James M. Buchanan

For other people named James Buchanan, see James Buchanan (disambiguation).
James M. Buchanan

Buchanan in September 2010
Born October 3, 1919
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, U.S.
Died January 9, 2013 (aged 93)
Blacksburg, Virginia, U.S.
Nationality American
Institution George Mason University
Virginia Tech
University of Virginia
Field Public choice
School or tradition
Constitutional economics
Alma mater University of Chicago
University of Tennessee
State Teachers College, Murfreesboro
Influences Frank Knight
Knut Wicksell
Friedrich Hayek
Ludwig von Mises
Influenced Elinor Ostrom
Tyler Cowen
Contributions Public choice theory
Logrolling
Awards Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences (1986)
Information at IDEAS / RePEc

James McGill Buchanan, Jr. (/bjuːˈkænɨn/; October 3, 1919 – January 9, 2013) was an American economist known for his work on public choice theory, for which he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in 1986. Buchanan's work initiated research on how politicians' self-interest and non-economic forces affect government economic policy. He was a member of the Board of Advisors of The Independent Institute, a member (and for a time the President) of the Mont Pelerin Society,[1] a Distinguished Senior Fellow of the Cato Institute, and professor at George Mason University.

Biography

Buchanan was born in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the eldest child of James and Lila (Scott) Buchanan. He was a grandson of John P. Buchanan, a governor of Tennessee in the 1890s.[2] He graduated from Middle Tennessee State Teachers College, now known as Middle Tennessee State University, in 1940. Buchanan completed his M.S. from the University of Tennessee in 1941. He spent the war years on the staff of Admiral Nimitz in Honolulu, and it was during that time he met and married Anne Bakke on October 5, 1945; Anne, of Norwegian descent, was working as a nurse at the military base in Hawaii.

Buchanan identified as a socialist in his youth, and was unaware of the University of Chicago's strong market-oriented approach to economics. His studies there, particularly under Frank Knight, converted him to "a zealous advocate of the market order".[3] Buchanan received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1948 for his thesis "Fiscal Equity in a Federal State," in which he was heavily influenced by Frank H. Knight. It was also at Chicago that he read for the first time and found enlightening the work of Knut Wicksell. Photographs of Knight and Wicksell have hung from his office walls ever since.

Buchanan was the founder of a new Virginia school of political economy.

He taught at the University of Virginia from 1956–1968, where he founded the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy. From 1955 to 1956 he was a Fulbright Scholar in Italy.

He taught at UCLA 1968–1969, followed by Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1969–1983 where he founded the Center for the Study of Public Choice (CSPC). In 1983 a conflict with Economics Department head Daniel M. Orr came to a head and Buchanan took the CSPC to its new home at George Mason University.[4]

He also taught at Florida State University and the University of Tennessee.

In 1988 Buchanan returned to Hawaii for the first time since the War and gave a series of lectures later published by the University Press. In 2001 Buchanan received an honorary doctoral degree from Universidad Francisco Marroquín, in Guatemala City, Guatemala, for his contribution to economics.[5]

Buchanan's work focused on public finance, the public debt, voting, rigorous analysis of the theory of logrolling, macroeconomics, constitutional economics, and libertarian theory.[6]

Buchanan died January 9, 2013, in Blacksburg, Virginia, at age 93.[7] The New York Times commented that the Nobel Prize-winning economist who championed public choice theory influenced a "generation of conservative thinking about deficits, taxes and the size of government".[8] The Badische Zeitung called Buchanan, who showed how politicians undermine fair and simple tax systems, the "founder of the New Political Economy".[9]

Approach to economic analysis

Buchanan was largely responsible for the rebirth of political economy as a scholarly pursuit.[10] Buchanan emphasized that public policy cannot be considered in terms of distribution, but is instead always a question of the choice over rules of the game that engender a pattern of exchange and distribution. His work in public choice theory is often interpreted as the quintessential case of economic imperialism;[11] however, Amartya Sen argued that Buchanan should not be identified with economic imperialism, since Buchanan has done more than most to introduce ethics, legal political thinking, and indeed social thinking into economics.[12] Crucial to understanding Buchanan's system of thought is the distinction he made between politics and policy. Politics is about the rules of the game, where policy is focused on strategies that players adopt within a given set of rules. “Questions about what are good rules of the game are in the domain of social philosophy, whereas questions about the strategies that players will adopt given those rules is the domain of economics, and it is the play between the rules (social philosophy) and the strategies (economics) that constitutes what Buchanan refers to as constitutional political economy”.[13]

Buchanan's important contribution to constitutionalism is his development of the sub-discipline of constitutional economics.[14] According to Buchanan the ethic of constitutionalism is a key for constitutional order and "may be called the idealized Kantian world" where the individual "who is making the ordering, along with substantially all of his fellows, adopts the moral law as a general rule for behaviour".[15] Buchanan rejects "any organic conception of the state as superior in wisdom, to the citizens of this state". This philosophical position forms the basis of constitutional economics. Buchanan believed that every constitution is created for at least several generations of citizens. Therefore, it must be able to balance the interests of the state, society, and each individual.[16]

Buchanan is considered to be a quasi-member of the Austrian school of economics, not formally associated with the school but sharing many common beliefs.[17] As Buchanan puts it: "I certainly have a great deal of affinity with Austrian economics and I have no objections to being called an Austrian. Hayek and Mises might consider me an Austrian but, surely some of the others would not." Buchanan went on to say that: "I didn't become acquainted with Mises until I wrote an article on individual choice and voting in the market in 1954. After I had finished the first draft I went back to see what Mises had said in Human Action. I found out, amazingly, that he had come closer to saying what I was trying to say than anybody else."[18]

List of publications

See also

References

  1. "Mont Pelerin Society Directory" (PDF). DeSmogBlog. Retrieved January 28, 2014.
  2. Reuben Kyle, From Nashville to the Nobel Prize: The Buchanans of Tennessee (Twin Oaks Press, 2012).
  3. http://econjwatch.org/ancillary/IPEL.html
  4. William C. Mitchell (1988). "Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-Five Years of Public Choice and Political Science". Public Choice 56 (2): 101–119. doi:10.1007/BF00115751.
  5. Honorary Doctoral Degrees at Universidad Francisco Marroquín
  6. Peter Barenboim, Natalya Merkulova. "The 25th Anniversary of Constitutional Economics: The Russian Model and Legal Reform in Russia, in The World Rule of Law Movement and Russian Legal Reform", edited by Francis Neate and Holly Nielsen, Justitsinform, Moscow (2007).
  7. "James M. Buchanan, Economic Scholar and Nobel Laureate, Dies at 93". New York Times. Retrieved January 9, 2013.
  8. McFadden, Robert D. (January 9, 2013). "James M. Buchanan, Economic Scholar and Nobel Laureate, Dies at 93". New York Times.
  9. "Nobelpreisträger James M. Buchanan ist tot". Badische Zeitung (in German). January 9, 2013.
  10. Boettke, P.J. (1998). James M. Buchanan and the rebirth of political economy, in (S. Pressman and R. Holt, eds.), Against the Grain: Dissent in Economics, pp. 21–39, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1998
  11. Amartya Sen, in Economics and Sociology, ch. 14, Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 263
  12. Swedberg, R. (1990). Economics and Sociology: On Redefining Their Boundaries, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 263
  13. "Where Economics and Philosophy Meet: Review of The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy with responses from the authors", The Economic Journal, 116 (June), 2006
  14. menu, Library of Economics and Liberty., 1990. "The Domain of Constitutional Economics," Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), pp. 1–18. Also as at 1990b & .
  15. James Buchanan, The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty, Volume 1, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1999, p. 314
  16. Buchanan, J., Logical Formulations of Constitutional Liberty, Vol. 1, Indianapolis, 1999, p. 372.
  17. http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj9n1/cj9n1-10.pdf
  18. https://mises.org/journals/aen/aen9_1_1.asp

Sources

External links

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