Indian National Army

This article is about the Second INA under Subas Chandra Bose. For the organisation under Mohan Singh, see First Indian National Army. For the modern Indian military, see Indian Armed Forces. For the army of the British Raj, see British Indian Army.
Indian National Army

Soldiers of the Indian National Army
Active August 1942 – September 1945
Country  Azad Hind
Role Guerrilla, infantry, special operations
Size 43,000 (approximate)
Motto Ittehad, Itmad aur Qurbani
(Unity, Faith and Sacrifice in Urdu)
March Kadam Kadam Badaye Ja
Engagements

World War II

Commanders
Ceremonial chief Subhas Chandra Bose
Insignia
Flag

The Indian National Army (INA; Azad Hind Fauj; Hindi: आज़ाद हिन्द फ़ौज; Urdu: آزاد ہند فوج‎) was an armed force formed by Indian nationalists in 1942 in Southeast Asia during World War II. The aim of the army was to secure Indian independence with Japanese assistance. Initially composed of Indian prisoners of war captured by Japan in the Malayan campaign and at Singapore, it later drew volunteers from Indian expatriate population in Malaya and Burma. The INA was also at the forefront of women's equality, and the formation of a women's regiment, the Rani of Jhansi Regiment was formed as an all-volunteer women's unit to fight the British Raj as well as provide medical services to the INA.

Initially formed in 1942 immediately after the fall of Singapore under Mohan Singh, the First INA collapsed in December that year before it was revived under the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose in 1943 and proclaimed the army of Bose's Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind (the Provisional Government of Free India). This second INA fought along with the Imperial Japanese Army against the British and Commonwealth forces in the campaigns in Burma, Imphal and Kohima, and later, against the successful Burma Campaign of the Allies. The end of the war saw a large number of the troops repatriated to India where some faced trial for treason and became a galvanising point of the Indian Independence movement.[1]

The legacy of the INA is controversial given its associations with Imperial Japan and the other Axis powers, the course of Japanese occupations in Burma, Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia, as well as Japanese war crimes and the alleged complicity of the troops of the INA in these. However the INA contributed to independence for India, as after the war, the trials of captured INA officers in India provoked massive public outcries in support of their efforts to fight for Indian independence against the Raj, eventually triggering the Bombay mutiny in the British Indian forces.[2] These events are accepted by historians to have played a crucial role in hastening the end of British rule.[3][4]

First Indian National Army

Major Iwaichi Fujiwara greets Captain Mohan Singh. Circa April 1942.

Japan and Southeast Asia were major refuges for Indian nationalists living in exile before the start of World War II. Japan had sent intelligence missions, notably under Major Iwaichi Fujiwara, into South Asia even before the start of the war to garner support from the Malayan Sultans, overseas Chinese, the Burmese resistance and the Indian movement. These missions were successful in establishing contacts with Indian nationalists in exile in Thailand and Malaya, supporting the establishment and organisation of the Indian Independence League (IIL).[5][6]

At the outbreak of World War II in South East Asia, 70,000 Indian troops were stationed in Malaya. After the start of the war, Japan's spectacular Malayan Campaign had brought under her control considerable numbers of Indian prisoners of war, nearly 55,000 after the Fall of Singapore alone. The conditions of service within the British Indian Army as well as the conditions in Malaya had fed dissension among these troops. From these troops, the First Indian National Army was formed under Mohan Singh and received considerable Japanese aid and support.[7]

Second Indian National Army

Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose

In a series of meetings between the INA leaders and the Japanese in 1943, it was decided to cede the leadership of the IIL and the INA to Subhas Chandra Bose, since a number of the officers and troops who had returned to PoW camps, or had not volunteered in the first place, made it known that they would be willing to join the INA only on the condition that it was led by Bose.[8] Bose had, at the start of the war in Europe, escaped from house arrest[9] to make his way to Germany, reaching Berlin on 2 April 1941. In Germany he convinced Adolf Hitler, in a series of conferences, to support the cause of Indian Independence,[10] forming the Free India Legion and the Azad Hind Radio.[11] By early 1943, Bose had turned his attention to Southeast Asia. With its large overseas Indian population, it was recognised that the region was fertile ground for establishing an anti-colonial force to fight the Raj. In January 1943, the Japanese invited Bose to lead the Indian nationalist movement in East Asia.[12] He accepted and left Germany on 8 February. After a three-month journey by submarine, and a short stop in Singapore, he reached Tokyo on 11 May 1943, where he made a number of radio broadcasts to the Indian communities, exhorting them to join in the fight for India's Independence.

Indian Army
Headquarters
New Delhi
History and traditions
stylebu gdcvnbn. Vcdfcnhsgsvgebnbs uhgsvnhegbs n ushbhss yem;"| Indian military history
British Indian Army
Indian National Army
Army Day (15 January)
Equipment
Equipment of the Indian Army
Components
Regiments
Personnel
Chief of Army Staff
Ranks and insignia

On 15 February 1943, the Army itself was put under the command of Lt. Col. M.Z. Kiani.[13] A policy forming body was formed with the Director of the Military Bureau, Lt. Col Bhonsle, in charge and clearly placed under the authority of the IIL. Under Bhonsle served Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan as Chief of General Staff, Major P.K. Sahgal as Military Secretary, Major Habib ur Rahman as commandant of the Officers' Training School and Lt. Col. A.C. Chatterji (later Major A.D. Jahangir) as head of enlightenment and culture.

On 4 July 1943, two days after reaching Singapore, Subhas Chandra Bose assumed the leadership of the IIL and the INA in a ceremony at Cathay Building. Bose's influence was notable. His appeal not only re-invigorated the fledgling INA, which previously consisted mainly of POWs, his appeals also touched a chord with the Indian expatriates in South Asia as local civilians, without caste, creed and religion- ranging from barristers, traders to plantation workers, including Khudabadi Sindhi Swarankar working as shop keepers – had no military experience joined the INA, doubled its troop strength.[14]

An Officers’ Training School for INA officers, led by Habib ur Rahman, and the Azad School for the civilian volunteers were set up to provide training to the recruits. A youth wing of the INA, composed of 45 Young Indians personally chosen by Bose and affectionately known as the Tokyo Boys, were also sent to Japan's Imperial Military Academy to train as fighter pilots. Also, possibly the first time in Asia, and even the only time outside the Soviet Union, a women's regiment, the Rani of Jhansi regiment was raised as a combat force.

Strength

Military parade of the INA at the Padang on 5 July 1943

Although there are slight variations in estimates, the INA is considered to have comprised about 40,000 troops when it was disbanded. The following is an estimate attributed to Lt. Colonel G.D. Anderson of British intelligence:

There were 45,000 Indian troops from Malaya captured and assembled in Singapore when the Japanese captured it. Of these, about 5,000 refused to join the First INA. The INA at this time had 40,000 recruits. The Japanese were prepared to arm 16,000. When the "first INA" disbanded, about 4,000 withdrew. The Second INA, commanded by Subhas Chandra Bose, started with 12,000 troops. Further recruitment of ex-Indian army personnel added about 8,000–10,000. About 18,000 Indian civilians enlisted during this time. In 1945, at the end of the INA, it consisted of about 40,000 soldiers.[15]

Order of battle

The Tokyo Boys at the Tokyo Imperial Military Academy

The exact organisation of the INA and its troop strength is not known, as Fay notes, since its records were destroyed by the withdrawing Azad Hind Government before Rangoon fell.[16]

Fay's account of the INA gives the following account of its organisation:

A soldier of the Rani of Jhansi Regiment in training.

The 1st Division was lightly armed. Each battalion was composed of five Companies of infantry. The individual companies were armed with six antitank rifles, six Bren guns and six Vickers machine guns. Some NCOs carried hand grenades, while men going forward on duty were issued British stocks of hand grenades by senior officer of the Bahadur groups attached to each unit. Mortars were available, but Fay points out these were not available at battalion level.[18]

Operations

The British had the advance knowledge about the impending Japanese offensive on its North-eastern frontier by Bhagat Ram Talwar (codenamed "Silver"), a communist double-agent in Kabul and a confidant of Subhas Chandra Bose, after Bose unsuspectingly revealed it to him.

As the Japanese offensive opened, the INA sent its first forces into battle. The INA's own strategy was to avoid set-piece battles for which it lacked arms, armament as well as manpower.[21] Initially, it sought to obtain arms as well as increase its ranks from British Indian soldiers expected to defect to patriotic cause. Once the Japanese forces were able to break the British defences at Imphal, the INA would cross the hills of North-East India into the Gangetic plain, where it was to work as a guerrilla army and expected to live off the land, garner support, supplies, and ranks from amongst the local populace to ultimately touch off a revolution.

Prem Kumar Sahgal, an officer of the INA, once military secretary to Subhas Bose and later tried in the first Red Fort trials, explained that although the war itself hung in balance and nobody was sure if the Japanese would win, initiating a popular revolution with grass-root support within India would ensure that even if Japan lost the war ultimately, Britain would not be in a position to re-assert its colonial authority, which was ultimately the aim of the INA and Azad Hind.

1944

Captain Malik Munawar Khan Awan ex 5 Punjab British Indian Army (later Major, 21AK Regt, Pakistan Army, recipient of Sitara e Jurat) was the commander of the most feared 2nd INA Guerrilla Regiment during Battle of Imphal

The plans decided between Bose and Kawabe envisaged the INA was to be assigned an independent sector of its own in the U Go offensive and no INA unit was to operate less than a battalion strength.For operational purposes, the Subhas Brigade was assigned under the command of the Japanese general Headquarters in Burma. Advance parties of the Bahadur Group also went forward with the advanced Japanese units early during the offensive. As Japan opened its offensive towards India, the INA's 1st Division, consisting of four Guerrilla regiments, was divided between the diversionary Ha Go offensive in Arakan 1944, with one battalion reaching as far as Mowdok in Chittagong. The victory of war successfully dropped Lt. Abdul Wahab from Athiyuthu from ramanathapuram dist. A Bahadur group unit, led by Shaukat Malik, took the border enclave of Moirang in early April. The main body of the first division was however committed to the U Go Offensive directed towards Manipur, initially successfully protecting the Japanese flanks against Chin and Kashin guerrillas as the Mutaguchi's three divisions crossed the Chindwin river and the Naga Hills, and later directed towards the main offensive through Tamu in the direction of Imphal and Kohima. However, by the time Khan's forces left Tamu, the offensive had been held, and the troops were redirected to Kohima. By the time Khan's forces reached Ukhrul in the vicinity of Kohima, Japanese forces had begun their withdrawal from Kohima. The first division suffered the same fate as did Mutaguchi's Army when the siege of Imphal was broken. With little or no supplies and supply lines deluged by the Monsoon, harassed by Allied air-dominance and local Burmese irregulars, the INA began withdrawing when the 15th Army and Burma Area Army began withdrawing, and suffer the same terrible fate as wounded, starved and diseased men succumbed during the hasty withdrawal into Burma. The INA lost a substantial amount of men and materiel in the retreat, and a number of units were disbanded or used to feed the newly formed units of the second division.

1945

See also: Battle of Pokoku and Battle of Meiktila and Mandalay

As the allied Burma campaign began the following year, the INA remained committed to the defence of Burma, and was a part of the Japanese defensive deployments. The second division, tasked with the defence of Irrawaddy and the adjoining areas around Nangyu, was instrumental in opposing Messervy's 7th Indian Division when it attempted to cross the river at Pagan and Nyangyu during Irrawaddy operations. Later, during the Battles of Meiktila and Mandalay, the 2nd Division was instrumental in denying the British 17th Division the area around Mount Popa that would have exposed the Flank of Kimura's forces attempting to retake Meiktila and Nyangyu. Ultimately however, the division was obliterated. As the Japanese situation became precarious, Azad Hind withdrew from Rangoon with Ba Maw's government and the Japanese forces for Singapore along with the remnants of the 1st Divisiondivision and the Rani of Jhansi Regiment. Nearly 6000 troops amongst the surviving units of the INA remained in Rangoon under A. D. Loganathan surrendered as Rangoon fell, and helped keep order until the Allied forces entered the city.

The only Indian territory that the Azad Hind government controlled were the Indian territories that fell during the Imphal offensive, and the islands of Andaman and Nicobar. However, the latter two were bases for the Japanese Navy, and the navy never really fully relinquished control. Enraged with the lack of administrative control, the Azad Hind Governor, Lt. Col Loganathan later relinquished his authority to return to the Government's headquarters in Rangoon. The Japanese forces is said to have carried out torture on thousands of local inhabitants during the occupation, and some historians apportion the blame to Subhas Bose's provisional government.[22]

End of the INA

Troops of the Indian National Army who surrendered at Mount Popa. Circa April 1945.

As the Japanese withdrawal from Burma progressed, the other remnants began a long march over land and on foot towards Bangkok, along with Subhas Chandra Bose. The withdrawing forces regularly suffered casualties from Allied airplanes strafing them, clashes with Aung San's Burmese resistance, as well as Chinese guerrillas who harassed the Japanese troops. At the time of Japan's surrender in September 1945, Bose left for Manchuria to attempt to contact the advancing Soviet troops, and was reported to have died in an air crash near Taiwan.[23][24]

Repatriation to India

Even before the end of the war in South Asia, the INA prisoners who were falling into allied hands were being evaluated by forward intelligence units for potential trials.[25] A small number had fallen into Allied hands in 1943 around the time of the Imphal Campaign and subsequent withdrawal, while larger numbers surrendered or were captured during the 14th Army's Burma Campaign. A total of 16,000 of the INA's 43,000 recruits were ever captured, of whom around 11,000 were interrogated.[26] The number of prisoners necessitated this selective policy which envisaged trials of those with the strongest commitment to Bose' ideologies, while those with less strong views and other extenuating circumstance may be dealt with more leniently, with the punishment proportional to their commitment or war crimes. For this purpose, the field intelligence units designated the captured troops as Blacks with strongest commitment to Azad Hind, Greys with varying commitment but also with enticing circumstances that led them to join the INA, and Whites, i.e., those who pressured into joining the INA under the circumstances but with no commitment to Azad Hind, INA, or Bose.

By July 1945, a large number had been shipped back to India. At the time of the fall of Japan, the remaining captured troops were transported to India via Rangoon. Large numbers of local Malay and Burmese volunteers including the recruits to the Rani of Jhansi regiment returned to civilian life and were not identified. Those repatriated passed through transit camps in Chittagong and Calcutta to be held at detention camps all over India including Jhingergacha and Nilganj near Calcutta, Kirkee outside Pune, Attock, Multan and at Bahadurgarh near Delhi. Bahadurgarh also held prisoners of the Indische Legion. By November, around 12,000 INA prisoners were held in these camps, from which they were released according to the "colours".[25] By December, around 600 whites were released per week. From amongst the rest, the selection for those to face trial started.[25]

Red Fort trials

The Red Fort, Delhi, the site of the INA trials which took place between 1945 and 1946.
Captured soldiers of the British Indian Army who refused to join the INA were executed by the Japanese.[27]

At the conclusion of the war, the government of British India brought some of the captured INA soldiers to trial on treason charges. The prisoners would face the death penalty, life imprisonment or a fine as punishment if found guilty. Between November 1945 and May 1946, approximately ten courts-martial were held. The first of these, and the most celebrated one, was the joint court-martial of Colonel Prem Sahgal, Colonel Gurubaksh Singh Dhillon and Major General Shah Nawaz Khan held in a public trial at the Red Fort in Delhi. Nearly all the defendants in the first trial were charged with Waging war against the King-Emperor (the charge of treason did not exist in the Indian Army Act, 1911) as well as torture, murder and abettment to murder. The three defendants were defended by the INA Defence Committee formed by the Congress and include legal luminaries of India of the time including Jawaharlal Nehru, Bhulabhai Desai, Kailashnath Katju, Asaf Ali. The trials covered arguments based on military law, constitutional law, international law, and politics and much of the initial defence was based on the argument that they should be treated as prisoners of war as they were not paid mercenaries but bona fide soldiers of a legal government, the Provisional Government of Free India, or the Arzi Hukumate Azad Hind, "however misinformed or otherwise they had been in their notion of patriotic duty towards their country" and as such they recognized the free Indian state as their sovereign and not the British sovereign.[28] Those charged later only faced trial for torture and murder or abutment of murder.

These trials attracted much publicity, and public sympathy for the defendants who were perceived as patriots in India. The Indian National Congress and the Muslim League both made the release of the three defendants an important political issue during the agitation for independence of 1945–6. Beyond the concurrent campaigns of non-cooperation and non-violent protest, this spread to include mutinies and wavering support within the British Indian Army. This movement marked the last major campaign in which the forces of the Congress and the Muslim League aligned together; the Congress tricolour and the green flag of the League were flown together at protests. In spite of this aggressive and widespread opposition, the court martial was carried out, and all three defendants were sentenced to deportation for life. This sentence, however, was never carried out, as the immense public pressure of the demonstrations and riots forced Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, to release all three defendants. Within three months, 11,000 soldiers of the INA were released after cashiering and forfeiture of pay and allowance.[3][29] On the recommendation of Lord Mountbatten of Burma, and agreed by Jawaharlal Nehru, as a condition for independence former soldiers of the INA were not allowed to join the new Indian Armed Forces.

Impact

The INA's impact on the war and on British India after the war has been analysed in detail. The INA's role in military terms is considered to be significant, despite its small numerical strength, lack of heavy weapons (it utilised captured British and Dutch arms initially). They fought alongside Japanese troops against British colonial troops. Shah Nawaz states in his personal memoirs that the INA was a very potent and motivated force. He claims the INA represented a potent force in the fight for independence. Its special services group played a significant part in halting the First Arakan Offensive while still under Mohan Singh's command. The propaganda threat of the INA, coupled with the lack of concrete intelligence on the unit early after the fall of Singapore made it a potent threat to Allied war plans in South East Asia. It threatened to destroy the Sepoy's loyalty in the British Indian Army[30] and in fact was significant and successful enough[31][32] during the First Arakan Offensive for the British intelligence to begin the Jiffs campaign as well as engage in campaign to improve morale and preserve the loyalty of the sepoy to consolidate and prepare for defence of Manipur. These measures included imposing a complete news ban on Bose and the INA, that was not lifted till four days after the fall of Rangoon two years later.

Later, during the Japanese U-GO offensive towards Manipur in 1944, it played a crucial and successful role in the diversionary attacks in Arakan as well as in the Manipur Basin itself where it fought with Mutaguchi's 15th Army.[4] It qualified itself well in the Battles in Arakan, Manipur, Imphal,[33] and later during the withdrawal through Manipur and Burma. Later, during the Burma Campaign, it did play a notable role in the Battles of Irrawaddy and Meiktilla especially in the latter, supporting the Japanese offensive and tying down British troops.[19][34][35][36][37] Fay also notes the published accounts of several veterans, including that of William Slim that portrays INA-troops as incapable fighters and untrustworthy, and points out the inconsistencies and conflicts between the different accounts to conclude that intelligence propaganda as well as institutional bias may have played a significant part in the portrayed opinions.[38]

It is however noted that the INA did indeed suffer a number of notable incidences of desertion. Fay notes the significant ones amongst these were not during the offensives into Manipur and the subsequent retreat through Burma, when incidences of desertion did occur but at a far smaller numbers than the fourteenth army told its troops.[39] The significant desertions, Fay notes, occurred around the Battles at Irrawaddy and later around Popa. During the fall of Rangoon, 6000 INA troops manned the city to maintain order before allied troops entered the city. Nevertheless, Fay argues, the INA was not significant enough to militarily beat the British Indian Army, and was moreover aware of this and formulated its own strategy of avoiding set-piece battles, garnering local and popular support within India and instigating revolt within the British Indian army to overthrow the Raj.[40] Moreover, the Forward Bloc underground within India had been crushed well before the offensives opened in the Burma-Manipur theatre, depriving the army of any organised internal support.[4]

It was however, the INA trials that attracted attention in India, and coupled to the decisions to hold the first trial in public, these became a rallying point for the independence movement from Autumn 1945,[1][3][4][2] so much so that the release of INA prisoners and suspension of the trials came to be the dominant political campaign in precedence over the campaign for Freedom.[3] Newspaper reports around November 1945 reported executions of INA troops,[41] which deteriorated already volatile situations. Opposition to the trial of the officers for treason became a major public and political campaign, and the very opening of the first trial saw violence and series of riots in a scale later described as sensational.[3] It also saw a campaign that defied communal barriers.

Increasingly violent confrontations broke out between the police and the mass rallies being held all over India, culminating in public riotings in support of the INA men.[1][42][43][44] The Raj also observed with increasing disquiet and unease the spread of pro-INA sympathies within the troops of the British Indian forces.[43] In February 1946, while the trials were still going on, a general strike ratings of the Royal Indian Navy rapidly deteriorated into a mutiny, incorporating ships and shore establishments of the RIN throughout India, from Karachi to Bombay and from Vizag to Calcutta. Amongst the rallying cries of the ratings the central one was the INA trials and slogans invoking Subhas Bose. Significantly, the mutiny received massive militant public support. At some places, NCOs in the British Indian Army started ignoring orders from British superiors. In Madras and Pune, the British garrisons had to face revolts within the ranks of the British Indian Army. Another Army mutiny took place at Jabalpur during the last week of February 1946, soon after the Navy mutiny at Bombay. British troops suppressed this by force, using bayonets. It lasted about two weeks. After the mutiny, about 45 persons were tried by court martial. 41 were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment or dismissal. In addition, a large number were discharged on administrative grounds. Fay records Claude Auchinleck as having sent a "Personal and Secret" letter to all senior British officers as having explained the remissions of the sentences in the first trial as[45]

“ ...practically all are sure that any attempt to enforce the sentence would have led to chaos in the country at large, and probably to mutiny and dissension in the Army, culminating in its dissolution ”

Later historians have pointed out that the INA trials and its after effects brought the decisive shift in British policy. The viceroy's journal describes the autumn and Winter 1945-45 as "The Edge of a Volcano".[4] Intelligence reports at the time noted widespread public interest and sympathy that turned into what has been described as "Patriotic Fury" that was beyond the communal barriers in India at the time. Particularly disturbing for the British, was the overt and public support for the INA by the soldiers of the Indian army.[46] In addition, the use of Indian troops for the restoration of Dutch and French rule in Vietnam and Indonesia also fed growing resentment within the forces.[47] The Raj had every reason to fear a revival of the Quit Indian movement, especially given the Congress rhetoric preceding the elections.[46] and rapidly realised that the Indian army, unlike in 1942, could not be used to suppress such a movement owing largely to nationalistic and political consciousness in the forces which was ascribed to the INA.[4][48] Some historians cite Auchinleck's own assessment of the situation to suggest this shortened the Raj by at least fifteen to twenty years.[48]

The political effects of the INA trials was enormous and were felt around India as late as 1948, much to the chagrin of the Indian government.[49][50] Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, reflecting on the factors that guided the British decision to relinquish the Raj in India, is said to have cited the effects of the INA and Bose's activities on the British Indian Army and the Bombay Mutiny as being the most important.[51]

After the war ended, the story of the INA and the Free India Legion was seen as so inflammatory that, fearing mass revolts and uprisings—not just in India, but across its empire—the British Government forbade the BBC from broadcasting their story.[52]

Relations

The army's relationship to the Japanese was an uncomfortable one. Bose wished to establish his political independence from the regime that sponsored him (he had, in fact, led protests against the Japanese expansion into Manchuria, and supported Chiang Kai-shek during the 1930s), but his complete dependence on them for arms and resources made this difficult. On the Japanese side, members of the high command had been personally impressed by Bose, and were thus willing to grant him some latitude; more importantly, the Japanese were interested in maintaining the support of a man who had been able to mobilise large numbers of Indian expatriates—including, most importantly, 40,000 of the 45,000 Indians captured by the Japanese at Singapore.[53]

INA memorial in Singapore after demolition by Indian Army sappers. Circa September 1945.

The INA's interactions with the British Indian Army occurred over two distinct phases. The first of these was December 1942 – March 1943, during the First Arakan offensive at a time that the morale of the Sepoy was low and the knowledge about the INA was minimal. The INA's Special Services agents led a successful operation during this time in encouraging the Indian troops to defect to the INA, while those who returned to India beaten in the field took back horrific if unbelievable stories of Japanese troops using their parachutes not only to drop from the skies, but to go back up again. The threat of the INA at this time was significant and successful enough for the British intelligence to begin the Jiffs campaign as well as engage in a campaign to improve morale and preserve the loyalty of the Sepoy. A general news ban on reporting the INA allowed the British Indian Army to consolidate and prepare for defence of Manipur, which it successfully did. By the end of March 1945, the Sepoy of the British Indian Army was reinvigorated and perceived the men of the INA little more than savage turncoats and cowards. Bayly and Harper mentions that a number of times, the Sepoys in the field units shot captured or wounded INA men, relieving their British officers of the complex task of formulating a formal plan for captured men.[54] The author George MacDonald Fraser stated that INA prisoners had to be guarded by British troops to prevent them from being shot by British Indians. After Singapore was retaken, Mountbatten ordered the INA's war memorial to its fallen soldiers to be blown up.

Controversies

A number of different views and controversies surround the history and records of the Indian National Army, borne especially by its integral associations with Imperial Japan, and the course and history of Japanese occupation of South-East Asia during the War. These include views especially among British troops[55] that the recruits were traitors, that they were Axis Collaborators, as well as allegations that INA troops engaged in or were complicit in widespread torture of Allied and Indian prisoners of war. Fay concludes in his 1993 history of the army that the allegations were largely products of the British propaganda campaign and points out that the allegations were not borne out by the charges against the defendants in the Red Fort trials.[56] Fay also points out that war-time press releases as well as the field counter-intelligence directed at the sepoy portrayed the INA as a small group and attributes to the Jiffs campaign the promulgation of the view that INA recruits were weak-willed and traitorous Axis collaborators motivated by selfish interests of greed and personal gain.[57] He further notes over the records of Shah Nawaz Khan's trial that officers of the INA had described to their men the possibility of having to fight the Japanese after having fought the British in order to prevent Japan from exploiting India.[31][58][59]

Controversy also exists in India with regards to the treatment of the ex-INA soldiers by the post-independence government of India and of historical records of the period leading up to Indian independence in 1947, with some alleging that official histories of the independence movement largely omit events surrounding the INA especially the Red Fort trials and the Bombay Mutiny and ignore their significance in terms of rejuvenation of the independence movement and guiding the British decision to relinquish the Raj.[60][61] Further criticisms have been made in recent years for the general hardships and apathy surrounding the conditions of ex-INA troops[62] including, for example, the circumstances surrounding the death and funeral of Ram Singh Thakuri,a gorkha captain (and composer of azad hind fauz's anthem Quami tarana, sare jaha se acchha, kadam kadam badaye ja). These have been compounded by a number of conspiracy-theories and news reports in the past on agreements between the Indian political leadership to hand over its leader Subhas Chandra Bose as a War Criminal if he was found to be alive.[63][64][65] Later historians have, however, argued that given the political aim and nature of the entire Azad Hind movement especially the Indian National Army, Nehru's decisions may have been to prevent politicisation of the army and assert civilian authority over the military.[66]

Post 1947

Within India, the INA continued to have a strong hold over the public psyche and the sentiments of the armed forces till as late as 1947. Some have said that Shah Nawaz Khan was instrumental in organising INA troops to train Congress volunteers on Jawaharlal Nehru's request in late 1946 and early 1947. After 1947,some accounts suggest that the INA-veterans were involved in training civilian resistance forces against the Nizam's Razakars prior to the execution of Operation Polo and annexation of Hyderabad.[67] There are also mentions of some INA veterans leading Pakistani irregulars during the First Kashmir war.[68]

INA-veterans were not allowed to join the Indian Army after India's independence in August 1947. However, a few ex-INA members, notably the most prominent members or those closely associated with Subhas Bose or with the INA trials later have seen prominent public life or held important positions in independent India.

Mohan Singh Deb was elected to Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Indian Parliament. He strove for the recognition of the members of Indian National Army as "freedom fighters" in the cause of the nation's liberation in and out of Parliament. Shah Nawaz Khan served as a Minister of State for Rail in the First Indian cabinet. Lakshmi Sahgal, Minister for Women's affairs in the Azad Hind govt,is a well known and widely respected public figure in India. In 1971, she joined the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and was later elected the leader of the All India Democratic Women's Association. Abid Hasan, Subhas Bose's sole Indian companion in the U-Boat from Germany to South-east Asia, joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1948 and served as the Indian ambassador to a number of countries including Egypt and Denmark.Ram Singh Thakur, composer of a number of songs including the INA's regimental march Kadam Kadam Badaye Ja, later composed the tune for the Indian National Anthem.

Amongst the very few ex-INA members who joined the Indian Armed Forces after 1947 was R S Benegal, a member of the Tokyo Boys who was allowed to join the Indian Air Force in 1952 and later rose to be an Air Commodore. Benegal saw action in both the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak war, earning a Maha Vir Chakra, India's second highest award for valour.

A few members, including Gurubaksh Singh Dhillon and Lakshmi Sahgal were later awarded civilian honours of Padma Vibhushan by the Indian Government in the 1990s. Lakshmi Sahgal was nominated for Indian presidential election by communist parties in 2002. She was the sole opponent of A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who emerged victorious. Subhas Bose himself was posthumously awarded Bharat Ratna in 1992 but this was later withdrawn over the controversy over the circumstances of his death.

Outside India, the Malaysian Indian Congress was founded in 1946 by, amongst others, notable members of the INA and of which John Thivy was the founding president. Janaky Athi Nahappan, Second in Command of the Rani of Jhansi Regiment was also a founding member of the MIC, and later was to become a noted welfare activist and a distinguished senator in the Dewan Negara of the Malaysian Parliament. Rasammah Bhupalan, also of the Rani of Jhansi Regiment, later became a noted welfare-activist and a widely respected champion for Women's Rights in Malaysia.

Commemorations

Memorials

Subhas Chandra Bose laying foundation stone of INA War Memorial, Singapore on 8 July 1945.
The plaque erected by the National Heritage Board at Esplanade Park, marking the INA Monument site in Singapore

Postage and philately

Indian commemorative post-mark of Jai Hind

The Indian Postal Department also includes the six unused Azad Hind Stamps in its commemorative book India's Freedom Struggle through India Postage Stamps.[72]

Works on the INA

The Indian National Army, from the time it came into public perception in India around the time of the Red Fort Trials, and from the time it found its way into the works of military historians around the world, has been the subject of a number of projects, both of academic, historical and of popular nature. Some of these are critical of the army, some-especially of the ex-INA men are biographical or auto-biographical, while still others historical and political works, that tell the story of the INA. A large number of these give a large analysis of Subhas Chandra Bose and his work with the INA.

Literary works

The first literary works on the INA were published as early as 1946.Some were works of fiction with the INA as the central theme and subject, others the records of the INA that the authors were able to obtain from the ex-servicemen, or from what information was available from the trials and from what the British Intelligence possessed and that the authors had access to. Some of the literature focussed on the first INA trial itself. The notable work on INA include

Historical literary works on the INA includes

Visual media

Notable works on the INA in the visual and electronic media include

Cinema

INA has also been the source of or a significant context of a number of movies in a number of Indian languages. Notable amongst these include

In music, Kadam Kadam Badaye Ja..., the INA's marching song, has since become a famous patriotic song in India. Today, it is in use as the Regimental quick march of the Indian Army as well as its Para Regiments. The music was composed by Ram Singh Thakur, from whose composition was later derived the tune for India's national anthem Jana Gana Mana.

Other mentions of the INA in popular culture abound through India, including

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Sarkar 1983, p. 420
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Fay 1993, pp. 496,498,499
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Chaudhuri 1953, p. 349
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Sarkar 1983, p. 411
  5. ↑ Lebra 1977, p. 23
  6. ↑ Lebra 1977, p. 24
  7. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 94
  8. ↑ Lebra 1977, p. 27
  9. ↑ "Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany". Sisir K. Majumdar. South Asia Forum Quarterly. 1997. pp. 10–14. Retrieved August 12, 2011.
  10. ↑ Tojo 1943
  11. ↑ Bose (2002). writings and speeches, 1941–1943. Calcutta: Netaji Research Bureau. p. 87. ISBN 81-7824-034-3.
  12. ↑ "Total Mobilisation". National Archives of Singapore. Retrieved August 12, 2011.
  13. ↑ "MZ kiani". World news. Retrieved August 12, 2011.
  14. ↑ "Historical Journey of the Indian National Army". National Archives of Singapore. Retrieved 2007-07-07.
  15. ↑ Fay 1993, pp. 525–6
  16. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 556
  17. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 263
  18. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 297
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 Fay 1993, p. 317
  20. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 318
  21. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 292,298
  22. ↑ Jayant Dasgupta Japanese in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Red Sun over Black Water (Delhi: Manas Publications) 2002 pp67, 87, 91–5; L.P. Mathur Kala Pani. History of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands with a study of India's Freedom Struggle (Delhi: Eastern Book Corporation) 1985 pp249-51
  23. ↑ Fay 1993, pp. 372–373
  24. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 384
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 Fay 1993, p. 436
  26. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 459
  27. ↑ Aldrich, Richard J. (2000), Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 371, ISBN 978-0-521-64186-9, retrieved 6 November 2013
  28. ↑ Stephen P. Cohen "Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army" Pacific Affairs Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter, 1963) pp 411–429
  29. ↑ Childs 2000, p. 28
  30. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 410
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Aldrich 2000, p. 163
  32. ↑ Aldrich 2000, p. 159
  33. ↑ Fay 1993, pp. 289–292
  34. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 316
  35. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 332
  36. ↑ Slim 1961, p. 425
  37. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 333
  38. ↑ Fay 1993, pp. 290–292
  39. ↑ Fay 1993, pp. 290–293
  40. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 138
  41. ↑ "Many INA already executed.". Hindustan Times. November 2, 1945. Retrieved 2007-09-02.
  42. ↑ Chaudhuri 1953, p. 351
  43. ↑ 43.0 43.1 Sarkar 1983, p. 419
  44. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 499
  45. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 517
  46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 Sarkar 1983, p. 412
  47. ↑ McMillan 2006, p. 155
  48. ↑ 48.0 48.1 Hyam 2007, p. 106
  49. ↑ Green 1948, p. 54
  50. ↑ Green 1948, p. 68
  51. ↑ Bhat D. "RIN mutiny gave a jolt to the British". The Tribune. Retrieved 2007-09-02.
  52. ↑ 52.0 52.1 Thomson M (2004-09-23). "Hitler's secret Indian Army". bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 2007-09-02.
  53. ↑ "Capture of INA" (Press release). Retrieved August 12, 2011.
  54. ↑ George MacDonald Fraser, Quartered Safe Out Here (1992): The Harvill Press. ISBN 0-00-272660-2
  55. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 5
  56. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 427
  57. ↑ Fay 1993, p. 426
  58. ↑ Fay 1993, pp. 423–424,453
  59. ↑ Fay 1993, pp. 461–463
  60. ↑ Cohen 1971, p. 132
  61. ↑ Shaikh, Sajid (2001-10-06). "INA's soldier lives in oblivion in Vadodara". timesofindia.indiatimes.com. Retrieved 2007-07-07.
  62. ↑ Pratibha Chauhan. "INA hero gets shabby treatment.". Tribune News Service. Retrieved 2007-09-02.
  63. ↑ "Radhakrishnan met Netaji in Moscow, says witness.". Hindustan Times. November 17, 1970. Retrieved 2007-09-02.
  64. ↑ "Gandhi, others had agreed to hand over Netaji.". Hindustan Times. January 23, 1971. Retrieved 2007-09-02.
  65. ↑ Shahira Naim. "The Bose I knew is a memory now — Lakshmi Sahgal.". The Tribune. Retrieved 2007-09-02.
  66. ↑ Sumit Ganguly. "Explaining India's Transition to Democracy.". Columbia University Press. Retrieved 2007-09-03.
  67. ↑ Menon, P. "The States". The Hindu. Retrieved 2007-09-03.
  68. ↑ "Taj Muhammad Khanzada. Legislators from Attock.". Provisional Assembly of The Punjab (Lahore-Pakistan). Govt of Pakistan. Archived from the original on 2007-11-01. Retrieved 2007-09-19.
  69. ↑ "Heritage Sites and Trails in Singapore". National Heritage Board of Singapore. Archived from the original on 2007-09-28. Retrieved 2007-07-07.
  70. ↑ "On I-Day eve, India forgets INA memorial". Rose India. Retrieved August 12, 2011.
  71. ↑ Ashok Kumar Bayanwala. "Art in miniature". Stamps of india. Retrieved 2011-08-11.
  72. ↑ 72.0 72.1 Bhaskaran, S.T. (2000-12-16). "Footprints of history". The Hindu (Chennai, India). Retrieved 2007-10-16.
  73. ↑ Healey, Beth (1989-12-03). "Pastimes; Stamps". New York Times. Retrieved 2007-10-16.
  74. ↑ 74.0 74.1 74.2 Urquhart, James. (August 7, 2000) The Independent Monday Book: A 'Doctor Zhivago' for the Far East — Review of The Glass Palace.
  75. ↑ http://www.epigrambooks.sg/flowers-at-dawn/
  76. ↑ Fay 1993, p. ix
  77. ↑ "Synopses The War of The Springing Tiger". British Film Institute. Retrieved 2007-07-09.
  78. ↑ Dutt, Nirupama. "A forgotten army marches again". Indian Express. Retrieved 2007-07-07.
  79. ↑ "Historical Journey of the Indian National Army". National Archives of Singapore. Retrieved 2007-07-07.
  80. ↑ Das Sitanshu. "Indian National Army in East Asia". Hindustan Times. Retrieved 2007-07-07.
  81. ↑ Bose 2006, p. 146
  82. ↑ 82.0 82.1 Dhawan, M.L. "Freedom struggle through Hindi films". www.tribuneindia.com. Retrieved 2007-07-09.
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References

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Further reading

External links