Two-level game theory

Two-level game theory is a political model of international conflict resolution between states derived from game theory and originally introduced in 1988 by Robert Putnam.^[1]

Origins

Putnam had been involved in research around the G7 summits between 1976 and 1979. However at the 4th summit, held in Bonn in 1978 he observed a qualitative shift in how the negotiations worked.

The model views international negotiations between states as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at both the intra-national level (i.e. domestic) and the international level (i.e. between governments). Over domestic negotiations, the chief negotiator absorbs the concern of societal actors and builds coalitions with them; at the international level, the chief negotiator seeks an agreement that is amongst the possible 'wins' in his state's 'win-set'. Win-sets are the possible outcomes that are likely to be accepted by the domestic interest groups who either must ratify the agreement or provide some other form of government backing. International agreements occur when there is an overlap between the win-sets of the states involved in the international negotiations.

References

↑ Putnam, Robert (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games". International Organization 42: 427–460. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027697.

Topics in game theory

Definitions	Normal-form game Extensive-form game Graphical game Cooperative game Succinct game Information set Hierarchy of beliefs Preference

Equilibrium concepts	Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Mertens-stable equilibrium Bayesian-Nash Perfect Bayesian Trembling hand Proper equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Correlated equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Risk dominance Core Shapley value Pareto efficiency Quantal response equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Strong Nash equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium

Strategies	Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Tit for tat Grim trigger Collusion Backward induction Forward induction Markov strategy

Classes of games	Symmetric game Perfect information Simultaneous game Sequential game Repeated game Signaling game Cheap talk Zero-sum game Mechanism design Bargaining problem Stochastic game n-player game Large Poisson game Nontransitive game Global games Strictly determined game

Games	Prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Rock-paper-scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto games War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Cake cutting Cournot game Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Screening game Prisoners and hats puzzle Trust game Princess and monster game Monty Hall problem Rendezvous problem

Theorems	Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Purification theorem Folk theorem Revelation principle Arrow's impossibility theorem

Key figures	Kenneth Arrow Robert Aumann Kenneth Binmore Samuel Bowles Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Drew Fudenberg Donald B. Gillies John Harsanyi Leonid Hurwicz David K. Levine Daniel Kahneman David M. Kreps Harold W. Kuhn Eric Maskin Jean-François Mertens Paul Milgrom Oskar Morgenstern Roger Myerson John Nash John von Neumann Ariel Rubinstein Thomas Schelling Reinhard Selten Herbert Simon Lloyd Shapley John Maynard Smith Jean Tirole Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky William Vickrey Robert B. Wilson Peyton Young

See also	Tragedy of the commons Tyranny of small decisions All-pay auction List of games in game theory Confrontation analysis List of game theorists Combinatorial game theory Alpha–beta pruning Bertrand paradox Bounded rationality No-win situation