State capture

State capture is a type of systemic political corruption in which private interests significantly influence a state's decision-making processes to their own advantage through illicit and unobvious channels. The influence may be through a range of state institutions, including the legislature, executive, ministries and the judiciary. It is thus similar to regulatory capture but differs through the wider variety of bodies through which it may be exercised and because, unlike regulatory capture, the influence is never overt.[1]

Another distinguishing factor from corruption is while in case of corruption the outcome (of policy or regulatory decision) is not certain, in case of captured state the outcome of the decision is known and is to very high probability to be beneficial for captors of the state. Also in case of corruption (even rampant) there is plurality and competition of 'corruptors' to influence the outcome of the policy or distribution of resources. In case of captured state, those deciding are usually more in a position of agents to the principals (captors) who function either in monopolistic or oligopolistic (non-competitive) fashion.

See also

References

  1. World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition: Contribution to the Policy Debate. World Bank Publications. ISBN 9780821348024.