Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. | |||||||
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Argued November 12, 1969 Decided June 1, 1970 | |||||||
Full case name | Sandra ADICKES, Petitioner, v. S. H. KRESS & COMPANY. | ||||||
Citations |
398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970) | ||||||
Prior history | Cert. to the United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit | ||||||
Holding | |||||||
A party moving for summary judgment carries the burden of proof to establish a lack of factual controversy. | |||||||
Court membership | |||||||
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Case opinions | |||||||
Majority | Harlan, joined by Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun | ||||||
Concurrence | Black | ||||||
Dissent | Douglas | ||||||
Dissent | Brennan | ||||||
Laws applied | |||||||
Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 420 U.S.C. §1983 |
Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), was a United States Supreme Court case where the majority ruling, written by Justice Harlan, asserted that the burden of showing a lack of factual controversy rests upon the party asserting the summary judgment. It was later challenged by Celotex Corp. v. Catrett but the case was not officially overruled.[1]
Background
Plaintiff Sandra Adickes (Adickes), a white schoolteacher, was refused service by defendant S. H. Kress & Co. when she ordered food at Kress's Hattiesburg, Mississippi lunch counter in 1964. The refusal was based on the fact that Adickes was accompanied by six of her students from the Mississippi Freedom School, all of whom were black, and who also ordered lunch. The protesters staged a sit-in to protest the racial discrimination. Upon leaving the establishment, Adickes was arrested for vagrancy by a police officer who had been seen inside the Kress store with the black students.
Adickes filed a lawsuit in federal court in New York, alleging two counts: (1) Kress had deprived her of the right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not to be discriminated against on the basis of race, and (2) that both the refusal of service and her subsequent arrest were the product of a conspiracy between Kress and Hattiesburg police. The first count went to trial and was ruled in favor of respondent; the second count was dismissed before trial on a motion for summary judgment. Adickes appealed the case. The United States Supreme Court granted Certiorari.[2]
Issues
The Court addressed two issues upon review of this case:
- Would a conspiracy between Kress and a police officer allow the plaintiff to recover under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (§1983)?
- Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy count?
Holding
- Yes, a conspiracy between Kress and a police officer would allow the plaintiff to recover under §1983. A §1983 claim requires two elements for recovery: (1) the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has deprived him of a right secured by the, "constitution and laws," of the US, and (2) the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of this constitutional right 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory' (under color of law). The Court held that the involvement of a state official in such a conspiracy would plainly provide the state action necessary for a §1983 claim. [2]
- Yes, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the conspiracy count. The Court held that the respondent did not carry its burden of showing the lack of any genuine issue of fact. Looking at the evidence provided, the respondent did not, "foreclose the possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store while petitioner was awaiting service and this policeman reached an understanding with some Kress employee that petitioner not be served." The store manager claimed that he had no communication with the police officer, but no affidavits were submitted by other store personnel. Additionally, the police officers who arrested Adickes did not provide affidavits to foreclose their potential participation in the conspiracy. Kress argued that Adickes did not bring forth evidence asserting the presence of the police officer in the store and that this allows for the summary judgment. The Court holds that because Kress did not meet the initial burden, Adickes had no need to provide this evidence. [2]