Shadow Open Market Committee
The Shadow Open Market Committee (SOMC) is an independent, monetarist economic analysis committee founded in 1973 by Profs. Karl Brunner, from the University of Rochester, and Allan Meltzer, from Carnegie Mellon University, named after the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), of which it is often critical. Its members are drawn both from academia and the private sector.
The Committee was founded at a time when many monetarist economists believed the Federal Reserve—and the alleged dominance of new Keynesians within the Fed[1]—had caused a recession by failing to keep money supply growth steady,[2] and advocates that the Fed change its procedures to tighten its control of M-1.[3] Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Committee's biannual studies consistently blamed the Fed for contributing to the inflation of that period.[4] After 1982, the SOMC was critical of the Fed's return to short-term interest rate targeting, which it believed would further inflation.[5]
The Committee also opposes the targeting of monetary policy on the exchange rate.[6]
Statistical analysis of the SOMC's policy recommendations and the FOMC's actions through 1995 indicated that the SOMC had little influence on FOMC directives.[7]
Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs Beryl Sprinkel was a long-time member of the SOMC.[8]
There are similar shadow committees in Europe, Latin America, and Japan.[9] The SOMC is viewed as somewhat of a model for those who advocate completely non-governmental central banks.[10]
Current members
- Michael Bordo, Rutgers University
- Charles Calomiris, Columbia University
- Marvin Goodfriend, Carnegie Mellon University
- Gregory Hess, Wabash College
- Bennett McCallum, Carnegie Mellon University
- Mickey Levy, Blenheim Capital Management
- Anna Schwartz, NBER
- Peter Ireland, Boston College
References
- ↑ Coats, Alfred William. 1993. The Sociology and Professionalization of Economics. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-06716-2. p. 615.
- ↑ Wells, Wyatt C. 1994. Economist in an Uncertain World: Arthur F. Burns and the Federal Reserve, 1970-78. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-08496-X. p. 149.
- ↑ Tobin, James. 1989. Policies for Prosperity: Essays in a Keynesian Mode. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-70036-0. p. 156.
- ↑ Shull, Bernard. 2005. The Fourth Branch: The Federal Reserve's Unlikely Rise To Power And Influence. Praeger/Greenwood. ISBN 1-56720-624-7. p. 144.
- ↑ Shull, 2005, p. 175.
- ↑ Hennnig, Randall C. 1994. Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Peterson Institute. ISBN 0-88132-127-3. p. 287.
- ↑ Havrilesky, Thomas M. 1995. The Pressures on American Monetary Policy. Springer. ISBN 0-7923-9561-1. p. 272.
- ↑ Dominguez, Kathryn Mary, and Frankel, Jeffrey A. 1993. Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Work?. Peterson Institute. ISBN 0-88132-104-4. p. 9.
- ↑ Martin, Preston. 2003. The Complete Idiot's Guide to the Federal Reserve. Alpha Books. ISBN 0-02-864323-2. p. 286.
- ↑ Calverley, John P. 2004. Bubbles and How To Survive Them. Nicholas Brealey Publishing. ISBN 1-85788-348-9. p. 168.