Cārvāka

For the village in Kyrgyzstan, see Charbak, Kyrgyzstan.

Cārvāka, originally known as Lokāyata and Bṛhaspatya, is one of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of Indian philosophy.[1][2] It rejects supernaturalism, emphasizes materialism and philosophical skepticism, holding empiricism, perception and conditional inference as the proper source of knowledge[3][4][5][6][7][8] Cārvāka is characterised as a materialistic, atheistic, non-orthodox school of thought.[9] Though this school of thought is not commonly considered as a part of six orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, Haribhadra, a Jain monk from circa the seventh century, considers this school as a part of those six in his book, Shaddarsana-samuccaya.[10] Carvakas are considered as an example of unorthodox Hindu tradition.[11][12][13][14]

Bṛhaspati is sometimes referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy. Much of the primary literature of Cārvāka, the Barhaspatya sutras (ca. 600 BCE), are missing or lost.[15] Its theories and development has been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the shastras, sutras and the Indian epic poetry as well as in the dialogues of Gautama Buddha and from Jain literature.[15][16] The origins of Cārvāka can be traced to the Rigveda, but substantial Cārvāka discussions are only found after 600 BCE.[15][17][18] Bhattacharya posits that Cārvāka may have been one of several atheistic, materialist schools that existed in ancient India.[19]

Cārvāka emerged as an alternative to the Āstika schools as well as a philosophical predecessor to subsequent or contemporaneous nāstika philosophies such as Ājīvika, Jainism and Buddhism in the classical period of Indian philosophy.[20]

One of the widely studied principles of Cārvāka philosophy was its rejection of inference as a means to establish valid, universal knowledge,and metaphysical truths.[21][22] In other words, the Cārvāka epistemology states that whenever one infers a truth from a set of observations or truths, one must acknowledge doubt; inferred knowledge is conditional.[23]

Etymology and meaning

Cārvāka means "agreeable speech" or "sweet talkers", from Sanskrit root words cāru "agreeable" and vāk "speech".[24][25] Its traditional name, Lokāyata (Sanskrit: लोकायत) signifies "directed towards, aiming at the world".[26][27]

In early to mid 20th century literature, the etymology of Lokayata has been given different interpretations, in part because the primary sources are unavailable, and the meaning has been deduced from divergent secondary literature.[28] The name Lokāyata, for example, is found in Chanakya's Arthashastra, which refers to three ānvīkṣikīs (अन्वीक्षिकी, literally, examining by reason,[29] logical philosophies) – Yoga, Samkhya and Lokāyata. However, Lokāyata in the Arthashastra is not anti-Vedic, but implies Lokāyata to be a part of Vedic lore.[30] Lokāyata here refers to logic or science of debate (disputatio, "criticism").[31] Rudolf Franke translated Lokayata in German as "logisch beweisende naturerklärung", that is "logically proven explanation of nature".[32] In 9th century AD Jaina literature, Saddarsanasamuccaya by Haribhadra, Lokayata is stated to be the Hindu school where there is "no God, no samsara (rebirth), no karma, no duty, no fruits of merit, no sin."[33]

The Buddhist Sanskrit work Divyavadana (ca. 200-350 AD) mentions Lokayata, where is listed among subjects of study, and with the sense of "technical logical science".[34] Santaraksita and Adi Shankara use the word lokayata to mean materialism.[15][35]

The name Cārvāka was first used in the 7th century by the philosopher Purandara, who referred to his fellow materialists as "the Cārvākas", and it was used by the 8th century philosophers Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra. Adi Shankara, on the other hand, always used Lokāyata, not Cārvāka.[36] The terms Lokayata and Brhaspatya have been used interchangeably for the Carvaka philosophy of materialism.

Origin

The origins of the Cārvāka can be traced to the Rgveda, but substantial discussions on the Cārvāka is found in post-Vedic literature.[15][37] The primary literature of Cārvāka, such as the Brhaspati Sutra is missing or lost.[15][17] Its theories and development has been compiled from historic secondary literature such as those found in the shastras (such as the Arthasastra), sutras and the epics (the Mahabharata and Ramayana) of Hinduism as well as from the dialogues of Gautama Buddha and Jain literature.[15][38]

The origins of materialism in Indian philosophy are unclear. There is evidence of its development in Vedic era.[39] The earliest documented Carvaka scholar in India is Ajita Kesakambali.[40] Although materialist schools existed before Cārvāka, it was the only school which systematised materialist philosophy by setting them down in the form of aphorisms in the 6th century BC. There was a base text, a collection sūtras or aphorisms and several commentaries were written to explicate the aphorisms.[41]

E. W. Hopkins, in his The Ethics of India (1924) claims that Cārvāka philosophy was contemporaneous to Jainism and Buddhism, mentioning "the old Cārvāka or materialist of the 6th century BC". Rhys Davids assumes that lokāyata in ca. 500 BC came to mean "skepticism" in general without yet being organised as a philosophical school. Its methodology of skepticism is included in the Ramayana, Ayodhya kanda, chapter 108, where Jabāli tries to persuade Rāma to accept the kingdom by using nāstika arguments (Rāma refutes him in chapter 109):[42]

O, the highly wise! Arrive at a conclusion, therefore, that there is nothing beyond this Universe. Give precedence to that which meets the eye and turn your back on what is beyond our knowledge. (2.108.17)

There are alternate theories behind the origins of Carvaka. Bṛhaspati is sometimes referred to as the founder of Cārvāka or Lokāyata philosophy. Billington states that a philosopher named Carvaka lived in or about the 6th century BC, who developed the premises of this Indian philosophy in the form of Brhaspati Sutra.[43] These sutras predate 150 BC, because they are mentioned in the Mahābhāṣya (7.3.45).[42]

Basham, citing the Buddhist Samaññaphala Sutta, suggests six schools of heterodox, pre-Buddhist and pre-Jain, atheistic Indian traditions in 6th century BCE, that included Carvakas and Ajivikas.[44] Cārvāka was a living philosophy up to the 12th century in India's historical timeline, after which this system seems to have disappeared without leaving any trace.[45]

Philosophy

The Cārvāka school of philosophy had a variety of atheistic and materialistic beliefs. They held perception to be the valid and reliable source of knowledge.[46]

Epistemology

The Carvaka epistemology holds perception as the primary and proper source of knowledge, while inference is held as prone to being either right or wrong and therefore conditional or invalid.[23][47] Perception are of two types, for Carvaka, external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.[23] Inference is described as deriving a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths. To Carvakas, inference is useful but prone to error, as inferred truths can never be without doubt.[48] Inference is good and helpful, it is the validity of inference that is suspect – sometimes in certain cases and often in others. To the Cārvākas there were no reliable means by which the efficacy of inference as a means of knowledge could be established.[21]

Carvakas epistemological argument can be explained with the example of fire and smoke. Kamal states, that when there is smoke (middle term), one's tendency may be to leap to the conclusion that it must be caused by fire (major term in logic).[23] While this is often true, it need not be universally true, everywhere or all the times, stated the Carvaka scholars. Smoke can have other causes. In Carvaka epistemology, as long as the relation between two phenomena, or observation and truth, has not been proven as unconditional, it is an uncertain truth. Such methods of reasoning, that is jumping to conclusions or inference, is prone to flaw in this Indian philosophy.[23][48] Carvakas further state that full knowledge is reached when we know all observations, all premises and all conditions. But the absence of conditions, state Carvakas, can not be established beyond doubt by perception, as some conditions may be hidden or escape our ability to observe.[23] They acknowledge that every person relies on inference in daily life, but to them if we act uncritically, we err. While our inference sometimes are true and lead to successful action, it is also a fact that sometimes inference is wrong and leads to error.[49] Truth then, state Carvaka, is not an unfailing character of inference, truth is merely an accident of inference, and one that is separable. We must be skeptics, question what we know by inference, question our epistemology.[17][23]

This epistemological proposition of Carvakas was influential among various schools of in Indian philosophies, by demonstrating a new way of thinking and re-evaluation of past doctrines. Hindu, Buddhist and Jain scholars extensively deployed Carvaka insights on inference in rational re-examination of their own theories.[23][50]

Comparison with other schools of Hinduism

Carvaka epistemology represents minimalist pramāṇas (epistemological methods) in Hindu philosophy. The other schools of Hinduism developed and accepted multiple valid forms of epistemology.[51] To Carvakas, Pratyakṣa (perception) was the one valid way to knowledge and other means of knowledge were either always conditional or invalid. Advaita Vedanta scholars considered six means of valid knowledge and to truths: Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāṇa (inference), Upamāṇa (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation), Anupalabdi (non-perception, cognitive proof) and Śabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).[51][52] While Carvaka school accepted just one, the valid means of epistemology in other schools of Hinduism ranged between 2 to 6.[51]

Metaphysics

Since none of the means of knowing were found to be worthy to establish the invariable connection between middle term and predicate, Cārvākas concluded that the inference could not be used to ascertain metaphysical truths. Thus, to Cārvākas, the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of something to infer the knowledge of something else could be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being in error. Cases where inference was justified by the result were seen only to be mere coincidences.[53]

Therefore, Cārvākas denied metaphysical concepts like reincarnation, extracorporeal soul, efficacy of religious rites, other worlds (heaven and hell), fate and accumulation of merit or demerit through the performance of certain actions.[41] Cārvākas also rejected the use of supernatural causes to describe natural phenomena. To them all natural phenomena was produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.[54]

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety ? from their own nature was it born.[54]

Consciousness and Afterlife

The Carvaka school did not believe in karma, rebirth or an afterlife. To them, all attributes that represented a person, such a thinness, fatness etc., resided in the body. The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha states the Carvaka position as follows:

There is no other world other than this;

There is no heaven and no hell;
The realm of Shiva and like regions,
are invented by stupid imposters.

—Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,  Verse 8[55]

Pleasure

Cārvāka believed that there was nothing wrong with sensual pleasure. Since it is impossible to have pleasure without pain, Cārvāka thought that wisdom lay in enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain as far as possible. Unlike many of the Indian philosophies of the time, Cārvāka did not believe in austerities or rejecting pleasure out of fear of pain and held such reasoning to be foolish.[46]

The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha states the Carvaka position on pleasure and hedonism as follows:

The enjoyment of heaven lies in eating delicious food, keeping company of young women, using fine clothes, perfumes, garlands, sandal paste... while moksha is death which is cessation of life-breath... the wise therefore ought not to take pains on account of moksha.

A fool wears himself out by penances and fasts. Chastity and other such ordinances are laid down by clever weaklings.

—Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,  Verses 9-12[56]

Religion

Cārvākas rejected religious conceptions of Hindus, Buddhists and Jains, such as those of afterlife, reincarnation, samsara, karma and religious rites. They were critical of the Vedas, as well as Buddhist scriptures.[57]

The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha with commentaries by Madhavacharya describes the Carvakas as critical of Vedas, materialists without morals and ethics. To Carvakas, the text states, the Vedas suffered from several faults – errors in transmission across generations, untruth, self-contradiction and tautology. The Carvakas pointed out the disagreements, debates and mutual rejection by karmakanda Vedic priests and jñānakanda Vedic priests, as proof that either one of them is wrong or both are wrong, as both cannot be right.[57][58]

Carvakas, according to Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha verses 10 and 11, declared the Vedas to be incoherent rhapsodies whose only usefulness was to provide livelihood to priests. They also held the belief that Vedas were invented by man, and had no divine authority.[58]

Carvakas rejected the need for ethics or morals, and suggested that "while life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt".[59]

The accuracy of these views, attributed to Carvakas, has been contested by scholars.[60][61]

Works

No independent works on Cārvāka philosophy can be found except for a few sūtras composed by Brihaspati. The 8th century Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa with Madhyamaka influence is a significant source of Carvaka philosophy. Shatdarshan Samuchay and Sarvadarśanasaṅ̇graha of Vidyaranya are a few other works which elucidate Cārvāka thought.[62]

In the epic Mahabharata, Book 12 Chapter 39, a villain who dresses up like a scholar, self appoints himself as spokesperson for all scholars, and who then advises Yudhisthira to act unethically, is named Cārvāka.[63]

One of the widely studied references to the Cārvāka philosophy is the Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (etymologically all-philosophy-collection), a famous work of 14th century Advaita Vedanta philosopher Mādhava Vidyāraṇya from South India, which starts with a chapter on the Cārvāka system. After invoking, in the Prologue of the book, the Hindu gods Shiva and Vishnu ("by whom the earth and rest were produced"), Vidyāraṇya asks, in the first chapter:[64]

“ ...but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Charvaka, the crest-gem of the atheistic school, the follower of the doctrine of Brihaspati? The efforts of Charvaka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain:
While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?[64]
 ”

Ain-i-Akbari, a record of the Mughal Emperor Akbar's court, mentions a symposium of philosophers of all faiths held in 1578 at Akbar's insistence.[65] In the text, the Mughal historian Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak summarizes Charvaka philosophy as "unenlightened" and that their literature as "lasting memorials to their ignorance". He notes that Charvakas considered paradise as "the state in which man lives as he chooses, without control of another", while hell as "the state in which he lives subject to another's rule". On state craft, Charvakas believe, states Mubarak, that it is best when "knowledge of just administration and benevolent government" is practiced.[66]

Sanskrit poems and plays like the Naiṣadha-carita, Prabodha-candrodaya, Āgama-dambara, Vidvanmoda-taraṅgiṇī and Kādambarī contain representations of the Cārvāka thought. However, the authors of these works were thoroughly opposed to materialism and tried to portray the Cārvāka in unfavourable light. Therefore, their works should only be accepted critically.[41]

Loss of original works

Main article: Barhaspatya sutras

There was no continuity in the Cārvāka tradition after the 12th century. Whatever is written on Cārvāka post this is based on second-hand knowledge, learned from preceptors to disciples and no independent works on Cārvāka philosophy can be found.[41] Chatterjee and Datta explain that our understanding of Cārvāka philosophy is fragmentary, based largely on criticism of its ideas by other schools, and that it is not a living tradition:

"Though materialism in some form or other has always been present in India, and occasional references are found in the Vedas, the Buddhistic literature, the Epics, as well as in the later philosophical works we do not find any systematic work on materialism, nor any organised school of followers as the other philosophical schools possess. But almost every work of the other schools states, for refutation, the materialistic views. Our knowledge of Indian materialism is chiefly based on these."[67]

Controversy on reliability of sources

Bhattacharya[60] states, that the claims against Cārvāka of hedonism, lack of any morality and ethics, disregard for spirituality is from texts of competing religious thoughts (Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism). Its primary sources, along with commentaries by Carvaka scholars is missing or lost. This reliance on indirect sources raises the question of reliability and whether there was a bias and exaggeration in representing the views of Carvakas. Bhattacharya points out that multiple manuscripts are inconsistent, with key passages alleging hedonism and immorality missing in many manuscripts of the same text.[60]

The Skhalitapramathana Yuktihetusiddhi by Āryadevapāda, in a manuscript found in Tibet, discusses the Cārvāka philosophy, but attributes a theistic claim to Carvakas - that happiness in this life, and the only life, can be attained by worshipping gods and defeating demons. Toso posits that as Carvaka philosophy's views spread and were widely discussed, non-Carvakas such as Āryadevapāda added certain points of view that may not be of Carvakas.[68]

Buddhists, Jains, Advaita Vedantins and Nyāya philosophers considered the Cārvākas as one of their opponents and tried to refute their views. These refutations are indirect sources of Cārvāka philosophy. The arguments and reasoning approach Carvakas deployed were significant that they continued to be referred to, even after all the authentic Cārvāka/Lokāyata texts had been lost. However, the representation of the Cārvāka thought in these works is not always firmly grounded in first-hand knowledge of Cārvāka texts and should be viewed critically.[41]

Likewise, states Bhattacharya, the charge of hedonism against Cārvāka might have been exaggerated.[60] Countering the argument that the Cārvākas opposed all that was good in the Vedic tradition, Dale Riepe states, "It may be said from the available material that Cārvākas hold truth, integrity, consistency, and freedom of thought in the highest esteem."[69]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ (Radhakrishnan 1957, pp. 1–3, Contents)
  2. ↑ (Flood 1996, p. 224)
  3. ↑ (Radhakrishnan 1957, pp. 187, 227–234)
  4. ↑ Robert Flint, Anti-theistic theories, p. 463, at Google Books, Appendix Note VII - Hindu Materialism: The Charvaka System; William Blackwood, London
  5. ↑ V.V. Raman (2012), Hinduism and Science: Some Reflections, Zygon - Journal of Religion and Science, 47(3): 549–574, Quote (page 557): "Aside from nontheistic schools like the Samkhya, there have also been explicitly atheistic schools in the Hindu tradition. One virulently anti-supernatural system is/was the so-called Carvaka school.", doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.2012.01274.x
  6. ↑ KN Tiwari (1998), Classical Indian Ethical Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120816077, page 67
  7. ↑ Roy W Perrett (1984), The problem of induction in Indian philosophy, Philosophy East and West, 34(2): 161-174
  8. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 21–32)
  9. ↑ (Radhakrishnan 1957, pp. 227–249)
  10. ↑ Potter, Karl H. (2007). The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Buddhist philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publications. pp. 435–436. ISBN 978-81-208-1968-9.
  11. ↑ Bill Cooke (2005), Dictionary of Atheism, Skepticism, and Humanism, ISBN 978-1591022992, page 84
  12. ↑ R Thomas (2014), Hindu Perspectives on Evolution: Darwin, Dharma, and Design. Sociology of Religion, Vol. 75, No. 1, pages 164-165, Quote: "some of the ancient Hindu traditions like Carvaka have a rich tradition of materialism, in general, other schools..."
  13. ↑ KN Tiwari (1998), Classical Indian Ethical Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120816077, page 67; Quote: "Of the three heterodox systems, the remaining one, the Cārvāka system, is a Hindu system.";
  14. ↑ For a general discussion of Carvaka and other atheistic traditions within Hindu philosophy, see Jessica Frazier (2014), Hinduism in The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Editors: Stephen Bullivant, Michael Ruse), Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199644650, pages 367-378
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 (Radhakrishnan 1957, pp. 227–249)
  16. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 21–44, 65–74)
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 17.2 John M. Koller (1977), Skepticism in Early Indian Thought, Philosophy East and West, 27(2): 155-164
  18. ↑ Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120812932, pages 53-58
  19. ↑ Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2013), The base text and its commentaries: Problem of representing and understanding the Carvaka / Lokayata, Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal, Issue 1, Volume 3, pages 133-150
  20. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, p. 9)
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Cowell and Gough, p. 5.
  22. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, p. 58)
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 23.2 23.3 23.4 23.5 23.6 23.7 MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16
  24. ↑ Monier-Williams (1899); the name literally means "speaking sweetly, pleasantly", (चारु, cāru – agreeable, pleasant or sweet and वाक, vāk – speech)
  25. ↑ Monier-Williams' 'Sanskrit-English Dictionary See cAru and vAka, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany
  26. ↑ Monier-Williams' 'Sanskrit-English Dictionary See loka and ayata, Cologne Digital Sanskrit Lexicon, Germany; (लोक, loka which means "worlds, abode, place of truth, people", and आयत, āyata means "extended, directed towards, aiming at")
  27. ↑ N. V. Isaeva (1 January 1993). Shankara and Indian Philosophy. SUNY Press. p. 27. ISBN 978-0-7914-1281-7. Retrieved 31 December 2013.
  28. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 187–192)
  29. ↑ Paul Hacker, Anviksiki, Kleine Schriften / hrsg. von Lambert Schmithausen (1978), OCLC 463106529, page 164, ISBN 978-3515026925
  30. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 188–190)
  31. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 27, 189–191)
  32. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, p. 188)
  33. ↑ Haribhadrasūri (Translator: M Jain, 1989), Saddarsanasamuccaya, Asiatic Society, OCLC 255495691
  34. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 193–195)
  35. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 196)
  36. ↑ ( & Bhattacarya 2002, p. 6)
  37. ↑ in hymn 10.129; John M. Koller (1977), Skepticism in Early Indian Thought, Philosophy East and West, 27(2): 155-164
  38. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 21–44, 65–74)
  39. ↑ A. K. Sinha (1994), Traces of Materialism in Early Vedic Thought: A Study, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 75, No. 1/4, pages 235-241
  40. ↑ Bhattacharya 2011, p. 29.
  41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 41.2 41.3 41.4 Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. Materialism in India: A Synoptic View. Retrieved 27 July 2012.
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 see Schermerhorn (1930).
  43. ↑ Ray Billington (1997), Understanding Eastern Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415129640, page 43
  44. ↑ Arthur Basham (2009), History and Doctrines of the Ajivikas: a Vanished Indian Religion, ISBN 978-8120812048, pages 11-17
  45. ↑ (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 65–74)
  46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 Cowell and Gough. p. 3
  47. ↑ Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2010), What the Cārvākas Originally Meant?, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38(6): 529-542
  48. ↑ 48.0 48.1 (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 55–67)
  49. ↑ Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2013), The Base Text and Its Commentaries: Problems of Representing and Understanding the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, Argument, 3 (1):133-149
  50. ↑ D Chatterjee (1977), Skepticism and Indian philosophy, Philosophy East and West, 27(2): 195-209
  51. ↑ 51.0 51.1 51.2
    • Eliott Deutsche (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 245-248;
    • John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, ISBN 978-0791430675, page 238
  52. ↑ Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0521438780, page 225
  53. ↑ Cowell and Gough, p. 9.
  54. ↑ 54.0 54.1 Cowell and Gough. p. 10
  55. ↑ Ray Billington (1997), Understanding Eastern Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415129640, page 44
  56. ↑ Ray Billington (1997), Understanding Eastern Philosophy, Routledge, ISBN 978-0415129640, page 44-45
  57. ↑ 57.0 57.1 Richard Hayes (2000), The Question of Doctrinalism in the Buddhist Epistemologists, in Philosophy of Religion: Indian Philosophy (Editor:Roy Perrett), Routledge, ISBN 978-0815336112, pages 187-212
  58. ↑ 58.0 58.1 Original Sanskrit version:Sarva-darsana-sangraha, pages 3-7; English version: The Charvaka System with commentary by Madhava Acharya, Translators: Cowell and Gough (1882), pages 5-9
  59. ↑ The Charvaka System with commentary by Madhava Acharya, Translators: Cowell and Gough (1882), page 10
  60. ↑ 60.0 60.1 60.2 60.3 (Bhattacharya 2011, pp. 10, 29–32)
  61. ↑ Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120812932
  62. ↑ Joshi, Dinkar. Glimpses of Indian Culture. Star Publications (P) Ltd, Delhi. P. 37. ISBN 81-7650-190-5.
  63. ↑ Shanti Parva, Chapter XXXIX The Mahabharata, KM Ganguli (Translator), pages 121-122
  64. ↑ 64.0 64.1 Cowell and Gough, p. 2.
  65. ↑ Ain-i-Akbari, Vol. III, translated by H. S. Barrett, pp 217–218 (also see Amartya Sen [2005], pp 288–289)
  66. ↑ Henry Sullivan Jarrett (Translator), The Ain-i-Akbari, Volume 3, p. 217, at Google Books, Abu'l-Fazl ibn Mubarak, 16th century, pages 217-218
  67. ↑ Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy. Eighth Reprint Edition. (University of Calcutta: 1984). p. 55.
  68. ↑ KD Toso (2010), The Stanzas on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata in the Skhalita pramathana yuktihetusiddhi, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38(6): 543-552
  69. ↑ Riepe, Dale. The Naturalistic Tradition of Indian Thought (Motilal Banarasidas, Varanasi) p.75

Bibliography

External links