ETRR-1

Experimental Training Research Reactor No. 1
Operating Institution	Nuclear Research Center
Location	Inshas, Egypt
Type	Light water tank WWR
Power	2 MW (thermal)
Construction and Upkeep
Construction Began	March 1, 1958 (1958-03-01)
First Criticality	February 8, 1961 (1961-02-08)
Staff	18
Operators	7
Refuel Frequency	Had never been refueled since the initial fuel load
Technical Specifications
Max Thermal Flux	1.5E13
Max Fast Flux	3.6E13
Fuel Type	10% enriched U235 EK-10[1][2]
Cooling	Light water
Neutron Moderator	Light water
Neutron Reflector	H2O
Control Rods	BC,SS 16 per element
Cladding Material	Aluminum alloy
Source(s): [3][4][5][6] Website www.eaea.org.eg

ETRR-1 or ET-RR-1 (Experimental Training Research Reactor Number one, and sometimes called Egypt Test and Research Reactor Number one^[7]) is the first nuclear reactor in Egypt^[8] supplied by the former USSR in 1958.^[9] The reactor is owned and operated by Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) at the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas, 40–60 kilometers northeast of Cairo.^[10][11]

Overview

The reactor is a Light Water tank type WWR 2 MW research reactor^[6] with an initial fuel load of 3.2 kg 10% enriched uranium U235 (EK-10)^[1] imported from Russia, since then the reactor had never been refueled.^[4][12]

In the 1980s ETRR-1 reactor was shut down to modernize and extend the reactor's operability by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).^[4][8]

Undeclared Nuclear Activity

On May 2009, according to a restricted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by Reuters, the U.N. nuclear watchdog was investigating the discovery of traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at a nuclear research facility. The detection was made by the environmental swipe samples taken in 2007 and 2008 at the Nuclear Research Center in Inshas, which was tested positive for both low enriched uranium (LEU) and highly enriched uranium without confirming whether the (HEU) particles were weapon-grade material.^[12][13][14]

Egypt accounted for the discovery of (HEU) material that it "could have been brought into the country through contaminated radioisotope transport containers," and the IAEA's inspectors had not verified the source of the particles, and there were no evidence that Egypt's explanation was not correct.^[12][13][14]

In late 2004 and early 2005, the IAEA started to investigate undisclosed experiments,^[7] which was published in open sources by former and current staff of the AEA, that indicated nuclear material, activities and facilities connected to uranium extraction, conversion, irradiation and reprocessing that unreported to the agency and a team of Agency inspectors visited the Nuclear Research Center from 9 to 13 October, 2004^[15][16] and IAEA's Director General Mohamed ElBaradei circulated a report to the board finding "a number of failures by Egypt to report to the agency in accordance with its obligations."^[17]

Egypt justified its reporting failures as the government and the IAEA had “differing interpretations” of Egypt’s safeguards obligations and emphasizing that the country’s “nuclear activities are strictly for peaceful purposes”^[18] accordingly, Egypt had taken corrective actions and maintained fully cooperated during the 2004/2005 investigation, which ended that the IAEA found no discrepancies between what have been declared during the investigation and IAEA's findings and no evidences of extraction of plutonium or enrichment of uranium and the investigation had been closed.^[12][16]

Uranium conversion experiments

During December, 2004 and January, 2005 inspections the IAEA found that Egypt failed to declare in the initial report in 1982, a 67 kg of imported uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), 3 kg of imported and domestically produced uranium metal, 9.5 kg of imported thorium compounds, and small amounts of domestically produced uranium dioxide (UO2), uranium trioxide (UO3) and UF4 stored in the basement of the Nuclear Chemistry Building at Inshas. Egypt reported that it had imported nuclear material and carried out uranium conversion using that material prior to the force entry of the Safeguards Agreement and granted the agency with access to the Nuclear Chemistry Building where the experiments on the uranium conversion had been conducted within the framework of staff development for the front end of the fuel cycle, and provided a list of the nuclear material that had been imported and the subsequent nuclear material that had been produced, which was unreported in the initial report in 1982.^[16][19]

Egypt notified the Agency that, the Nuclear Material Authority (NMA) had conducted a project to recover uranium ore concentrate as a by-product of activities at the Phosphoric Acid Purification Plant in Inshas but failed to separate uranium. Egypt presented to the agency the program for heap leaching of uranium ore in the Sinai and Eastern deserts and declared that none of the uranium ore concentrate produced as a result of the leaching activities had been of a purity and composition that required to be reported.^[16]

Uranium and thorium irradiation experiments

In December 2004 investigation, Egypt acknowledged that between 1990 and 2003, about 12 unreported experiments to the IAEA performed using a total of 1.15 g of natural uranium compounds and 9 thorium samples had been irradiated and conducted at the ETRR-1 and between 1999 and 2003 about 4 unreported experiments using a total of 0.24 g of natural uranium compounds irradiated at the ETRR-2, these experiments involving the irradiation of small amounts of natural uranium in the reactor to test the production of fission product isotopes for medical purposes and the irradiated compounds had been dissolved in three laboratories located in the Nuclear Chemistry Building with no plutonium or U-233 was separated during these experiments. Egypt provided modified design information for the two reactors and submitted inventory change reports (ICRs). Also, Egypt declared that similar experiments had been conducted between 1982 and 1988, prior the entry of safeguards agreement into force.^[12][16][20]

Activities related to reprocessing

In March 2001 and July 2002, the IAEA was investigating on the environmental samples which was taken from the ETRR-1's hot cells that revealed traces of actinides and fission products, which was explained by Egypt in July 2003, that the presence of the particles was attributed by a damaged nuclear fuel cladding resulted in contamination of the reactor water that penetrated the hot cells from irradiated sample cans.^[16][18]

In December 2004, Egypt declared that it failed to include in the initial report, a total gross weight (include cladding and containers) of one kilogram of imported unirradiated fuel rods containing 10% enriched U-235, which was used in experiments involved in laboratory scale testing of fuel dissolution prior to the development of a reprocessing laboratory (Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant) and presented to the agency one intact fuel rod enriched 10% U-235, a number of pieces of other fuel rods (natural and enriched uranium), and uranyl nitrate solution with uranium enriched 10% U-235. Theses experiments was conducted at the Nuclear Chemistry Building prior to force entry of the Safeguards Agreement.Egypt had agreed to correct its initial report to include these materials.^[16][20]

Egypt also declared that, at the end of the 1970s, it concluded several contracts with a foreign company to build the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant (HPP) and in 1982, laboratory 2 became operational. The Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant designed for conducting bench scale radiochemistry experiments involving the separation of plutonium and uranium from irradiated fuel elements of the ETRR-1 research reactor. In November 2004 and January 2005, Egypt acknowledged that, in 1987, it had carried out acceptance tests in the HPP using unirradiated uranyl nitrate in chemical reagents purchased on the local market while the uranyl nitrate had been mixed with a solution obtained from the dissolution of domestically produced scrap UO2 pellets (with 1.9 kg of uranium compounds). Egypt did not declare it to the IAEA for safeguarding, due to the fact that the facility never completed and it was designed for bench scale experiments. Egypt had submitted the Hydrometallurgy Pilot Plant design information and had agreed to provide ICRs.^[16][21]

In 2004, Egypt shows the IAEA's inspectors the Radioisotope Production Facility at Inshas, which was a new facility under construction intended for the separation of radioisotopes from enriched 19.7% U-235 irradiated at the ETRR-2 reactor while Egypt should have reported the decision to construct the new facility no later than 1997.^[18] Egypt took a corrective measure, and provided the agency with the facility design information.^[16][22]

Accidents

• On April 2010, one of the cooling pumps of the ETRR-1's reactor broke, according to Mohamed Al-Qolali, the director of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority, the accident was immediately fixed without any radioactive water leakage as this incident happened due to operating the reactor without receiving safe operation permission from the Nuclear Safety Authority. According to Al-Qolali, the reactor director, and the operating manager were responsible for the accident and there were two visits by IAEA one on July and another one on August to ensure security measures had been taken and they recommend for urgent renovation of the aging reactor in order to restoring operation.^[23][24]

• On 25 May 2011,^[24] another incident of water leakage happened again for the second time due to explosion in the reactor's pump which released 10 cubic meters of radioactive water according to a source at the Atomic Energy Authority said to a Rose El Youssef newspaper, that the disaster considered a third degree according to the IAEA's International Nuclear Event Scale.^[25] The government and officials denied any radiation leaks^[26] and attributed the accident to a leakage of water from a pump that has nothing to do with the normal fuel cycle.^[24][27] Finally, The Atomic Energy Authority admitted of a leak of radioactive water from ETRR-1 with a zero risk to the reactor and the neighboring area as the leaking fluid was immediately contained according to Naguib Ashoub, director of the Department of Reactors "the first reactor is 50 years old and hasn't been operated for a year and a half," and he explained that, "the leak took place during the maintenance of the pump," confirming that safety measures had been taken without any leaks outside the chamber and that IAEA's inspectors visited the reactor the day after the leak without detecting any radiation.^[24][28] A contradicting statement by Samir Mekheimar, a former director at the Nuclear Research Center said, "the fact that the reactor was by mere chance not operated the next day saved the area from environmental disaster." also, he added that the leak was due to an operator error and the AEA ordered its staff not to publicize the leak or face dismissal.^[24][29] In addition, according to Hani Amer, which was an Egyptian Nuclear Safety Agency's inspector who visited the site, attributed the accident due to a valve failure coolant from the primary reactor was not able to flow through the correct channels to the waste tanks and no workers had been exposed to radioactivity and that,"the radiation level was in the range of 1 microsievert per hour, which is four times the normal background level of 0.25 microsievert per hour."^[24]

Reactor Specifications

Data from ^[3][4][5][6]

General Data

• Safeguards: IAEA
• Total Staff: 18
• No of Operators: 7

Technical Data

• Reactor Type: Tank WWR
• Thermal Power, Steady (kW): 2,000.00
• Max Flux SS, Thermal (n/cm2-s): 1.5E13^[8][30]
• Max Flux SS, Fast (n/cm2-s): 3.6E13^[8]
• Thermal Power, Pulsed (MW): 0.00
• Moderator: Light Water
• Coolant: Light Water
• Forced Cooling: 960 M3/H
• Coolant Velocity in Core: 1.8 M/S
• Reflector: H2O
• Control Rods Material: BC,SS
• Control Rods number: 9

Experimental Facilities

• Horizontal Channels: 9
• Horizontal Max Flux (n/cm2-s): 5.0E8^[8]
• Horizontal Use: Neutron Physics, Solid State, & Shielding
• Vertical Channels: 8
• Vertical Max Flux (n/cm2-s): 0.8E13
• Vertical Use: Production of Radioisotopes
• Core Irradiation Facilities: 1
• Core Max Flux (n/cm2-s): 0.8E13
• Loops Max Flux: 1.0E13

Fuel data

• Origin of Fissile Material: Russia
• Enrichment Supplier: Russia
• Equilibrium Core Size: 44
• Rods per Element: 16^[2]
• Dimensions of Rods, mm: 10 DIA, 500L
• Cladding Material: Aluminum Alloy^[2]
• Cladding Thickness, mm: 1.5
• Fuel Thickness, mm: 7
• Burnup on Discharge, max %: 25
• Burnup Average, %: 20
• Fuel Fabricator: Russia

Utilization

• Hours per Day: 3
• Days per Week: 3
• Weeks per Year: 20
• MW Days per Year: 96
• Materials/fuel test experiments: No
• Neutron Scattering: No
• Neutron Radiography: No
• Neutron capture therapy: No
• Activation Analysis: No
• Transmutation: No
• Geochronology: No
• Other Uses: Solid state, nuclear, and reactor physics, chemical research, isotope production, and biological irradiation

See also

• ETRR-2
• Nuclear program of Egypt
• Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority
• List of nuclear reactors
• Fuel Manufacturing Pilot Plant

References