including Hirota.

Justice Radhabinod Pal of India produced a 1,235-page judgment in which he dismissed the legitimacy of the IMTFE as victor's justice: "I would hold that each and every one of the accused must be found not guilty of each and every one of the charges in the indictment and should be acquitted on all those charges". While taking into account the influence of wartime propaganda, exaggerations, and distortions of facts in the evidence, and "over-zealous" and "hostile" witnesses, Pal concluded, "The evidence is still overwhelming that atrocities were perpetrated by the members of the Japanese armed forces against the civilian population of some of the territories occupied by them as also against the prisoners of war".

Sentencing

One defendant, Shūmei Ōkawa, was found mentally unfit for trial and the charges were dropped.

Two defendants, Matsuoka Yosuke and Nagano Osami, died of natural causes during the trial.

Six defendants were sentenced to death by hanging for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace (Class A, Class B and Class C):

One defendant was sentenced to death by hanging for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Class B and Class C):

They were executed at Sugamo Prison in Ikebukuro on December 23, 1948. MacArthur, afraid of embarrassing and antagonizing the Japanese people, defied the wishes of President Truman and barred photography of any kind, instead bringing in four members of the Allied Council to act as official witnesses.

Sixteen defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment. Three (Koiso, Shiratori, and Umezu) died in prison, while the other thirteen were paroled between 1954 and 1956:

Foreign minister Shigenori Tōgō was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and died in prison in 1949. Foreign minister Mamoru Shigemitsu was sentenced to 7 years.

The verdict and sentences of the tribunal were confirmed by MacArthur on November 24, 1948, two days after a perfunctory meeting with members of the Allied Control Commission for Japan, who acted as the local representatives of the nations of the Far Eastern Commission. Six of those representatives made no recommendations for clemency. Australia, Canada, India, and the Netherlands were willing to see the general make some reductions in sentences. He chose not to do so. The issue of clemency was thereafter to disturb Japanese relations with the Allied powers until the late 1950s, when a majority of the Allied powers agreed to release the last of the convicted major war criminals from captivity.

Other war crimes trials

According to Japanese records, 5,700 Japanese individuals were indicted for Class B and Class C war crimes. Of this number, 984 were initially condemned to death; 475 received life sentences; 2,944 were given more limited prison terms; 1,018 were acquitted; and 279 were never brought to trial or not sentenced. The number of death sentences by country is as follows: the Netherlands 236, Great Britain 223, Australia 153, China 149, United States 140, France 26, and Philippines 17.[13] The Soviet Union and Chinese Communist forces also held trials for Japanese war criminals.

The Khabarovsk War Crime Trials held by the Soviets tried and found guilty some members of Japan's bacteriological and chemical warfare unit, also known as Unit 731. However, those who surrendered to the Americans were never brought to trial. As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, MacArthur gave immunity to Shiro Ishii and all members of the bacteriological research units in exchange for germ warfare data based on human experimentation. On May 6, 1947, he wrote to Washington that "additional data, possibly some statements from Ishii probably can be obtained by informing Japanese involved that information will be retained in intelligence channels and will not be employed as 'War Crimes' evidence".[14] The deal was concluded in 1948.[15]

In 1981 John W. Powell published an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists detailing the experiments of Unit 731 and its open-air tests of germ warfare on civilians. It was printed with a statement by Judge Röling, the last surviving member of the Tokyo Tribunal, who wrote, "As one of the judges in the International Military Tribunal, it is a bitter experience for me to be informed now that centrally ordered Japanese war criminality of the most disgusting kind was kept secret from the Court by the U.S. government".[16]

Criticism

Charges of victors' justice

The United States had provided the funds and staff necessary for running the Tribunal and also held the function of Chief Prosecutor. The argument was made that it was difficult, if not impossible, to uphold the requirement of impartiality with which such an organ should be invested. This apparent conflict gave the impression that the tribunal was no more than a means for the dispensation of victor's justice. Solis Horowitz argues that IMTFE had an American bias: unlike the Nuremberg Trials, there was only a single prosecution team, led by an American, although the members of the tribunal represented eleven different Allied countries.[17] The IMTFE had less official support than the Nuremberg Trials. Keenan, a former U.S. assistant attorney general, had a much lower position than Nuremberg's Robert H. Jackson, a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Justice Delfin had been captured by the Japanese and walked the Bataan Death March.[18] The defense sought to remove him from the bench claiming he would be unable to maintain objectivity. The request was rejected but Delfin did excuse himself from presentation of evidence for atrocities in his native country of the Philippines.[19]

Justice Radhabinod Pal argued that the exclusion of Western colonialism and the use of the atomic bomb by the United States from the list of crimes and the lack of judges from the vanquished nations on the bench signified the "failure of the Tribunal to provide anything other than the opportunity for the victors to retaliate".[20] In this he was not alone among Indian jurists, with one prominent Calcutta barrister writing that the Tribunal was little more than "a sword in a [judge's] wig".

Justice Röling stated, "[o]f course, in Japan we were all aware of the bombings and the burnings of Tokyo and Yokohama and other big cities. It was horrible that we went there for the purpose of vindicating the laws of war, and yet saw every day how the Allies had violated them dreadfully". However, no positive or specific customary international humanitarian law with respect to aerial warfare existed before and during World War II, which was one of the main reasons why Japanese officers escaped prosecution for their aerial raids on cities in China and other nations in Asia.[21]

Pal's dissenting opinion

Pal's dissenting opinion raised substantive objections: he found that the entire prosecution case to be weak regarding the conspiracy to commit an act of aggressive war, which would include the brutalization and subjugation of conquered nations. About the Nanking Massacre—while acknowledging the brutality of the incident—he said that there was nothing to show that it was the "product of government policy" or that Japanese government officials were directly responsible. There is "no evidence, testimonial or circumstantial, concomitant, prospectant, restrospectant, that would in any way lead to the inference that the government in any way permitted the commission of such offenses", he said.[20] In any case, he added, conspiracy to wage aggressive war was not illegal in 1937, or at any point since.[20]

Exoneration of the imperial family

There has been much criticism of the blanket exoneration of Emperor Hirohito and all members of the imperial family, including Prince Asaka, Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu, Prince Higashikuni and Prince Takeda.[22][23]

As early as November 26, 1945, MacArthur confirmed to Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai that the emperor's abdication would not be necessary.[24] Before the war crimes trials actually convened, SCAP, the IPS, and court officials worked behind the scenes not only to prevent the imperial family from being indicted, but also to slant the testimony of the defendants to ensure that no one implicated the emperor. High officials in court circles and the Japanese government collaborated with Allied GHQ in compiling lists of prospective war criminals. People arrested as Class A suspects and incarcerated in the Sugamo Prison solemnly vowed to protect their sovereign against any possible taint of war responsibility.[24]

According to historian Herbert Bix, Brigadier General Bonner Fellers "immediately on landing in Japan went to work to protect Hirohito from the role he had played during and at the end of the war" and "allowed the major criminal suspects to coordinate their stories so that the emperor would be spared from indictment".[25]

Bix also argues that "MacArthur's truly extraordinary measures to save Hirohito from trial as a war criminal had a lasting and profoundly distorting impact on Japanese understanding of the lost war" and "months before the Tokyo tribunal commenced, MacArthur's highest subordinates were working to attribute ultimate responsibility for Pearl Harbor to Hideki Tōjō".[26] According to a written report by Shūichi Mizota, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai's interpreter, Fellers met the two men at his office on March 6, 1946, and told Yonai, "it would be most convenient if the Japanese side could prove to us that the emperor is completely blameless. I think the forthcoming trials offer the best opportunity to do that. Tōjō, in particular, should be made to bear all responsibility at this trial".[27][28]

Historian John W. Dower wrote that the campaign to absolve Emperor Hirohito of responsibility "knew no bounds". He argued that with MacArthur's full approval, the prosecution effectively acted as "a defense team for the emperor", who was presented as "an almost saintly figure" let alone someone culpable of war crimes.[24] He stated, "Even Japanese activists who endorse the ideals of the Nuremberg and Tokyo charters, and who have labored to document and publicize the atrocities of the Shōwa regime, cannot defend the American decision to exonerate the emperor of war responsibility and then, in the chill of the Cold War, release and soon afterwards openly embrace accused right-winged war criminals like the later prime minister Nobusuke Kishi".[29]

Three justices wrote an obiter dictum about the criminal responsibility of Hirohito. Judge-in-Chief Webb declared, "no ruler can commit the crime of launching aggressive war and then validly claim to be excused for doing so because his life would otherwise have been in danger...It will remain that the men who advised the commission of a crime, if it be one, are in no worse position than the man who directs the crime be committed".[11]

Justice Henri Bernard of France concluded that Japan's declaration of war "had a principal author who escaped all prosecution and of whom in any case the present Defendants could only be considered as accomplices".[12]

Justice Röling did not find the emperor's immunity objectionable and further argued that five defendants (Kido, Hata, Hirota, Shigemitsu, and Tōgō) should have been acquitted.

Aftermath

Release of the remaining 42 "Class A" suspects

The International Prosecution Section of the SCAP decided to try the seventy Japanese apprehended for "Class A" war crimes in three groups. The first group of 28 were major leaders in the military, political, and diplomatic sphere. The second group (23 people) and the third group (nineteen people) were industrial and financial magnates who had been engaged in weapons manufacturing industries or were accused of trafficking in narcotics, as well as a number of lesser known leaders in military, political, and diplomatic spheres. The most notable among these were:

All remaining people apprehended and accused of Class A war crimes who had not yet come to trial were set free by MacArthur in 1947 and 1948.

San Francisco Peace Treaty

Under Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951, Japan accepted the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Article 11 of the treaty reads:

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, reduce sentences and parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the government or governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on the recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.[30]

Parole for war criminals movement

In 1950, after most Allied war crimes trials had ended, thousands of convicted war criminals sat in prisons across Asia and Europe, detained in the countries where they had been convicted. Some executions had not yet been carried out, as Allied courts agreed to reexamine their verdicts. Sentences were reduced in some cases, and a system of parole was instituted, but without relinquishing control over the fate of the imprisoned (even after Japan and Germany had regained their sovereignty).

The focus changed from the top wartime leaders to "ordinary" war criminals (Class B and C in Japan), and an intense and broadly-supported campaign for amnesty for all imprisoned war criminals ensued. The issue of criminal responsibility was reframed as a humanitarian problem.

On March 7, 1950, MacArthur issued a directive that reduced the sentences by one-third for good behavior and authorized the parole after fifteen years of those who had received life sentences. Several of those who were imprisoned were released earlier on parole due to ill health.

Many Japanese reacted to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal by demanding parole for the detainees or mitigation of their sentences. Shortly after the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, a movement demanding the release of B- and C-class war criminals began, emphasizing the "unfairness of the war crimes tribunals" and the "misery and hardship of the families of war criminals". The movement quickly garnered the support of more than ten million Japanese. The government commented that "public sentiment in our country is that the war criminals are not criminals. Rather, they gather great sympathy as victims of the war, and the number of people concerned about the war crimes tribunal system itself is steadily increasing".

The parole for war criminals movement was driven by two groups: people who had "a sense of pity" for the prisoners demanded, "just set them free" (tonikaku shakuho o) regardless of how it is done. The war criminals themselves called for their own release as part of an anti-war peace movement.

On September 4, 1952, President Truman issued Executive Order 10393, establishing a Clemency and Parole Board for War Criminals. Its purpose was to advise the President regarding recommendations by the Government of Japan for clemency, reduction of sentence, or parole of Japanese war criminals sentenced by military tribunals.[31]

On May 26, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rejected a proposed amnesty for the imprisoned war criminals but instead agreed to "change the ground rules" by reducing the period required for eligibility for parole from 15 years to 10 years.[32]

By the end of 1958, all Japanese war criminals were released from prison and politically rehabilitated. Hashimoto Kingorô, Hata Shunroku, Minami Jirô, and Oka Takazumi were all released on parole in 1954. Araki Sadao, Hiranuma Kiichirô, Hoshino Naoki, Kaya Okinori, Kido Kôichi, Ôshima Hiroshi, Shimada Shigetarô, and Suzuki Teiichi were released on parole in 1955. Satô Kenryô, whom many—including Judge Röling—regarded as the one least deserving of imprisonment, was not granted parole until March 1956, the last of the Class A Japanese war criminals to be released. With the concurrence of a majority of the powers represented on the tribunal, the Japanese government announced on April 7, 1957, that the last ten major Japanese war criminals who had previously been paroled were granted clemency and were to be regarded henceforth as unconditionally free.

Legacy

In 1978 the kami of 1,068 convicted war criminals, including 14 convicted Class-A war criminals were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine.[33] Those enshrined include Hideki Tōjō, Kenji Doihara, Iwane Matsui, Heitarō Kimura, Kōki Hirota, Seishirō Itagaki, Akira Mutō, Yosuke Matsuoka, Osami Nagano, Toshio Shiratori, Kiichirō Hiranuma, Kuniaki Koiso and Yoshijirō Umezu.[34] Since 1985, visits made by Japanese government officials to the Shrine have aroused protests in China and South Korea.

Arnold Brackman, who had covered the trials for United Press International, wrote The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, a rebuttal to charges that the trial had been "victors' justice;" this rebuttal was published posthumously in 1987.[35]

In a survey of 3,000 Japanese people conducted by Asahi News as the 60th anniversary approached in 2006, 70% of those questioned were unaware of the details of the trials, a figure that rose to 90% for those in the 20–29 age group. Some 76% of the people polled recognized a degree of aggression on Japan's part during the war, while only 7% believed it was a war strictly for self-defense.[36]

A South Korean government commission cleared 83 of the 148 Koreans convicted by the Allies of war crimes during World War II. The commission ruled that the Koreans, who were categorized as Class B and Class C war criminals, were in fact victims of Japanese imperialism.[37]

See also

References

Notes

  1. ↑ "Herbert P. Bix on Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan". HarperCollins. Retrieved May 9, 2012.
  2. ↑ "Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East". Archived from the original on February 22, 1999. Retrieved May 12, 2012.
  3. ↑ Within documents relating to the IMTFE, it is also referred to as the "Charter".
  4. ↑ Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. April 25, 1946.
  5. ↑ Personal correspondence, Sir William Webb, as President of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to Dr Evatt, Minister for External Affairs and Attorney General. Letter of 3 July 1946. Available at:http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/DetailsReports/ItemDetail.aspx?Barcode=819494&isAv=N
  6. ↑ Brackman 1987, p. 60.
  7. ↑ Minear 1971, p. 118.
  8. ↑ Minear 1971, p. 120.
  9. 1 2 Minear 1971, pp. 122–123.
  10. ↑ George Furness, a Defense Counsel, stated, "[w]e say that regardless of the known integrity of the individual members of this tribunal they cannot, under the circumstances of their appointment, be impartial; that under the circumstances this trial, both in the present day and in history, will never be free from substantial doubt as to its legality, fairness and impartiality".
  11. 1 2 Röling & Rüter 1977, p. 478.
  12. 1 2 Röling & Rüter 1977, p. 496.
  13. ↑ Dower 1999, p. 447.
  14. ↑ Gold 2003, p. 109.
  15. ↑ Drayton, Richard (May 10, 2005). "An Ethical Blank Check: British and US Mythology About the Second World War Ignores Our Own Crimes and Legitimizes Anglo-American Warmaking". The Guardian. Retrieved May 9, 2012.
  16. ↑ Barenblatt, Daniel (2004). A Plague upon Humanity. Harper Collins. p. 222.
  17. ↑ Horowitz 1950.
  18. ↑ "Hon. Delfin J. Jaranilla, Attorney General, 1927 - 1932". Republic Of The Philippines, Office Of The Solicitor General. Retrieved 29 April 2013.
  19. ↑ Robert Cryer, Neil Boister, ed. (Sep 25, 2008). Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment, and Judgments, Volume 1 1. Oxford University Press. pp. LV. ISBN 0199541922.
  20. 1 2 3 "The Tokyo Judgment and the Rape of Nanking", by Timothy Brook, The Journal of Asian Studies, August 2001.
  21. ↑ Terror from the Sky: The Bombing of German Cities in World War II. Berghahn Books. 2010. p. 167. ISBN 1-8454-5844-3.
  22. ↑ Dower 1999.
  23. ↑ Bix 2001.
  24. 1 2 3 Dower 1999, pp. 323–325.
  25. ↑ Bix 2001, p. 583.
  26. ↑ Bix 2001, p. 585.
  27. ↑ Kumao Toyoda 豊田隈雄, Sensô saiban yoroku 『戦争裁判余録』, Taiseisha Kabushiki Kaisha,泰生社 1986, p.170–172.
  28. ↑ Bix 2001, p. 584.
  29. ↑ Dower 1999, p. 562.
  30. ↑ "Taiwan Documents Project – Treaty of Peace with Japan". Retrieved April 13, 2009.
  31. ↑ "Harry S. Truman – Executive Order 10393 – Establishment of the Clemency and Parole Board for War Criminals". Retrieved April 13, 2009.
  32. ↑ Maguire, Peter H. (2000). Law and War. Columbia University Press. p. 255. ISBN 978-0-231-12051-7.
  33. ↑ "Where war criminals are venerated". CNN.com. January 4, 2003. Retrieved April 13, 2008.
  34. ↑ "Enshrinement Politics: War Dead and War Criminals at Yasukuni Shrine". JapanFocus. Archived from the original on October 16, 2007. Retrieved May 12, 2012.
  35. ↑ Brackman, Arnold C. (1987), The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, New York: Morrow.
  36. ↑ "Asahi Shimbun May 2, 2006 "Tokyo Trials Poll"". Mansfield Asian Opinion Poll Database. April 2006. Archived from the original on November 8, 2006. Retrieved May 9, 2012.
  37. ↑ Koehler, Robert (November 13, 2006). "Korean war criminals cleared". rjkoehler.com. Retrieved May 9, 2012.

Books

Web

Further reading

  • International Military Tribunal for the Far East; R. John Pritchard. The Tokyo major war crimes trial: the transcripts of the court proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Robert M.W. Kempner Collegium by E. Mellen Press. ISBN 978-0-7734-8313-2. 
  • Bass, Gary Jonathan (2000). Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Trials. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
  • Frank, Richard B. (1999). Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Penguin Books. 
  • Holmes, Linda Goetz (2001). Unjust Enrichment: How Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books. 
  • Lael, Richard L. (1982). The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources. 
  • Maga, Timothy P. (2001). Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 978-0-8131-2177-2. 
  • Piccigallo, Philip R. (1979). The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. 
  • Rees, Laurence (2001). Horror in the East: Japan and the Atrocities of World War II. Boston: Da Capo Press. 
  • Sherman, Christine (2001). War Crimes: International Military Tribunal. Paducah, Kentucky: Turner Publishing Company. ISBN 978-1-56311-728-2. 
  • Totani, Yuma (2009). The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center. ISBN 978-0-674-03339-9. 

External links

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