Welfare state

% of GDP in social expenditures in OECD states, 2013

  >30%
  25-30%
  20-25%
  0-20%

A welfare state is a concept of government in which the state plays a key role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of its citizens. It is based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life. The general term may cover a variety of forms of economic and social organization.[1] The sociologist T.H. Marshall identified the modern welfare state as a distinctive combination of democracy, welfare, and capitalism.[2]

Modern welfare states include the Nordic countries, such as Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland[3] which employ a system known as the Nordic model. Esping-Andersen classified the most developed welfare state systems into three categories; Social Democratic, Conservative, and Liberal.[4]

The welfare state involves a transfer of funds from the state, to the services provided (i.e. healthcare, education, etc.), as well as directly to individuals ("benefits"). It is funded through redistributionist taxation and is often referred to as a type of "mixed economy".[5] Such taxation usually includes a larger income tax for people with higher incomes, called a progressive tax. This helps to reduce the income gap between the rich and poor.[6][7][8]

Etymology

The German term Sozialstaat ("social state") has been used since 1870 to describe state support programs devised by German Sozialpolitiker ("social politicians") and implemented as part of Bismarck's conservative reforms.[9] The literal English equivalent "social state" didn't catch on in Anglophone countries[10] until the Second World War, when Anglican Archbishop William Temple, author of the book Christianity and the Social Order (1942), popularized the concept using the phrase "welfare state."[11] Bishop Temple's use of "welfare state" has been connected to Benjamin Disraeli's 1845 novel Sybil: or the Two Nations (i.e., the rich and the poor), which speaks of "the only duty of power, the social welfare of the PEOPLE.'"[12] At the time he wrote Sybil, Disraeli, later Prime Minister, belonged to Young England, a conservative group of youthful Tories who disagreed with how the Whig dealt with the conditions of the industrial poor. Members of Young England attempted to garner support among the privileged classes to assist the less fortunate, and to recognize the dignity of labor that they imagined had characterized England during the Feudal Middle Ages.[13]

The Italian term stato sociale ("social state") reproduces the German term. The Swedish welfare state is called Folkhemmet — literally, "folk home", and goes back to the 1936 compromise between Swedish trade unions and large corporations. Sweden's mixed economy is based on strong unions, a robustly funded system of social security, and universal health care. In Germany, the term Wohlfahrtsstaat, a direct translation of the English "welfare state", is used to describe Sweden's social insurance arrangements. Spanish and many other languages employ an analogous term: estado del bienestar— literally, "state of well-being". In Portuguese, two similar phrases exist: estado do bem-estar social, which means "state of social well-being", and estado de providência— "providing state", denoting the state's mission to ensure the basic well-being of the citizenry. In Brazil, the concept is referred to as previdência social, or "social providence".

Modern model

Modern welfare programs are chiefly distinguished from earlier forms of poverty relief by their universal, comprehensive character. The institution of social insurance in Germany under Bismarck was an influential template. Some schemes were based largely in the development of autonomous, mutualist provision of benefits. Others were founded on state provision. In an influential essay, "Citizenship and Social Class" (1949), British sociologist T.H. Marshall identified modern welfare states as a distinctive combination of democracy, welfare, and capitalism, arguing that citizenship must encompass access to social, as well as to political and civil rights. Examples of such states are Germany, all of the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Uruguay and New Zealand and the United Kingdom in the 1930s. Since that time, the term welfare state applies only to states where social rights are accompanied by civil and political rights.

Changed attitudes in reaction to the world-wide Great Depression, which brought unemployment and misery to millions, were instrumental in the move to the welfare state in many countries. During the Great Depression, the welfare state was seen as a "middle way" between the extremes of communism on the left and unregulated laissez-faire capitalism on the right.[14] In the period following the World War II, many countries in Europe moved from partial or selective provision of social services to relatively comprehensive "cradle-to-grave" coverage of the population.

The activities of present-day welfare states extend to the provision of both cash welfare benefits (such as old-age pensions or unemployment benefits) and in-kind welfare services (such as health or childcare services). Through these provisions, welfare states can affect the distribution of wellbeing and personal autonomy among their citizens, as well as influencing how their citizens consume and how they spend their time.[15][16]

History of welfare states

Historian Robert Paxton observes that on the European continent the provisions of the welfare state were originally enacted by conservatives in the late nineteenth century and by fascists in the twentieth in order to distract workers from unions and socialism, and were opposed by leftists and radicals. He recalls that the German welfare state was set up in the 1880s by Chancellor Bismarck, who had just closed 45 newspapers and passed laws banning the German Socialist Party and other meetings by trade unionists and socialists.[17] A similar version was set up by Count Eduard von Taaffe in the Austro-Hungarian Empire a few years later. "All the modern twentieth-century European dictatorships of the right, both fascist and authoritarian, were welfare states", he writes. "They all provided medical care, pensions, affordable housing, and mass transport as a matter of course, in order to maintain productivity, national unity, and social peace."[18]

Continental European Marxists opposed piecemeal welfare measures as likely to dilute worker militancy without changing anything fundamental about the distribution of wealth and power. It was only after World War II, when they abandoned Marxism (in 1959 in West Germany, for example), that continental European socialist parties and unions fully accepted the welfare state as their ultimate goal.[19]

In Britain, the foundations for the welfare state originated with the Liberal Party under governments headed by prime ministers H. H. Asquith and David Lloyd George. British liberals supported a capitalist economy and in the nineteenth-century had principally been concerned with issues of free trade (see Classical liberalism), but by the turn of the twentieth century, they shifted away from laissez faire economics and began to favor pro-active social legislation to assure equal opportunity for all citizens (and to counteract the appeal of the Labour Party). In this they were directly inspired by the signal success of the German economy under Bismarck's top-down social reforms. The French welfare state originated in the 1930s during a period of socialist political ascendency, with the Matignon Accords and the reforms of the Popular Front, though, as Paxton points out, these reforms were paralleled and even exceeded by measures taken by the Vichy regime in the 1940s.

Germany

Main article: Welfare in Germany

Otto von Bismarck, the first Chancellor of Germany, created the modern welfare state by building on a tradition of welfare programs in Prussia and Saxony that had begun as early as in the 1840s. The measures that Bismarck introduced – old age pensions, accident insurance, and medical care – formed the basis of the modern European welfare state. His paternalistic programs aimed to forestall social unrest (specifically to prevent an uprising like that of the Paris Commune in 1871), to undercut the appeal of the Socialist party, and to secure the support of the working classes for the German Empire, as well as to reduce the outflow of immigrants to the United States, where wages were higher but welfare did not exist.[20][21] Bismarck further won the support of both industry and skilled workers through his high tariff policies, which protected profits and wages from American competition, although they alienated the liberal intellectuals who wanted free trade.[22][23]

Great Britain

The modern welfare state in Great Britain started to emerge with the Liberal welfare reforms of 1906–1914 under Liberal Prime Minister H. H. Asquith.[24] These included the passing of the Old-Age Pensions Act in 1908, the introduction of free school meals in 1909, the 1909 Labour Exchanges Act, the Development Act 1909, which heralded greater Government intervention in economic development, and the enacting of the National Insurance Act 1911 setting up a national insurance contribution for unemployment and health benefits from work.[25][26]

December 1942 saw the publication of the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, commonly known as the Beveridge Report after its chairman, Sir William Beveridge. The Beveridge Report proposed a series of measures to aid those who were in need of help, or in poverty and recommended that the government find ways of tackling it called "the five giants", namely: Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness. It urged the government to take steps to provide citizens with adequate income, adequate health care, adequate education, adequate housing, and adequate employment, proposing that "All people of working age should pay a weekly National Insurance contribution. In return, benefits would be paid to people who were sick, unemployed, retired, or widowed."

The basic assumptions of the report were that the National Health Service would provide free health care to all citizens; a Universal Child Benefit would give benefits to parents, encouraging people to have children by enabling them to feed and support a family. The report stressed the lower costs and efficiency of universal benefits. Beveridge cited miners' pension schemes as examples of some of the most efficient available and argued that a universal state scheme would be cheaper than a myriad of individual friendly societies and private insurance schemes and also less expensive to administer than a means-tested government-run welfare system for the poor.

The report's recommendations were adopted by the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, and then by the Labour Party.[27] Following the Labour election victory in the 1945 general election many of Beveridge's reforms were implemented through a series of Acts of Parliament. On July 5, 1948, the National Insurance Act, National Assistance Act and National Health Service Act came into force, forming the key planks of the modern UK welfare state. The universal system that was to be called National Insurance, in which the rich paid in and the state paid out to the rich just as to the poor, was justified on the grounds of both fairness and lower cost. Universal benefits, such as the Universal Child Benefit, were particularly beneficial after the Second World War when the birth rate was low, and may have helped drive the 1950s baby boom.

Before 1939, most health care had to be paid for through non-government organisations – through a vast network of friendly societies, trade unions, and other insurance companies, which counted the vast majority of the UK working population as members. These organizations provided insurance for sickness, unemployment, and disability, providing an income to people when they were unable to work. Following the implementation of Beveridge's recommendations, institutions run by local councils to provide health services for the uninsured poor, part of the poor law tradition of workhouses, were merged into the new national system. As part of the reforms, the Church of England also closed down its voluntary relief networks and passed the ownership of thousands of church schools, hospitals and other bodies to the state.[28]

Welfare systems continued to develop over the following decades. By the end of the 20th century parts of the welfare system had been restructured, with some provision channelled through non-governmental organizations which became important providers of social services.[29]

United States

Although the United States was to lag far behind Germany and Britain, it did finally develop a limited welfare state in the 1930s.[30] Ironically, however, the earliest and most comprehensive philosophical justification for the welfare state was produced by an American, the sociologist Lester Frank Ward (1841–1913), whom the historian Henry Steele Commager called "the father of the modern welfare state".

Nineteenth-century American businessmen had been quick to adopt the laissez-faire theories of British philosopher Herbert Spencer and his American disciples. Spencer had strongly opposed the paternalistic social reforms associated with Bismarck. He argued that coddling the poor and unfit would only encourage them to reproduce, obstructing what he considered the "scientific" and natural evolutionary progress of the human race.

Ward challenged Spencer's contention that social phenomena are not amenable to human control. "It is only through the artificial control of natural phenomena that science is made to minister to human needs." he wrote, "and if social laws are really analogous to physical laws, there is no reason why social science should not receive practical application such as have been given to physical science."[31] "The charge of paternalism" wrote Ward:

is chiefly made by the class that enjoys the largest share of government protection. Those who denounce it are those who most frequently and successfully invoke it. Nothing is more obvious today than the signal inability of capital and private enterprise to take care of themselves unaided by the state; and while they are incessantly denouncing "paternalism," by which they mean the claim of the defenseless laborer and artisan to a share in this lavish state protection, they are all the while besieging legislatures for relief from their own incompetency, and "pleading the baby act" through a trained body of lawyers and lobbyists. The dispensing of national pap to this class should rather be called "maternalism," to which a square, open, and dignified paternalism would be infinitely preferable.[32]

Central to Ward's theories was his belief that a universal and comprehensive system of education was necessary if a democratic government was to function successfully. His writings profoundly influenced younger generations of progressive thinkers such as Theodore Roosevelt, Thomas Dewey, and Frances Perkins, among others.[33]

The United States would be the only industrialized country that went into the Great Depression with no social insurance policies in place. It was not until 1935 that significant, if conservative by European standards, social insurance policies were finally instituted under Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. In 1938, the Fair Labor Standards Act, limiting the work week to 40 hours and banning child labor for children under 16, was passed over stiff congressional opposition. The price of passage of the New Deal's Social Security and Fair Labor acts was the exclusion of domestic, agricultural, and restaurant workers, who were largely African-American, from social security benefits and labor protections.[30]

By 2013 the U.S. remains the only major industrial state without a uniform national sickness program. American spending on health care (as percent of GDP) is the highest in the world, but it is a complex mix of federal, state, philanthropic, employer and individual funding. The US spent 16% of its GDP on health care in 2008, compared to 11% in France in second place.[34]

Some scholars argue that union weakness in the Southern United States undermined unionization and social reform throughout the United States as a whole, and is largely responsible for the anaemic U.S. welfare state.[35]

Oil countries

Saudi Arabia,[36][37][38][39] Brunei, Kuwait,[40] Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have become welfare states exclusively for their own citizens. They exclude all foreign residents, who form the majority of the residents in their respective nations, from access to social benefits.

Early stages: China

China traditionally relied on the extended family to provide welfare services.[41] In recent years the one-child policy has made that unrealistic, and new models have emerged since the 1980s as China has rapidly become richer and more urban. Much discussion is underway regarding China's proposed path toward a welfare state.[42] Chinese policies have been incremental and fragmented in terms of social insurance, privatization, and targeting. In the cities, where the rapid economic development has centered, there are now lines of cleavage, between state sector and non-state sector employees and between labor market insiders and outsiders.[43]

Three worlds of the welfare state

Broadly speaking, welfare states are either universal – with provisions that cover everybody, or selective – with provisions covering only those deemed most needy. In his 1990 book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen further identified three subtypes of welfare state models.[44] Though increasingly criticised, these classifications are still used as a starting point in analysis of modern welfare states[45] and remain a fundamental heuristic tool for welfare state scholars.[46]

Esping-Andersen's welfare classification acknowledges the historical role of three dominant twentieth-century Western European and American political movements: Social Democracy, Christian Democracy (conservatism); and Liberalism.[47]

  1. The Social-Democratic welfare state model is based on the principle of Universalism, granting access to benefits and services based on citizenship. Such a welfare state is said to provide a relatively high degree of citizen autonomy, limiting reliance on family and market.[48] In this context, social policies are perceived as "politics against the market".[49]
  2. The Christian-Democratic welfare state model is based on the principle of subsidiarity (decentralization) and the dominance of social insurance schemes, offering a medium level of decommodification and permitting a high degree of social stratification.
  3. The Liberal model is based on market dominance and private provision; ideally, in this model, the state only interferes to ameliorate poverty and provide for basic needs, largely on a means-tested basis. Hence, the decommodification potential of state benefits is assumed to be low and social stratification high.[48]

Based on the decommodification index, Esping-Andersen divided 18 OECD countries into the following groups:[50]

  1. Social Democratic: Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden
  2. Christian Democratic: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and Italy
  3. Liberal: Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the US
  4. Not clearly classified: Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom

Since the building of the decommodification index is limited,[51] this typology could be also criticized. Nevertheless, these 18 countries can be placed on a continuum from the most purely social-democratic, Sweden, to the most liberal, the United States.[52]

Swedish professor of political science Bo Rothstein points out that in non-universal welfare states, the state is primarily concerned with directing resources to "the people most in need". This requires tight bureaucratic control in order to determine who is eligible for assistance and who is not. Under universal models such as Sweden, on the other hand, the state distributes welfare to all people who fulfill easily established criteria (e.g. having children, receiving medical treatment, etc.) with as little bureaucratic interference as possible. This, however, requires higher taxation due to the scale of services provided. This model was constructed by the Scandinavian ministers Karl Kristian Steincke and Gustav Möller in the 1930s and is dominant in Scandinavia.[53]

Sociologist Lane Kenworthy argues that the Nordic experience demonstrates that the modern social democratic model can "promote economic security, expand opportunity, and ensure rising living standards for all . . . while facilitating freedom, flexibility and market dynamism."[54]

Finally, scholars have also proposed to classify welfare regimes using 'outcomes', such as inequalities, poverty rates, response to different social risks, rather than simply focusing on institutional configurations. [55]

Effects of welfare on poverty

Empirical evidence suggests that taxes and transfers considerably reduce poverty in most countries whose welfare states constitute at least a fifth of GDP.[56][57]

Country Absolute poverty rate (1960–1991)
(threshold set at 40% of U.S. median household income)[56]		 Relative poverty rate (1970–1997)[57]
Pre-welfare Post-welfare Pre-welfare Post-welfare
 Sweden23.75.814.84.8
 Norway9.21.712.44.0
 Netherlands22.17.318.511.5
 Finland11.93.712.43.1
 Denmark26.45.917.44.8
 Germany15.24.39.75.1
  Switzerland12.53.810.99.1
 Canada22.56.517.111.9
 France36.19.821.86.1
 Belgium26.86.019.54.1
 Australia23.311.916.29.2
 United Kingdom16.88.716.48.2
 United States21.011.717.215.1
 Italy30.714.319.79.1

Effects of social expenditure on economic growth, public debt, and education

Researchers have found very little correlation between economic performance and social expenditure.[58] They also see little evidence that social expenditures contribute to losses in productivity; economist Peter Lindert of the University of California, Davis attributes this to policy innovations such as the implementation of "pro-growth" tax policies in real-world welfare states.[59]

Nor have social expenses contributed significantly to public debt.

According to the OECD, social expenditures in its 34 member countries rose steadily between 1980 and 2007, but the increase in costs was almost completely offset by GDP growth. More money was spent on welfare because more money circulated in the economy and because government revenues increased. In 1980, the OECD averaged social expenditures equal to 16 percent of GDP. In 2007, just before the financial crisis kicked into full gear, they had risen to 19 percent – a manageable increase.[60]

A Norwegian study covering the period 1980 to 2003 found welfare state spending correlated negatively with student achievement.[61] However, many of the top-ranking OECD countries on the 2009 PISA tests are considered welfare states.[62]

The table below shows, first, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP for some (selected) OECD member states and second, GDP per capita (PPP US$) in 2013:

Nation Social expenditure
(% of GDP)[63] 		Year[64] GDP per capita (PPP US$)[65]
 France 31.9 2014 $36,907
 Finland 31.0 2014 $38,251
 Belgium 30.7 2014 $40,338
 Denmark 30.1 2014 $42,764
 Italy 28.6 2014 $34,303
 Austria 28.4 2014 $44,149
 Sweden 28.1 2014 $43,533
 Spain 26.8 2014 $32,103
 Germany 25.8 2014 $43,332
 Portugal 25.2 2014 $25,900
 Netherlands 24.7 2014 $43,404
 Greece 24.0 2014 $25,651
 Slovenia 23.7 2014 $28,298
 Luxembourg 23.5 2013 $90,790
 Japan 23.1 2011 $36,315
 Hungary 22.1 2014 $22,878
 Norway 22.0 2014 $65,461
 United Kingdom 21.7 2014 $35,760
 Ireland 21.0 2014 $43,304
 New Zealand 20.8 2013 $34,826
 Poland 20.6 2014 $23,275
 Czech Republic 20.6 2014 $27,344
  Switzerland 19.4 2014 $53,672
 United States 19.2 2014 $53,143
 Australia 19.0 2014 $43,550
 Slovakia 18.4 2014 $26,114
 Canada 17.0 2014 $43,247
 Iceland 16.5 2014 $39,996
 Estonia 16.3 2014 $25,049
 Israel 15.0 2013 $32,760
 Turkey 12.5 2013 $18,975
 South Korea 10.4 2014 $33,140
 Chile 10.0 2013 $21,911
 Mexico 7.9 2012 $16,463

Criticism and response

Main article: Criticisms of welfare

Early conservatives, under the influence of Malthus, opposed every form of social insurance "root and branch", arguing, as economist Brad DeLong put it: "make the poor richer, and they would become more fertile. As a result, farm sizes would drop (as land was divided among ever more children), labor productivity would fall, and the poor would become even poorer. Social insurance was not just pointless; it was counterproductive."[66] Malthus, a clergyman, for whom birth control was anathema, believed that the poor needed to learn the hard way to practice frugality, self-control, and chastity. Traditional conservatives also protested that the effect of social insurance would be to weaken private charity and loosen traditional social bonds of family, friends, religious, and non-governmental welfare organisations.[67]

Karl Marx, on the other hand, opposed piecemeal reforms advanced by middle class reformers out of a sense of duty. In his Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, written after the failed revolution of 1848, he warned that measures designed to increase wages, improve working conditions, and provide social insurance were merely bribes that would only temporarily make the situation of working classes tolerable and in the long run would weaken the revolutionary consciousness needed to achieve a socialist economy.[68] Nevertheless, Marx also proclaimed that the Communists had to support the bourgeoisie wherever it acted as a revolutionary progressive class because "bourgeois liberties had first to be conquered and then criticised."[69]

In the twentieth century, opponents of the welfare state have expressed apprehension about the creation of a large, possibly self-interested bureaucracy required to administer it and the tax burden on the wealthier citizens that this entailed.[70]

Political historian Alan Ryan points out that the modern welfare state stops short of being an "advance in the direction of socialism," noting in particular that: "its egalitarian elements are more minimal than either its defenders or its critics think", and because it does not entail advocacy for social ownership of industry. The modern welfare state, Ryan writes, does not set out:

to make the poor richer and the rich poorer, which is a central element in socialism, but to help people to provide for themselves in sickness while they enjoy good health, to put money aside to cover unemployment while they are in work, and to have adults provide for the education of their own and other people’s children, expecting those children’s future taxes to pay in due course for the pensions of their parents’ generation. These are devices for shifting income across different stages in life, not for shifting income across classes. Another distinct difference is that social insurance does not aim to transform work and working relations; employers and employees pay taxes at a level they would not have done in the nineteenth century, but owners are not expropriated, profits are not illegitimate, cooperativism does not replace hierarchical management.[71]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Welfare state, Britannica Online Encyclopedia
  2. ↑ Marshall, T H. Citizenship and Social Class: And Other Essays. Cambridge [Eng.: University Press, 1950]. Print.
  3. ↑ Paul K. Edwards and Tony Elger, The global economy, national states and the regulation of labour (1999) p, 111
  4. ↑ Esping-Andersen (1990); for a revision of his typology see Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011).
  5. ↑ "Welfare state." Encyclopedia of Political Economy. Ed. Phillip Anthony O'Hara. Routledge, 1999. p. 1245
  6. ↑ Pickett and Wilkinson, The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better, 2011
  7. ↑ The Economics of Welfare| Arthur Cecil Pigou
  8. ↑ Andrew Berg and Jonathan D. Ostry, 2011, "Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/11/08, International Monetary Fund
  9. ↑ S. B. Fay, 'Bismarck's Welfare State', Current History: XVIII (January 1950): 1-7.
  10. ↑ Smith, Munroe (December 1901). "Four German Jurists. IV". Political Science Quarterly (The Academy of Political Science) 16 (4): 669. doi:10.2307/2140421. ISSN 0032-3195. JSTOR 2140421.
  11. ↑ Megginson, William L.; Jeffry M. Netter (June 2001). "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization" (PDF). Journal of Economic Literature 39 (2): 321–389. doi:10.1257/jel.39.2.321. ISSN 0022-0515..
  12. ↑ Sybil, p. 273, quoted in Michael Alexander, Medievalism: The Middle Ages in Modern England (Yale University Press), p. 93.
  13. ↑ Alexander, Medievalism, pp. xxiv–xxv, 62, 93, and passim.
  14. ↑ "Welfare State", O'Hara, Phillip Anthony, editor, Encyclopedia of political economy (Routledge 1999), p. 1245
  15. ↑ Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1999). Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-874200-2.
  16. ↑ Rice, James Mahmud; Robert E. Goodin; Antti Parpo (September–December 2006). "The Temporal Welfare State: A Crossnational Comparison" (PDF). Journal of Public Policy 26 (3): 195–228. doi:10.1017/S0143814X06000523. ISSN 0143-814X.
  17. ↑ These laws had no effect and were allowed to lapse in 1890.
  18. ↑ Robert O. Paxton, "Vichy Lives!—In a way," The New York Review of Books April 25, 2013
  19. ↑ Paxton, "Vichy Lives!—In a way,"
  20. ↑ E. P. Hennock, The Origin of the Welfare State in England and Germany, 1850–1914: Social Policies Compared (2007)
  21. ↑ Hermann Beck, Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia, 1815-1870 (1995)
  22. ↑ Elaine Glovka Spencer, "Rules of the Ruhr: Leadership and Authority in German Big Business Before 1914," Business History Review: 53 (Spring 1979), 1:40-64.
  23. ↑ Ivo N. Lambi, "The Protectionist Interests of the German Iron and Steel Industry, 1873-1879," Journal of Economic History: 22 (March 1962): 1: 59-70.
  24. ↑ Francis G. Castles et al. (2010). The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. Oxford Handbooks Online. p. 67.
  25. ↑ Bentley Gilbert, "David Lloyd George: Land, the Budget, and Social Reform," American Historical Review: 81 (Dec 1976): 5: 1058-66. in JSTOR
  26. ↑ Derek Fraser, The evolution of the British welfare state: a history of social policy since the Industrial Revolution (1973).
  27. ↑ Beveridge, Power and Influence
  28. ↑ Bagehot: God in austerity Britain The Economist, published 2011-12-10
  29. ↑ Pawel Zaleski Global Non-governmental Administrative System: Geosociology of the Third Sector, [in:] Gawin, Dariusz & Glinski, Piotr [ed.]: "Civil Society in the Making", IFiS Publishers, Warszawa 2006
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 Walter I. Trattner (2007). From Poor Law to Welfare State, 6th Edition: A History of Social Welfare in America. Free Press. p. 15.
  31. ↑ Quoted in Thomas F. Gosset, Race: The History of an Idea in America (Oxford University Press, 1997 [1963]), p. 161.
  32. ↑ Lester Frank Ward, Forum XX, 1895, quoted in Henry Steel Commager's The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought and Character Since the 1880s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 210.
  33. ↑ Henry Steele Commager, Editor, Lester Ward and the Welfare State (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967).
  34. ↑ Soeren Mattke et al. (2011). Health and Well-Being in the Home: A Global Analysis of Needs, Expectations, and Priorities for Home Health Care Technology. Rand Corporation. pp. 33–.
  35. ↑ Friedman, Gerald (June 2000). The Political Economy of Early Southern Unionism: Race, Politics, and Labor in the South, 1880-1953. The Journal of Economic History published by Cambridge University Press, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 384-413. Retrieved 25 December 2014.
  36. ↑ http://www.albawaba.com/business/saudi-arabia-unemployment--545543
  37. ↑ http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/817.htm
  38. ↑ Social Services (2) - Saudi Arabia Information
  39. ↑ Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia London
  40. ↑ Sulayman Khalaf and Hassan Hammoud, "The Emergence of the Oil Welfare State", Dialectical Anthropology: 12 (1987): 3: 343-357.
  41. ↑ A. B. Susanto and Patricia Susanto (2013). The Dragon Network: Inside Stories of the Most Successful Chinese Family Businesses. Wiley. p. 22.
  42. ↑ Scott Kennedy (2011). Beyond the Middle Kingdom: Comparative Perspectives on China’s Capitalist Transformation. Stanford U.P. p. 89.
  43. ↑ Xian Huang, "The Politics of Social Welfare Reform in Urban China: Social Welfare Preferences and Reform Policies," Journal of Chinese Political Science (March 2013) 18#1 pp 61-85
  44. ↑ Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 18–27.
  45. ↑ For a review of the debate on the Three worlds of Welfare Capitalism, see Art and Gelissen (2002) and Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011).
  46. ↑ Even for those who claim that in-depth analysis of a single case is more suited to capture the complexity of different social policy arrangements, welfare typologies can provide a comparative lens that can help to place single cases in perspective. See Emanuele Ferragina and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (2011). Welfare regime debate: past, present, futures. Policy & Politics: 39: 4 (2011). p. 598.
  47. ↑ Stephens (1979); Korpi (1983); Van Kersbergen (1995); Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011); Vrooman (2012).
  48. ↑ 48.0 48.1 Emanuele Ferragina and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (2011). Welfare regime debate: past, present, futures. Policy & Politics: 39: 4 (2011). p. 584.
  49. ↑ Esping-Andersen (1985).
  50. ↑ Esping-Andersen (1990), p. 71.
  51. ↑ According to the French sociologist Georges Menahem, Esping-Andersen's "decommodification index" aggregates both qualitative and quantitative variables for "sets of dimensions" which fluid, and pertain to three very different areas. These characters involve similar limits of the validity of the index and of its potential for replication. Cf. Georges Menahem, « The decommodified security ratio: A tool for assessing European social protection systems », in International Social Security Review, Volume 60, Issue 4, Pages 69–103, October–December 2007.
  52. ↑ Emanuele Ferragina and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (2011). Welfare regime debate: past, present, futures. Policy & Politics:, 39:4 (2011). p. 597.
  53. ↑ Bo Rothstein, Just Institutions Matter: the Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 18–27.
  54. ↑ Kenworthy, Lane (2014). Social Democratic America. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0199322511 p. 9.
  55. ↑ [Ferragina, E. et al. (2015). The Four Worlds of ‘Welfare Reality’ – Social Risks and Outcomes in Europe, Social Policy and Society, vol. 14 (2), 287-307] .
  56. ↑ 56.0 56.1 Kenworthy, L. (1999). Do social-welfare policies reduce poverty? A cross-national assessment. Social Forces: 77: 3: 1119-1139.
  57. ↑ 57.0 57.1 Bradley, D., Huber, E., Moller, S., Nielson, F. & Stephens, J. D. (2003) "Determinants of relative poverty in advanced capitalist democracies. American Sociological Review 68:3: 22-51.
  58. ↑ Atkinson, A. B. (1995). Incomes and the Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-55796-8.
  59. ↑ Lindert, Peter (2004). Growing Public: Social Spending And Economic Growth Since The Eighteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-82175-4.
  60. ↑ Martin Eierman, "The Myth of the Exploding Welfare State", The European, October 24,.2012.
  61. ↑ Does a generous welfare state crowd out student achievement? Panel data evidence from international student tests.
  62. ↑ Shepherd, Jessica. December 7, 2010. World education rankings: which country does best at reading, maths and science?. The Guardian. Accessed: 28 November 2013.
  63. ↑ http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG
  64. ↑ For social expenditure figures.
  65. ↑ , The World Bank, World Bank. Accessed on 11 October 2014.
  66. ↑ J. Bradford DeLong, "American Conservatism's Crisis of Ideas" (February 23, 2013).
  67. ↑ James Rolph Edwards, "The Costs of Public Income Redistribution and Private Charity", Journal of Libertarian Studies 21: 2 (2007): 3–20.
  68. ↑ Karl Marx, "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League" (1850) retrieved January 5, 2013 from Marxists.org: "However, the democratic petty bourgeois want better wages and security for the workers, and hope to achieve this by an extension of state employment and by welfare measures; in short, they hope to bribe the workers with a more or less disguised form of alms and to break their revolutionary strength by temporarily rendering their situation tolerable."
  69. ↑ Eduard Bernstein, "Karl Marx and Social Reform", Progressive Review, no 7, April 1897.
  70. ↑ Alan Ryan, The Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton and Oxford University Presses, 2012), p. 26 and passim.
  71. ↑ Alan Ryan, On Politics, Book Two: A History of Political Thought From Hobbes to the Present (Liveright, 2012), pp. 904−905.

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