Brute Force (book)

For the cryptography book by Matt Curtin, see Brute Force: Cracking the Data Encryption Standard.

Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (published 1990) is a book by historian John Ellis which concludes that the Allied Forces won World War II not by the skill of their leaders, war planners and commanders in the field, but by brute force (which he describes as advantages in firepower and logistics).[1]

Ellis describes what he feels are poor decisions by the Allied High Command with regards to such things as employment of weapons systems or misuses of their overwhelming advantage in manpower. Among his criticisms are the use of armor in North Africa, the Soviet Union's use of manpower, wasteful bombing strategies (RAF Marshal Sir Arthur Harris' area bombing in particular), and the failure to target Japanese shipping lanes. He also points out the similarities between World War II generals like Bernard Law Montgomery and World War I generals like Douglas Haig (in particular, the cautious method both men used to plan battles). The book is noted for its extensive use of statistical background information.

References

Notes

  1. ↑ Allied Fighting Effectiveness in North Africa and Italy, 1942-1945. BRILL. 15 May 2014. p. 2. ISBN 978-90-04-25570-8.


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