Beauchamp Duff

Sir Beauchamp Duff
Born	(1855-02-17)17 February 1855 Turriff, Scotland
Died	20 January 1918(1918-01-20) (aged 62) London, England
Allegiance	United Kingdom
Service/branch	British Indian Army
Years of service	1874–1918
Rank	General
Commands held	Commander-in-Chief, India Chief of the General Staff (India)
Battles/wars	North-West Frontier Second Boer War First World War
Awards	Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the Star of India Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire Knight of Justice of the Order of St John

General Sir Beauchamp Duff GCB, GCSI, KCVO, CIE, KStJ (17 February 1855 – 20 January 1918) was a Scottish officer with a distinguished military career in the British Indian Army, serving as Commander-in-Chief of India during the First World War.

Early life

Duff was born to an aristocratic family in Turriff, Aberdeenshire. He was destined for the army from an early age. Duff was educated at Trinity College, Glenalmond before attending the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, from which he graduated in 1874. Commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1874^[1] and served in the Afghan War from 1878 to 1880.^[1] In 1881, he was transferred to the Indian Staff Corps and then attended the Staff College from 1888 to 1889.^[1]

Family life

Duff married 1876 Grace Wood, daughter of Oswald Wood of the Punjab Uncovenanted Civil Service. They had two sons and a daughter.

Early Army Career

He was Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General at the Indian Army Headquarters from 1891 to 1895, then served as a Brigade Major in the Isazai Expedition in 1892.^[1] He was Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General during the Waziristan Expedition from 1894 to 1895.^[1]

From 1895 to 1899 he was Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief in India before being appointed Assistant Military Secretary for Indian Affairs in the War Office in 1899.^[1] However, the same year he took part in the South African War of 1899 to 1901.^[1] Upon returning to India, he served as Deputy Adjutant-General at the Indian Army Headquarters from 1901 to 1902, before commanding the Allahabad District as a brigadier-general in 1903.^[1]

With the appointment of Lord Kitchener as Commander-in-Chief of India in November 1902, Duff quickly rose in ranks, serving first as Adjutant-General, India from June 1903 to March 1906. He was required to file a secret memorandum on the delpoyment of forces in the event of Russia invading India, as Chief of the General Staff in India from March 1906 to 1909.^[1] Following Kitchener's departure, Duff served as Secretary in the Military Department of the India Office from 1910 to 1914.^[1]

In 1914, he was appointed as ADC General to HM the King.

On 8 March 1914, Duff reached the top position when replacing General O'Moore Creagh as Commander-in-Chief, India.^[1] His appointment was a change to normal practice as the post was normally held by a British Army officer rather than Beauchamp Duff who was part of the Indian Army and it was the first time it had been done.^[2] Charles Monro took over the post in June 1917.

First World War

Indian Viceroy Lord Hardinge asked Duff to make a military assessment as to the feasibility of an operation in Mesopotamia. Duff decided in short order that it was not possible. The Ottomans had 15,000 badly armed troops that would grow in numbers. A single brigade could if careful, take Baghdad, as long as it had friendly Arab support. He guess-timated that an occupying force would be at Baghdad for at least a fortnight before river transport could bring reinforcements. A division might garrison Baghdad, so long as the Russians held down the Turks in Armenia. His conclusion was that Baghdad was of little military value. The India Office in London was not keen either. They were sceptical of being holed up in Basra without action for an occupying force into the interior. But the talented Indian political department had a whip hand, were a source of information supplied, and impressive to the cabinet.^[3] But the laws of Order of Precedent applied, so any decision had to be vetted by the Imperial government in London. The Mesopotamian Campaign was under the responsibility of the Indian Army, but even after Townshend's brilliant capture of Amara he did know where were his strategic objectives. Falling very sick in summer 1915, he returned to India to recover. Duff entertained the general advising that on no account could a weakened force advance any further beyond Kut, until made up to "adequate strength." General Barrow was also present at these Simla meetings.^[4] The question remained hoowever that Townshend wanted to retreet - Aziziyeh, was untenable, and in any event concurred with Duff's instructions, not too over-extend. Yet the chain of command remained connfused: responsibility for reinforcements, which Townshend refused from Nixon, would later be blamed on the Indian Commander-in-chief.

Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force

The campaign started well with Fao Landing near Basrah in November 1914. Duff was determind that it was an Indian Army operation, advised by Sir Percy Lake, chief of staff, and GOC, Sir John Nixon there were adequate numbers of troops, 35, 000 to carry out all operations. The march on Baghdad began well: 9,000 troops of the 6th Indian Division commanded by Major-General Townshend in 1915 ended in catastrophe when the remnants of the British invasion force, cut down by heatstroke and disease, were defeated at Ctesiphon, and then surrounded in Kut El Amara. Duff set the final date for a possible rescue attempt before the floods, agreed by Lake to be 15 March 1916. But already the two men had fallen out; which was later reflected in the Commission of Inquiry's apportionment of culpability.^[5] Duff was reluctant to sack Lake telling Robertson that he was sure he "had his reasons," when Sir Percy finally went in July 1916.^[6] But by this time Robertson and the War Office had assumed responsibility for all military commands by-passing India.^[7]

Three attempts to relieve the trapped British and Indian troops led by General Aylmer, and then General Gorringe also ended in failure, at the cost of 23,000 lives.^[8] The surrender on 29 April 1916 was described as one of the worst military disasters in the history of the British Army. Duff could not have known how bad the prisoners were treated, as news began to filter back in September 1916. Colonel Braddon in The Siege alleged that Duff had ordered returning officers and men to remain silent on their own experiences in captivity; that they lacked food, and sufficient medical attention for the blistering sun of 130 F. He remained sanguine about these conflicting opinions. The Viceroy had asked Duff to investigate the lack of supplies and provisions. As soon as Viscount Chelmsford had replaced Lord Hardinge, he had called on the new Viceroy. Duff promised a rigorous investigation into "the actual facts".^[9] Unfortuately the answer came back that everything was going to plan. That was in December 1915, when he embarked on another in inquiry in February 1916: Duff was astutely aware of public opinion, investigating before pushed by London. In July, the reported lack of hospital and transports ships, nominally General Nixon's command responsibility had not been discharged by Duff, as Force D Medical staff were all under India. The political pressure mounted on Duff in the Commons. However Conservative Lord President of the Privy Council, Bonar Law argued that any disclosure of Inquiry details during the war could only help the enemy and undermine morale.^[10]

Consequently, Duff was relieved of command on 1 October 1916. The Mesopotamia Commission of Enquiry was damning in its conclusions. While General Townshend was exonerated, the Commission was harsh towards the Government of India and Duff together with the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge.^[8] Cmdr Josiah Wedgwood reflected that his condemnatory opinion pushed the general to take his own life. India had not only refused to raise new armies for war, they had given all their rifles to the Imperial army.^[11] Duff had declared Indian troops 'quite unfit for frontier work' Kitchener had reported in 1915 "if we lose it will be worse for India than any success of internal revolution or frontier attack... held unpatriotic in a private citizen ... and in men in the positions occupied by Lord Hardinge and Sir Beauchamp Duff it has been a calamity for England."^[12] Colonial Secretary Lord Curzon called it "official blundering and incompetence" on a scale not seen since the Crimean War. When finally published 27 June 1917, it had been thoroughly discussed and agonised over by the cabinet, and on 3 July, MPs had their chance to debate.General Nixon, the Commander-in-Chief of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, was also held responsible for the failed campaign "it looked as if India were trying to lay down a policy behind the back of the Secretary of State and the Cabinet."^[13] Both men were found in the dissentient [sic?] report from Cmdr Josiah Wedgwood to have shown little desire to help... some desire actually to obstruct the energetic prosecution of the war.^[14] Unable to live with the shame, Duff took to drink, committing suicide on 20 January 1918.

References

Bibliography

• Goold, Douglas (1927). Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamia Expedition and Inquiry, 1914-1917. London. 
• Latter, Edwin (1994). "The Indian Army in Mesopotamia 1914-1918". Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. I, II, III (72). 
• Mobberley, Frederick J. (1923–1927). "The Campaign of Mesopotamia 1914-1918". Official History of the Great War (London) 4. 
• Nunn, Vice-admiral Wilfrid (1932). Tigris Gunboats. London. 
• Taylor, Alasdair; Taylor, Henrietta (1914). The Book of the Duffs. Edinburgh: W. Brown. 
• Townshend, Charles (2010). When God Made Hell: The British Invasion And The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921. Faber & Faber. ISBN 9780571237197. 

External links

• Family tree
• Military profile