Epirus Army Section

The Epirus Army Section (Greek: Τμήμα Στρατιάς Ηπείρου, ΤΣΗ) was a field army of the Hellenic Army active between 14 February and 20 April 1941 during the Greco-Italian War and the Battle of Greece.

Establishment and operations in February–March

The Epirus Army Section was established on 14 February 1941, and encompassed the I Army Corps and II Army Corps fighting on the western and central sections of the Albanian front. Until that point, the two corps had been under the direct control of the General Field Headquarters at Ioannina, led by the Greek commander-in-chief Lt. General Alexandros Papagos, but the increasing possibility of a German attack through Bulgaria necessitated the relocation of GHQ back to Athens and the establishment of a new higher command.[1]

The first commander of the Epirus Army Section was Lt. General Markos Drakos.[2] Drakos was retired in early March, along with his two corps commanders, Lt. Generals Panagiotis Demestichas (I Corps) and Dimitrios Papadopoulos (II Corps), and replaced by the former commander of the Western Macedonia Army Section, Lt. General Ioannis Pitsikas, while I Corps went to Lt. General Panagiotis Demestichas and II Corps to Major General Georgios Bakos.[3] During 9–24 March, II Corps faced successive Italian attacks in the Klisura sector, which it held off with success.[4] At the end of March, the Epirus Army Section comprised I Corps, with the 2nd, 3rd and 8th Divisions (a combined total of three Evzone and eight standard infantry regiments) plus a cavalry regiment, and II Corps with the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 11th, 15th and 17th Divisions (a total of 21 infantry regiments).[5]

German invasion and collapse

Following the start of the German invasion of Greece on 6 April and the rapid progress of the German troops with the capture of Thessaloniki three days later, on 12 April GHQ in Athens gave the order of retreat to the Greek forces on the Albanian front.[6] The decision came too late. The Greek commanders were aware that, given the continued Italian pressure, the lack of Greek motor transport and pack animals, the physical exhaustion of the Greek army and the poor transport network of Epirus any retreat was likely to end up in disintegration. They had pressed in vain for a retreat already before the start of the German attack, but now they petitioned Pitsikas to surrender. Although Pitsikas forbade such talk, he notified Papagos of these developments and urged a solution that would secure "the salvation and honour of our victorious Army".[7][8] Indeed the orders to retreat, coupled with the disheartening news of the Yugoslav collapse and of the rapid German advance, led to a breakdown of the morale of the Greek troops, many of whom had been fighting without reprieve for five months and were now forced to abandon hard-won ground. By 15 April, the divisions of II Army Corps, beginning with the Cretan 5th Division, began to disintegrate, with men and even entire units abandoning their positions.[7][9][10]

On 16 April, Pitsikas reported to Papagos that signs of disintegration had begun to appear among the divisions of I Corps as well, and begged him to "save the army from the Italians", i.e. to be allowed to capitulate to the Germans before the military situation collapsed completely. On the next day, the Western Macedonia Army Section (Lt. General Georgios Tsolakoglou) was renamed to III Army Corps and placed under Pitsikas' command as well. The three corps commanders, along with the metropolitan bishop of Ioannina, Spyridon, pressured Pitsikas to unilaterally begin negotiations with the Germans.[9][11][12] When he refused, the others decided to bypass him and selected Tsolakoglou, as the senior of the three generals, to carry out the task. Tsolakoglou delayed for a few days, sending his chief of staff to Athens to secure permission from Papagos. The chief of staff reported the chaos in Athens and urged his commander to take the initiative in a message that implied permission by Papagos, although this was not in fact the case. On 20 April, Tsolakoglou contacted the commander of the nearest German unit, the LSSAH brigade, Sepp Dietrich, to offer surrender. The protocol of surrender was signed at 18:00 of the same day between Tsolakoglou and Dietrich. Presented with the fait accompli, Pitsikas was informed an hour later and resigned his command.[13][14][15]

References

  1. ↑ Gedeon 2001, pp. 28–29.
  2. ↑ Gedeon 2001, p. 28.
  3. ↑ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 442.
  4. ↑ Gedeon 2001, pp. 30–31.
  5. ↑ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 77.
  6. ↑ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 444.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Koliopoulos 1978, p. 446.
  8. ↑ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 225–227, 282.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Gedeon 2001, p. 33.
  10. ↑ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 258.
  11. ↑ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 448.
  12. ↑ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 282–283, 382.
  13. ↑ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 448–450.
  14. ↑ Gedeon 2001, pp. 33–34.
  15. ↑ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 383–384, 396–398, 401–402.

Sources