ETRR-2

(Multi-Purpose) Experimental Training Research Reactor No. 2

Location of (Multi-Purpose) Experimental Training Research Reactor No. 2

Operating Institution Nuclear Research Center
Location Inshas, Egypt
Coordinates 30°17′35.0″N 31°24′32.5″E / 30.293056°N 31.409028°ECoordinates: 30°17′35.0″N 31°24′32.5″E / 30.293056°N 31.409028°E
Type Light Water Pool-type reactor
Power 22 MW (thermal)
Construction and Upkeep
Construction Cost US$75 million
Construction Began December 1, 1992
First Criticality November 27, 1997
Annual Upkeep Cost US$6 million
Staff 25
Operators 8
Technical Specifications
Max Thermal Flux 2.8E14
Max Fast Flux 2.2E14
Cooling Light Water
Neutron Moderator Light Water
Neutron Reflector BE
Control Rods AG,IN,CD
Cladding Material Aluminum Alloy

Source(s): [1][2][3][4]

Website
www.eaea.org.eg

ETRR-2 or ET-RR-2 (Experimental Training Research Reactor Number two), (Egypt Test and Research Reactor Number two)[5] or (Multi-Purpose Reactor) is the second nuclear reactor in Egypt supplied by the Argentine company Investigacion Aplicada (INVAP) in 1992.[6] The reactor is owned and operated by Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) at the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas, 60 kilometers northeast of Cairo.[7]

History

Since 1990, Egypt started to search for a new research reactor to replace the aging ETRR-1 and the Israeli press claimed that Egypt was cooperating with Pakistan, Iraq and Argentina to build a plutonium-producing reactor for nuclear weapons. Finally, Egypt announced international tender and among the bidders were the Canadian Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, the French Framatome and the Argentinian INVAP.[8]

On September 1992, a contract was signed between INVAP and the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) and a branch office of INVAP in Nasr City was established to oversee the project with the construction works began in 1993 jointly by Argentina and Egypt.[9]

On November 1997, ETRR-2 achieved initial criticality, and was inaugurated by the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and the Argentine president Carlos Menem on February 1998.[9]

Overview

ETRR-2 is a multi-purpose open pool type 22 MW reactor[10][11] with an initial fuel load of 19.75% enriched uranium U235 imported from Russia and the last shipment was delivered by Argentina in 1997. Since that, Egypt has fabricated the fuel rods for the ETRR-2 from the Fuel Manufacturing Pilot Plant (FMPP), which is located at the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas.[11][12] The reactor core is cooled and moderated by light water and beryllium reflector.[13]

According to the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, ETRR-2 could produce over 6 kg of plutonium annually which is enough for one nuclear weapon per year.[11][12][14]

Undeclared Nuclear Activity

On May 2009, according to a restricted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by Reuters, the U.N. nuclear watchdog was investigating the discovery of traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a nuclear research facility. The detection was made by the environmental swipe samples taken in 2007 and 2008 at the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas, which was tested positive for both low enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium without confirming whether the (HEU) particles were weapon-grade material.[12][15][16]

Egypt accounted for the discovery of (HEU) material that it "could have been brought into the country through contaminated radioisotope transport containers," and the IAEA's inspectors had not verified the source of the particles, and there were no evidence that Egypt's explanation was not correct.[12][15][16]

In late 2004 and early 2005, the IAEA started to investigate undisclosed experiments,[17] which was published in open sources by former and current staff of the AEA, that indicated nuclear material, activities and facilities connected to uranium extraction, conversion, irradiation and reprocessing that unreported to the agency and a team of Agency inspectors visited the Nuclear Research Center from 9 to 13 October, 2004[18][19] and IAEA's Director General Mohamed ElBaradei circulated a report to the board finding "a number of failures by Egypt to report to the agency in accordance with its obligations."[20]

Egypt justified its reporting failures as the government and the IAEA had “differing interpretations” of Egypt’s safeguards obligations and emphasizing that the country’s “nuclear activities are strictly for peaceful purposes”[21] accordingly, Egypt had taken corrective actions and maintained fully cooperated during the 2004/2005 investigation, which ended that the IAEA found no discrepancies between what have been declared during the investigation and IAEA's findings and no evidences of extraction of plutonium or enrichment of uranium and the investigation had been closed.[12][19]

Uranium conversion experiments

During December, 2004 and January, 2005 inspections the IAEA found that Egypt failed to declare in the initial report in 1982, a 67 kg of imported uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), 3 kg of imported and domestically produced uranium metal, 9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, and small amounts of domestically produced uranium dioxide (UO2), uranium trioxide (UO3) and UF4 stored in the basement of the Nuclear Chemistry Building at Inshas. Egypt reported that it had imported nuclear material and carried out uranium conversion using that material prior to the force entry of the Safeguards Agreement and granted the agency with access to the Nuclear Chemistry Building where the experiments on the uranium conversion had been conducted within the framework of staff development for the front end of the fuel cycle, and provided a list of the nuclear material that had been imported and the subsequent nuclear material that had been produced, which was unreported in the initial report in 1982.[19][22]

Egypt notified the Agency that, the Nuclear Material Authority (NMA) had conducted a project to recover uranium ore concentrate as a by-product of activities at the Phosphoric Acid Purification Plant in Inshas but failed to separate uranium. Egypt presented to the agency the program for heap leaching of uranium ore in the Sinai and Eastern deserts and declared that none of the uranium ore concentrate produced as a result of the leaching activities had been of a purity and composition that required to be reported.[19]

Uranium and thorium irradiation experiments

In December 2004 investigation, Egypt acknowledged that between 1990 and 2003, about 12 unreported experiments to the IAEA performed using a total of 1.15 g of natural uranium compounds and 9 thorium samples had been irradiated and conducted at the ETRR-1 and between 1999 and 2003 about 4 unreported experiments using a total of 0.24 g of natural uranium compounds irradiated at the ETRR-2, these experiments involving the irradiation of small amounts of natural uranium in the reactor to test the production of fission product isotopes for medical purposes and the irradiated compounds had been dissolved in three laboratories located in the Nuclear Chemistry Building with no plutonium or U-233 was separated during these experiments. Egypt provided modified design information for the two reactors and submitted inventory change reports (ICRs). Also, Egypt declared that similar experiments had been conducted between 1982 and 1988, prior the entry of safeguards agreement into force.[12][19][23]

Activities related to reprocessing

In March 2001 and July 2002, the IAEA was investigating on the environmental samples which was taken from the ETRR-1's hot cells that revealed traces of actinides and fission products, which was explained by Egypt in July 2003, that the presence of the particles was attributed by a damaged nuclear fuel cladding resulted in contamination of the reactor water that penetrated the hot cells from irradiated sample cans.[19][21]

In December 2004, Egypt declared that it failed to include in the initial report, a total gross weight (include cladding and containers) of one kilogram of imported unirradiated fuel rods containing 10% enriched U-235, which was used in experiments involved in laboratory scale testing of fuel dissolution prior to the development of a reprocessing laboratory (Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant) and presented to the agency one intact fuel rod enriched 10% U-235, a number of pieces of other fuel rods (natural and enriched uranium), and uranyl nitrate solution with uranium enriched 10% U-235. Theses experiments was conducted at the Nuclear Chemistry Building prior to force entry of the Safeguards Agreement.Egypt had agreed to correct its initial report to include these materials.[19][23]

Egypt also declared that, at the end of the 1970s, it concluded several contracts with a foreign company to build the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant (HPP) and in 1982, laboratory 2 became operational. The Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant designed for conducting bench scale radiochemistry experiments involving the separation of plutonium and uranium from irradiated fuel elements of the ETRR-1 research reactor. In November 2004 and January 2005, Egypt acknowledged that, in 1987, it had carried out acceptance tests in the HPP using unirradiated uranyl nitrate in chemical reagents purchased on the local market while the uranyl nitrate had been mixed with a solution obtained from the dissolution of domestically produced scrap UO2 pellets (with 1.9 kg of uranium compounds). Egypt did not declare it to the IAEA for safeguarding, due to the fact that the facility never completed and it was designed for bench scale experiments. Egypt had submitted the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant design information and had agreed to provide ICRs.[19][24]

In 2004, Egypt shows the IAEA's inspectors the Radioisotope Production Facility at Inshas, which was a new facility under construction intended for the separation of radioisotopes from enriched 19.7% U-235 irradiated at the ETRR-2 reactor while Egypt should have reported the decision to construct the new facility no later than 1997.[21] Egypt took a corrective measure, and provided the agency with the facility design information.[19][25]

Reactor Specifications

Data from [1][2][3]

General Data

Technical Data

Experimental Facilities

Fuel data

Utilization

See also

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Global Research Nuclear Reactors Handbook: Strategic Information and Nuclear Reactors in Selected Countries (Algeria, Germany). [S.l.]: Intl Business Pubns Usa. 2013. pp. 161–163. ISBN 1577514505. Retrieved 11 July 2014.
  2. 2.0 2.1 "Research Reactor Details - ETRR-2". iaea.org. International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved 17 July 2014.
  3. 3.0 3.1 "Research Reactors - ETRR-2". nucleus.iaea.org. International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved 30 August 2014.
  4. "Nuclear Research Center (NRC)". Nuclear Threat Initiative. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Retrieved 9 April 2015.
  5. El-Messiry, A.M. "ETRR-2 control rod withdrawal accident". ScienceDirect. Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved 19 July 2014.
  6. Bissani, M.; O'Kelly, D. S. "Joint Assessment of ETRR-2 Research Reactor Operations Program, Capabilities, and Facilities" (PDF). Office of Scientific and Technical Information. University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Retrieved 19 July 2014.
  7. "ETRR-2 reactor (Egypt)". INVAP. Retrieved 9 April 2015.
  8. "Egypt's Budding Nuclear Program". Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Retrieved 3 September 2014.
  9. 9.0 9.1 Ragheb, M. "Safeguards, Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Energy" (PDF). mragheb. Retrieved 9 April 2015.
  10. Villarino, Eduardo; Doval, Alicia (2011). "INVAP's Research Reactor Designs". Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations 2011: 4. Retrieved 19 July 2014.
  11. 11.0 11.1 11.2 "ETRR-2". Nuclear Threat Initiative. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Retrieved 19 July 2014.
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Fitzpatrick, Mark (July 2011). "Nuclear capabilities in the Middle East" (PDF). nonproliferation.eu. EU Non-Proliferation Consortium. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  13. Hassanain, A. M.; Mohamed, Nader M. A.; Aly, M. Naguib; Badawi, Alya A.; Gaheen, M. A. (2011). "Neutron Flux Characterization for Radioisotope Production at ETRR-2". International Journal of Mathematical, Computational, Physical and Quantum Engineering 5 (1): 1. Retrieved 19 July 2014.
  14. Stock, Raymond (7 September 2012). "Egypt:The Muslim Brotherhood Bomb?". Gatestone Institute. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  15. 15.0 15.1 Heinrich, Mark (6 May 2009). "High-enriched uranium traces found in Egypt: IAEA". Reuters (Vienna). Thomson Reuters. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  16. 16.0 16.1 "Highly Enriched Uranium Traces in Egypt Prompt IAEA Investigation". Global Security Newswire. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 7 May 2009. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  17. Sullivan, Denis Joseph; Jones, Kimberly (2008). Global Security Watch--Egypt: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO. pp. 29–31. ISBN 9780275994822. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  18. "Nuclear Weapons Program". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  19. 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.7 19.8 "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt" (PDF). globalsecurity.org. International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  20. "Case Closed on Egyptian Nuclear Research". Nuclear Threat Initiative. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  21. 21.0 21.1 21.2 Kerr, Paul (1 March 2005). "IAEA: Egypt's Reporting Failures 'Matter of Concern'". Arms Control Association. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  22. "Nuclear Chemistry Building". Nuclear Threat Initiative. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  23. 23.0 23.1 Nartker, Mike (14 February 2005). "Egypt Failed to Report “A Number” of Nuclear Materials, Activities, Facilities, IAEA Says". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Global Security Newswire. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  24. "Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant (HPP)". Nuclear Threat Initiative. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Retrieved 22 April 2015.
  25. "Radioisotope Production Facility". Nuclear Threat Initiative. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Retrieved 22 April 2015.