Battle of Kirkuk (1733)
| Ottoman–Persian War (1730–35) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Naderian Wars | |||||||||
 Diagram of the battle | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Safavid Empire |
 Ottoman Empire | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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Nader Haji Beg Khan |
Topal Osman Pasha † Memish Pasha † | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 50,000-80,000[2][3] | 100,000[4] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| minimal[5] |
20,000[6]
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The Battle of Kirkuk, also known as the Battle of Agh-Darband was the last battle in Nader's Mesopotamian campaign where he avenged his earlier defeat at the hands of the Ottoman general Topal Osman Pasha who lost his life during the battle. The battle was another in the chain of seemingly unpredictable triumphs and tragedies for both sides as the war swung wildly from the favour of one side to the other. Although the battle ended in a crushing victory for the Persians they had to be withdrawn from the area due to a growing rebellion in the south of Persia led by Mohammad Khan Baluch, in effect robbing Nader of the strategic benefits of his great victory which would have included the capture of Baghdad if he had the chance to resume his campaign.
Background
The aftermath of Samara
The defeat Nader had conceded at the battle of Samara had effects beyond just the immediate results of reducing Nader's force by 30,000 and saving Baghdad from his clutches. The loss of so many experienced fighting men and precious equipment could not be easily overcome and the first task Nader faced was restoring the morale of his fighting men who had up to that point thought themselves invincible, and not without reason as they had been nothing but victorious in all encounters. Summoning his officers he began with admitting his own mistakes: "...[Nader] claimed his fate and those of him men as one and the same, reminding them of their past sacrifices and bravery, promised them that he would wipe away the memory of their recent defeat. Thus, he came to be admired by his officers and soldiers alike and while instilling a renewed fighting spirit in the souls of his warriors he ensured they would not show reluctance in the forthcoming conclusion with the Turks."
A rebellion broke out in southern Persia under the leadership of Mohammad Khan Baluch who gathered a substantial mass of malcontents around himself and was supplied with more men from the local Arab tribes in the region. Nader's solution was first to rectify the problem of Topal Pasha and only then crush Mohammad Khan's rebellion.
Reconstituting the Persian army
There were also political dimensions present also as Nader was keen to rectify his reputation as news of his defeat at Samara would spread in Persia making fertile soil for any growths of rebellion from within. It is unclear to what extent Nader craved an opportunity to repair his ego as well as his reputation by defeating Topal Pasha who was the only man (and would remain the only man) to have bested him on the field of battle. Ordering a nation-wide effort to restore his bloodied army, Nader was able in a mere 40 days to gather vast amounts of supplies of all sorts with 140,000 horses, mules and camels for transportation as well as raising 50,000 fresh troops for training. These efforts at reconstituting his army meant terrible suffering for the citizenry especially in the west of the country who were made to pay exorbitant taxes unless they were to be subjected to draconian punishments. The result was that Nader could divide the extraordinary sum of 200,000 Tomans among the soldiery greatly raising their spirits for the coming struggle.
In a conversation which reveals a great deal about Nader's perception of himself he told a Persian courtier
"Do you know of why they speak of me in such an incessant manner? Because I will not permit even a moment of peace or tranquillity in the country. I will desecrate and destroy everything, for I am not a man, but the wrath of god sent to scourge mankind".
Statements such as these give clear indication of a narcissistic personality coupled with an almost obnoxious psychopathy. It was also these same traits which made Nader the unrelenting genius of war that he was recognized and admired to be by both contemporaries and historians ever since. Reforms were undertaken in the infantry arm where the corps was divided into three main components. The jazayerchi in the first rank, equipped with the best and heaviest form of musket available, namely the jazayer. The qarachurlu would be the rear ranks of the musketeers in the army firing their muskets after the jazayerchi. Finally there were the piyadegan who were armed with swords and spears, providing a specialised tool in the hand-to-hand fighting that would require their particular skills. These reforms structured the Persian infantry into a deadly force which could articulate itself appropriately in various circumstances.
Topal Pasha was also eager to make good his losses having suffered the total loss of 20,000 men or 1 out of every 4 in his army. Sending requests to Istanbul he also demanded to be replaced with a younger general (Topal Pasha was approximately 70 years old at this time). By the time of the next Persian invasion of Iraq however he managed to put together an army 100,000 strong.
Horse & Musket Era Tactics & Drill
Infantry
The drill and specific fighting methods of oriental musketeers has been relatively obscure until some recent research. The Ottoman army contained a feared corps of elite matchlock armed infantry known as the janissaries who were using firing systems since the end of the sixteenth century. The Persian Safavid armies of this era were almost entirely composed of mounted troops until in the face of Ottoman superiority in fire power, Abbas I of Persia introduced some much needed reforms that created a corps of musketeers as well as significant artillery arm.
Although it is not clear to what extent these reforms duplicated the Ottoman system it is reasonable to infer that they would not have been dissimilar. The numerous military engagements between the two empires meant plenty of opportunities to familiarise with each other's tactics. By examining the fighting methods of one we can guess at the methods of the other.
An Ottoman chronicler by the name of Abdulkadir who was present at a military drill at the beginning of the seventeenth century gives us a slight insight into the fire-by-rank system utilised by the Ottoman infantry which remained largely the same well into the eighteenth century and was widely used across Europe:
And in the middle of the field, the Janissary regiments stood in three ranks, each musketeer with matches ready [to fire], and they lined up the big cannons chained in front of the Janissaries. Then, after the first rank of the Janissaries fires their muskets, the second rank fires too. Afterwards, the rank that fired first bends double and begins to reload their muskets. And as the third rank fires, the second rank in front [of them] bends and prepares their muskets. Then, the first rank again stands up and fires their muskets (Yılmazer 2003, p. 437).
The division of the Persian infantry gives us clues concerning their particular firing methods also. Dividing the musketeers into the jazayerchi who would fire first and then the qarachurlu who would fire subsequently strongly implies a fire-by-rank system of at least two lines deep. This is in addition to the description of various battles which describe the Persian infantry firing on mass in a highly disciplined manner and continuing to fire repeated salvoes. In the Persian army under Nader particular attention was given to personal marksmanship which is apparent in the eye witness account of the Greek traveller Vatatzes:
...the infantry, by which I mean those that carry muskets, drilled en masse in units. They aimed at targets and kept continuously training...
Although the new recruits Nader was training in western Persia were excellently drilled, the fact remained that they were untested in battle unlike the 30,000 or so veteran soldiers that Nader had lost in Samara. Topal Osman Pasha had to also make good his loss of some 20,000 high quality fighting men with new recruits drawn from the Eyalats in the Levant.
Cavalry
The Persian cavalry were a diverse mix of conventional & tribal elements. here also Vatatzes provides an indispensable account of their training exercises:
...they attacked from all sides, circling in any new direction. The ranks closed in and then they would charge and then disperse, after which this same scattered group would close ranks on the same point. They would feign a retreat and then counter attack...—Vatatzes, Basile
The cavalry were also divided into various components, the most prestigious of which was 'Savaran-e Saltanati' (the royal cavalry) and the 'Savaran-e Sepah-e Khorasan' (the riders of Khorasan). They were armed with intimidatingly sharp Persian curved swords and by 1736 muskets had become standard issue weapons but were used mostly in a skirmishing role. On numerous occasions the Persian cavalry proved the superior of its Ottoman counterpart and enjoyed an excellent reputation as some of the best mounted soldiers in the world.
The Ottoman cavalry was also one of the most feared fighting forces of this era. Sipahi refers to all freeborn Ottoman Turkish mounted troops other than akıncıs and tribal horsemen in the Ottoman army. The word was used almost synonymously with cavalry. The Sipahis formed two distinct types of cavalry: feudal-like, provincial timarlı sipahi (timariots) which consisted most of the Ottoman army, and salaried, regular kapıkulu sipahi (sipahi of the Porte), which consisted cavalry part of the Ottoman household troops. Equipment of Silahtar, Sipahi and Ulufeci divisions was plated mail, chainmail, round shield, sword, composite bow, arrows, lance, bozdogan mace and axe. Their equipment was similar to Rumeli (Balkan) provincial Timarli Sipahis, though they wore brilliant fabrics, prominent hats and bore ornamented pole-arms.
Preliminary manoeuvres
On October 2 the Persian army left Hamadan for Kirkuk. Nader having entered Ottoman Iraq for a second time set out to draw Topal Pasha into a pitched battle. On October 24 elements of both sides clashed around Leilan just south of kirkuk the result of which was indecisive with the Turks withdrawing to Kirkuk shortly after. The castle of Surdash to the north-east of Kirkuk fell the Persians.
Nader's spies informed him of a 12,000 strong force approaching via the valley of Agh-Darband. Topal Pasha had dispatched this body of men under Memish Pasha as an advance guard with himself following up with the main army. Nader also sent out an advance guard under Haji Beg Khan in order to lure the Memish Pasha towards the main Persian army. After pursuing Haji Beg for a distance Memish Pasha marched right into the jaws of Nader's ambush with two sets of 15,000 men setting upon the Ottomans from two directions and routing them with ease. Memish Pasha who had sent word to Topal Osman Pasha claiming to have routed the Persian and requesting further troops for the pursuit now lay amongst the dead.
The battle
The opening phase
The route of Memish Pasha's soldiers was followed up by a rapid advance by Nader with the bulk of his army against the main Ottoman force under Topal Pasha who was a mere 5 kilometres away. Topal Pasha sensing something was afoot ordered a halt and began to deploy his men. As the Persian army closed the distance Nader formed up his infantry body in a line and sent it forward to engage the janissaries. An incredible enfilade commenced were the Ottoman and Persian soldiery raked fire upon each other for two hours.
Of course the most effective volleys delivered in the horse & musket era were the first few. The great cacophony of wails, shrieks, muskets crashing out and cannon blasting would obscure any orders coming from the officers who were in any case shrouded in billowing smoke from the guns, with musketeers being barely able to observe a few feet around their person. Naturally under such circumstances aiming was simply meaningless and the only physically effective volleys was always the initial few, after which it would become increasingly more difficult to maintain a rotation of fire by ranks eventually leading to the soldiers firing at will amid the degenerating conditions of confusion and chaos. A great frustration of this era was the enormous difficulty involved in getting the men to cease fire in order to carry out other orders. As a unit of musketeers involved in firing for any extended period of time was notoriously likely to remain stationary for most of the battle with only the most extreme measures by their officers having a chance at putting a stop to their individual firing and readying them for either an advance or any other manoeuvre.
The closing phase
The Persian infantry in this case proved itself spectacularly disciplined as after two hours of continuous musketry they maintained their order well enough for their commanding officers to have them cease fire, draw their swords and carry out a direct charge onto the janissaries ranks. With impeccable timing Nader now released two contingents of cavalry, each 15,000 strong with Haji Beg in command of the right and himself in command of the left contingent he manoeuvred round the Ottoman line and caught it in a double-envelopment.[8]
The Ottomans were now pressed by a viscous assault of sabre-armed infantry from ahead as well as cavalry slicing into their formations from either flank. As the janissaries began to collapse and were chased from their entrenchments the jazayerchi started to fire into their backs. The situation was so dire that Topal Pasha recognized his melancholy fate and mounted a horse to join his men in what would be his last battle. The old fox had been outwitted by the young Turk who he had all too recently bested at Samara, but Topal Osman chose to die with his men rather than fall back and escape with his life. The old general was shot twice before he fell from his mount whence a Persian cavalryman severed his head from his body, taking the gory item to present to Nader.
The battle ended with some 20,000 Ottoman casualties in addition to the loss of all their artillery as well as most of their baggage. Sufficient vengeance for the terrible defeat Topal Pasha had inflicted on Nader at Samara. Nader in respect of Topal Osman Pasha's person ordered his head to be reunited with his body, for a while he stared despondently at the frail old corpse of the only man who had defeated him in battle, perhaps disconcerted by the fact that such a frail old man had battled him harder than any other of his younger adversaries. Along with full honours Nader sent the body of Topal Osman Pasha to Baghdad where he was to be buried.
Aftermath
Nader had been hopeful of starting a siege of Baghdad and began to put together the logistics of its capture as well as preparing for a campaign in the Caucasus. Startled by Topal Pasha's defeat and death Ahmad Pasha began negotiations to hand over territory in exchange for peace though these were never ratified by Istanbul. Tabriz had already been evacuated by the Ottomans in the aftermath of the panic which the battle of Agh-Darband caused but repeated reports of Mohammad Khan's rebellion in the south of Iran could not be ignored any longer as the uprising started to turn into a more serious threat. This robbed Nader of all the fruits of his victory as he was finally poised to take Baghdad but had to gather his troops to put down Mohammad Khan's rebellion back in Persia.
In many ways however the overall victor of the Mesopotamian campaign was Topal Osman who saved Baghdad due to his crushing victory in the battle of Samarra and although he was later defeated and killed at Kirkuk (Agh-Darband), Nader could not exploit his victory any more due to Mohammad Khan Baluch's insurrection back in Persia. If Topal Osman Pasha had lost at Samarra then Baghdad would certainly have fallen into Persian hands and probably remained under Persian rule for at least decades to come.
See also
- Battle of Samara
- Ottoman–Persian War (1730–35)
- Siege of Baghdad (1733)
References
- ↑ Ghafouri, Ali(2008). History of Iran's wars: from the Medes to now,p. 382. Etela'at Publishing
- ↑ Farrokh, Kaveh(2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988, p. 112. Osprey Publishing
- ↑ Moghtader, Gholam-Hussein(2008). The Great Batlles of Nader Shah,p. 47. Donyaye Ketab
- ↑ Farrokh, Kaveh(2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988, p. 112. Osprey Publishing
- ↑ Moghtader, Gholam-Hussein(2008). The Great Batlles of Nader Shah,p. 47. Donyaye Ketab
- ↑ Axworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant,p. 190. I. B. Tauris
- ↑ Moghtader, Gholam-Hussein(2008). The Great Batlles of Nader Shah,p. 46. Donyaye Ketab
- ↑ Ghafouri, Ali(2008). History of Iran's wars: from the Medes to now,p. 382. Etela'at Publishing
Sources
- Moghtader, Gholam-Hussein(2008). The Great Batlles of Nader Shah, Donyaye Ketab
- Axworthy, Michael(2009). The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from tribal warrior to conquering tyrant, I. B. Tauris
- Ghafouri, Ali(2008). History of Iran's wars: from the Medes to now, Etela'at Publishing
- Farrokh, Kaveh(2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988, p. 114. Osprey Publishing
- GÜNHAN BÖREKÇİ(2006). A_Contribution_to_the_Military_Revolution_Debate_The_Janissaries_Use_of_Volley_Fire__1593, Department of History, Ohio University