Cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan (August 1998)

Operation Infinite Reach
Part of the Second Sudanese Civil War

A pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, destroyed during Operation Infinite Reach.
DateAugust 20, 1998
LocationAfghanistan and Sudan
15°38′45″N 32°33′42″E / 15.64583°N 32.56167°ECoordinates: 15°38′45″N 32°33′42″E / 15.64583°N 32.56167°E
Result Disputed
Belligerents
 United States al-Qaeda
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
 Sudan
Commanders and leaders
United States Anthony Zinni Osama Bin Laden
Sudan Omar al-Bashir
Fazlur Rehman Khalil
Strength
Around 10 warships and 5 submarines Unknown
Casualties and losses
None 6 killed,[1]
1 killed

The August 1998 bombings of Afghanistan and Sudan (codenamed Operation Infinite Reach by the United States) were American cruise missile strikes on terrorist bases in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan on August 20, 1998. The attack was in retaliation for the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed 224 people (including 12 Americans) and injured 5,000 others.

Al-Shifa plant bombing and controversy

The missiles were launched from American warships in the Red Sea. Several hit the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, which the United States claimed was helping Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the embassy attacks, build chemical weapons. One man was killed and ten were wounded in Sudan by the strike.

Then United States National Security Council advisor Richard Clarke stated that intelligence existed linking Osama bin Laden to Al-Shifa's current and past operators, namely the Iraqi nerve gas experts and the National Islamic Front in Sudan.[2] The government of Sudan demanded an apology from both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations; but none has been given, since U.S. intelligence still believes the plant had ties to chemical weapons. According to testimony by William Cohen,[3] "...the U.S. intelligence community obtained physical evidence from outside the al-Shifa facility in Sudan that supported long-standing concerns regarding its potential role in Sudanese chemical weapon efforts that could be exploited by al Qaeda."[4]

Officials later acknowledged, however, that "the evidence that prompted President Clinton to order the missile strike on the Shifa plant was not as solid as first portrayed." Indeed, officials later said that there was no proof that the plant had been manufacturing or storing nerve gas, as initially suspected by the Americans, or had been linked to Osama bin Laden, who was a resident of Khartoum in the 1990s."[5]

The Al-Shifa factory was Sudan's primary source of pharmaceuticals, covering the majority of the Sudanese market. Werner Daum (Germany's ambassador to Sudan 19962000) wrote an article in which he estimated that the attack "probably led to tens of thousands of deaths" of Sudanese civilians.[6] The American Bureau of Intelligence and Research wrote a report in 1999 questioning the attack on the factory, suggesting that the connection to bin Laden was not accurate; James Risen reported in the New York Times:

"Now, the analysts renewed their doubts and told Assistant Secretary of State Phyllis Oakley that the C.I.A.'s evidence on which the attack was based was inadequate. Ms. Oakley asked them to double-check; perhaps there was some intelligence they had not yet seen. The answer came back quickly: There was no additional evidence. Ms. Oakley called a meeting of key aides and a consensus emerged: Contrary to what the Administration was saying, the case tying Al Shifa to Mr. bin Laden or to chemical weapons was weak."[7]

The Chairman of El Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries, who is critical of the Sudanese government, more recently told reporters, "I had inventories of every chemical and records of every employee's history. There were no such [nerve gas] chemicals being made here."[8] Sudan has since invited the U.S. to conduct chemical tests at the site for evidence to support its claim that the plant might have been a chemical weapons factory; so far, the U.S. has refused the invitation to investigate. Nevertheless, the U.S. has refused to officially apologize for the attacks.[5]

Attack on camps in Afghanistan

Satellite image showing an al-Qaeda training camp in Zhawar Kili
Interestingly, even if bin Laden had been there, it would have taken a good deal of luck to kill him. The camp facilities at Khowst are fairly extensive and cover a substantial piece of ground.

Michael Scheuer, CIA Station Chief[9]

About 75 cruise missiles were fired by the U.S. into the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan at four Afghan training camps:

The attack was made partly in an attempt to assassinate bin Laden and other leaders.[14] After the attack, the CIA heard that bin Laden had been at Zhawar Kili al-Badr but had left some hours before the missiles hit.[15]

The earlier arrest of Mohammed Odeh on August 7 while traveling to meet with Osama, is said to have alerted bin Laden, who canceled the meeting which meant that the camps targeted by the cruise missiles were mainly empty the day of the U.S. strike.[16]

According to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, 20 Afghans, seven Pakistanis, three Yemenis, two Egyptians, one Saudi and one Turk were killed.[10] Abu Jandal later estimated that only six men had been killed in the strikes.[1] The only confirmed death in the strikes was Egyptian-Canadian Amr Hamed. Osama bin Laden jokingly told militants at the al-Jihad merger that only a few camels and chickens had died.[17]

U.S. President Bill Clinton announced the attacks in a TV address, saying the Khost camp was "one of the most active terrorist bases in the world,"[18] adding that "I want the world to understand that our actions today were not aimed against Islam" which he called "a great religion."[19]

The failure of the cruise missiles to eliminate their targets would lead to an acceleration in the American program to develop unmanned combat air vehicles.[20]

Reaction

See also

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 Bergen (2006)
  2. Loeb, Vernon (23 January 1999). "Embassy Attacks Thwarted, U.S. Says; Official Cites Gains Against Bin Laden; Clinton Seeks $10 Billion to Fight Terrorism". The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.). p. A.02. Retrieved 27 February 2015.
  3. Cohen (2004)
  4. Cohen (2004), p. 9 (of PDF)
  5. 5.0 5.1 Lacey, Marc (20 October 2005). "Look at the Place! Sudan Says, 'Say Sorry,' but U.S. Won't". The New York Times. Retrieved 27 February 2015.
  6. Universalism and the West
  7. To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle
  8. Sudan shifts from pariah to partner
  9. Scheuer, Michael. "Marching Towards Hell", 2008
  10. 10.0 10.1 Rashid, Taliban (2000), p.134
  11. https://fas.org/irp/world/para/hua.htm Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA)
  12. New York Times, August 27, 1998, p.A8
  13. Coll (2005), pp. 409-410
  14. Coll (2005), p. 410
  15. Coll (2005), p. 411
  16. Gertz, Bill, "Inside The Ring: Missing bin Laden", Washington Times, September 18, 2008, pg. B1.
  17. Temple-Raston, Dina. "The Jihad Next Door", 2007.
  18. New York Times, August 22, 1998, p.A10
  19. New York Times, August 21, 1998, p.A8
  20. "Armed Drones and the Hunt for bin Laden."
  21. 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 21.6 21.7 21.8 21.9 21.10 21.11 Muslims, Yeltsin denounce attack, CNN, August 21, 1998
  22. 22.0 22.1 Thousands stage anti-U.S. protest in Sudan, CNN, August 22, 1998
  23. New York Times August 21, 1998, p.A13
  24. Explosion rips through Planet Hollywood in South Africa, CNN, August 25, 1998
  25. Chechnya declares war on USA, PTI, Aug 23 1998
  26. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (2005), page 323. Vintage Books: ISBN 978-1-4000-3084-2

Bibliography

External links