Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant

Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant

Reactor 3 at Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant.
Country Sweden
Location Forsmark
Coordinates 60°24′12″N 18°10′0″E / 60.40333°N 18.16667°ECoordinates: 60°24′12″N 18°10′0″E / 60.40333°N 18.16667°E
Status Operational
Commission date 1980
Operator(s) Vattenfall
Nuclear power station
Reactor type Boiling water reactor
Power generation
Units operational 2 x 1010 MW
1 x 1190 MW
Annual generation 22,300 GW·h
Website
www.vattenfall.se/forsmark

Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant is a nuclear power plant in Forsmark, Sweden, and also the site of the Swedish Final repository for radioactive operational waste. It is operated by a subsidiary of Vattenfall.

Reactors

Forsmark NPP has three Boiling water reactors:

Other facilities

West of Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant, there is the static inverter of HVDC Fenno-Skan.

Waste disposal

Forsmark is the proposed site for the long-term burial of all spent fuel from Swedish nuclear power reactors, using the KBS-3 process. The new site will be located next to the already existing final repository for radioactive operational waste, but the two will not be connected with each other.

July 2006 incident

On 25 July 2006, one reactor was shut down after an electrical fault.[1][2] According to the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspection authority SKI, the incident was rated 2 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. Initially it was rated 1 since two generators remained online. But once it was discovered that all four generators could have failed due to the same fault, the event was upgraded to 2.

At the request of the Swedish Government, IAEA launched an OSART mission to Forsmark.

Lars-Olov Höglund, a former construction chief at Vattenfall, claimed it was the most serious nuclear incident in the world since the Chernobyl disaster and it was pure luck that prevented a meltdown.[3] Both the SKI and the safety chief of Forsmark power plant disagree with that opinion and state that the incident was serious but the description provided by Höglund was incorrect and there was no real risk of a meltdown.[4] Höglund has personally been involved in a legal dispute with Forsmark Nuclear powerplant for several years in connection with his private business.[5]

However, Kjell Olsson, a researcher at SKI, later stated in an informal discussion with school children that a meltdown technically could have developed from the incident.[6] The agency later stated that the failing safety system proved to be linked together in a delicate, extremely serious way.[7]

On March 14, 2011, Höglund commented that the Fukushima-disaster parallels the Forsmark incident, i.e. failing UPS system backup, and repeated his statement from 2007 that "only luck" prevented a meltdown at the Swedish plant.[8]

February 2007 shutdown

On February 3, two units at Forsmark were shut down to inspect a rubber seal in one of the safety systems. On Forsmark 1 this seal needed to be replaced, a job that would take approximately one month. Unit 2 was cleared by the regulator SKI and was free to restart.

In January an internal report made by a few employees at Forsmark who were concerned over a "degrading safety culture" was leaked to media who ran an extensive story on it. In the storm following the report the Forsmark CEO chose to resign. Forsmark was already under way to implement a 60-point program designed to improve safety culture, designed shortly after the event in July 2006.

Incursions by activists

In June 2010, Greenpeace activists invaded Forsmark to protest the then-plan to remove the government prohibition on building new nuclear power plants. In October 2012, 50 anti-nuclear activists used special ladders to scale security fences. Greenpeace said that its non-violent actions were protests against the continuing operation of these reactors, which it says are unsafe in European stress tests, and to emphasise that stress tests did nothing to prepare against threats from outside the plant. A report by the Swedish nuclear regulator said that "the current overall level of protection against sabotage is insufficient". Although Swedish nuclear power plants have security guards, the police are responsible for emergency response. The report criticised the level of cooperation between nuclear site staff and police in the case of sabotage or attack.[9]

See also

References

External links